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Judgment
By filling the present application under section 482
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the applicants
prayed for quashment of the First Information Report
(FIR) bearing Crime Register No.I-187 of 2012 registered
on 10.10.2012 with Deesa City police station, District
Banaskantha. The said FIR was in respect of the offecnes
under sections 463, 464, 465, 467, 468, 470, 471, 420,
120B and 114 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.
The first informant-respondent No.2 herein
stated in his complaint inter alia that the accused No.1-
applicant No.1 herein had instituted Special Civil Suit
No. 18 of 2017 before the civil court at Deesa, against
the complainant as well as one Patel Kalabhai Dharmabhai
and others. It was alleged that in the said suit
proceedings, alongwith others, the plaintiff had produced
two agreements to sell in respect of agricultural land,
out of which agreement dated 14.07.2015 showed the first
informant to be the vendor. It was alleged that no such
agreement to sell dated 14.07.2005 was executed by the
first informant, nor by said Kalabhai Dharmbhai Patel and
that neither of them had signed any such document. It
was claimed that no amount of consideration was received.
In the First Information Report, in all 11 accused were
named. It was further inter alia alleged that accused
No.4 who was a Notary Public, notarised the document in
absence of the applicants and that the other applicant
accused who were advocate by profession, gave wrong
identification.
It appears from the contents of the allegations
in the FIR and the facts pleaded in the application that
one Kanbi Kalabhai Rajabhai and other persons were the
owners of certain agricultural land situated at Moti
Mahudi, Taluka Dantiwada, District Banaskantha. Their
lands were acquired by the government for the Sipu
Irrigation Project. The owners-the land losers were to
be compensated by the state government. It appears that
the original owners-the land losers executed six
different agreements to sell in favour of the the first
informant-the respondent No.2 and his partner Patel
Kalabhai Dharmabhai. The agreement to sell was executed
on 28.12.2004 as well as on 16.05.2005 for total
consideration of Rs. 8,22,000/- The respondent No.2 and
his partner failed to fulfill terms of the agreements and
could not arrange the funds towards consideration within
time. It is the case of the applicants that they
approached the applicant No.1 and thereupon agreed to
execute agreement to sell in favour of the applicant No.1
in respect of the very parcels of lands. Out of the
total land admeasuring 30 acres and 22 gunthas, the lands
admeasuring 20 acres and 12 gunthas were agreed to be
sold to applicant NO.1. The state government allotted 31
acres and 18 gunthas of land in favour of the original
owners-land losers. It is the case of the applicants
that the land-losers fulfilled their part of performance
by giving Power of Attorney to respondent No.2-his
partner Kalabhai Dharmabhai Patel empowering them to
sell, transfer or alienate the agricultural lands
allotted to the land losers. Respondent No.2 and his
partner did not fulfill their responsibility with regard
to the agreement to sell subsequently executed in favour
of applicant No.1.
3.1 A Special Civil Suit No. 18 of 2017 for
Specific Performance of the agreement in favour of the
present applicant No.1 was initiated by the applicant
herein against the first informant and his partner. An
application Exh. 5 was also filed seeking temporary
injunction. In the suit proceedings, original owners,
who were parties, did not choose to appear. Exh. 5
application came to be allowed on 4.7.2009. Appeal From
Order preferred against the order below Exh.5 came to be
withdrawn on 7.8.2009 and in the suit proceedings, the
issues came to be framed on 30.06.2010. It was stated in
course of the hearing that the said suit is pending at
the stage of leading evidence.
Heard learned advocate Mr. Hriday Buch for the
applicants and learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr.
Raval for the respondent state, as also learned senior
counsel Mr. Percy Kavina with learned advocate Mr. Vijay
Nagesh for original complainant-the respondent No.2
herein.
