Head Constable Subhash Chander vs State of Haryana and Others

Rajiv Narain Raina, J.—The challenge, in this petition, is to the order dated 13.8.2009 (Annexure P-6) passed by the Commandant, 4th Banal lion, Haryana Armed Police, Madhuban inflicting punishment of stoppage of 4 annual increments with permanent effect on the petitioner. The brief facts are that the petitioner while he was posted as Head Constable in the 4th Batallion. HAP, a criminal case was registered against the petitioner in FIR No. 239 dated 27.11.2008 in Police Station, Madhuban under Sections 323, 325 IPC on the statement of one Peeru Ram. The petitioner was arrested. He was placed under suspension. A regular enquiry was instituted. On the basis of the aforesaid premises, the petitioner was charge sheeted on 19.1.2009. Since a challan has been presented in the criminal case, it is stated that the enquiry officer found the petitioner guilty. A show cause notice was issued to the petitioner proposing dismissal from service. He filed reply.

Aggrieved, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Inspector General of Police, 4th Batallion, HAP, Madhuban which was dismissed on 7.12.2009. The petitioner was acquitted by the trial court vide judgment dated 2.6.2011. On acquittal, the petitioner filed a review petition before the Inspector General of Police, 4th Batallion, HAP, Madhuban which was also dismissed vide order dated 21.7.2011 on the ground that the petitioner had won over the trial witnesses. Against that order, a revision petition was filed before the Director General of Police which was dismissed on 30.5.2012.

Mr. Yadav, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that a criminal offence under Sections 323, 325 IPC does not involve moral turpitude notwithstanding that he was acquitted in the criminal case and that the judgment has attained finality. Therefore, the punishment imposed in the disciplinary proceedings arising out of the criminal case is not sustainable in the eyes of law. He referred to Rule 16.3 of the PPR as applicable to Haryana which lays down action following on a judicial acquittal is to be done. Rule 16.3(1) deals with a situation where the police officer has been tried and convicted by the criminal court, then he shall not be charged on the same charge or different charge upon evidence cited in the criminal case whether actually led or not unless 5 situations mentioned in the Rule are met. Sub-rule (b) inter alia empowers the Superintendent of Police to take departmental action in case where the prosecution witnesses had been won over. In this manner, the learned counsel presses rule against double jeopardy. He would submit that in a case of this kind before launching departmental enquiry, the concurrence of the District Magistrate was mandatory under Rule 16.38. It is further argued that the trial court did not in its judgment record a finding that the petitioner had won over the witnesses. From a reading of para 7 of the judgment of the trial court, it is borne out that Peeru Ram, injured complainant, when examined as a star prosecution witness failed to identify the petitioner present in Court as the one who had caused hurt to him by infliction of a danda blow. On this statement, the witness was declared hostile on the request of the Additional Public Prosecutor and was allowed to be cross-examined. In the cross-examination, he resiled from his previous statement. Further, PW3 Savitri Devi, daughter-in-law of the complainant Peeru Ram, also resiled from her statement and was declared hostile and was allowed to be cross-examined.

The short question that has to be answered in this petition is whether the Inspector General of Police, HAP, Madhuban was empowered by Rule and justified in recording a finding on reading of the judgment of the trial court that the prosecution witnesses had been won over by the petitioner and could be a material circumstance to hold against the petitioner''s involvement in retraction. Rule 16.3 carves out certain exceptions following judicial acquittal and one of them is that if in the opinion of the Superintendent of Police, the prosecution witnesses had been won over it would justify departmental punishment. In such circumstances, it matters little as to the nature of criminal charge whether it involves moral turpitude or not. All that is required is a finding that the prosecution witnesses had been won over. The standards of conduct required of a common man and of a police officer are widely different. In the case of a police officer, the highest standards of conduct and ethics are demanded even in their personal lives. When Peeru Ram and Savitri Devi resiled from then statements, the only beneficiary of this would be the petitioner and none else can gain from it. Therefore, it cannot be said that any substantial injustice has been done to the petitioner in imposing the punishment. Learned counsel has relied on the following judgments:--

Shri Sahib Ram v. Delhi Administration and others 1984 (2) SLR 133

Harinarayan Ramratan Dubey, Khandwa Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others,

These judgments are distinguishable on facts and law. In none of these cases, the provisions of Rule 16.3(1)(b) have been dealt with or considered. The principle of double jeopardy would not figure, in this case. Since the spinal issue presented here relates to failure of a prosecution case against the police officer with two star witnesses on one of whom a Danda blow was attributed on the person of the star witness, have resiled from their previous statements made before the police and were declared hostile by the Court.

I see no cogent reason to interfere with the impugned order on preponderance of probabilities. Consequently, the writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed.