High CourtsSingle Bench

Harjindar Sethi vs Dwarika Prasad

Madhya Pradesh High Court · Decided on 20 August 2013 · Citation: (2013) 08 MP CK 0256

HON’BLE JUDGES
Sheel Nagu, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Section 100 · Madhya Pradesh/Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 — Section 12(1)(a), 12(1)(f)
CASE NUMBER
SA. No. 104 of 2013
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Judgment

11 paragraphs · 990 words

Sheel Nagu, J.—This second appeal u/s. 100 CPC has been filed assailing the concurrent findings of the courts below in allowing suit for eviction and arrears of rent u/s. 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(f) M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for brevity ''Act of 1961'') while repelling the ground of nuisance. The facts giving rise to the instant second appeal is that suit was brought by the landlord seeking eviction and recovery of arrears of rent, primarily on the ground of bona fide need u/s. 12(1)(f) of the Act of 1961 and tenant having created nuisance.

2.

During pendency of the suit plaintiff carried out extensive amendment providing better particulars in respect of the ground of bonafide need u/s. 12(1)(f). The plaintiff in the said amendment also pleaded that the alternative accommodation even if available was not vacant as it was in possession of his sons who were also pursuing the business of sale of cloth and that the suit accommodation was the most suitable for his need for starting business of cloth sale for being situated on the ground floor of the house in which the plaintiff Landlord resided on the first floor.

3.

After filing of written statement, evidence was adduced by the rival parties and the trial Court by the judgment and decree passed on 29.11. 2011 decreed the suit in favour of the landlord only in respect of the claim put up by the landlord u/s. 12(1)(a) & (f) of the Act of 1961 while the other grounds were repelled.

4.

On assailing the above said decree and judgment of the trial Court, the first appellate court affirmed the same in toto holding existence of bona fide need, landlord having no suitable alternative vacant accommodation within the municipal limit of the town and that tenant having failed to prove that the landlord has rented out another vacant accommodation to Dcot shirt company on monthly rent of Rs. 25,000/-, whereas the findings arrived at by the trial Court in regard to issues Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 and 9 were upturned by the first appellate court.

5.

Accordingly, this first appeal is dismissed affirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. The cross objection filed by the landlord before the first appellate Court was also rejected.

6.

Learned counsel for the appellant primarily contends that the material and evidence available on record indicate that the need shown by the landlord u/s. 12(1)(f) of the Act of 1961 was not real but feigned and therefore the landlord was not entitled to a decree on the ground of bona fide need. Learned counsel for the appellant has taken this Court to the deposition of the landlord and to the contents of para 28 of the judgment and decree passed by first appellate court and also the fact of the delay of nearly six (6) years in providing better particulars in respect of ground u/s. 12(1)(f) to contend that the bona fide need shown is neither actual nor real and thus not bona fide. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellant/tenant on decisions in the cases of Mattulal Vs. Radhelal , Banarsi Devi Jain Vs. M.P. Transport Company and Another, , in support of his contentions of the bona fide need of the landlord being unreal and feigned. The intention of the landlord to commence business at the ripe-old age of 65 years has also been attacked as unnatural.

7.

On the other hand, landlord/respondent contends that the suit has been rightly decreed on the ground of bona fide need u/s. 12(1)(f) of the Act of 1961. It is contented that the landlord in his deposition demonstrated that the alternative accommodation available to the landlord was infact occupied by sons and was thus not vacant.

8.

Learned counsel further submitted that the suit accommodation is most suited for the need of starting business by the landlord since the suit accommodation is on the ground floor and the landlord presently resided on the first floor of the same building and thus from the point of view of convenience the said suit accommodation is the only accommodation which can satisfy the bona fide need of the landlord to start his business.

9.

Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the decisions in the cases of Ragavendra Kumar Vs. Firm Prem Machinary and Co., Kailash Chandra Trivedi Vs. Punjab National Bank Ltd. and Others, Ramjidas and Another Vs. Rambabu and Others, , R.C. Tamrakar and Another Vs. Nidi Lekha, and Deep Chandra Juneja Vs. Smt. Lajwanti Kathuria (Dead) through L.Rs.,

10.

Perusal of the record of the courts below, the material and evidence contained therein and after hearing learned counsel for the rival parties, this Court is of the considered view that the judgment and decree rendered by the courts below is based on evidence available on record. Merely because the landlord is aged 65 years and has several other shops within municipal limit of the town, cannot by itself bely the ground of bona fide need unless the tenant is able to show whether the alternative accommodation is better suited for the satisfaction of the bona fide need as compared to the suit accommodation. The landlord has proved his bona fide need by taking the ground of convenience and location of the suit accommodation which is at the ground floor of the building in which the landlord resides on the first floor of the same building. The tenant has failed to prove that the alternative accommodation even if available is equally or more suitable qua the landlord.

11.

The concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below are neither perverse nor suffer from any material irregularities or illegality. This Court is thus of the considered view that neither any of the proposed substantial questions of law nor any new one arises for consideration. Accordingly, this second appeal deserves to be and is therefore rejected, sans cost.