High CourtsSingle Bench

Harniv Sandhu vs Sandeep Singh Sandhu and Another

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 2 July 1998 · Citation: (1998) 3 CivCC 676 : (1998) 3 CivCC 676 : (1999) 121 PLR 675 : (1999) 3 RCR(Civil) 144 : (1998) 3 RCR(Civil) 564

HON’BLE JUDGES
Sat Pal, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Order 39 Rule 1, Order 39 Rule 2
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Civil Revision No. 2718 of 1998
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Judgment

8 paragraphs · 919 words

Sat Pal, J.—This petition has been directed against the order dated 15.6.1998 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Chandigarh. By this order, the learned Additional District Judge has confirmed the order passed by the learned trial Court on 8.6.1998 by which the learned trial Court had dismissed the application filed by the petitioner-plaintiff under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC for interim injunction.

2.

Mr. Chhibbar, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the petitioner-plaintiff is admittedly the wife of the respondent No. 1 namely, Sandeep Singh Sandhu and she is the daughter-in-law of respondent No. 2 Davinder Kaur Sandhu. The learned Counsel further submits that the petitioner-plaintiff had been put into possession of the suit premises by the respondents themselves when they were not prepared to keep her in matrimonial home situated at Amritsar. He further submits that the learned lower appellate Court has passed the impugned order on the wrong assumption that the petitioner-plaintiff has failed to establish her possession for a long period. In this connection he has referred to para 10 of the grounds of revision and submits that the plaintiff started residing in the house towards the end of 1997. He, therefore, contends that from this fact it is clearly established that the petitioner- plaintiff has been residing in the suit premises for a long period. The learned Counsel also submitted that in para 2 of the plaint a clear averment was made by the plaintiff that she had been living in this house since the end of 1997 and this averment has not been specifically denied by the respondents-defendants, in the written statement.

3.

The learned counsel further submits that the learned lower appellate Court has passed the impugned order on another wrong assumption that the petitioner-plaintiff had not approached the learned trial Court with clean hands inasmuch as she had got the ex parte injunction by placing a wrong fact with regard to installation of telephone No. 780169 at her residence. The learned Counsel submits that this telephone in fact pertains to the parents of the plaintiff who are residing in Chandigarh and it was given just as a contact number.

4.

Lastly, the learned counsel submitted that the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Premji Ratensey Shah and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. J.T. 1994(6) S.C. 585, was not applicable to the facts of the present case as in that case there was a clear finding given by the Supreme Court that the defendants had not ghost of right, title or interest in the lands acquired from the original owner, but in the present case, the petitioner had the right in the property.

5.

After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner and having perused the impugned order I, however, do not find any merit in the contentions raised by the learned counsel of the petitioner. From the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents-defendants, I find that in para-l of the preliminary objection, it has been clearly stated by the defendants that on 14.5.1998, the plaintiff alongwith certain persons, whose names have been mentioned in that paragraph, broke open the locks of suit premises and even took away articles lying therein. For this, even an FIR was lodged by the defendants with the police. It is also not disputed that the petitioner-plaintiff had obtained an ex parte injunction on 13.5.1998 and thereafter she got the electricity connection on 27.5.1998. Keeping in view these facts both the Courts below came to the prima facie conclusion that prior to 13.5.1998 the plaintiff-petitioner was not in possession of the suit premises. Since the prima facie findings of the Courts below are based on the valid reasons, I am of the opinion that the judgments of the Courts below do not call for any interference by this Court in its jurisdiction u/s 115 CPC. In this connection the following observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Premji Ratensey Shah and others (supra) may be referred to:

"Even assuming that they had any possession, their possession is wholly unlawful possession of a trespasser and an injunction cannot be issued in favour of a trespasser or a person who gained unlawful possession as against the owner."

6.

As regards, the argument of the learned counsel of the petitioner that telephone No. 780169 had been mentioned as a contact number, I am of the opinion that this fact cannot be taken into consideration at this stage and this question can be gone into by the learned trial Court while disposing of the main suit. Both the Courts below after relying on certain documents have come to the prima facie conclusion that the suit property belongs to respondent No. 2 who is the mother-in-law of the plaintiff and the plaintiff cannot claim any right to claim possession in the property which is owned not by her husband but by her mother-in-law. Mr. Chhibbar of course has argued that one power of attorney was executed by the original owner in favour of the husband also, but that power of attorney was not placed on record before the Courts below and this point can also be gone into the learned trial Court at the time of trial of the main case.

7.

In view of the above discussion, I do not find any merit in the petition and the same is dismissed. Any observation made herein shall not have any bearing on the main suit.