Hardeep Kaur vs State of Punjab

Sabina, J.—Petitioner has filed this petition challenging the order dated 16/18.7.2013 (Annexure P-1) whereby she was removed from service on account of her conviction in a criminal case.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that petitioner was appointed as a helper on 4.8.2004. Services of the petitioner were regularized vide letter dated 25.8.2005 with effect from 4.8.2004. FIR No. 114 dated 4.7.2007 was registered against the petitioner u/s 420 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 at Police Station Phase-1, Mohali. In this regard, petitioner faced trial and was convicted and sentenced by the Trial Court vide judgment/order dated 27.4.2013. In view of the conviction/sentence order passed by the Trial Court, petitioner was removed from service vide order Annexure P-1. However, in appeal, petitioner has earned her acquittal. Therefore, petitioner was liable to be reinstated in service. In this regard, petitioner approached the respondents vide Annexure P-4 but no action was taken on the same. Since the petitioner had been acquitted in the criminal proceedings, she was liable to be reinstated in service.

Learned counsel for respondent No. 2, on the other hand, has submitted that petitioner had been merely acquitted on account of the fact that the offence was compounded on the basis of compromise effected between the parties. Therefore, petitioner was not liable to be reinstated in service.

Facts in the present case are not in dispute. Petitioner faced trial in FIR No. 114 dated 4.7.2007 and was convicted and sentenced qua commission of offence punishable u/s 420 IPC. On account of her conviction in the criminal case, petitioner was removed from service vide order Annexure P-1. Thus, it is not the case where the department had held any disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner before passing the order Annexure P-1. Rather, the petitioner was removed from service on account of her conviction in the criminal case. Petitioner filed an appeal against the judgment/order dated 27.4.2013 whereby she had been convicted and sentenced qua commission of offence punishable u/s 420 IPC. In appeal, the matter was compromised by the petitioner with the complainant party and, consequently, she was acquitted by the Appellate Court vide order dated 11.9.2013 (Annexure P-2).

It has been held by the Apex Court in ''State Bank of India and another versus Mohammed Abdul Rahim, 2013(4), Recent Service Judgments, 614'' wherein it was held as under:-

In the present case, the respondent was acquitted by the appellate court. There can be no manner of doubt that the said acquittal would relate back and the initial order of conviction would stand obliterated. On that basis, there can be no manner of doubt that the substratum of the cause that had led to the respondents dismissal/discharge in the present case had ceased to exist. The same would entitle him to be reinstated in service, an act that has been duly performed by the appellant-bank.

The issue relating to entitlement to back wages, however, stands on a somewhat different footing. While in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra), Jaipal Singh (supra) and Baldev Singh (supra), the basis of refusal of back wages by this Court would appear to be the inability of the employer to avail of the service of the employee due to his incarceration in jail, in Banshi Dhar (supra), the refusal of back wages by this Court was in a situation largely similar to the case before us, namely, where the employee was all along on bail and was thus available for work. In Banshi Dhar (supra), this Court answered the question against the employee by holding that grant of back wages is not automatic and such an entitlement has to be judged in the context of the totality of the facts of a given case. It is on such consideration that back wages was declined. In the present case, it will not even be necessary for the Court to perform the said exercise and delve into the surrounding facts and circumstances for the purpose of adjudication of the entitlement of the respondent to back wages in view of the provisions of Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Act. The said provisions impose a clear bar on a banking company from employing or continuing to employ a person who has been convicted by a criminal court of an offence involving moral turpitude. No discussion as to the meaning of the expression moral turpitude is necessary having regard to the nature of the offences alleged against the respondent, namely, u/s 498-A of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. No doubt, the respondent was not in custody during the period for which he has been denied back wages in as much as the sentence imposed on him was suspended during the pendency of the appeal. But what cannot be lost sight of is that the conviction of the respondent continued to remain on record until it was reversed by the appellate court on 22.02.2002. During the aforesaid period there was, therefore, a prohibition in law on the appellant-bank from employing him. If the respondent could not have remained employed with the appellant-bank during the said period on account of the provisions of the Act, it is difficult to visualise as to how he would be entitled to payment of salary during that period. His subsequent acquittal though obliterates his conviction, does not operate to retrospectively wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction under the Act. The entitlement of the respondent to back wages has to be judged on the aforesaid basis. His reinstatement, undoubtedly, became due following his acquittal and the same have been granted by the appellant-bank.

The respondent was acquitted on 22.02.2002; the demand for reinstatement was made by him on 22.4.2002 and he was reinstated in service by the appellant bank on 7.11.2002. On the view that we have taken, at the highest, what can be said in favour of the respondent is that he is entitled to wages from the date he had lodged the demand for the same following his acquittal, namely, from 22.4.2002, until the date of his reinstatement, if the same has not already been granted by the appellant-bank.

Since the petitioner has earned her acquittal in the criminal proceedings, she is liable to be reinstated. The criminal offence committed by the petitioner was not in relation to her official duties but was with some private persons.

Accordingly, this petition is allowed. Order dated 16/18.7.2013 (Annexure P-1) is quashed. Petitioner is ordered to be reinstated in service with effect from the date she served the representation (Annexure P-4) with all consequential benefits. Petitioner would not be entitled to the relief of back wages for the period she remained out of service on account of her involvement in the criminal case till the date she served the representation (Annexure P-4).