Hindusthan National Glass And Industries Limited vs Amit Das And Others

Arindam Mukherjee, J:

In a suit for money claim with relief for declaration and injunction instituted on 11th June, 2026, the plaintiff has taken out an application being G.A.1 of 2026 inter alia for injunction. The application was moved ex parte on June 16, 2026 when an ad interim order was passed which was subsequently corrected on 18th June, 2026. The defendant no. 3 and defendant nos. 5 to 8 have taken out their respective vacating applications being G.A. 2 of 2026 and G.A.3 of 2026.

Brief Facts:

The Plaintiff company, Hindustan National Glass & Industries Limited (HNGIL), is currently under the management of Independent Sugar Corporation Limited (INSCO) following a successful resolution process under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) approved by an order dated 14^th August, 2025 passed by the National Company Law Tribunal (in short, “NCLT”)

Prior to this takeover, HNGIL operated an Exempted Provident Fund through a trust known as the ‘HNG Group Companies Provident Fund Institution’ for its employees. (hereinafter for the sake convenience referred to as the said Trust).

Upon assuming control of the plaintiff company in September 2025, the new management conducted an internal review and audit with regard to the said Trust. This investigation said to have revealed massive financial irregularities perpetrated by the erstwhile trustees (Respondents 2-8) and a former employee of HNGIL (Respondent 1). On the basis of the above facts, the plaintiff company instituted the suit and filed an injunction application therein. The facts pleaded in the plaint and those alleged in the said injunction application persuaded this Court to hold that a prima facie, case has been made out by the plaintiff which was sufficient for passing on ex parte an ad-interim order of injunction dated 16th June, 2026 restraining the defendants from using the bank accounts and processing any transaction - against the Respondent nos. 1 to 8, 10, 11, 12 and the banks and financial institutions. Further, an investigation by Serious Fraud Investigation Office (in short, ‘SFIO’) was also directed. The plaintiff was further directed to comply with the provisions of Order 39 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short, ‘CPC’). The order dated 16th June, 2026 was subsequently corrected by an order dated 18th June, 2026.

After service of the application, the defendant nos. 1 to 8 have appeared and opposed the continuance of the ad interim order dated 16th June, 2026 as corrected by the order dated 18th June, 2026. The defendant nos. 3 has filed an application for vacating the order dated 16th June, 2026 as corrected by the order dated 18th June, 2026 being G.A. 2 of 2026 intera lia taking several grounds for the same. Although, the defendant no. 3 claims to have filed this application but on a perusal of the same, it appears to have been made also on behalf of defendant no. 2 and 4. The defendants no. 5 to 8 have also taken out an application for vacating the order dated 16th June, 2026 as corrected by the order dated 18th June, 2026 being G.A. 3 of 2026.

Submissions on behalf of defendant no. 1.

Submission by Respondent no. 2.

a. It is submitted by the respondent no. 2 that the said respondent has been served with a copy of the application on 22nd June, 2026, but no copy of the plaint has been served. It is further submitted by the said respondent that even on merits the ex parte ad interim order dated 16th June, 2026 as corrected by order dated 18th June, 2026 is required to be discharged and/or vacated. The learned senior advocate representing the said respondent has drawn the attention of the court to various documents including the advice said to have been given by the learned advocate for the plaintiff to his client for filing the suit to demonstrate that there is no allegation as against the said respondent contained either in the plaint or in the application.

b. It is the case of the respondent no.2 who is incidentally one of the promoter of the plaintiff company, its director till the change in management and also the trustee of the exempted trust fund that there is no allegation that the money required to be deducted from the employees, staff and workers of the plaintiff company were not deducted or along with the employers’ contribution was not deposited with the trust fund on regular basis as required under the statute. There is also no allegation that the employees, who had superannuated or in the case where their family members became entitled to the terminal benefits the same were not so paid. The resolution plan, so far as the provisions contained therein on being approved cannot be further questioned in a collateral proceeding unless an appeal has been preferred against the same. In the instant case the plaintiff has concealed the fact that an appeal challenging the acceptance of the resolution has been filed by the erstwhile management of the plaintiff company including the respondent no. 2 which is now pending before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, (in short, NCLAT) .

c. It is also the case of the respondent that at the present pursuant to the First Information Report (in short, FIR) having been lodged, there are two agencies; one who under the statute pursuant to the FIR is entrusted to investigate and the other in terms of the order dated 16th June, 2026 as corrected by the order dated 15th June, 2026. There may be a conflict in the process of investigation. Although, the respondent no. 2 is not feared to face the investigating agencies, yet that part of the order directing SFIO to carry out the investigation should be vacated for such reason. The respondent no.2 also draws attention to the averment in the plaint and the reliefs also to show that the plaintiff never came before the court for protecting the interest of the employees but to shield any liability that may have been fastened to the plaintiff pursuant to the take-over.

