High Court of Karnataka vs Chinen Das and others

Saldanha, J.—This is a suo motu contempt proceeding wherein notice to show cause why action under the Contempt of Courts Act for having committed criminal contempt was issued to four respondents. The first of these respondents was the publisher of ''The Economic Times'' newspaper of Bangalore. The second one was the printer, the third one was the press-reporter who had written the news report in the issue of the paper dated 7-11-96 and the fourth respondent was Captain T. S. Gopalakrishna who is the person responsible for making an application to the Advocate General of Karnataka praying for sanction to prosecute a sitting Judge of the Karnataka High Court, Justice M. P. Chinnappa, on the charge that the learned Judge had committed contempt of Court. Captain Gopalakrishna, hereinafter referred to as the the fourth respondent, was the respondent in Criminal Petition Nos. 2554, 2555, 2556, 1241, 1379 and 1703 of 1995 which had been heard and disposed of by Justice M. P. Chinnappa. According to R-4, the learned Judge had incorporated certain incorrect statements and findings in his judgment and R-4 being aggrieved by this situation filed an application before the Advocate General in which he sought sanction to prosecute the learned Judge alleging that the Judge had committed criminal contempt by scandalising the Court. In the application seeking sanction to prosecute the Judge, R-4 had repeatedly, incorporated the averment that the learned Judge had made "false statements". There are several other averments in the application in question which at the relevant time was pending consideration by the Advocate General. On 7-11-1996, the Economic Times prominently published a news report extracting the statements and allegations that were contained in the application for sanction. One such allegation is that "the Hon''ble Justice making false statements in the judgment contrary to the documentary evidence on record amounts to the distorting of facts on record in his Court". A simple reading of this news report would create the definite impression that the Judge has done gross injustice in this proceeding, that he has gravely misconducted himself and that the situation is so serious as would require a virtual prosecution of the Judge on the charge of criminal contempt. The impression gathered by the plain readers of the publication would be that this situation presents something very wrong with regard to the manner in which the High Court is working which in turn would directly undermine the status of the high Court, public confidence in it and the faith in the administration of justice. It was on the basis of this publication that contempt notice was issued to the fourth respondent.

Respondents-1 to 3 appeared before the Court with their counsel on receipt of the show-cause notice, but at that time, the notice was not served on R-4 and there was no indication as to when R-4 would appear before the Court. The case as far as R-1 to R-3 are concerned was heard. R-1 to R-3 tendered an unconditional apology and it was stated in their defence that they had only reproduced the material which had been made available to the press by R-4. This Court held that such a defence was untenable in so far as in contempt proceedings a party cannot exonerate himself by seeking to contend that the party is not the author of the offensive material, because reproduction or publication of the offensive material are per se contemptuous and is actionable independently. On the basis of the explanation and the apology, this Court disposed of the proceeding through a speaking order which was passed on 19-12-1996 against R-1 to R-3. Since that order is very relevant to the present proceeding, the office is directed to tag the order dated 19-12-1996 to the present order. The case as far as F-4 is concerned was separated and was taken up for hearing after the notice was served on him.

