Hem Raj vs State Of Himachal Pradesh

N.V. Anjaria, J

Leave granted.

The present appeal is directed against common judgment  and  order  dated  05.12.2023  passed  by  the  High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Criminal Appeal No. 93 of 2020 and Criminal Appeal No. 230 of 2020, in so far as the decision  relates  to  Criminal  Appeal  No.  93  of  2020,  which was the appeal preferred by the appellant herein.

2.1. The High Court partly allowed the appeal by modifying the sentence part of the judgment of learned Special  Judge  by  reducing  the  substantive  sentence of  the appellant to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment from 12 years of rigorous imprisonment, separately imposed for the offences under Section  20(b)(ii)(C)  and also under Sections 25 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 “NDPS Act”. Rest of the sentence awarded by the Special Judge remained unaffected.

2.2. The Court of learned Special Judge, Chamba Division, Chamba (H.P.) decided Sessions Trial No. 8 of 2015 (NDPS Act) by its judgment dated 07.11.2019 against the present appellant Hem Raj, son of Shri Devi Singh and co-accused Kulwant, son of Shri Bhagwant. Both the accused including the appellant herein came to be convicted for commission of offence punishable under Sections 20(b)(ii)(C) and 25 read with Section 29 of NDPS Act.

2.2.1. After hearing the convicts on the quantum of sentence, learned Special Judge by the order dated 16.11.2019 sentenced both the convicts to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 12 years each and to pay  fine  of  Rs.  1,20,000/-  each  and  in  default  of  payment of the amount of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonmentfor a period of one year each for the commission of offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the NDPS Act.

2.2.2. In respect of offence punishable under Section 25 read with Section 29 of the NDPS Act, the appellant and the co-convict were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonmentfor a period of 12 years each and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,20,000/- each and in default of payment of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonmentof further period of one year each.

2.2.3. It was directed that both the sentences shall run concurrently. In the appeal preferred by appellant Hem Raj before  the  High  Court  as  stated  above,  the  sentence  came to be reduced to 10 years from 12 years of rigorous imprisonment. The remainder part of the sentence stood confirmed as awarded by learned Special Judge.

2.3. As  noted  by  this  Court  in  order  dated  28.11.2025, the  assail  to  the  judgment  and  order  of  the  High  Court  in this appeal is on two grounds. Firstly, that the appellant could not have been convicted separately for offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) on one hand and Sections  25  and  29  of  the  NDPS  Act  on  the  other.  Second ground has been that the fine sentence could not have been imposed separately for both the offences and that since the sentences  were  ordered  to  run  concurrently,  the  appellant is not required to pay the double amount of fine.

Noticing  the  facts,  on  22.12.2014,  the  police  squad was exercising Nakabandi duty at TunnuhattiPolice Barrier in wee hours. At around 3.50 a.m., while checking the vehicles, a grey coloured Esteem car bearing registration No. PB-65A-9377 was seen coming from the side of Banikhet. The police party stopped the car for checking. The driver revealed his name to be Kulwant Singh who was also the registered owner of the car, and the appellant Hem Raj sitting  on  the front  seat,  were the  two  occupying  the  car. When  driver  Kulwant  Singh  opened  the  window  glass,  the smell of cannabis spread out.

3.1. Upon search of the said two persons and the vehicle, a blue coloured carry bag having transparent polythene packets containing black hard substance was found kept below the leg space of the front seat occupied by the appellant herein. The said blue coloured bag had in it eight transparent polythene packets containing black substance in round and stick shape. When  it  was checked with the drugs detection kit, the same was found to be charas of the quantity of 4 kgs.100 gms.

3.2. After undertaking the necessary procedure both the accused were nabbed and were charged with the offence punishable  under  Sections  20(b)(ii)(C) and  25  read  with Section 29 of the NDPS Act in the chargesheet filed on 14.08.2015.

Learned Counsel for the appellant Mr. Ajay Marwah while not challenging the conviction, highlighting the limited  yet  substantial  challenge  to  the  sentence  imposed, submitted that the courts below were not justified in imposing separate punishments for the offences under Section 20 as well as under Section 25 read with Section 29 of the NDPS Act, despite the fact that both the convictions arose from one indivisible transaction. Learned counsel took the court through Sections 20, 25 and 29 of the Act to pinpoint that no separate punishment was provided under Section 25 and Section 29 of the Act.