It is also the case of the respondent no.2 that despite specific direction in the order dated 16th June, 2026 the mandatory provisions of Order 39 Rule 3 of CPC has not been complied with. On that ground alone, the ex parte ad interim order is required to be vacated.

A. It is submitted by the respondent no. 3 that the said respondent has already filed a vacating application being IA No. GA/2/2026 wherein apart from the merits, the said defendant/respondent has taken the plea of non-service of the plaint as one of the grounds for vacating the ad interim order dated 16th June, 2026 as corrected by order dated 18th June, 2026. The defendant no. 3 also objects to the supplementary affidavit filed by the plaintiff/petitioner being taken on record. It is the case of the said defendant that the issue of vacating or contriving of with the ad interim order shall be on the basis of the documents already on record and as such the supplementary affidavit of the plaintiff should not be considered at this stage.

B. In course of argument, the learned Senior Advocate for the respondent no. 3 has referred to paragraph 10A at page 19 of the supplementary affidavit filed by the plaintiff and then had referred to pages 27 and 29 of the said supplementary affidavit. By relying upon these documents, it is submitted by that prior to filing of the suit a specific criminal complaint on the selfsame allegations has been made on the basis whereof a First Information Report (in short, FIR) is said to have been registered. The complaint was made by one Rohit Mishra, who has also verified the plaint and affirmed the instant application. The said Rohit Mishra was aware of the complaint and as such ought to have disclosed such fact. Having not done so it is suppression of material fact for which the ad interim order should be set aside. Furthermore, once such FIR is registered it is within the purview of the authority to whom the complaint has been made to investigate into the same and bring it to a logical conclusion. The complaint made is based on the allegation of misappropriation and defalcation of trust fund. Since a competent authority is already in seisin of the matter SFIO is not required to be directed to further investigate. Moreover, according to the said respondent SFIO is empowered to investigate into the affairs of the company under Section 212 of the Companies Act, 2013 and not into the affairs of the trust fund which is independent and stands outside the ambit of the assets belonging to the company. Assuming without admitting that there has been a defalcation then also it is also submitted that the plaintiff’s money has not been defalcated for the recovery of which a civil suit like the instant one can be maintained that too during the pendency of the criminal case. The alleged defalcation, if any is in respect of trust fund to which the plaintiff has no right to seek recovery and as such the civil suit cannot be maintained on the basis of such allegations. Mr. Mookherjee thereafter placed paragraphs 64, 66 to 68 of the plaint to show the allegation on the basis whereof the plaintiff has come to Court and submitted that the same does not relate to either the respondent no. 3 or any of the trustees. It is further submitted that none of these allegations concern the respondent no.3, a managing trustee of the trust fund. There is also no allegation that the amount required to be deposited as per the provisions of the Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (in short, PF Act) to the trust fund has not been deposited. There is also no allegation that the amount which fell due to an employee, staff or worker of the plaintiff company on his superannuation or death as retiral benefit or the terminal benefit have not been paid between 2021 to 2025. Mr. Mookherjee has also placed reliance on page 352 of the application in Volume-III thereof to draw the attention of the court to the financial statement contained therein to contend that no deficit far less defalcation of the trust fund has taken place. It is also the case of respondent no. 3 that records reveal that the assets of the trust far exceed its liabilities.

C. The respondent no.3 has further relied upon the resolution plan pursuant to which the order dated 14th August, 2025 was passed by NCLT. The said order is at page 190 (annexure-D – Volume-II of the application). Keeping side by side the resolution plan and the order dated 14th August, 2025, it was argued that the resolution plan submitted by the present management of the plaintiff company actually intended to extinguish the claims and/or dues of the employees, staff and workers of the plaintiff company, which on being approved becomes binding on the employees in view of the provisions of Section 31 of the IBC. The trigger date as contained in page 39 of the resolution plan has also been informed to the Court to give the date from which the present management has become liable for the PF dues. The suit has been filed to avoid any penal consequence against the present management of the plaintiff company for default in paying the statutory dues in the garb of allegations against the trust and the trustees which are untrue on the face of record. Referring to paragraphs 43, 45, 48 and 49, it is submitted by Mr. Mookherjee that there is no allegation as against the said respondent of having received any siphoned off money from the trust. No particulars of bank account of the respondent no.3 has also been provided alleging that money said to have been siphoned off from the trust fund has been parked into the said account. It is also the case of the respondent no.3 that the allegation regarding change of management of the trust fund during the pendency of CIRP also does not hold good in respect of the respondent no.3 as the said respondent was not present in the meeting dated 16th December, 2023 and his leave of absence was granted as specifically recorded in the minutes of the meeting which is at page 796, Volume-VI of the application.

