Haribandhu vs State Of Madhya Pradesh

In this criminal appeal the challenge is levied to the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 28-6-2000 passed by 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Raigarh, MP ( now CG) in ST No. 183/1996 whereby and whereunder he convicted the appellant for offence punishable under Section 306/34 of the Indian Penal Code (in brevity 'IPC') and sentenced him to undergo RI for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo additional RI for 2 months.

This is admitted by the appellant that marriage of the deceased Gangadhar Sharma was solemnized with Bindu Sharma who was his daughter. Deceased was a heavy drunker.

In brief, the prosecution story is that deceased did not come to house. On 22-7-1996 in the night he was lying near Behra Thela at Gharghoda due to heavy intoxication. On the next day morning he was found dead. His father Brahmaraj Sharma intimated police station Gharghoda where merg intimation was lodged. After the inquiry on 25-7-1996 an FIR was lodged in Police Station Gharghoda. After the investigation, a charge sheet was filed against him and co-accused Smt. Bindu Sharma. The trial Court framed the charge against him under Section 306/34 of the IPC. To bring home the charge, prosecution examined as many as 12 witnesses. The appellant examined one witness in his defence. After completion of trial, trial Court convicted and sentenced him as aforesaid.

Being aggrieved, the appellant and co-accused Smt. Bindu Sharma have preferred this appeal. During the pendency of this appeal, appeal was abated against co-accused Smt. Bindu Sharma due to her death.

Shri B.D. Guru, counsel for the appellant argued that trial Court has not appreciated the evidence in proper perspective. Prosecution failed to establish the essential elements of Section 306 of the IPC. Thus, his conviction and sentence are bad in eyes of law. Hence, he may be acquitted of the aforesaid charge.

Counsel for the State argued that the conviction and sentence of the appellant are based on clinching evidence. The conviction and sentence of the appellant do not call for any interference by this Court.

As per the PM report Ex. P-5, P.W. 5 Dr. S.N. Kesari had conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased Gangadhar Sharma and opined that the mode of death was asphyxia, cause of death of suspected poisoning.

There is no such evidence on record on strength of which it can be said that Ex. P-5 is not believable. Thus this Court believes on Ex. P-5.

As per the RFSL report Ex. P-13, in viscera 'A' and 'B', insecticide democron was found.

There is no such evidence on record on strength of which it can be said that Ex. P-13 is not believable. Thus this Court believes on Ex. P-13.

On the strength of Ex. P-5 and Ex. P-13, this Court finds that prosecution has succeeded to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the death of the deceased Gangadhar Sharma was suicidal in nature.

It is contained in letter Ex. P-18 that "esjs llqj gfjcU/kq ,oa iRuh fcUnq ls rax [kkdj vkRegR;k dj jgk gwwaA

In letter Ex. P-20, it is mentioned that "eSa ,d ,slk vijk/k djus tk jgk gwa tks fd v{kE; gSA eSa ;g vkRegR;k vius Lolqj ,oa iRuh ds pyrs gh dj jgk gwaA"

In letter Ex. P-21, it is written that "tks Hkh nks"k gS "fcUnq" ,oa "gfjca/kq", NksVk lkyk rFkk lkl dkA"

In the letter Ex. P-23 it is written that "eSa vius Lolqj ,oa chch ls rax vkdj Lo;a vkRegR;k dj jgk gwaA"

In the letter Ex. P-25 it is mentioned that "esjs ejus ds ckn fcUnq ,oa gfjcU/kq nksuks dk 'kkjhfjd ijh{k.k ,oa xqIr :i ls muds ?kj ds ekgksy ds laca/k esa vo'; tkudkjh yh tk;sA "

In the letter Ex. P-27 it is mentioned that "esjs ejus dk lEiw.kZ tokcnkjh vkSjr fcUnq ,oa [kyuk;d gfjcU/kq uUns gSA"

In the letter Ex. P-32 it is mentioned that "gfjcU/kq vc rqe ,s'k dh ftanxh ft;ks 'kk;n eSa ck/kd Fkk fQj Hkh pqi gh jgk vc lnk ds fy, pqi gqvkA "

In the paper Ex. P-33 it is written that "fnuksafnu cnkZ'r ds ckgj gksrs tk jgk gS ;k ;ksa le>sa eSa vius gfjcU/kq Lolqj ds dkj.k gh bruk cM+k t?kU; vijk/k vkRegR;k dj jgk gwaA "

It would be pertinent to extract the provisions of Section 306 of IPC :

"306. Abetment of suicide.-If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."

The provisions of Section 107 of the IPC are noticeable which reads as under :-

"107. Abetment of a thing.-A person abets the doing of a thing, who- First.-Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly.-Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.-Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.

Explanation 1.-A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing.

Explanation 2.-Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act."

