Harbans Lal vs Punjab State

J.M. Tandon, J.

The Kapurthala Fishermen Cooperative Society, Kapurthala, (shortly the Society) through its Secretary, Shri Harbans Lal, entered into an agreement with the Punjab State Fisheries Department (briefly the Department) for fishing rights for 12 months in 1962. The Society agreed to pay to the Department Rs. 30,000/ out of which Rs. 26,000/ were paid leaving a balance of Rs.4,000/. The Department claimed the balance from Shri Harbans Lal petitioner and the Society. The balance remained unpaid. The Department started coercive process to recover the balance amount as arrears of land revenue under the Punjab Land Revenue Act (for the sake of brevity the Act).

Harbans Lal petitioner filed a suit for permanent injunction against the Punjab State, restraining them from recovering the balance amount from him on the ground that the agreement had been entered into between the Society and the Department and that he himself, being the Secretary of the Society, was not personally liable to pay the amount.

The State of Punjab raised a preliminary objection that the suit was not maintainable. The trial Court framed the following issue :

"Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit ? O.P.D."

Shri H.S. Nohria, Subordinate Judge I Class, Jullundur, vide his order dated 1.5.1974 held that the suit filed by the petitioner was barred under section 158(2)(xiv) of the Punjab Land Revenue Act,1887 (to be called the Act). The plaint was directed to be returned to the petitioner. The petitioner assailed the order of the trial Court in appeal which was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Jullundur, vide order dated 12.4.1978. It is under these circumstances that the petitioner has filed the present revision.

The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the trial Court or the Appellate Court has not found that the petitioner is or is not personally liable to pay the balance of Rs. 4,000/ to the Department in pursuance of the agreement which had been entered into between the Society through the petitioner and the Department. The argument proceeds that for the purposes of deciding the preliminary issue, the averments made by the petitioner in the plaint shall be taken as correct. The petitioner has averred that he was the Secretary of the Society and that it was the Society which had entered into an agreement with the Department. The petitioner, being the Secretary of the Society, is not personally liable to pay the balance amount of Rs. 4,000/. The Courts below have wrongly invoked the provisions of section 158(2)(xiv) of the Act for holding that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the petitioner. Reliance has been placed on Union of India v. Firm Ralia Ram Raj Kumar and another, AIR 1954 Punjab 271. The contention of the learned counsel must prevail.

Section 158(2)(xiv) of the Act reads :

EXCLUSION OF JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURTS.

"158. Exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of Revenue Officers. Except as otherwise provided by this Act

(1) a Civil Court shall not have jurisdiction in any matter which the State Government or a Revenue Officer is empowered by this Act to dispose of or take cognizance of the manner in which the State Government or any Revenue Officer exercises any powers vested in it or him by or under this Act; and in particular

(2) a Civil Court shall not exercise jurisdiction over any of the following matters, namely : ... ...

(xiv) any claim connected with or arising out of, the collection by the Government, or the enforcement by the Government, of any process for the recovery of land revenue, or any sum recoverable as an arrear of land revenue; ... ...."

It has been held in Firm Ralia Ram Raj Kumar''s case (supra) that there is no provision in the Act which will give relief to a person other than a defaulter in case the property of that person is proceeded against for the recovery of arrears of land revenue. That being the position of matters, the conclusion is almost irresistible that it was not the intention of the Legislature that the prohibition contained in section 158(2)(xiv) of the Act should apply to the claim of the persons other than the defaulter.

The petitioner would certainly be a defaulter if the agreement is found to have been entered into between him and the Department. He will again be a defaulter if it is found that he was acting in the name of the Society. On the contrary, if it is found that the agreement had been entered into between the Society and the Department and further the petitioner was only an employee of the Society, then it is understood that he cannot be made personally liable for the payment of the unpaid balance. If the averments made by the petitioner in the plaint are taken as correct, the provisions under section 158(2)(xiv) cannot be invoked against him. The suit filed by him shall not be maintainable under section 158(2)(xiv) in case it is found that he himself is a defaulter. In the absence of a finding by the Courts below that the petitioner is a defaulter, the concurrent finding recorded by them that the suit filed by the petitioner is not maintainable under section 158(2)(xiv) of the Act, cannot be sustained.

In the result, the revision is allowed and the impugned orders, of the Courts below set aside. The case will be decided afresh by the trial Court in the light of the observations made above.

The parties, through their counsel, are directed to appear in the trial Court on the 28th day of January, 1985.