D. Mr. Mookherjee has also referred to page 799 and annexure AA at page 815, annexure AD at page 844 and page 944 annexure AK to demonstrate that there is no allegation as against the respondent no.3 and as such the plaintiff has no cause of action to file and maintain the suit as against the said respondent. In that view of the matter, no interim or ad interim order can or could be passed against the respondent no.3. The order directing investigation by SFIO, however, acts as a prejudice to the interest of the respondent no.3 in the absence of any specific allegation against the said respondent and, as such, the said part of the order directory investigation by SFIO should be vacated or in the alternative the same for the time being should be stayed.

In the light of the aforesaid submissions and by adopting the submissions made on behalf of respondent nos.2, 3, 5 to 8 and respondent no.1, it is submitted by the respondent no.4 that the plaint discloses no cause of action as against the respondent no.4 and the plaintiff also does not have any cause of action to file and maintain the suit against the respondent no.3. in such situation no order, in interim or ad interim form, can be passed or continued against the respondent no.4.

It is submitted by the respondent no. 5 to 8 that the application to which the plaint is annexed has been served, but the annexures to the plaint are not annexed to the application. Assuming without admitting that service of the application with a copy of the plaint annexed thereto is substantial compliance of the provisions of Order 39 Rule 3 of CPC then also service of a copy of the plaint as an annexure to the application without the annexures of the plaint is not a proper service in compliance with the provisions of Order XXXIX Rule 3 of CPC. The ex parte ad interim order dated 16th June, 2026 as corrected by the order dated 18th June, 2026 is, therefore, liable to be vacated and/or discharged on that ground alone. It is further submitted, that no copy of the order has been served and, as such, his clients were unable to appreciate the scope of the order. Furthermore, on the facts of the instant case there is no necessity of passing of any interim order in favour of the plaintiff/petitioner.

On behalf of the Respondent Nos. 5 to 8, it is also submitted that the plaintiff has no cause of action as against either of the Respondent Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8 inasmuch as the money of which defalcation is complained of is not the money of the plaintiff company. It is at the highest the money of the employees, staff and workers of the plaintiff company which was to be deposited with the trust fund in compliance of the statutory provisions. It is further submitted by the said Respondent Nos. 5 to 8 that if the money does not belong to the plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot have any grievance about its alleged defalcation or shortfall. The plaintiff, therefore, cannot file and maintain the suit. The Order dated 16th June, 2026 as corrected by the Order dated 18th June, 2026 as a consequence thereof, should be vacated on this ground alone.

The respondent nos. 5 to 8 submit that the relief claimed in the suit cannot be granted to the plaintiff. Assuming without admitting that the plaintiff has a cause as against the defendant nos. 1 to 14 then also the relief(s) claimed in the suit cannot be granted. By referring to prayer (a) of the plaint appearing at page 933 of the application and paragraph 67 of the plaint at page 928 of the application, it is submitted that the money claimed by the plaintiff does not belong to the plaintiff. The genesis of the money is deduction from the employees added to the employer’s contribution towards the provident fund which is kept in a trust fund. The trust is a separate entity. The money in the trust fund is that of the employees, staff and workers of the plaintiff company. Once the money is deducted from the employees and with the employer’s contribution is deposited in the trust fund, it loses the character of the money belonging to the plaintiff. Since the plaintiff is not entitled to the money, no relief as in prayer (a) on the basis of the pleading as in paragraph 67 of the plaint can be given to the plaintiff. Similarly, the prayer (b) read with paragraph 68 of the plaint cannot be also granted to the plaintiff. The allegation of the plaintiff is that the trustees have defalcated and/or swindled out money belonging to the plaintiff, is a completely incorrect statement on the face of the record. Assuming without admitting that the trustees have misappropriated the fund then also the said money can be recovered at the instance of the workers, staff and employees of plaintiff and has to be either put into the trust fund or with the balance money lying in the trust in case of the exemption being revoked is to be deposited with the provident fund authorities and not to the plaintiff as claimed under any circumstances. The suit according to the respondent no. 5 to 8 also suffers from misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. The trust wherein the money was being deposited had several trustees which comprised of representatives of the employer and the employee. Neither the employer’s representative nor the employees’ representative have been made parties to the suit. Furthermore, the allegation as to misappropriation of fund spreads over from 2021-22 to 2025-26. During this period, several trustees have changed. All these trustees were required to be made parties but only some of them and not have been made so. Any action against the trust has to be against all the trustees. It is well-settled principle of law that an action where all the trustees have not been made parties to a suit like that framed in the instant case is bound to fail. The respondent nos. 5 to 8 has also referred to page 796 of the application to submit that Manoj Bhaskaran, who was admittedly a trustee, was not made a party to cite as instance of non-joinder of parties. No interim order in aid of the reliefs claimed in the suit, for the reasons aforesaid, according to the respondent nos. 5 to 8 can or could be passed in favour of the plaintiff.