On receipt of the show-cause notice, R-4 appeared before us in person. He stated that he is an ex-army officer and according to him, the reporter had asked him for a copy of the application made by him to the Advocate General which he had handed over, but he had told the reporter not to publish anything concerning this application until the Advocate General took a decision in the matter. According to him, the reporter prepared the news report and informed him that he proposes to go ahead with the publication because he was covered by the Press Act. As far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, the learned S.P.P. submitted very strongly that R-4 irrespective of whether he was asked for the report or whether he gave it to the reporter on his own accord, could not have and ought not to have handed over a copy of an application making serious allegations and charges against a sitting High Court Judge merely on the ground that such an application has been made and it was pending before the Advocate General. His submission is that in parting with a copy of this document, R-4 has clearly started an exercise whereby the status and dignity of the High Court and of the learned judge in particular was being deliberately undermined through newspaper publication and that this was the only intention because there was no special news-worthiness in that material. We do need to observe that the application was made by R-4 and irrespective of whether the reporter had asked for it or not, R-4 ought to have exercised his discretion before parting with a copy of that report, because once it is handed over to the representative of the press, it is presumed that it is handed over for publication. It is not open to a party who gives a report to the press or to the reporter to lay down conditions as to how much of it should be published, how it should be published or when it should be published, because these are factors within the decision of the representative of the press. To this extent, therefore, the submission canvassed by the learned S.P.P. is justified. 4. The learned S.P.P. very vehemently submitted that an application of this type is virtually unprecedented. His contention is that it would become unsafe and impossible for judicial officers to function if litigants were to be permitted merely because they are unhappy with the decision which has gone against them, to institute counter proceedings against the Judge personally. A Division Bench of this Court had occasion to deal with a more or less similar situation where attempts were made to institute proceedings against judicial officers and this Court has held that it was a case of gross contempt and was required to take a rigorous view of the matter and sentence the contemnor in that case. The learned S.P.P. has therefore submitted that if a litigant desires to exercise a right of making an application against a judicial officer and that too, a sitting Judge of the High Court, that the facts must be very gross and there should be unimpeachable material to justify even the institution of such a proceeding. The mere fact that such an application is made signifies that the law is set in motion and that, in the submission of the learned S.P.P., is sufficient to constitute an offence of criminal contempt, because he points out and perhaps with some justification that such counter blasts would seriously affect the working of the Courts and the functioning of the judiciary if Judges and judicial officers were to be made vulnerable to such counter attacks. He has, in this background, vehemently opposed the acceptance of the apology, because though he concedes that it was tendered at the earliest point of time and that it is unconditional, he submits with full responsibility that this is not one such case in which an apology could be accepted.

On the other hand, R-4 submitted before us that he has the highest respect for the judiciary and he also pointed out that since he was appearing in person that the filing of the application against the Judge should be viewed at as a mistake. According to him, he was genuinely upset and unhappy over the decision and he bona fide believed that in such a situation which in his view constituted "distortion of facts and scandalising the Court" that he was entitled to apply for sanction to prosecute the learned judge concerned. In any event, it was submitted that he does not desire to justify his conduct and he requests the Court to accept the apology and close the proceedings. He also sought to point out that the Supreme Court had occasioned to consider the law of criminal contempt almost thread-bare in the recent decision reported in Dr. D.C. Saxena, Contemnor Vs. Hon''ble the Chief Justice of India, and it was his contention that a reading of that judgment would indicate that it is certainly open to a party to indulge in criticism of the work of the Courts in general or of a particular decision if facts and circumstances so justify. We do not propose to labour much on this contention because R-4 having tendered an unconditional apology has only advanced his submissions in passing but he has not tried to justify his conduct which in our considered view is the right thing to do in the circumstances and of which we have taken note. Had R-4 insisted by justifying his conduct, we would have had no option except to come down very heavily because we have had occasion to point out when the earlier order was passed that unjustified, unwarranted, malicious or motivated criticism against the Judges, Courts or judiciary as a whole seems to have become a fashion of the day in certain quarters and we were required to administer a stern warning in the earlier order that this Court will take stringent steps if such misconduct persists. We also had occasion to observe in the earlier order that a wrong confidence seems to have developed that irrespective of the gravity of the contempt, that a party can be more or less certain that if an apology is tendered, the Court will accept it and nothing will happen thereafter. Whereas the Courts adopt a policy of magnanimity the contemnors misunderstood the sympathy and kindness shown to them and the sum total of the situation was that there was a sporadic increase in such instances with not a single person being awarded the punishment which the law provides. It is that situation which requires rectification.