4.1. It was additionally submitted that as borne out from chargesheet, the registered owner of the vehicle was co- accused Kulwant Singh and not the appellant herein, therefore, it was submitted,  in absence of  ownership, the‘occupation’ and ‘control’ over the vehicle was not of the appellant and that he could not have “knowingly permitted its use” . On such basis it was sought to be submitted that the very foundation of invoking Section 25 of the Act against the appellant was lacking and that the appellant could not have been convicted under Section 25.

4.1.1. It was next submitted without prejudice that even if the appellant could be booked for the offence under Sections  25  and  29,  the  said  provision  does  not  prescribe an  independent  punishment  or  sentence.  According  to  the learned counsel for the appellant, the offences contemplated under these Sections are merely in the nature of extension of the main offence in the nature of commission of supplemented act creating vicarious liability with the principal offence, which was under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the Act. It was submitted that the sentence awarded to the appellant amounted to double punishment which is prohibited under Section 71 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 “IPC”. as well.

4.1.2. It was the next submission on behalf of the appellant that when the sentences for the said offences were directed to run concurrently,  the entire punishment  including the fine  should  have  a  concurrent  operation.  In  this  regard  it was submitted that ‘punishments’ under Section 53, IPC includes both imprisonment and fine, therefore, treating imprisonment to be concurrent but treating the fine as cumulative would be illogical and would not be permissible.

4.1.3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that due  to  poor  condition, the  appellant  is  not  in  a position  to pay  the  fine.  It  was  submitted  that  till  January  2026,  the appellant has already suffered incarceration for about 11 years  including  the  remission,  as  indicated  in  the  custody certificate.

4.2. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent State Mr. Bimlesh Kumar Singh refuted the arguments  advanced  on  behalf  of  the  appellant  to  submit that FIR  No.  140 of  2014  dated  22.12.2014  was  registered against the appellant and the co-convict which was for the offences punishable under Sections 20,  25 and 29 of  the NDPS  Act  for  possessing,  transporting  and  commissioning the crime with criminal conspiracy, to have in the car below the front driver seat 4 kgs and 100 gms of Charas and that both the persons came to be convicted for the said offence, the appellant having not challenged the said conviction.

4.2.1. It was submitted that the High Court considering the aspect that appellant had already undergone 9 years of imprisonment  and  further  that  there  was  no  complaint  in the  jail  conduct  of  the  appellant,  the  substantive  sentence came to be reduced to 10 years from 12 years for the offences committed under Section 20 as well as 25 and 29 of the Act.

4.2.2. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the sentence prescribed under Section 20(b)(ii)(C)  is  of  rigorous  imprisonment  of  not  less  than  10 years which may extend to 20 years and fine to be not less than Rs. 1 lakh extendable to Rs. 2 lakh. It was highlighted that the commercial quantity of Charas was found to be in possession of the accused persons which was proved in the trial  leading  to  conviction  under  Section  20(b)(ii)(C)  of  the Act. The car was used for transportation of narcotics, submitted  learned  counsel  for  the  respondent,  the  offence attracted Section 25 read with Section 29, which provisions prescribed for awarding same sentence as of the main offence.

4.2.3. It was emphasised that the appellant was “occupier” of the car from whom the contraband was found and recovered and both acted in criminal conspiracy as held by the courts below. It was submitted that therefore the conviction and imposition of sentence under the said sections separately done is justified. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that there is no error in imposition of separate fine amounts which is part of sentence.

4.2.4. Learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  also  submitted that the sentence awarded is in consonance with the provision  of  the  Section  65  of  the  IPC  which  provides  that the  term  for  which  the  court  may  direct  the  offender  to  be in  prison  in  default of  payment of fine  shall  not  exceed  up to 1/4th of the term of imprisonment which is the imprisonment maximum fixed for the offence if the offence is punishable with imprisonment as well as with fine.

