H.B. Kashivishwanatha Setty vs P. Srinivasa and Others

A.S. Bopanna, J.

The appellant is before this Court assailing the concurrent judgments rendered by the Courts below.

The respondents herein had filed the suit in O.S. No. 355/2010 seeking for a judgment and decree of ejectment and possession of the suit schedule property. The defendant though did not dispute the jural relationship had however contended that the termination of tenancy is not justified inasmuch as the defendant had the right to have the tenancy extended by paying the enhanced rate of rent. Hence, the suit for ejectment was resisted.

The trial Court had framed as many as six issues for its consideration. The first plaintiff examined himself as PW-1 and relied upon the documents at Exhs.P1 to P27. The defendant examined himself as DW-1 and relied upon the document at Ex-D1. The trial Court on analyzing the said evidence held issue Nos. 1 to 3 in the affirmative and in that view, granted the relief of ejectment and possession. The defendant claiming to be aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 09.10.2013 passed by the trial Court was before the Lower Appellate Court in R.A. No. 61/2013. The Lower Appellate Court by its judgment dated 26.02.2015 has confirmed the judgment of the trial Court. The appellant therefore is before this Court in this second appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.

The learned counsel for the appellant while assailing the judgments of the Courts below would contend that the Courts below have not properly construed the agreement dated 04.03.2003 which had been entered into between the appellant and the vendor of the respondents. It is his case that the agreement provided that after the initial period on 01.01.2004, the appellant had the right to have the tenancy extended on payment of the enhanced rent at 15% of the existing rent once in four years. He therefore contends that accordingly, the rents have been enhanced from the original rent of Rs. 3,900/- to Rs. 4,500/- and thereafter to Rs. 5,175/-. He therefore contends that in such circumstance, tenancy having been continued, the defendant was entitled to continue therein.

The learned counsel for the caveator would however seek to sustain the judgments rendered by the Courts below.

In the light of the contention put forth, since, there is no dispute with regard to the jural relationship, the only aspect to be noticed with regard to the contention is to examine whether the same would raise a substantial question of law for consideration in a second appeal of the present nature.

In that light, a perusal of the agreement of lease at Ex-P26 would no doubt indicate that a right had been provided in favour of the tenant to continue the tenancy after the expiry of a period of one year granted therein on enhancement of rent at 15% per annum at the end of four years. In the instant case, even though it is pointed out that the rent has been subsequently enhanced, the fact that the extension had been made thereafter is not in dispute.

As rightly held by the Lower Appellate Court, even though such benefit is available under the said agreement, it cannot be construed as if it is in perpetuity and tenancy can never be terminated by the landlord. If this aspect of the matter is kept in view, though the tenancy had been extended earlier by acceptance of the enhanced rate of rent, a notice as required under law had been issued terminating the tenancy. The notice has been produced at Ex-P24.

In that circumstance, when the tenancy was terminated and thereafter possession was sought and such termination was as provided in law, the Courts below were justified in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff, directing the defendant to vacate and handover vacant possession of the premises. In that view, I do not see any substantial question of law to be raised herein. Hence, the judgments of the Courts below do not call for interference.

At this stage, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that some reasonable time be granted to the appellant to vacate from the suit schedule premises. He contends that it is a commercial premises and therefore, at least a period of one year be granted.

Learned counsel for the caveator points out that already five years time had lapsed from the date of the institution of the suit and the appellant in any event has an alternate premises and this aspect be kept in view while considering the said request. Hence, taking into consideration all aspects of the matter, the appellant is granted six months time from this day to vacate and handover vacant possession of the suit schedule premises subject to the appellant filing an undertaking before this Court within six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, undertaking therein to voluntarily vacate from the suit schedule premises on accepting this judgment to be final between the parties.

In terms of the above, the appeal stands disposed of.