HARYANA URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs KHAZANI DEVI

WHETHER the Haryana Urban Development Authority is invariably liable to pay interest on refund to the allottees who are discretionarily allowed to surrender their plots? This is the solitary significant position in this appeal.

THE facts are not in serious dispute. THE respondent was allotted Booth No. 5, C.U. II (Part-II) in Hissar in an open auction on the 4th of January, 1992 on the usual terms and conditions. It would appear that the respondent was unable to comply with the requisite terms and conditions and applied for the surrender of the said booth on the 27th of January, 1993 as per rules and regulations prayed for the refund of the total deposited amount which was Rs. 1,02,370/- against the total cost of Rs. 2,52,000/-. Her prayer for surrendering the plot remained under the favorable consideration of the appellants for some time but she forthwith preferred the complaint seeking the amount of Rs. 75,600/-as a refund alongwith interest thereon and compensation also. The appellants-HUDA in their written statement firmly took up the preliminary objection that the respondent having purchased the plot in an open auction was not a consumer and the complaint was not maintainable as such. Reliance was placed on the decision of the National Commission in First Appeal No. 80 of 1992, Ramesh Chander v. Haryana Urban Development Authority for this stand. On merits the fair plea was that on compassionate grounds the respondent''s prayer had been acceded to and the appellants were ready and willing to refund the amount to her under the rules and regulations after making the requisite deductions and the due amount would be released as soon as the requisite sanction is received from the Head Office. However, the firm stand was that the respondent-allottee was not entitled to any interest on the refund.

The District Forum took note of the fact that the appellants in their own statement of accounts had shown that the amount to be refunded to the complainant was Rs. 75,451.75 paise apparently after a 10% deductions. Holding on that premise that the respondent was clearly entitled to the refund of the said amount the District Forum however proceeded further to direct that the same be refunded alongwith interest at 18% primarily on the purported basis of the decision of this Commission in First Appeal Nos. 118, 133 to 136 of 1993 and the decision of the National Commission in Revision Petition No. 326 of 1993, Chief Administrator, HUDA v. Madan Mohan Gandhi.

MR. A.S. Gulia, the learned Counsel for the appellants had first placed primal reliance on the decision of the National Commission in Revision Petition No. 79 of 1993, Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Devki Rani, decided on 8th of September, 1993 for the proposition that the purchaser in an open auction sale of immovable property conducted by the Haryana Urban Development Authority cannot be regarded as a consumer as defined in the Act. In the alternative it was argued that the respondent in fact was herself guilty of backtracking from the terms of the conditions of the allotment and had sought to surrender the allotment herself on the 27th of January, 1993. It was the stand that under regulation 14 the acceptance of an offer to surrender was purely discretionary and inevitably has to be processed up to the highest authorities for the sanction thereof. It was alleged that the appellants on the compassionate ground of her being a widow had graciously acceded to her prayer for surrender in accordance with the regulation 14. It was the case that under the said regulation and even otherwise no right to interest accrued on the refund of the deposited amount and in fact such a claim was a classic example snapping at the hand which feeds. It was pointed out that the calculated amount of the refund had been duly tendered on the 22nd of September, 1993 and the District Forum was in patent error in granting interest on the basis of cases which were entirely distinguishable in law and fact.

ON the other hand Dr. Partap Singh Sawant, the authorized representative of the respondent had fairly taken the stand that she was fully agreeable to the deduction of Rs. 26,918.35 p. being 10% of the total costs of the plot and also of interest paid for the delayed installments in accordance with the conditions of allotment and the relevant rules and regulations. Nevertheless, the contention was that the respondent was entitled to interest on the balance refunded amount primarily on the analogy of the cases relied upon by the District Forum. As the controversy herein must necessarily revolve around regulation 14 which admittedly is applicable to the case, it is apt to notice the same in extenso at the very outset : "Surrender of land by the transferee or lessee : .-If a transferee/lessee is unable to raise construction on the land disposed of to him due to certain compelling circumstances the Estate Officer may allow to surrender the land at his discretion, subject to the policy guidelines laid down by the Chief Administrator from time to time. In the case of acceptance of surrender, the interest amount recovered from the transferee or lessee shall not in any case be refunded."

Now a plain reading of the aforesaid regulation makes it manifest that the allottee of the land or site has no vested right to surrender the land duly transferred or leased to him. Indeed, if the appellant-HUDA so chooses, it can enforce the terms and conditions of the allotment including forfeiture, and if so advised may refuse to accept any surrender of the land by the transferee or lessee. Obviously enough, the aforesaid regulation clearly vests a discretion in the Estate Officer and that too subject to the policy, guidelines laid down by the Chief Administrator from time to time. The tenor of the language of the provision makes it manifest that this discretion is to be exercised only if the transferee or lessee is unable to comply with the terms due to certain compelling circumstances. It appears to us that compliance with the terms and conditions is the rule, whilst surrender is a mere exception resting entirely in the discretion of the Estate Officer.

