Harbans Singh vs Municipal Committee Moga and Others

Mehinder Singh Sullar, J.—Mr.A.P. Bhandari, Advocate for Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Mehinder Singh Sullar, J. (Oral) The challenge in the instant writ petition filed by the Petitioner is to the demand notices (Annexures P3/T and P4/T) in so far as seeking to recover the arrears of house tax for the period before March 31,1989 (beyond three years) issued by the Municipal Committee, Moga (Respondent No. 1) (hereinafter to be referred as "the Respondent-Committee") u/s 80(2) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 (for short "the Act").

The case set up by the Petitioner, in brief, in so far as relevant, was that he is owner of the property in question, which comprises shops and several residential units, situated in the main bazar Moga city, within the municipal limits. The most of the units of property were stated to have been let out by his father in the year 1930 and almost the same tenants are in possession of the same by paying the meagre rent. It was claimed that the Respondent-Committee has illegally levied excess house tax on these units of property of the Petitioner. Accordingly, he received the impugned bill bearing No. 52, book No. 126 dated 16.6.87 for a sum of `43,598-01 P on account of house tax arrears for the years 1965-66 to 1986-87 and 1987-88, in respect of the units of property IX 257, 258 , 263 to 269 etc. Another bill No. 53 book No. 126 dated 16.6.87 for a sum of `1928-68 P on account of arrears of house tax for the years 1975-76 to 1986-87 and 1987-88 in Civil Writ Petition No. 12592 of 1993 respect of mortgaged property units bearing No. IX 259-262. The Petitioner raised a protest in this regard but in vain. The Respondents again issued Bill No. 41 book No. 61 dated 3.12.90 for a sum of `50,862-09 P in respect of property units IX 257, 258, 263 to 269, 562 to 566, 588 to 645, 647, 648 to 658 and XIV 60, 714, 741 being arrears of house tax for these units for the years 1965-66 to 1989-90 and 1990-91. The repeated representations filed by the Petitioner were stated to have been ignored, which necessitated him to file appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, Faridkot (Respondent No. 2) u/s 84 of the Act, vide appeal (Annexure P11/T), which was stated to have been withdrawn by the learned Counsel to enable the Petitioner to file the instant writ petition in this regard.

Levelling a variety of allegations and narrating the sequence of events, in all, according to the Petitioner that the impugned demand notices of house tax raised by the Respondent-Committee are illegal, arbitrary and without any basis because the tax has not been determined in terms of Section 80 of the Act. The Petitioner claimed that even the amount of arrears of house tax cannot be recovered after a period of three years from the date when it became due. On the basis of aforesaid allegations, the Petitioner sought quashment of the impugned demand notices of recovery of house tax in the manner indicated here-in-above.

The Respondent-Committee contested the claim of the Petitioner and filed written statement, inter-alia pleading certain preliminary objections of, maintainability of the writ petition, in view of availability of the alternative remedy. According to the Respondent-Committee, as the Petitioner did not make the payment of the amount of house tax, therefore, it (Respondent-Committee) rightly issued the impugned demand notices, which he is liable to pay even beyond the period of three years. It will not be out of place to mention here that the Respondents have stoutly denied all other allegations contained in the writ petition and prayed for its dismissal.

Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, having gone Civil Writ Petition No. 12592 of 1993 through the record and relevant legal provisions of the Act with their valuable help and after bestowal of thoughts over the entire matter, to my mind, the instant petition deserves to be partly accepted in this context.

As is evident from the record that Respondent-Committee levied house tax, which, according to the Petitioner, is against the provisions of the Act. Not only that, the Petitioner claimed that even the Respondent-Committee cannot legally recover the amount of house tax after the expiry of three years, while according to the Respondent-Committee, limitation is no bar to recover the impugned amount of house tax. Thus, it would be seen that the facts of this case are neither intricate nor much disputed.

Above being the position on record, now the sole question that arises for determination in this petition is as to whether the Respondent-Committee can recover the impugned amount in lieu of house tax beyond the period of three years of limitation or not?

An identical question as to whether Municipal Committee has a right to recover the house tax after a lapse of period of three years from the date it fell due is not res integra and was raised before a Division Bench of this Court in case Municipal Committee Bhatinda v. Jaswant Rai 1990 (8) PLR 222. Having considered the relevant provisions, it was ruled as under (para 21):

In our considered view as well as from the law laid down in the precedents cited above, with which we fully agree that limitation in case of recovery of a tax other than the tax in respect of any property of the owners, will be three years as provided by Article 113 of the Limitation Act. It was not refuted that there is no specific provisions under the Limitation Act providing a limitation for recovery of the taxes. It was not disputed in the course of arguments and otherwise also as it cannot be disputed that in the absence of any specific provision under the Limitation Act or the statute, it would be part X of the Schedule to the Limitation Act which provides limitation for the suits for which there is no prescribed period to govern the limitation. Undisputably, the limitation governing the arrears of tax other than the tax on the property would be governed by Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963, wherein a limitation of three years is provided for a suit to Civil Writ Petition No. 12592 of 1993 recover the amount of tax from the date the right to sue accrues. There is no gainsaying that right to sue with respect to tax accrued on the date the tax was imposed in terms of Sections 80 and 81 of the Municipal Act. It is undisputed that in case the Municipal Committee decides to make the recovery under Sections 80 and 81, the period of limitation would be three years. The period of limitation only gets enlarged when the arrears of tax with respect to the property on account of their non payment become a charge on the property. It is in the latter case only that it would be governed by Article 62 of the Limitation Act which provides limitation of twelve years for the recovery of the amount due which is a charge on the property. Our view finds support from a Full Bench decision of the Delhi High Court reported in Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Palace Cinema and Another, . We fully agree with the reasoning adopted therein and nothing more can be added.

Hence, the aforesaid observations "mutatis mutandis" are applicable to the facts of the present case and are the complete answer to the problem in hand. What is not disputed here is that as the impugned notices were issued beyond the period of limitation of three years, therefore, the Respondent-Committee cannot recover the impugned amount beyond the period of limitation of three years and the impugned notices in this respect deserve to be quashed.

No other legal point, worth consideration, has either been urged or pressed by the learned Counsel for the parties.

In the light of the aforesaid reasons, the instant writ petition is partly accepted and the impugned demand notices (Annexures P3/T and P4/T)) in so far as they seek to recover the arrears of house tax beyond the period of limitation of three years, are hereby set aside in the obtaining circumstances of the case.

Needless to mention that Respondent-Committee would be at liberty to recover the impugned amount of house tax due within a period of three years before issuing the impugned demand notices in this relevant connection.