Counsel for the appellants placed reliance on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of S.S. Chheena -v- Vijay Kumar Mahajan and another [(2010) 12 SCC 190] wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that suicide note did not even remotely connect accused with the offence of abetment. Para 25 of the judgment is relevant and quoted below :-

"25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide."

In the matter of State of WB -v- Orilal Jaiswal [(1994) 1 SCC 73], Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 17 that :-

"17. ... The court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it appears to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty."

In the matter of Mahendra Singh -v- State of MP [1995 Suppl.

(3) SCC 731], Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 1 that :-

"1. ... My mother-in-law and husband and sister-in-law (husband's elder brother's wife) harassed me. They beat me and abused me. My husband Mahendra wants to marry a second time. He has illicit connections with my sister-in-law. Because of these reasons and being harassed I want to die by burning."

The Supreme Court in S.S. Chheena (supra) observed that in the case of Mahendra Singh (supra), that bench came to a definite conclusion that by no stretch the ingredients of abetment are attracted on the aforesaid statement of the deceased.

In the matter of Ramesh Kumar -v- State of Chhattisgarh [(2001) 9 SCC 618 , Hon'ble Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with a case of a dispute between the husband and wife, the appellant/ husband uttered "you are free to do whatever you wish and go wherever you like' thereafter the wife of the appellant committed suicide. Para 20 of the judgment is extracted below :-

"20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do 'an act'. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation."

In the matter of Chitresh Kumar Chopra -v- State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [(2009) 16 SCC 605], Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that :-

"24. .... there should be intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter. Each person's suicidiability pattern is different from the other. Each person has his own idea of self-esteem and self-respect. Therefore, it is impossible to lay down any straitjacket formula in dealing with such cases. Each case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts and circumstances."

In the matter of Mangat Ram -v- State of Haryana [AIR 2014 SC 1782], Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that :-

"A woman may attempt to commit suicide due to various reasons, such as depression, financial difficulties, disappointment in love, tired of domestic worries, acute or chronic ailments and so on and need not be due to abetment."

In Ex. P-18, Ex. P-20, Ex. P-21, Ex. P-23, Ex. P-25, P-27, P-32, P-33 it has not been mentioned that appellant had allegedly harassed or tortured deceased in such manner, to such extent, on such dates from which it may be inferred that deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, the deceased had in fact induced to end life by committing suicide, there was a clear mens rea on part of the appellant that deceased should commit suicide.

In the present case, prosecution failed to examine any person who may say that appellant had allegedly harassed or tortured deceased in such manner and to such degree, on such specific dates from which it may be deemed that deceased had no other option but to commit suicide, the deceased had in fact induced to end life by committing suicide, there was a clear mens rea on part of the appellant that deceased should commit suicide.

In Ex. P-3 it has been mentioned that deceased used to roam after consuming liquor, and did not come to house. P.W. 7 Mohd. Kasim says in para 3 during his cross-examination that deceased was drunker. This is true that when deceased was at Bastar, he was beating his wife, thus, she had filed a case against him in the Court of S.D.O., she had also filed a case in civil court for maintenance. He was not going in his service place, used to sleep outside. As per the Ex. D-4, appellant had lodged the report in police station Gharghoda against the deceased that he had beaten his daughter and made quarrel with her. In these circumstances and looking to concerned admitted fact, it cannot be said that legal proceedings initiated by the wife of deceased, appellant, amounts to cruelty with deceased and this possibility cannot be ruled out that deceased had committed suicide due to depression, or domestic worries.

Ordinary petulance, discord and differences in marital life are quite common to the society and no inference can be drawn that intention was that someone commits suicide.

Looking to the above mentioned facts and circumstances of the case, looking to the above mentioned judicial precedent laid down in S.S. Chheena (supra), State of WB (supra), Mahendra Singh (supra), Ramesh Kumar (supra), Chitresh Kumar Chopra (supra) and Mangat Ram (supra), this Court finds that aforesaid facts which are revealed from Ex. P-18, Ex. P-20, Ex. P-21, Ex. P-23, Ex. P-25, Ex. P-27, Ex. P-32, Ex. P-33, aforesaid legal proceedings initiated by the appellant and his daughter, do not amount as instigation, engagement in conspiracy, intentionally aid, for committing suicide by deceased.

After the appreciation of the evidence discussed herebefore, this Court finds that prosecution has failed to prove charge punishable under Section 306/34 of the IPC beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant. Thus, the aforesaid judgment of conviction and order of sentence are set aside.

Hence, the appeal is allowed and the appellant is acquitted of the charge punishable under 306/34 of the IPC extending him benefit of doubt.

The fine amount if deposited by the appellant be returned to him after expiration of the prescribed period for legal action available to the parties.

The appellant is reported to be on bail. His bail and bond are cancelled subject to provision of Section 437-A of the Cr.P.C.