WHAT next calls for pointed notice is the fact that neither regulation 14 nor any other term or condition, even remotely talks of the payment of the interest on the amount refunded, after the surrender of the land has been discretionarily allowed. There is consequently neither any legal obligation or any stipulation for the payment of interest. Indeed, the position is in reverse and it is firmly laid down that even the interest amount recovered from the transferee or lessee shall not in any case be refunded, far from paying any interest to him on the balance. As has already been noticed, the terms and conditions warrant the deduction of 10% of the costs of the plot, rather than any accretion thereto by way of interest. We are, therefore, unable to see any requirement to pay interest either as a matter of law or of any contractual obligation under the terms and conditions of allotment.

IN the light of the above, it is obvious that there can possibly be no deficiency in the services extended out by the appellant-HUDA, where it acts according to its regulations or the terms and conditions of the allotment. Within the consumer jurisdiction, relief of this nature would be possible only if there was a manifest deficiency which in terms would imply a derogation from either a provision of law or a firmly contracted stipulation. Conformity with the provisions of the Haryana Development Authority Act, 1977 and the regulations framed therein cannot in our view possibly be termed as a deficiency within this field. In construing the relevant provisions, it has to be kept in mind that the HUDA under the statute has to act on the altruistic principle of no profit no loss basis for the purposes of urban development within the State. It is not to be deemed as a banking organization, which is either obliged or had contracted to pay interest on the moneys paid to it. Consequently, there is no inherent right in an allottee to claim interest from the HUDA except on the ground of some patent deficiency in service and compensation therefore either by a liquidated sum of money, or by way of interest on the principal.

The District Forum seems to have erred in primarily relying upon II (1993) CPJ 1219 ''Estate Officer'', HUDA v. Modern Mohan Gandhi & Others, for awarding interest in the present context. A plain perusal of the judgment in the aforesaid case, would show that it was not even remotely a case either directly or even akin to the question of the surrender of land by a transferee or lessee. The relevant Regulation 14 which is the kingpin of the appellant''s arguments, did not at all arise for construction therein. The proposition evolved in the said case was thus entirely different and distinguishable. The said observation equally applies to the decision of the National Commission in a Revision Petition No. 326 of 1993 ''Chief Administrator, HUDA v. Madan Mohan Gandhi'' decided on 8th of September, 1993, which also was not at all a case of surrender of land etc. The respondent''s reliance on the said case is thus of little or no avail to her herein.

FOR the fore-going reasons, the answer to the question posed at the outset is rendered in the negative. It is held that the HUDA is not invariably liable to pay interest on refunds to the allottees who are discretionarily allowed to surrender their plots. Even though the appellant-HUDA broadly succeeds on the legal aspect it wins only a pyrrhic victory. This is so because the aforesaid ratio is rested on the assumption that the appellant-HUDA would take a reasonably expeditious decision on the application of the transferee or lessee for surrender of land under Section 14. In the event of allowing the same the amount must be refunded with reasonable promp-attitude and if there is any unreasonable and unwarranted delay for doing so, the issue of deficiency in service would obviously arise with the corresponding liability to pay compensation.

VIEWED in the aforesaid perspective the admitted facts are that the respondent-consumer had applied for the surrender as early as on the 27th of January, 1993. Even though the prayer for surrender was accepted, the amount was neither refunded nor even tendered to the respondent within a reasonable time, thereby forcing her to knock at the door of the District Forum. It was only thereafter that on the 4th of October, 1993 that the amount was paid resulting in a gap of nearly 9 months betwixt the application and the actual payment of the amount. The learned Counsel for the appellants on the merits of the case could point out no reasonable or plausible cause for what appears to us as inordinate delay on the part of the appellants to discharge its obligation to the consumer. A reference to regulation 14 would show that the discretion to accept the surrender is vested at the level of the Estate Officer himself. A time frame of about two months from the application to a final decision either accepting or declining the surrender, would, therefore, be more than ample in deciding the request. Once that is done the appellant-HUDA should normally tender the amount to the consumer within a month of the decision to accept the surrender. In any case a broad over all limit of three months in this context appears to us as amply sufficient barring exceptional circumstances, the burden of proof whereof would necessarily be on the HUDA. As the District Forum noticed it was entirely an internal matter of the appellant''s Hissar Office and its Head Office at Chandigarh as to how and from where the amount is to be realized or arranged and the respondent could not be made a victim of red tape on that ground. There was thus a patent deficiency and delay in making the refund and the award of interest by the District Forum has to be necessarily sustained on this alternative ground. For the fore-going reasons the order under appeal must be upheld and the appeal consequently fails. However, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.