4.2.5. By relying on the decision of this Court in Shahejadkhan Mahebubkhan Pathan v. State of Gujarat (2013) 1 SCC 570, it was submitted by learned counsel for the respondent that the term of imprisonment in default of payment of fine is not a sentence, but it is a penalty which a  person  incurs  on  account  of  non-payment  of  fine.  Same principle was sought to be highlighted from another decision of this Court in Shantilal v. State of M.P (2007) 11 SCC 243. It was submitted that the minimum sentence prescribed is 10 years of rigorous imprisonment, therefore no option is available but to impose such minimum sentence in the list, which is done by the High Court.

4.2.6. Learned counsel for the respondent proceeded to submit about deleterious impact of narcotic drugs and the activities  in  dealing  with  the  narcotic  drugs  on  the  society and that how the menace of drug addiction has the tendency of destroying the life of an individual and the derailing the quality of the society to have the effect  on the generations to come, by pressing into service the observation of this Court in Gurdev Singh v. State of Punjab (2021) 6 SCC 558.

In  order  to  find  an  answer  as  to  whether  separate sentence for the offence under Section 20 on one hand and, on the other hand, for the offences committed under Sections 25 and 29 of the Act is permissible to be awarded and  whether  offences  under  Sections  25  and  29  could be considered as part of  the main offence under Section 20, and therefore not attracting separate punishment and sentence,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  various  provisions  in Chapter  IV  of  the  NDPS  Act  1985,  titled  as  “Offences  and Penalties”. In different Sections, the punishment for contravention  of  different  kinds  of  contrabands  prohibited under the Act is considered.

5.1. Section 15 of the Act is about punishment for contravention in relation to poppy straw, whereas punishment for contravention in relation to coca plant and coca leaves is dealt in Section 16. Punishment for contravention  in  relation  to  prepared  opium  in  Section  17 whereas punishment for contravention in relation to opium poppy and opium is contemplated in Section 18.

5.1.1. The measure of sentence in Sections 15, 17 and 18 is  made  dependent  upon  whether  the  quantity  involved  is small  quantity  or  the  quantity  lesser  than  commercial  but greater  than small quantity or whether the contravention involves  commercial  quantity  as  the  case  may  be.  Section 16 as well as Section 19 provide for punishment for embezzlement of opium by cultivator. In the provisions from Section 15 onwards, the specific punishment of the term of imprisonment, is expressly provided for.

5.1.2. Similar is the punishment for contravention in relation to manufactured drugs and preparations under Section 21, wherein also the specific punishment is provided for, depending upon the quantity of the contraband involved. Provision of Section 22 is in respect of punishment for contravention in relation to psychotropic substances whereas Section 23 is for punishmentfor illegal import into India, export from India, or transhipments of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.  Section 24 is about  punishment  for  external dealings  in  narcotic  drugs and psychotropic substances in contravention of Section 20. For the offences under these sections also, punishment is expressly and specifically provided.

5.2. In the present case, the commissionof offence under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) is established against the appellant convict.  Section  20  which  is  in  respect  for  punishment  for contravention in relation to cannabis plant and cannabis reads as under,

‘20. Punishmentfor contraventionin relationto cannabis plant and cannabis.—Whoever, in contravention of any provision of this Act or any rule  or  order  made  or  condition  of  licence  granted thereunder,—

(a) cultivates any cannabis plant; or

(b) produces, manufactures, possesses, sells, purchases, transports, imports  inter-State,  exports  inter-State or uses cannabis, shall be punishable,— (i) where such contravention  relates  to  clause  (a)  with rigorous imprisonmentfor a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to one lakh rupees; and

(ii) where such contravention relates to sub-clause (b),—

(A) and involves small quantity, with rigorous imprisonmentfor a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both;

(B) and involves quantity lesser than commercial quantity but greater than small quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees;

(C) and involves commercial quantity, with  rigorous  imprisonment  for  a  term which  shall  not  be  less  than  ten  years but which  may  extend  to  twenty  years and shall also be liable to fine which shall  not  be  less  than  one  lakh  rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees:

Provided that the court may, for reasons to be recorded in the judgment,  impose a  fine exceeding two lakh rupees.’

