Haryana Woollen Development Corporation vs The Presiding Officer, I.T.-cum-L.C. and Another

G.C. Garg, J.—Krishan Kumar, Respondent No. 2 was employed as Peon-cum-Chowkidar with the petitioner Corporation on March 3, 1983. His services were terminated on June 6, 1987. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute, which the State Government in exercise of its powers conferred by Sub-clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ''the Act''), referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak (hereinafter to be referred as ''the Tribunal''). The reference made to the Tribunal is in the following terms:

"Whether the termination of services of Shri Krishan Kumar is justified and in order? If not, to what reliefs is he entitled?"

The workman filed a claim statement complaining therein that the management has failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Sections 25F, 25G and 25H of the Act and, therefore, the termination was illegal and consequently, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity of service and full back wages.

The claim of the workman was contested by the management by pleading that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction in the matter. The termination was sought to be justified on the ground that a regular employee had joined the management and, therefore, the services of the workman were not needed.

Neither any evidence was produced nor any arguments were addressed on the issue, whether the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court had no jurisdiction to try the reference? This issue was thus, answered against the management. As regards the other issue, it was concluded that the provisions of Section 25F of the Act had not been complied with while terminating the services of the workman. It was rather admitted by the witnesses of the management that neither any notice was given to the workman before terminating his services nor he was paid wages for the notice period as retrenchment compensation. Resultantly, the Tribunal vide its award dated January 4, 1991, Annexure P.5 ordered reinstatement of the workman with continuity of service and full back wages.

The Management has challenged the award of the Tribunal only on the ground that the petitioner-Corporation is not an industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Act. There is no merit in the contention of the learned counsel. No plea was raised before the Tribunal that the petitioner-management was not an industry within the meaning of the Act. This apart, no evidence whatsoever was produced before the Tribunal, This plea has been raised for the first time in this writ petition. Nothing has been pleaded on the record of the writ petition to show that the petitioner is not an industry within the meaning of the Act. It is essentially a question of fact which can be decided on consideration of the matter and having regard to its activities. The question thus, cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time, being a complicated one requiring evidence especially when no foundation has been laid to go into this matter. Even otherwise, in para 2 of the writ petition, it is stated that the petitioner Corporation was set up for the upliftment of the women and the weaker sections of the society and the main object of the Corporation is to advance loans to individual women for training purposes with the condition that when they start earning, they will pay full or part of the loan in instalment to create a revolving fund so that more could be assisted. It was further stated that the objective of the Corporation is only to work for the development even without getting full return of the loan and for the upliftment of women and the weaker section of the society. In Nathaniel Masih Vs. U.P. Scheduled Caste Finance and Development Corpn. Ltd. and Others, , a similar question arose in respect of U.P. Scheduled Caste Finance and Development Corporation Ltd. A Division Bench of that Court after considering the decision in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. A. Rajappa and Others, and few other cases, concluded as under (p. 349):

"A driver doing mechanical work and getting less than Rs. 500/- is a ''workman''. The Corporation is to organise and work in various ways for upliftment of downtrodden, help them financially for various purposes including starting industries and organising and helping them in getting technical training etc. The activities which are systematic and cannot be carried on without the co-operation of employees of the Corporation and causes production and distribution of goods and services is an ''industry'' within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act."

The functions of the petitioner-Corporation are also precisely of the same nature as in Nathaniel Masih''s case (supra). The petitioner Corporation is nothing but meant for upliftment of women and the weaker section of the society, giving them training and advancing loans so that they can make a living of their own.

In Devi Singh v. State of Rajasthan 1990 (5) S.L.R. 610, the question was whether, the Women, Child and Nutrition Department, Government of Rajasthan is an industry within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act. A Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court concluded that it was an industry and during the discussion, the Bench observed as under:

"The problem which commonly comes for judicial scrutiny is as to what activities of the State are legal or sovereign and which are not. One of the tests which is generally adopted to find out whether the activity operated by the Government is or is not an industry is can such activity be carried on a by a private individual or group of individuals? Vide The State of Bombay and Others Vs. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and Others, If the answer is in ''Yes''. such an activity comes within ambit of ''industry'' as defined in the Act." The Division Bench went on to observe further:

"In the instant case in our hand, we have discussed above that the activities of the Women, Child and Nutrition department relate to the development and welfare of the child and women, these are the welfare activities carried on by the Government. These activities can be easily carried only by an individual or group of individuals. These activities, therefore, bring the Department of Women, Child and Nutrition within the ambit of industry as defined in the Act."

There can be no manner of doubt that the activities of the petitioner-Corporation are precisely the same as in Devi Singh''s case (supra). There is thus, no hesitation to hold that the petitioner-Corporation is an industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

The other finding returned by the Tribunal regarding non-compliance of Section 25F of the Act has not been challenged before me.

For the reasons stated above, this writ petition fails and is dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.