The present case is an unusual one and is very different from the normal cases under the Contempt of Courts Act. Hitherto, as rightly pointed out by the learned S.P.P., attacks against the Judges and judicial officers were few and far between and contempt cases more invariably confined themselves to disobedience of Court orders or interference with the course of judicial proceedings both of which were far less serious than what has happened in this case. As indicated by us earlier, the leniency and sympathy that was repeatedly shown by the Courts because of apologies and all sorts of pious assurances and pleas that were put forward has had the wrong effect with the impression being created that contempt proceedings are innocuous proceedings that the law of contempt is virtually a toothless legislation and that the sum total of the situation is that a contemnor has only to appear contrite and that he will go scot-free. In sum and substance, it has resulted in subversion of the law and that exhibits the misplaced courage with which the attacks of the present type have been taking place. The law does recognise a situation whereunder the judicial decisions can be criticised, but there are Parameters which cannot be crossed in so far as when the right of freedom of speech has been exercised, it has got to be within very well defined and reasonable limits and as far as the law of contempt is concerned, it prescribes that the criticism will not be personal and malicious but that it will conform to the definition of fair criticism and fair comment. Similarly, the law provides for adequate redressal in respect of every grievance that has taken place in the course of a judicial proceeding if the order is incorrect. If it is without jurisdiction and even if it is perverse, the law provide ample avenues for rectification of the situation, and the same applies even to a situation where a judicial officer might have gone grossly wrong by overlooking or disregarding intentionally or otherwise material aspects of the record or points of law or even by conducting the proceedings in the manner in which he ought not to have done, all of which are invariably within the framework of the effective law by approaching a superior forum. The law totally prohibits a personal counter attack on a Judge or a judicial officer in respect of a decision rendered by him in the course of his judicial duties and the law also provides specific immunity to a Judge in such a situation. This is very necessary in order to provide every judicial officer an atmosphere to carry out the judicial functions independently and without fear or favour. In such a situation, therefore, if any attempt is as a site Engineer and under the present petitioner and as he was found unsuitable for the job, his service was terminated with effect from 22-7-1992. It is alleged that on 9-4-1993 the opposite party sent a letter without his signature to the petitioner making all sorts of imputations against the petitioner. After receiving the letter, the petitioner sent a photo copy thereof to the opposite party asking him to put his signature thereon, if the same has been sent by him. The photo copy was sent by registered post on 19-4-93 and it is alleged that the opposite party sent back the photo copy of the defamatory letter with a signature. Receiving back the said copy of the letter the petitioner compared the signature with the signature of the opposite party available in his office and found that the signature was not the signature of the opposite party. On 6-5-93 the petitioner issued a pleader''s notice to which the opposite party gave his reply through his advocate on 10-5-93. It is alleged that the said reply also contained scurrilous remarks against the petitioner. So the petitioner filed the complaint against the opposite party. The opposite party denied the allegation levelled against him and claimed trial.

To substantiate his case the complainant besides examining himself as P.W. 1, examined two other witnesses. Out of them, P.W. 2 is a member of Board of Directors of the said Hospital, who has deposed to have seen the letter containing scurrilous remarks against the petitioner in the petitioner''s house. P.W. 3 is a witness to the reply, Ext. 5 given by the lawyers of the opposite party to the notice served on the opposite party. The petitioner also relied on certain documents such as Ext. 1, the letter said to have been written by the opposite party to the complainant in April, 1993, Ext. 2 the acknowledgment letter, Ext. 3 the photo copy of the letter. Ext. 4 office copy of the pleader''s notice, and Ext. 5 reply to the pleader''s notice. The accused-opposite party however did not examine any witness in support of his case.

The learned counsel of the petitioner contended that the learned Magistrate has failed to appreciate the evidence adduced by the complainant and his witnesses in their proper perspectives and has arrived at wrong findings. The learned counsel of the opposite, party, on the other hand, argued in support of the findings. In the above context, it is noticed that the learned G.O.J.M. after hearing the parties and considering the evidence found that there is no material to show that the opposite party is the author of Ext. 1, the letter containing the scurrilous remarks against the petitioner. He also found that there is as evidence to show that the photo copy of the letter sent by the petitioner in the address of the opposite party was served on the opposite party and the opposite party sent back the case to the petitioner. In fact, the petitioner has admitted that the letter was not signed and the name appearing in the photo copy is not the signature of the opposite party. The learned Magistrate also found that there is no evidence to come to a finding that the pleader''s notice was served on the opposite party and the reply was given by the counsel being instructed by the opposite party. On the basis of his above findings, the learned Magistrate held the opposite party not guilty of the charge under S. 500, IPC and acquitted him. After hearing the counsel of the parties and carefully going through the impugned judgment, it is noticed that the learned Magistrate has assigned clear and cogent reasons for the findings recorded by him and the order does not suffer from any illegality, manifest error or perversity.

In the above circumstances, the prayer for leave to appeal is refused. The Criminal Misc. Case is accordingly dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.