The respondent nos. 5 to 8 also submit that the plaintiff has not only suppressed the material fact but has given an incorrect picture of the fact regarding cancellation of the exemption granted to the trust. By referring to the provisions of the Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (in short ‘PF Act’), it is submitted that the exemption is granted by the appropriate government. The appropriate government in the instant case is the central government who granted the exemption by issuing a notification. A notification dated 11th January 2011 is placed before the Court to demonstrate that the central government had given the exemption. It is also the case of the respondent nos. 5 to 8 that the exemption, if had to be cancelled, can only be done by the central government on issuing a further notification. The PF authorities or any other authority not being the central government can cancel the same. No such cancellation has taken place as yet and as such, the question of passing an order treating the exemption to have been cancelled, cannot be passed or be continued.

The respondent nos. 5 to 8 also submit that no suit at the instance of the plaintiff can or could be maintained inasmuch as the right to take any action against the trustees if at all, is with the PF authorities in case of defalcation or misappropriation of fund. The veracity of the allegation is required to be scrutinized by the PF authorities to find out whether the plaintiff as the employer had deposited the correct amount from time to time as per the statutory provision. Unless the ascertainment takes place, it cannot be said that the plaintiff company as the employer had deposited the correct sum and that such sum has been misappropriated by the trustees. The respondent nos. 5 to 8 also submit that while approving the Resolution Plan the NCLT was informed by the PF authorities that a sum of Rs.5,27,500/-was the shortfall amount. By an order passed by the NCLT in the application of the PF authorities, the said sum of Rs.5,27,500/- had been made over to the PF authorities and as such, there is no further dues. Moreover, the case that the plaintiff is trying to run is contrary to the record as in the Resolution Plan there has been no amount shown to be due from the trustees to the plaintiff company whom the plaintiff company was under CIRP. The respondent nos. 5 to 8 has also referred to the provisions of Section 36 of the IBC in this regard. It is also the case of the respondent nos. 5 to 8 that no order for investigation by the SFIO can or could have been passed in the facts of the case. There is no pleading or prayer for such a relief. In absence of pleading and specific claim, no order in aid of the final relief claimed in the suit, can or could be passed at the interlocutory stage. The respondent nos. 5 to 8 refers to Section 212 of the Companies Act, 2013 to demonstrate that only the central government on the happening of certain events can direct investigation by SFIO. The Court is not empowered to do so. The Court can in an appropriate 6 case request the central government to enquire and if necessary, direct investigation through SFIO, provided such pleading is made and relief is claimed in the suit. The suit is also bad as no notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short, CPC) had been issued to PF authorities though they have been impleaded as a party defendant. In the light of the arguments advanced, the respondent nos. 5 to 8 submit that the interim order dated 16th June, 2026, as corrected by the order dated 18th June, 2026 should be vacated.

Submission on behalf of respondent no. 9.

It is submitted that the respondent no. 9 was the Resolution Professional (in short, RP) appointed by the National Company Law Tribunal (in short, `NCLT), Kolkata Bench. The said respondent is neither a necessary nor a proper party to the suit. Although no orders have been passed against the said respondent but the said respondent prays and further intends to make an application for expunging his name from the array of the defendants.

Submission on behalf of respondent no. 13.

