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Hari Kishan Dogra vs Arjan Singh

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 24 May 1973 · Citation: (1973) RCR(Rent) 721

HON’BLE JUDGES
Prem Chand Pandit, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 — Section 13
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Civil Revision No. 176 of 1973
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Judgment

13 paragraphs · 1,029 words

Prem Chand Pandit, J.—This is a tenant''s revision petition against the decision of the Appellate Authority confirming on appeal the order of the Rent Controller evicting him from the premises in question.

2.

The house in dispute, situate in Amritsar City, was owned by the Rehabilitation Department and at that time Hari Kishan was occupying it as a tenant under the said Department. Subsequently, in October 1955 this house was purchased by Sewa Singh, who, later on, sold it to Arjan Singh for Rs. 12,000/-, and, consequently, Hari Krishan became the tenant of the new purchaser, namely, Arjan Singh. Later on, the landlord made an application u/s 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, hereinafter called the Act, against his tenant seeking to evict him on a number of grounds, but, in the present revision petition, we are concerned with only one of them, namely, that the landlord require this house for his own occupation.

3.

This ground was resisted by the tenant, according to whom, the landlord did not require the premises for his own needs and that he was occupying an other residential building in Amritsar and, therefore, he could not file the ejectment application.

4.

The Rent Controller partly allowed the application and ordered the ejectment of the tenant from two rooms, marked A and B in the plan. Exhibit A 2. The application regarding the remaining portion of the house wad rejected.

5.

This led to two appeals before the Appellate Authority one by the landlord and the other by the tenant. The Appellate Authority dismissed both these appeals and affirmed the finding of the Rent Controller that the landlord required the premises for his own occupation. The tenant has come here in revision.

6.

After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner, I see no reason to interfere with the orders of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority. It is true that the landlord was occupying another house in Amritsar, but he was residing there as a tenant. Surely, a person, who is residing as a tenant in a building, is entitled to purchase a residential house for his own needs and his application for ejectment cannot be thrown out merely on the ground that he is already occupying another residential building in the urban area concerned, even though he may be doing so merely as a tenant, and, consequently, at the mercy of his landlord. " Occupation of another residential building " occurring, in section 13 (3) (a) (i) (b) of the Act, in my opinion, means that he must be there in his own right. Moreover, in my view, it is also not necessary that the landlord should prove that his landlord had actually taken ejectment proceedings against him and he was going to be evicted from the tenanted premises and it was only then that he could move an application for the eviction of his tenant from the house, which he had purchased for his own occupation.

7.

It was then said that the eviction application should be rejected, because, during the pendency of the same, it was brought to the notice of the Rent Controller that the landlord''s son Prithipal Singh had purchased another residential house and according to the tenant, this was a Benami transaction and the real purchaser was the landlord himself.

8.

This argument was also raised before the Appellate Authority and it was rightly rejected by him. When this fact came to the notice of the tenant, he should have moved an application for the amendment of his written statement in that behalf and then an issue would have been struck on the point whether the transaction in question was Benami or not. It was only after considering the evidence produced by both the parties that a finding could be given as to whether the purchase in the instant case, on which reliance was being placed by the tenant. Was really Benami or not. The Appellate Authority had further observed that the amendment application was moved by the tenant in this case as well, but, subsequently, it was not pressed and the same was, accordingly, dismissed.

9.

It was then submitted by the learned counsel that at the time of the registration of the sale-deed regarding the new house; it was only the landlord, who was present before the Registration Authorities and it was he, who made the payment of the sale price.

10.

On that fact alone, no finding can be given that the transaction was Benami. As has been said in a number of authorities, it is the source of money and not the hand which actually pays it, which has to be seen for holding a particular transaction to Benami or otherwise. It is in evidence that both the landlord and his son Prithipal Singh were having joint business and it may be that the money that was being given to the seller of the house, in reality, belonged to the son, and that might be his share in the joint business. But be that as it may, as I have already said, it is a question of fact and it should have been raised before the Rent Controller and then decided after both the parties had been afforded a reasonable opportunity to lead evidence.

11.

It was also submitted that the finding of the Appellate Authority and the Rent Controller that the landlord in reality needed the house in question for his own occupation was not correct.

12.

It has been found by the Appellate Authority that the landlord was occupying only two rooms in the house, which he had taken on rent. He had got two grown up sons, one un-married daughter, three married daughters and a wife. Obviously, the accommodation in his possession even though as a tenant, was quite insufficient and did not meet his requirements. I have not been persuaded to disturb this finding regarding personal necessity, which is one of fact, as well

13.

The result is that this petition fails and is dismissed, but with no order as to costs. The tenant is, however, allowed two months'' time to vacate the premises.