Harpal Singh Chouhan vs State Of M.P. & Others

The petitioner has filed the present petition challenging the orders dated 5.11.2008 (Annexure P/2) and 10.11.2008 (Annexure P/3) passed by

Conservator of Forest (DFO, Indore). The petitioner has also claimed refund of Rs.66,829/- with interest, re-fixation of pay-scale and pension, etc.

The facts, in brief, are that the petitioner was initially appointed on the post of Forest Guard in the month of July, 1969. He was promoted on the

post of Forestor vide order dated 3.11.1977. His pay was revised on 1.1.1986 under the M.P. Pay Revision of Pay Rules, 1983 and again his pay was

revised as per M.P. Revision of Pay Rules, 1990 as on 1.1.1986 and as per M.P. Revision of Pay Rules, 1998 on 1.1.1996. His name was considered

for grant of second Kramonnati after completion of 24 years' service and vide order dated 12.8.2000, he was granted the benefit of second

Kramonnati. Thereafter, the petitioner was considered for promotion to the post of Dy. Ranger, Forest and after recommendation of the Departmental

Promotion Committee (DPC), he was promoted on the said post in October, 2005 in the pay-scale of Rs.4000-100-6000/- which he was already

getting by way of second Kramonnati. The petitioner stood retired on 31.8.2008 and his service book was sent to the District Treasury Officer for

verification. The District Treasury Officer raised an objection in respect of pay-fixation of the petitioner from 19.4.1999 when the benefit of second

Kramonnati was granted. By order dated 5.11.2008 (Annexure P/2), refixation was done and benefit of second Kramonnati was withdrawn.

Thereafter, by order dated 10.11.2008, the respondents have recovered the amount of Rs.66,829/- from the gratuity amount payable to the petitioner.

Hence, the present petition before this Court.

Shri Dwivedi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that this Court in the case of Santosh Verma V/s. State of M.P. & others (W.P.

No.379/2009) has decided the similar controversy and held that on promotion to the higher post, the benefit of Kramonnati granted on account of

stagnation on one post for a period of 12 or 24 years cannot be withdrawn. He submits that on the basis of aforesaid judgment, the order of refixation

and recovery in respect of similarly placed persons has been set aside by this Court in W.P. No.4048/2013. The petitioner has already submitted the

representation in 2015, but the same has not been decided.

On the other hand, Shri Sisodia, learned Govt. Advocate, has raised a preliminary objection in respect of delay in approaching this Court and prays

for dismissal of the petition.

The present petition is filed against the orders dated 5.11.2008 and 10.11.2008. The petitioner accepted those orders and remained silent for almost

10 years. According to the petitioner, he submitted the representation on 4.9.2015 and on 20.11.2017, which are filed as Annexure P/5 and P/6, but

there is no acknowledgement. The petitioner sent a legal notice on 24.2.2018 and thereafter filed the present petition. In the considered opinion of this

Court, the petition is hopelessly barred by time as the petitioner is challenging the orders after a lapse of more than 10 years for which no explanation

has been offered.

The Apex Court in case of New Delhi Municipal Corporation Vs. Pan Singh and Others : (2007) 9 SCC 278 has held as under:

There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. Respondents herein filed a Writ Petition after 17 years. They did not agitate

their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not

implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those

employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time,

therefore, the Writ Petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be

exercised in favour of those who approach the Court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction

The Apex Court in case of Regional Manager, A.P.SRTC Vs. N.Satyanarayana & Others : (2008) 1 SCC 210 has held as under:

Even a bare reading of paragraph-18 of the judgment on which reliance has been placed by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, it is

clear that the relief was moulded to avoid anomalies and in view of the peculiar situation involved. This Court categorically held that the orders

impugned in the appeals were not sustainable because the writ petitions were filed after a long lapse of time. Similar is the position here. The

regularization was done w.e.f. 1.8.1987 and the writ petitions were filed in the year 1999. That being so and since in the writ petition without any

explanation has been offered for the delayed approach, writ petition should have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.

The Apex Court in case of S.S.Balu & Another Vs. State of Kerela and Others : (2009) 2 SCC 479 has held as under:

It is also well settled principle of law that ""delay defeats equity"". Government Order was issued on 15.1.2002. Appellants did not file any writ

application questioning the legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others were allowed and State of Kerala preferred an

appeal thereagainst, they impleaded themselves as party respondents. It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court

after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to

the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment. It is, thus, not possible for us to issue any direction to the State of Kerala or the

Commission to appoint the appellants at this stage.

The Apex Court in case of Gulam Rasool Lone Vs. State of Jammu Kashmir and Another : (2009) 15 SCC 321 has held as under:

It is beyond any cavil of doubt that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a discretionary one. For sufficient or cogent

reasons a court may in a given case refuse to exercise its jurisdiction; delay and latches being one of them while considering the question of delay and

latches on the part of the petitioner, the Court must also consider the effect thereo f

In view of the foregoing discussion, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed on the ground of delay and latches.