5.2.1. The convictionagainst the appellant is also recorded under  Sections 25  and 29 of  the  Act. Section  25  relates  to the  punishment  for  allowing  premises,  etc.,  to  be  used  for commission of an offence. The said section is extracted hereinbelow,

‘25.  Punishment  for  allowing  premises,  etc.,  to be  used  for  commission  of  an  offence.-Whoever, being  the  owner  or  occupier  or  having  the  control or use of any house, room, enclosure, space, place, animal or conveyance, knowingly permits it to be used for the commission by any other person of an offence punishable under any provision of this Act, shall be punishable with the punishment provided for that offence.’

5.2.2. Section 29 dealing with the punishmentof abetment and criminal conspiracy, is reproduced hereinbelow,

‘29. Punishment for abetment and criminal conspiracy.—(1)  Whoever  abets,  or  is  a party  to  a criminal conspiracy to commit, an offence punishable under this Chapter, shall, whether such offence be or be not committed in consequence  of  such  abetment  or  in  pursuance  of such criminal conspiracy, and notwithstanding anything contained in section 116 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), be punishable with the punishment provided for the offence.

(2) A person abets, or is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit, an offence, within the meaning of this section, who, in India, abets or is a party to the criminal conspiracy to the commission of any act in a place without and beyond India which—

(a) would constitute an offence if committed within India; or

(b) under the laws of such place, is an offence relating to narcotic drugs or psychotropic  substances  having  all  the legal conditions required to constitute it such an offence the same as or analogous to the legal conditions required to constitute it an offence punishable under this Chapter, if committed within India.’

5.3. Reading Sections 15 to 19, 21 to 24, 25A, 27 as well as Section 20 which is relevant to the present case, it would be noticed that all these sections prescribed punishment and sentence separately for the offence related to contraband mentioned therein. Section 25 however says that a person who is found to be owner or occupier or having the control or use of any house, room, enclosure, space, place, animal or conveyance, is found to be knowingly permitting it  to be used for  the commission by any  other person of an offence punishable under any provision of this Act shall be punishable with “the punishment provided for that offence”. Similar phraseology is employed in respect of punishment in Section 29 which says that a person found guilty of abetment and criminal conspiracy to commit an offence under Chapter IV “be punishable with the punishment provided for the offence”, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 116 of the IPC.

5.4. The argument is sought to be founded on the variation of language in Section 20 (as also noticeable in other  sections  mentioned  above)  vis-a-vis  Sections  25  and 29 that since Section 20 specifically provides for a particular  punishment  and  Sections  25  and  29  only  says that punishment for the said offences which may be imposed  would  be  the  same“asprovided  for  that  offence”, the conviction under Sections 25 and 29 could not have attracted a separate and distinct punishment. What is contended is that punishmentimposed under Section 20 on the appellant would take care of the punishment for the conviction under Section 25 and Section 29 of the Act, which according to learned counsel of the appellant, are only part of substantive offence.

5.5. The submission namely that the appellant could not have been held to have committed offence under Section 25 of the Act in as much as the appellant was only sitting in the front seat in the car belonging to the other person–the co-convict, therefore, could not have been said to have‘knowingly permitted’ the car to be used for the commission of  offence  by  that  another  person,  may  be  dealt  with.  The submission which looks attractive at the first blush, has no substance when Section 25 is read carefully.

5.5.1. The provision contains the words “occupier” as well as  “use  of  any  house,  space,  conveyance,  etc.  by  person”. The appellant was an occupier of the car. In capacity of occupier the appellant could be said to have committed the crime under Section 25. Section 25 could be applied to operate in two ways. In any view, along with Section 25, convictionis also recorded under Section 29. The conviction is not challenged.

5.6. There exists an apparent fallacy in what is sought to be  canvassed  that  separate  sentence  is  not  permissible  to be awarded. Various sections in Chapter IV of the Act relate to different independent offences pertaining to the contraband.  Section  25  and  Section  29,  which  are  part  of the  group  of  sections,  also  speak  of  the  offences.  Allowing premises etc. to be used for commission of an offence is conceived by the legislature to be a separate offence and engrafted in the Act accordingly as an independent offence under Section 25.

5.6.1. In a given case, an offender may have permitted the other person to use the house, room, space, place, animal or conveyance etc. to facilitate the commission of any offence under the Act. This conduct would fall squarely within Section 25 to become a distinct and independent offence by that person who so permits the use of house, conveyance etc. for the purpose of committingan offence by the other person.