4.1 Learned advocate for the applicants submitted that prior to lodging of the FIR in question, the
applicants had instituted the civil suit for specific
performance and it was after delay of 5 years that the
criminal complaint was filed alleging that the agreements
to sell which was subject matter of civil proceedings
were forged. He relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Kishan Singh (D)through L.R.s vs. Gurpal Singh [(2010)
8 SCC 775]. He further submitted that issues were framed
in the civil suit,but there was no issue regarding
forgery. It was submitted that essentially it was a
civil dispute between the parties and out of motives mala
fide and intended to wreck vengeance, criminal machinery
was invoked. Learned advocate for the applicants further relied on the decision in Bharat S. Cholera vs. State of
Gujarat being Criminal Misc. Application No. 14379 of 2011
decided on 18th April, 2013, as well as another decision in the case of Vinodbhandra Trambaklal Acharya vs. State
of Gujarat Criminal Misc. Application NO. 13067 of 2015
decided as per order dated 13.01.2016 to submit that
section 13 of the Notaries Act prohibits the courts from
taking cognizance of offence committed by a Notary in
exercise of or in purported exercise of the functions
under the Act.
4.2 On the other hand, learned Assistant Government
Pleader seriously opposed the prayer for quashment
submitting that mere aspect that civil suit was pending,
would not justify the court to readily exercise the
inherent powers which are to be exercised sparingly and
with circumspection. Joining with the submissions of
learned AGP and furthering the case, learned senior
counsel submitted that the allegations in the FIR were
clear so as to make out the offences alleged. He
submitted that there were believable evidence in support
of the allegations, that chargesheet was filed and
therefore, the court may not quash the F.I.R.. He
submitted that the powers under section 482 of the
Criminal Procedure Code are not to be exercised in
routine manner, but in rare cases where on the bare
reading of the allegations in the FIR, it could be
concluded that the offences were not made out. He
further submitted that delay will be irrelevant for
arriving at a conclusion whether FIR is required to be
quashed or not. Delay by itself is not fatal, according
to learned senior counsel, who submitted that in the
given set of circumstances, passage of time becomes usual
and natural, which may not be a factor to doubt the
veracity of the complainant. He relied on the decision in State of Maharashtra vs. Narain Singh Yadav [(2009) 16
SCC 392], to buttress his submission that in that case,
the decision of the High Court in quashing criminal
proceedings solely on the ground of lapse of time was not
approved by the Apex Court.
Now, the conspectus of the controversy reveal
the following facts and aspects relating to the civil
proceedings between the parties.
(i) The applicant No.1 instituted Special Civil
Suit for specific performance of the agreements to
sell in which the respondent No.2-the original
complainant and his partner Patel Kalabhai
Dharmabhai are defendant Nos. 2 and 1 respectively.
The said suit was filed on 31.02.2007 and is
pending. The very documents which are subject matter
of civil suit, are subject matter of alleged
offences under the FIR in question.
(ii) In the said suit, application Exh. 5 for
temporary injunction was filed, which was allowed
partly. Respondent No.2, purchaser of the land and
his partner were directed to maintain status quo
with regard to the ownership and possession of the
land.
(iii) Aggrieved by the order below Exh. 5, the
first informant and his partner Patel Kalabhai
Dharmabhai and others approached this court by
filling an Appeal from Order. It is the case of the
applicants that the Appeal from Order was withdrawn,
as the court was not inclined to entertain the same.
In any case, the Appeal from Order has been
withdrawn and the injunction as was granted by the
trial court is in operation in respect of the
subject matter land.
(iv) Defendant Nos. 24 and 25 came to be
subsequently added, who have filed their written
statement below Exh. 149 raising contentions that
they are bona fide purchaser. They also raised
contention about the limitation. Additional issues
are framed by the court on the basis of these
pleadings.
(v) In the said civil suit, the court framed issues
below Exh.97 on 30.06.2010. It is relevant to
notice an un-controverted aspect that in the issues
framed, no issue is raised by any of the defendants
including the first informant-respondent No.2 about
the forgery of agreements to sell, nor the court has
framed any such issue regarding forgery of the
documents as sought to be now alleged in the F.I.R.
filed. Even in additional issues, such issue on
forgery has not been framed.
(vi) In the written statement filed by the
respondent No.2-the first informant, he has not
chosen to allege fraud or forgery of the signatures
on the agreements to sell in question. What is
pleaded in the written statement at Exh. 81 is that
the agreements to sell are got up, however, specific
case of fraud or forgery has not been put forth or
pleaded.
5.1 The other attendant conspicuous aspect include
that the applicant No.1 had written cheque in connection
with the Sale agreement for an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/-
on 3.2.2006 drawn on Deesa Nagrik Sahkari Bank. The said
cheque which was in favour of the partner of respondent
No.2- Patel Kalabhai Dharmabhai, was presented for
withdrawl of the amount by said Patel Kalabhai
Dharmabhai himself and he has countersigned the cheque.
