Heera Lal vs State Of Rajasthan

Appellant has filed this appeal challenging his conviction and sentence ordered by the Trial Court vide judgment/order dated 14.06.2019 under Section

302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’).

Prosecution case was set in motion on the basis of Exhibit-P-18 statement of Janki Bai. On the basis of Exhibit-P-18, formal FIR Exhibit-P-19 bearing

No.181 dated 04.10.2012 was registered at Police Station Kelwara, District Baran for offence punishable under Section 307 IPC. Statement of Janki

Bai Exhibit-P-22 was also recorded by the Magistrate under Section 164 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Janki Bai died on 20.10.2012. Thereafter,

offence under Section 302 IPC was added in the FIR.

As per the statements Exhibit-P-18 and Exhibit-P-22 of Janki Bai recorded by the police as well as by the Magistrate, the allegation is that the

appellant had set his wife (Janki Bai) on fire after pouring kerosene oil on her under the influence of liquor.

After completion of investigation and necessary formalities, challan was presented against the appellant.

Charge was framed against the appellant by the trial court under Section 302 IPC.

Appellant did not plead guilty to the charge framed against him and claimed trial.

In order to prove its case, prosecution examined 23 witnesses, during trial. Appellant when examined under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973, after the close of prosecution evidence, prayed that he was innocent and had been falsely involved in this case.

Appellant did not examine any witness in his defence.

Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the material witnesses have not supported the prosecution case during trial. No reliance could be

placed on the statements Exhibit-P-18 and Exhibit-P-22 of deceased Janki Bai. Doctor who had given the fitness certificate of deceased Janki Bai at

the time of recording of her statement Exhibit-P-22 had not been examined during trial. Statement Exhibit-P-18 was recorded without any certificate

of fitness granted by the doctor. Janki Bai had died after 16 days of the incident. In-fact, it was a case of suicide.

Learned State counsel has opposed the appeal.

Present case relates to murder of Janki Bai.

PW-11 Doctor Vivek Jain proved the medico-legalexamination report of deceased Janki Bai, i.e., Exhibit-P-13. A perusal of the same reveals that

Janki Bai had suffered flame burns on her face, whole trunk, both hands, thighs and knees.

As per postmortem examination report Exhibit-P-23, cause of death of deceased Janki Bai was septicemia shock as a result of antemortem external

burn injuries. Postmortem examination report was proved by PW-21 Doctor Surendra Meena.

Material witnesses, including the brother and children of deceased Janki Bai have not supported the prosecution case, during trial. Case rests on dying

declarations of the deceased, i.e., Exhibit-P-18 and Exhibit-P-22.

It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Muthu Kutty And Another Vs. State By Inspector of Police, T.N. in (2005) 9 Supreme Court

Cases 113, as under:-

“Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power

is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such

a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result

of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a

clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base

its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis

of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the

principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under as indicated in Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat, AIR(1992) SC 1817:

(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (See Munnu Raja & Anr. v. The

State of Madhya Pradesh, [1976] 2 SCR 764)

(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (See State of Uttar

Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav and Ors., AIR (1985) SC 416 and Ramavati Devi v. State of Bihar, AIR (1983) SC 164)

(iii) The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or

imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. [See K.

Ramachandra Reddy and Anr. v. The Public Prosecutor, AIR (1976) SC 1994].

(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (See Rasheed Beg. v. State of Madhya

Pradesh, [1974] 4 SCC 264).

(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. [See Kaka

Singh v. State of M.P., AIR (1982) SC 1021].

(vi) A dying declaration with suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (See Ram Manorath and Ors v. State of U.P., [1981] 2 SCC

654)

(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. [See State of Maharashtra v.

Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu, AIR (1981) SC 617].

(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth.

[See Surajdeo Oza and Ors v. State of Bihar, AIR (1979) SC 1505].

(ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion.

But where the eye-witness said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail.

[See Nanahau Ram and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1988) SC 912].

(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. [See State of

U.P. v. Medan Mohan and Ors., AIR (1989) SC 1519].

(xi) Where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality

of dying declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. [See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR

(1982) SC 839].â€​