5.7. Looking  at  Section  29,  it  speaks  of  punishment  for the offence of abetment and criminal conspiracy. An abetment of a thing is an independent offence mentioned in the  IPC.  Section  116,  IPC  mentions  about  the  abetment  of offence punishable with imprisonment  - if offence  be or be not committed.

5.7.1. Section 116, IPC is relevant to be noticed as under,

‘116. Abetment of offence punishable with imprisonment—if offence be not committed.—

Whoever abets an offence punishable with imprisonment shall, if that offence be not committed in consequence of the abetment, and no express provision is made by this Code for the punishment of such abetment, be punished with imprisonment  of  any  description  provided  for  that offence for a term  which may extend to one-fourth part of the longest term provided for that offence; or with such fine as is provided for that offence, or with  both;  if  abettor  or  person  abetted  be  a public servant whose duty it is to prevent offence.—and if the abettor or the person abetted is a public servant, whose duty it is to prevent the commission of such offence, the abettor shall be punished with imprisonment  of  any  description  provided  for  that offence, for a term which may extend to one-half of the  longest  term  provided  for  that  offence,  or  with such fine as is provided for the offence, or with both.’

5.7.2. Now, Section 29 says that “notwithstanding anything contained in Section 116 of the IPC, be punishable with the punishment provided for the offence”. What it contemplates  is  that  whoever  abets  the  offence  under  the NDPS Act in Chapter IV shall be punished for the‘punishment  provided  for  the  offence’.  In  other  words,  the fetter and limitation about the term of imprisonment mentioned in Section 116 IPC, is done away with in relation to offence of abetment under Section 29 of the NDPS Act.

5.8. The offence of criminal conspiracy which is inherently covert and rarely leaves behind direct traces and whose existence could be inferred from the surrounding facts and circumstances,where any overt commissionof act not always present, is seldom capable to be proved by direct evidence. Section 120B, IPC is the punishment for the offence of criminal conspiracy.

5.8.1. It is well settled that conspiracy is an independent offence. In Gurdeep  Singh  v.  State  of Punjab (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1669, this Court referred to its earlier  decision in State (NCT of Delhi) v. NavjotSandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600, as also in Noor Mohammad Mohd. Yusuf Momin v. State of Maharashtra (1970) 1 SCC 696, to underline that conspiracy is an independent offence and may be punishable even if the substantive offence committed by the conspirators does not ultimately materialise.

5.8.2. It was held in Noor Mohammad(supra) that Section 120B, IPC makes criminal conspiracy a substantive offence which postulates an agreement between two or more persons to do or cause to be done an act by illegal  means. Thus, criminal conspiracy, which is an independent offence, is so incorporated in Section 29 of the NDPS Act.

When the offence under Section 25 is entirely possible to be committed separately as an independent offence to remain distinct in itself, and when the offences of abetment and criminal conspiracy mentioned in Section 29 are in themselves independent offences, it is entirely logical to  deduce  and  conclude  that commission  of  these offences once  established,  would  attract  separate  punishment  and sentence.

6.1. It would not be right  to say that when Section 25 and Section 29 mention the punishment for allowing premises to be used for the offence or for abetment and criminal conspiracy in the commission of an offence under the Chapter, and that punishment is not expressly mentioned, but what is mentioned is  “punishment for that offence,” it would mean that the imposition of separate punishment is not contemplated. Both the Sections 25 and 29 mention that the commissioner of offence in question shall be punishable with the punishment provided for “that offence” or “the offence”.

Section  25  and Section  29 insofar  as they provide that the punishment for the respective offences mentioned therein is same which would be for the principal offence, is an  instance  of  legislation  by  reference.  The  legislature  has referred to the punishment mentioned in the particular section to be referred to and applied for the purpose of punishment and sentence to be imposed under another section. Stating differently, the punishmentprovided for the offence under Section 20 of the Act is mentioned by way of reference under Section 25 and Section 29 to be read into it in a similar way to be applied for the imposition.

7.1. The doctrine of reference is a well-recognised tool of legislation.  It  is  a process  whereby the  legislature  refers  to the  provision  of  one  statute  in  the  provisions  of  the  other statute  to  be  read  into  the  other  statute.  In  that way,  the provision  in  one  statute  becomes  part  of  the  provisions  of the other statute in which it is referred to. Analogous is the doctrine of incorporation, which bears a fine distinction with the doctrine of reference where provision from one statute is bodily lifted to be incorporated to be part of provision in another enactment.