Furthermore, it could also be noticed that agreement to
sell in question was sent for obtaining opinion of a
hand-writing expert alongwith the documents containing
the signatures of the first informant and his partner
Patel Kalabhai Dharmabhai. The handwriting expert of the
Forensic Science Laboratory gave his opinion specifically
to state that on comparison of the natural signatures as
well a the disputed signatures, both match each other and
that there was no significant difference between two sets
of signatures.
5.2 Not only that the pleadings in defence raised
in respect of the case in the civil suit of the applicant
does not include the plea that the documents of agreement
to sell were forged or that forgery was committed, the
report of the hand-writing expert at least prima facie
reflected in its paragraph-14 that there was no
difference between the real and disputed signatures. The
fact of depositing of amount of Rs. 1,00,000/-, was
established by showing encashment of the cheque by the
said Patel Kalabhai Dharmabhai-partner of the first
informant. The issues were framed on 30.06.2010. Untill
that stage, there was no case or conception with the
respondent NO.2 original complainant that the documents
were forged. The instant FIR in question was filed on
10.10.2012 in which the case of forgery and the related
offecnes under IPC were put-forth and sought to be made
out.
5.3 All the persons who have either signed as
witnesses to the agreements or have prepared the
agreements as advocates or notarised the same, are sought
to be roped into in the allegations of commission of
offence. Out of the persons named in the FIR, the
applicant Nos. 2 and 3 are the drafters, the applicant
Nos. 4 and 6 are the signatories, whereas the applicant
Nos. 7 and 8 are the Notaries.
5.4 Another aspect that emerged in respect of the
FIR in question was that the same was filed on 10.10.2012
in respect of the offences alleged to have been committed
in July, 2005. The complaint was filed which was tainted
by gross-delay, when the criminal proceedings are
initiated 7 years after the execution of the agreements
to sell and five years after filling of the civil suit.
This superadded by the fact aforementioned that the civil
suit was filed in which, the complainant failed to get
any protective order. Delay in lodging the FIR strikes
at the root of the credibility of the allegations, for
the reason that a genuine complainant would not while
away the time beyond a reasonable limit.
5.5 In Kishan Singh (supra), the Supreme Court
stated on the aspect thus,
"In cases where there is a delay in lodging a FIR, the Court has to look for a plausible explanation for such delay. In absence of such an explanation, the delay may be fatal. The reason for quashing such proceedings may not be merely that the allegations were an afterthought or had given a coloured version of events. In such cases the court should carefully examine the facts before it for the reason that a frustrated litigant who failed to succeed before the Civil Court may initiate criminal proceedings just to harass the other side with mala fide intentions or the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance on the other party. Chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustrations by cheaply invoking the jurisdiction of the criminal court. The court proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment and persecution. In such a case, where an FIR is lodged clearly with a view to spite the other party because of a private and personal grudge and to enmesh the other party in long and arduous criminal proceedings, the court may take a view that it amounts to an abuse of the process of law in the facts and circumstances of the case. (Vide : Chandrapal Singh & Ors. v. Maharaj Singh & Anr ., AIR 1982 SC 1238; State of Haryana & Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors ., AIR 1992 SC 604; G. Sagar Suri & Anr. v. State of U.P.& Ors ., AIR 2000 SC 754; and Gorige Pentaiah v. State of A.P. &
It is well settled and reiterated in catena of decisions including in Inder Mohan Goswami and another vs.
State of Urraranchal [(2007) 12 SCC Page 1] that powers
under section 482, Cr.P.C ., which are inherent in nature,
are required to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do
the real and substantial justice. It was observed that
these are the powers to be exercised for prevention of
abuse of process of court and to otherwise secure the
ends of justice. A proceeding instituted by mala fide
would also justifiably attract exercise of the inherent
powers.
The principle is well settled that criminal
proceedings are not to be misused for settling the scores
or pressurising the parties to settle the civil disputes.
In Y.V. Jose v State of Gujarat [(2009) 3 SCC 78], was a
case where a dispute between the appellants and
respondent No.2 was regarding supply of a machine. The
Apex Court observed considering the facts of the case
that matter essentially involved dispute of civil nature
and may not be allowed to be resorted to as a short-cut.
