Hari Singh and others vs State of Punjab and another

I. S. Tiwana, J. (Oral)

In these five writ petitions Nos. 3287, 3396, 4673, 4676 and 5352 of 1982, the same very two notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called the `Act'') on July 18, 1974 and June 30, 1977 (Annexure P/1 and P/2) respectively, are impugned and again on the same very grounds, that is :

(i) there has been no compliance of the provisions of subsection (1) of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act inasmuch as the substance of notification dated July 5, 1974 was not published in the locality till August 1, 1974; and

(ii) the whole exercise of power under the abovenoted provisions of law is a colourable exercise of power as the only intention behind the issuance of the first notification was to peg down the prices of the land in question or in any case the exercise of power is arbitrary.

In order to appreciate the contentions raised, the following facts, which are otherwise not in dispute, deserve to be noticed.

Notification under Section 4 of the Act was published in the State Gazette on July 18, 1974 and as already indicated, the substance of the same was published in the locality concerned on August 1, 1974. Notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued on June 30, 1977. No step whatsoever was taken till September 17, 1980 when notices under Section 9 of the Act were issued with regard to some of the land falling outside the lal lakir. Again similar notices with regard to the land falling within the lal lakir were issued on November 2, 1982, by the acquiring authorities. It is the admitted position that no Award since then has been announced by the Land Acquisition Collector in terms of Section 11 of the Act though, as per the State authorities, it has not been so done on account of the `Stay of proceedings'' granted by this Court as an interim measure on October 25, 1982. It is in the light of the abovenoted facts that it is sought to be contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the whole exercise of power under the Act, by the respondentauthorities is a colourable exercise of power or in any case is an arbitrary exercise of the power. For this stand of theirs, learned counsel for the petitioners rely on the judgments of this Court in Man Singh and others v. State of Punjab and another, 1980(2) I.L.R. Pb.&Hy. 403, and Radhey Sham Gupta v. State of Haryana and others, 1982 P.L.R. 743 [F.B.]. Having given my thoughtful consideration to the entire matter, I find that the later mentioned submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is not devoid of merit. It has authoritatively been laid down in the abovenoted judgments that unexplained inordinate delay on the part of the acquiring authorities in completing the acquisition proceedings can give rise to the inference that there was no genuine need for the acquisition of the land notified at the time of the issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Act or in other words, the said exercise of power was a colourable exercise of power Mr. Mann, learned Deputy Advocate General, Punjab, appearing for the respondentauthorities, however, contends that the mere delay cannot possibly give rise to this solitary inference and there may be various other factors or reasons which can well explain the delay caused by the acquiring authorities for not completing the acquisition proceedings within a reasonable time. The learned Deputy Advocate General, Punjab, may well be right in submitting that there can be reasons which can explain the occurrence of the delay that has taken place between the initiation and conclusion of the acquisition proceedings, but I think, the absence of that explanation or an explanation which is wholly untenable, does give rise to an inference that either the acquiring authorities did not genuinely need the land notified or the purpose or object sought to be achieved by issuing the notification may well be different, that is, the pegging down of the prices of the land sought to be acquired to the date of the notification under Section 4 of the Act, and that is, what is sought to be maintained by the petitioners in these cases. The only explanation which has been offered in these cases for the noncompletion of the acquisition proceedings for more than eight years is as follows :

``.......But award could not be given because the budget provision had not been made for the acquisition of this land. The funds were provided for the acquisition of this land in the month of October, 1982 and the notices under Section 9 of the Act in respect of the land situated within the `Lal Lakir'' were issued for 2.11.1982... ... ... ...''''.

This explanation offered by the respondents completely goes to support the case of the petitioners. In the absence of budgetary provisions or funds available with the respondentsauthorities for the acquisition of the land in question, the purpose of the issuance of the impugned notifications could be nothing other than the pegging down of the price of the land in question to the date of the first notification, that is, under Section 4 of the Act July 18, 1974 and to acquire the same at their own convenience. This exercise of power, on the part of the authorities, to my mind, is not only colourable exercise of power but is also arbitrary. What is sought to be done or achieved is that the petitioners are to be paid compensation for their lands on the basis of the market value of the same as on July 18, 1974. This compensation cannot be said to be anything else than farce of a compensation. In the light of this conclusion, I do not feel the necessity of going into the merits of other contention raised by the petitioners.

For the reasons recorded above, these petitions are allowed and the impugned notifications are quashed so far as these concern the petitioners'' lands. They are also held entitled to the costs of this litigation which I determine at Rs. 300/ in each case.