7.2. While  the  Court  is  not  concerned  in  this  case  with the distinction, it would suffice to say that the provisions of Section 20, or as the case may be, vis-à-vis Sections 25 and 29 in the NDPS Act, when  refers  to  the punishment under Section 20 conforming to the main offence, as the case may be, to be also the punishmentunder Section 25 and Section 29  of  the  Act,  it  also  becomes  legislation  by  incorporation, since  provision  in  one  section  of  the  statute  is  made  to  be referred, to be read into, and to be applied in the provision of other sections of the same  statute. Given this legislative mandate, the contention has to be negatived that no separate punishment and sentence is contemplated in respect of Section 25 and Section 29 of the Act.

However, a riding clarification may be necessary. Even though punishment for the offences under Section 25 and  Section  29  of  the  Act  is  separately  contemplated  and could be imposed independently and additionally, in a given case and in most of the cases these offences have a connect and an interaction with any of the main offences mentioned in Sections 15 to 19, 20 to 24 and others. It may happen in large  number  of  cases  that  offences  under  Section  25  and 29, as the case may be, take place along with the other substantive offences mentioned in Chapter IV, in course of the  same  transaction.  The  two  offences  may  be  part  of  an inclusive transaction. In other words, though separately punishable, the offences under Sections 25 and 29 could be parasitic and derivative.

8.1. The conviction is possible for two offences which may be inclusive or interdependent arising out of same course of action or the transaction. However, since the offences committed for their kind and nature, would be distinct offences, would entail separate punishment. Therefore, even while imposing separate punishment for such different offences, it would be the rule of wisdom to be followed by the court that in such cases, the sentence is made to run concurrently. In the instant case, the sentences are ordered to run concurrently.

8.2. The  punishment and  sentence  should  not  result  in double  jeopardy.  One  of  the  objects  of  concurrent  running of the sentence is to avoid double punishment. This principle would readily apply when two separate punishments  are  awarded,  and  sentences  are  imposed  for two  offences  relatable  to  one  set  of  facts.  It  would  call  for applying concurrent sufferance of punishment.

This takes the Court to the second remaining question as to whether the fine imposed separately as part of the punishment of two offences would be liable to be treated concurrent along with the sentences of imprisonment.

9.1. Section 53 IPC deals with the punishments. It says that  punishments  for  which  the  offenders  are  liable  under the provisions of this Code are death, imprisonment whether rigorous or simple, forfeiture of property and fine. Both imprisonment and fine are treated as punishments.

9.2. In the present  case, the appellant  is sentenced  by the High Court to undergo 10 years rigorous imprisonment, and to pay fine of₹1,20,000/- and in default to undergo further rigorous imprisonmentfor one year. This is a default imprisonment. In Shahejadkhan Mahebubkhan Pathan v. State of Gujarat (2013) 1 SCC 570, this Court observed that the term of imprisonmentin default of payment of fine is not a sentence it  is a penalty which a person incurs on account  of  non- payment of fine. On the other hand, it was further observed, if sentence is imposed, an offender must undergo unless it is modified or varied in part or whole in the judicial proceedings.

9.3. What it implies is that although the default imprisonmentclause is taken out of the concept of sentence and is treated as penalty for not observing sentence of fine, the amount of fine imposed required to be paid by the convict is a sentence and has to be treated as part of sentence. Section 53, IPC mentioned above also includes fine  as  a punishment  to  be  part  of  sentence.  In  that  view when the sentence is directed to run concurrently, the appellant cannot be made to pay fine twice.

It is not in dispute that the appellant has undergone total 11 years of imprisonment till January 2026, which includes the default imprisonment. Since the appellant has suffered  the  default  imprisonment  also  and  that  he  is  not required  to  pay  double  amount  of  fine,  he  is  entitled  to  be released from the jail.

10.1. As a result, the appellant is directed to be set at liberty forthwith unless he is required to be detained in respect of any other offence.

The appeal is disposed of in the above terms and the direction.

Interlocutory applications, as may have been pending, shall not survive.