Harkesh Chaudhary vs Controlling Authority Under The Payment of Gratuity Act for U. T. Chandigarh and others

Jawahar Lal Gupta, J.—The petitioner was employed with the Panchayat Bhawan, Chandigarh. He retired as an Assistant Supervisor on April 30, 1994. After his retirement, the petitioner was paid an amount of Rs. 28,365/- on account of gratuity. Not satisfied with this payment, the petitioner approached the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 with the claim that the payment should have been made by taking into account not only his basic pay but also the Dearness Allowance as admissible under the rules. This claim was accepted. Vide order dated December 2, 1996, the controlling authority held that the petitioner was entitled to the payment of an amount of Rupees 65,529/-. After deducting the amount already paid, the petitioner was held entitled to a further payment of Rs. 37,164/-. Still not satisfied, the petitioner filed an appeal u/s 7 of the Act. The appellate Authority held that under the provisions of Section 4(3) of the Act, the amount of gratuity payable to an employee cannot exceed Rs. 50,000/-. Thus, it ordered that the petitioner was entitled to the payment of an amount of Rs. 50,000/-. Rs. 28,365 had been paid to him on September 20, 1994. An amount of Rs. 21,635/- had been paid on February 20, 1997 by the employer even before the decision. The petitioner was further held entitled to the payment of interest @.14% per annum for the period of delay.

The petitioner is still not satisfied. He has approached this Court through this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. He prays that the order dated July 14, 1997 passed by the appellate authority, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure P. 2 with the writ petition, be modified and that he be held entitled to the payment of the amount as determined by the controlling authority. He further prays that the cut off date fixed in the notification dated May 24, 1994, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure P. 3 with the writ petition, be quashed.

The respondents contest the petitioner''s claim. A reply has been filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 3 and 4.

Counsel for the parties have been heard.

Mr. Arun Nehra, counsel for the petitioner concedes that prior to May 24, 1994, Section 4(3) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 placed a limit of Rs. 50,000/- with regard to the amount payable to an employee. It was vide notification of May 24, 1994 that the limit was raised to Rs. 1 lac. Consequently, the petitioner could not have been paid anything more than Rs. 50,000/-. The controlling authority had erred in holding that he was entitled to an amount of Rs. 65,529/-. The order passed by the controlling authority has been rightly modified by the appellate authority.

Mr. Nehra contends that respondent Nos. 3 and 4 had not filed any appeal against the order of the controlling authority. Thus, the order passed by the authority had become final. That being so, the petitioner could not have been deprived of the amount as determined by the controlling authority.

Even if it is assumed that the petitioner''s plea is technically correct. We find that under the provisions of Section 4(3) as prevalent on the date of his retirement viz April 30, 1994, a maximum amount of Rs. 50,000/- only was admissible to him. That being so, we find no ground to interfere with the order passed by the appellate authority in the exercise of our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It also deserves notice that the appellate authority has awarded interest to the petitioner for the delay.

Mr. Nehra contends that by notification dated May 24, 1994, the limit of Rs. 50,000/- had been revised and raised to Rs. 1 lac. He prays that this should have been made applicable to the petitioner also.

The claim is wholly baseless. It is well known that every statute operates prospectively unless specifically made retrospective by the Legislature. The provisions of the Act were amended vide notification dated May 24, 1994. This could operate only prospectively. The petitioner could claim no benefit under these provisions.

No other point has been raised.

We find no merit in this writ petition. It is, consequently, dismissed. No costs.