Harbans Singh Jalal vs State of Punjab and another

M.L. Koul, J.

The petitionerHarbans Singh Jalal while invoking the inherent powers of this Court within the provisions of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is seeking quashing of F.I.R. No. 198 dated 26.11.1996 registered against him under Sections 448, 452, 506, 465 and 466 of the Indian Penal Code by Police Station, Kotwali, Bathinda in which case the investigation is being faced by him.

A case under the above mentioned F.I.R. stands registered against the petitioner on the complaint of one Mohinder Singh, who lodged application No. 410/Peshi dated 16.3.1996 with the Senior Superintendent of Police, Bathinda and upon that a thorough enquiry was conducted by the Superintendent of Police, Headquarters, Bathinda on whose report the case for the above mentioned offences was registered against the petitioner.

As stated by the complainant in his written reply and corroborated by the enquiry report of the police, originally the land in question belonged to one Kulwant Singh who constructed the house over the land including a poultry farm, two rooms and one kitchen. The said Kulwant Singh sold the property in favour of Ravi Sonkar who made some further construction upon the building and made it double storeyed. That Ravi Sonkar was in possession of the property till 4.12.1985 when he sold the same vide separate sale deeds in favour of Mohinder Singh, the complainant, his father Milkha Singh and two brothers namely Dr. Ramesh and Parminder Singh in equal shares. He delivered the possession of the property in favour of the complainant, his father and brothers. As the State of Punjab was gripped in heavy terrorism and the complainant was getting threats from the terrorists he left his house locked in Bathinda and shifted to Chandigarh for safety. According to the complainant the property was occupied by Gurcharan Singh and Bakhtwar Singh terrorists forcibly. When Gurcharan Singh Sodhi was killed in an encounter with the police the complainant again was getting threats from the terrorists. Due to repeated threats from the terrorists the complainant along with his father Milkha Singh had to transfer their 1000 Sq. yds. vide sale deeds in favour of Surinder Singh Dhaliwal and thereafter the complainant again purchased the entire property of 2000 Sq. yards which was in the name of Surinder Singh Dhaliwal to the extent of and the other share in the name of his brothers vide sale deed dated 17.4.1996. On the basis of that sale deeds the mutation had already been sanctioned vide mutation No. 38006 which was later on entered in the revenue record.

The petitioner in nutshell submits that if at all any offence is made out against him, it is under Section 448 I.P.C. for which the limitation is one year. According to him, the matter in dispute is regarding the legality of the possession of the petitioner which can only be settled through a civil suit. His possession is long and peaceful and without any disturbance since 1973 and it is accepted from 1987 in the F.I.R.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and bestowed my thoughtful consideration over the record on the file.

At the outset it would not be out of place to mention that if the petitioner was holding the property as an owner or by adverse possession as well then how this property was sold many a time till 1996 and changed many hands. No case of any kind civil or criminal was instituted by the petitioner before any competent forum about it.

It is an admitted case of the parties that the petitioner does not own any documentary evidence in his favour to show that the property in question has devolved upon him by inheritance or is a self acquired property by sale or otherwise. Various documents have been produced by the complainant to show that the petitioner is a land grabber and already FIR No. 42 dated 8.6.94 for offences under Sections 447/149 IPC is registered against the petitioner and also a civil suit about the property is pending against him in the Court of Sub Judge 1st Class, Phool. It has been mentioned in the enquiry report by the Superintendent of Police, Headquarters, Bathinda, that he recorded the evidence of the Patwari and found that the house in question is recorded in the name of the complainant and he is its owner. The petitioner in no way is owner of the property and he has raised many kinds of defence before the Superintendent of Police while saying that the property belongs to Wakf Board and at other time he has said that this land before 1947 was donated by a Muslim Faqir who had gone to Pakistan to Sant Gulab Singh of village Jalal; that after the Sant went to Nabha, this place was looked after by one Kulwant Singh who is said to be a police officer. It ipso facto shows that even the petitioner admits that the property originally belonged to Kulwant Singh wherefrom it has changed many hands and has come in the possession of the complainant. The complainant after getting the property back in the year 1996 lodged an application with the Senior Superintendent of Police, Bathinda for 0necessary action, who sent the enquiry to the Superintendent of Police, Headquarters and after thorough enquiry it was found that a prima facie case under Sections 448/452/506/465/466 of the Indian Penal Code was made out against the petitioner and, therefore, asked for the registration of a case against him.

The case is still under investigation and this Court while exercising the inherent powers in no manner is in a position to divulge (delve ?) upon the merits of the case under the provisions of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and scuttle the investigation. It has been held in Union of India v. B.R. Bajaj and others, reported as JT 1994(1) S.C. 103 that the High Court should refrain from interfering when F.I.R. discloses commission of cognizable offence. The High Court should not interfere with the statutory powers of the police to investigate, when several aspects of the case are to be looked into by the Investigating Officer and the matter is still under investigation.

To the same effect it has been held in State of Bihar v. K.J.D. Singh, 1994(2) R.C.R. 37 , that where a trial has not commenced and no evidence has been led the invoking of the inherent powers prior to the commencement of trial and leading of evidence is not desirable.

In the instant case various aspects of the matter are to be investigated by the police and they have to collect the evidence as to how and when the offence has been committed by the petitioner and as to whether any cognizable offence from the face of the F.I.R. has been committed by him or not. This Court in no manner can interfere with the powers of the police investigating the case.

It has been held by the Apex Court in Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, reported as 1995(3) R.C.R. 700 that the High Court is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the probability, reliability or genuineness of allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint. An F.I.R. or complaint may be quashed if the allegations made therein are so absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

This case law has direct bearing on the merits of this case that there are genuine allegations made in the F.I.R. that the petitioner has trespassed in the house of the complainant and has occupied it illegally so much so he kept a tenant in it unauthorisedly for some time knowing that he is the tres passer of the property and by no stretch of imagination could be allowed to occupy the property in that manner. The petitioner who claims to be an Ex M.L.A. appears to be emboldened person and is facing criminal investigation and civil litigation in the Court at Phool. Since the conduct of the petitioner is so tenacious and already another case has been registered against him for trespassing and also the case of the complainant is under investigation for the said purpose, therefore, this Court by no stretch of imagination can quash the F.I.R. in question and interfere with the bona fide investigation of the case being conducted by the police.

I am afraid to accept the argument of Mr. Khaira, learned counsel for the petitioner that it is a civil trespass. Civil trespass is unknown to law. Rather one who trespasses is a transgressor, a law breaker and a wrong doer. In wide sense trespass means any violation or transgression of the law. Once the trespass is violation of law and a cognizable offence therefore, the police can investigate it with the other offences for which a case has been registered against the petitioner. At this stage this Court in no manner can interfere with the statutory powers of the police in investigating the matter. Hence this petition fails and is dismissed.