Hari Om vs Shri Gurbux Singh

M.S. Liberhan, J.—The only questions raised in this revision petition are, (i) whether a purchaser can seek ejectment on the ground of change of user during the period prior to the purchase; and (ii) whether the findings with respect to change of user were improperly arrived at.

Briefly, the undisputed facts which have come on record and have not been challenged during the course of arguments are, that the premises in dispute were leased out to the Petitioner on 28-7-1978 vide rent note Exhibit A1 by the predecessor-in-interest of the Respondent-landlord. The Respondent purchased the demised premises from him on 25-8-1982. The ejectment of the tenant was sought 12-10-1982 on the ground that the Petitioner tenant has changed the user of the premises in dispute from a residential house to that of a commercial building i.e. for preparation and sale of sweets, without the written consent of the landlord.

The tenant claimed that the premises in dispute were in fact leased out for no specific purpose and he was using the same for preparing and selling petha sweets from the very inception of the tenancy. The learned authorities below after appreciating the evidence and relying upon Full Bench judgment of this Court in Des Raj v. Sham Lal AIR 1980 P&H. 229, came to the conclusion that the premises in dispute leased out to the tenant were residential premises i.e., a house and using the same for business purpose as admitted by the tenant amounted to change of user. No written consent has been either pleaded or proved on the record. Resultantly, ejectment order was passed.

Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has half-heartedly challenged the finding of fact arrived at by the authorities below. He has taken me through the oral evidence. The oral evidence becomes insignificant in view of the document Exhibit A1 admittedly having been executed between the landlord and tenant at the time of leasing out the demised premises to the tenant. The lease deed Exhibit A1 categorically describes the premises in dispute as a house, though no specific purpose for leasing, it has been mentioned. In the Full Bench judgment reported in Des Raj''s case (supra) it has been observed:

A lease deed wherein the building leased out is described only as a building should be considered totally silent as to the use for which the demised building is leased out. Not only this, such a lease-deed by itself would even be considered silent as to the category of building, that is, it would not show whether the demised building is land or a godown or an out-house or ''non-residential building'' with the result that in such a case it would perhaps be open to lessee, if no other indication is available from the evidence, oral or documentary, which the parties would be entitled to adduce, suggestive of the category of the building and its intended use by the lessee, to put the building so leased to any use without attracting the provisions of Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act.

It was further observed:

Accordingly, if a demised building is identified as a ''house'' in a lease-deed, it would be taken that the parties had used the expression ''house'' in the sense in which the ''house'' is understood in common parlance or as indicated by its dictionary meaning. Similar, would be the situation where the expression ''shop'' is used. In such a case, the parties would be taken to have used the expression ''shop'' as understood in common parlance and the mean-given to the same in the dictionaries.

The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has not been able to persuade me to take a different view than the one taken by the authorities below. To be fair to the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, he has cited 1985 (1) RCR 527. Undoubtedly, it supports the contention raised by the counsel for the Petitioner that where the premises are being used from the very inception for a different purpose than the one described in the rent note referring to the building, it would be deemed that the premises were leased for the purpose for which it was being used but I am afraid that in view of the Full Bench decision which is binding on me no option is left to follow the Single Bench.

So far as the first contention is concerned, though the learned Counsel for the Petitioner has relied upon Shantinath S. Ghongade v. Rajmal Uttam Chand Gugale 1979 (1) R.C.R. 701, but this is again a Single Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court and in view of the judgment in Pritam Singh and Ors. v. Raja Ram and Anr. (1964) 66 P.L.R. 289, which is a Division Bench judgment of this Court. I am bound to follow the view of larger Bench of this Court. Not only this, I respectfully agree with the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Priiam Singh''s case (supra) wherein it has been observed:

The expression ''without the written consent of the landlord'' given in Section 13(2)(ii)(a) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act must mean without the written consent of the then landlord even where there has been a subsequent transfer of the landlord''s rights to the person who brings the petition for ejectment, and the word landlord'' in this context is not necessarily confined to the landlord who files the petition. A transferee from a landlord can seek ejectment of the tenant who had sublet the building without the consent of the previous landlord who had transferred the building.

In view of the observations made, there being a different phraseology in the Section providing change of user as a ground for ejectment, it has been held that a tenant cannot change the user of the premises without the written consent of the landlord. It is not disputed that there is no written consent by the landlord and in view of my above observations confirming the finding that change of user is there, there are no reasons for setting aside the findings of the authorities below.

In view of my above observations, I find no force in the revision petition. The same is dismissed with no order as to costs.