Haradhan Karmakar vs Subodh Kumar Bhattacharjee

Renupada Mtjkharjee, J.—This appeal arises out of a suit for ejectment instituted by one Subodh Kumar Bhattacharjee, Respondent No. 1 of this appeal, for ejectment of the Appellants along with some persons from premised No. 13B, Sadananda Road, Calcutta. It is not disputed that Defendant No. 1 of the trial court, Nagendra Nath Karmakar, was the sole direct tenant under the above-mentioned Plaintiff in respect of the above premises which bore a rental of Rs. 82-8 per month.

The suit for ejectment was based on several grounds, the principal of which were that the direct tenant was such a defaulter as disentitled him from claiming any protection tinder the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, 1950, and that the premises were reasonably required by the landlord Plaintiff for his own us and occupation and for occupation by other members of his family. Excepting Defendant No. 1 other Defendants of the trial court were impleaded on the ground that they were occupying portions of the disputed premises either as sub-tenants or as licencees of the direct tenant. Several sets of written statements were filed by several Defendants. "Ultimately, however, the suit was contested by Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 of the trial Court whose defence was that they were bona fide sub-tenants under Defendant No. 1 and were in lawful occupation of a major portion of the premises as lib-tenants. They further contended that the Plaintiff did not reasonably require the disputed premises either for his own occupation or for occupation by other members of his family. These objections of Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were overruled by the trial court which decreed the suit against Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 and dismissed the suit against Defendants Nos. 5 to 9 because they were unnecessary parties. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 preferred an appeal and the appeal was dismissed by the lower appellate court which affirmed the findings of the Munsif. So this second Appeal has been preferred by Defendants Nos. 2 and 3.

The only contention which Mr. Bhattacharjee who appeared on behalf of the Appellants could urge before me with some show of reason was that the question of reasonable requirement was not decided by the lower appellate court in accordance with the provisions of law contained in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, 1950, read with the Explanation to the above mentioned Clause (h). I shall later on deal with the provisions of law contained therein. In the meantime I must say that both the courts have concurrently held upon a consideration of the evidence on record that the Plaintiff Respondent does reasonably require the disputed premises for his own occupation and for occupation by other members of his family. It is in evidence that there are 15 persons altogether in the family of the Plaintiff who live in joint mess. All of them are at present huddled together in only two rooms in premises No. 13/2, Chowringhee Terrace. It could not, therefore, be disputed in the courts below that the accommodation available in, premises No. 13/2, Chowringhee Terraoe, is much too small for the requirement of the Plaintiff and that the Plaintiff really and reasonably requires the disputed premises for his own occupation and for occupation by other members of his family. Mr. Bhattacharjee appearing on behalf of the Appellants contended in this connection that there are as many as 9 rooms in the disputed premises and that the requirement of the Plaintiff may be satisfied if they are given some of these rooms and if the Appellants are allowed to remain in possession of the rest. No such case of partial eviction was, however made out in the trial court and I am not inclined to allow this point to be raised for the first time in this second appeal. In the circumstances, I accept the concurrent findings of the Courts below that the premises in dispute are reasonably required by the Plaintiff for his own use and occupation.

Mr. Bhattacharjee, however, contended on behalf of the Appellants that in considering the question of reasonable requirement the courts below have not at all adverted to the requirement of the Appellants at all. Mr. Bhattacharjee submitted that in view of the Explanation to Clause (h) of Sub-section (7) of Section 12 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, 1950, the courts below should have had regard to the comparative advantage and disadvantage of not only the landlord but also of the Appellants Mr. Bhattacharjee argued that the lower appellate court has specifically stated in its judgment that where a sub-tenant is made a party in an ejectment suit, the court need not and should not consider his disadvantages in case a decree for ejectment is passed against him. This proposition of law enunciated by the lower court is challenged as incorrect by Mr. Bhattacharjee who submitted that the whole judgment of the lower appellate court has become vitiated by illegality inasmuch as the disadvantage of the Appellants had not been taken into consideration. In my opinion, the above contention of Mr. Bhattacharjee cannot be supported. Mr. Chatterjee who appeared on behalf of the landlord Respondents drew my attention to a case Haralal Das and Another Vs. Pasupati Charan Biswas and Others, wherein it has been held by a Division Bench of this Court that in an ejectment suit where the landlord claims ejectment on the ground of reasonable requirement, the Court will not consider the question of relative advantage or disadvantage in determining the reasonableness as to requirement as between a landlord and sub-tenant. It was pointed out in the above case that the result, though anomalous, follows from the plain words used in the statute. In my opinion, the present case is covered by the authority of the abvomentioned case and I am not prepared to agree with the submission of Mr. Bhattacharjee that in refusing to take into account the relative disadvantage of the sub-tenant the courts below committed any error in law.

Mr. Bhattacharjee wanted to distinguish the present case from the case reported in 58 C.W.N. 696 on the ground that in this case ejectment was prayed for by the landlord not only on the ground of his own requirement but also OD the ground of default whereas in the other case, ejectment was prayed for only on the ground of reasonable requirement of the landlord. In my opinion, this distinction is one without any difference, because the additional ground for ejectment on the ground of default does not take away the cogency of the other ground; namely, reasonable requirement of the landlord which is altogether separate and independent ground.

For reasons stated above, I overrule the contention raised on behalf of the Appellants and I hold that the appeal must fail.

The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs to the Plaintiff Respondent.

The Appellants must vacate the disputed premises by the end of August, 1957, failing which the Plaintiff Respondent will be entitled to take delivery of possession thereof by executing the decree.