Civil litigation converted into criminal allegations to
squeeze and to pressurize tantamount to abuse of process
of law and therefore when the proceedings of the
complainant reveal in its substance and essence dispute
of civil nature, criminal proceedings in that regard does
not survive to be continued. Continuing of the criminal
proceedings is a serious thing and cannot be allowed be
continued for the sake of continuance. This principle is
applied where controversy unfolded is basically in the
realm of civil rights and the criminal complaint is used
as a tool to pressurize.
In Rajeeb Ranjan vs. R. Vijaykumar [(2015) 1
SCC 513], the facts were that the tender of the
respondent complainant was rejected due to non-furnishing
of the necessary documents. The respondent made various
complaints before the authorities, but his case did not
find favour. Whereafter, he instituted civil suit
challenging the rejection of his tender, which was
ultimately dismissed for non-prosecution, and the Special
Leave to Petition was also dismissed by the Apex Court.
After exhaustion of the aforesaid remedies, the
respondent filed the complaint. The Magistrate took
cognizance and summoned the appellants. The petition
filed for quashing of the complaint came to be dismissed
by the High Court while accepting the case of the
appellant Rajeeb Ranjan. The Supreme Court allowed the
Special Leave to Petition and held that the allegations
of fabricating of records were mischievously made, which
was an after thought and the same was intended just to
give colour of criminality in a civil case. Since the
complaint was filed after losing the battle in the civil
proceedings, it was observed that filing of complaint was
not bona fide and amounted to misuse and abuse of process
of law. It was held that the High Court should have
quashed such criminal proceedings in exercise of inherent
powers under sections 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973.
8.1 Observations in paragraph No. 19 in Rajeeb
Ranjan (Supra), reads thus,
"If one looks into the allegations made in the complaint as stand alone allegations, probably what the High Court has said may seem to be justified. However, a little deeper scrutiny into the circumstances under which the complaint came to be filed would demonstrate that allegation of fabricating the false record is clearly an afterthought and it becomes more than apparent that the respondent has chosen to level such a make belief allegation with sole motive to give a shape of criminality to the entire dispute, which was otherwise civil in nature. As noted above, the respondent had in fact initiated civil action in the form of suit for injunction against the award of the contract in which he failed. Order of civil court was challenged by filing writ petition in the High Court. Plea of the respondent was that the action of the Department in rejecting his tender and awarding the contract to accused No.1 was illegal and motivated. Writ petition was also dismissed with cost. These orders attained finality. It is only thereafter criminal complaint is filed with the allegation that accused No.1 is favoured by creating a false certificate dated 28.12.2004. We would dilate this discussion with some elaboration, hereinafter."
The Supreme Court in Paramjeet Batra v State of
Uttrakhand [(2013) 11 SCC 673] observed,
"While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court." (Para 12)
9.1 It was then stated,
"A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court." (Para 12)
In the instant case, from the afore-discussed
cumulative facts, circumstances and the aspects,
necessary inference is that the criminal complaint is
field in respect of the civil matter already pending and
subject matter of civil suit, to pressurise the
applicants. The criminal action was adverted to after
having lost at material stages in the suit with a view to
pressurise. The dispute which was pre-dominantly and
practically was of civil nature, is sought to be
translated into criminal offence and the complaint is
registered with the police by alleging that the
documents of agreements to sell were forged, after gap of
six-seven years and that too without showing any real
basis for establishing commission of affences. Thus, it
is clear from the kind and nature of the allegation in
the First Information Report as well as from attendant
facts and circumstances, that the dispute has clinching
civil attributes. Whatever aspect of the matter raised
for alleging offences under Indian Penal Code, are
intended to give colour of criminality to essentially a
civil dispute. Such abusive initiation of criminal
proceedings have to be quashed irrespective of the stage
they may have reached. Filing of charge-sheet is no bar
more particularly when overwhelming aspects of the case
require exercise of powers under section 482 of the Cr.
P.C..
In view of the above, criminal proceedings
against the applicants pursuant to First Information
Report in question cannot be continued. The First
Information Report bearing Crime Register No.I-187 of
2012 registered on 10.10.2012 before the Deesa City
police station, District Banaskantha and all
consequential proceedings, qua the present applicants,
are quashed.