On behalf of the respondent no.13, it is submitted that the said respondent was engaged as the statutory auditor of the plaintiff company for the years 2018-19, 2021-22 and 2024-25. The statutory auditor (respondent no.13) did not personally visit the office of the Provident Fund Authorities to scrutinise the records. The statutory auditor also did not personally go and scrutinise the accounts at the premises of the plaintiff but only acted on the basis of the particulars, documents and accounts provided by the plaintiff which was collected by his team and scrutinised at the office of the statutory auditor. The statutory auditor, therefore, claims to be neither a necessary nor a proper party to this proceeding. No order can or could be passed against the said statutory auditor. It is further submitted that the name of statutory auditor be deleted and/or expunged from the array of defendants.

Submission on behalf of respondent no. 15.

On behalf of the respondent No. 15 it is submitted that the said respondent has been served with the copy of the application. The learned Advocate, however, on instruction submits that the second volume of the application has not been served on her client. However, in compliance with the order dated 16th June, 2026 as corrected by order dated 18th June, 2026, the said bank has stopped operation of the accounts as also passed necessary directions so that the securities, if any of the respondent no. 1 to 8 are not dealt with.

Submission on behalf of respondent no. 31.

It is submitted on behalf of the respondent No.31 and submits that no relief has been claimed against the said respondent. In the order there is also no direction upon them.

Submission on behalf of respondent no. 36.

It is submitted on behalf of the respondent No.36, the Employees Provident Fund Organisation (in short, ‘EPF’) submits that the plaintiff had on 16th June, 2026 as recorded in the order had made an incorrect submission. The trustees of the Exempted Provident Fund Trust of the plaintiff company did not deposit the amount as required under the provisions of Section 17(5) of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the PF Act) read with condition No. 28 of Para 27AA of the Scheme framed under the PF Act. Despite the exemption being recalled by the appropriate Government, it is also the case of the said respondent that only after the present management of the plaintiff company corresponded with the EPFO authorities it came to the notice of the EPFO authorities that there has been a deficit/shortfall in the funds required to be deposited towards employees contribution along with the employers contribution for the financial year 2025-2026 and for a further period of one month. It, however, appears that EPFO authority has taken no steps as against the trustees for having not complied with the provisions of Section 17(5) of the PF Act.

In course of argument, the PF authorities have relied upon the following judgments :

By relying upon paragraph 9 of Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. [supra] it is submitted by learned advocate representing the PF authorities that the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the scheme of 1952 along with the amendments thereto did not hold that the scheme is ultra vires to any statutory provision. The only finding of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is that the amendments to the scheme are required to be notified which has been subsequently done by an order published by the concerned Ministry. The learned advocate for the PF Authorities has also placed before the court an order of the Government of India, Ministry of Labour and Employment dated 5th April, 2016 to contend that the exemption was extended in terms of paragraph 27A of the 1952 Scheme to the plaintiff company with effect from 04.02.2005. a copy of such order is taken on record.

By referring to Dalmia Cement it is submitted by PF authorities that as late as in 2025 the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court did not find any infirmity or anomaly in the provisions of the scheme to hold that the same are not binding. It is further submitted by PF authorities that in view of such legal position clause 29 of Appendix A to the 1952 scheme is binding. Once there has been a transfer of any nature the exemption stands withdrawn or revoked.

However, the fact remains that no notification has been placed by the PF authorities withdrawing or revoking the exemption though the exemption was granted by way of a notification which has been relied upon by respondent nos.5 to 8.

It is further submitted by respondent no. 36 that The PF authorities have placed before Court the print out of Form RM-2 being the annual audited returns of the trust fund filed with such authority wherein the employers’ and the employees’ contribution as per the provisions of the Employees’ Provident Fund Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (in short, PF Act) were to be deposited in respect of the plaintiff company. By submitting five such returns received by the PF authorities on different dates of December, 2023 which are taken on record it is submitted that there was no shortfall in the amount required to be deposited as per the provisions of PF Act with the trust fund till the financial year 2023-24. The only deficit was the surcharge amount which has been recorded pursuant to orders of National Company Law Tribunal (in short NCLT). It is further submitted by the PF authorities that until returns for the financial year 2024-25 and 2025-26 are not submitted and the details of the accounts relating to the trust fund showing the amount deposited are not provided, it will not be possible for the PF authorities to comment whether there has been any shortfall or deficit subsequent to the financial year 2023-24. It will also not be also possible for the PF authorities in such facts and circumstances to assertively say as to whether there has been any siphoning of fund from the said trust account which can only be computed if there is any difference between the money now lying in the trust fund and the money with interest that should be in the trust fund on the date of take over is noticed. It is also the case of the PF authorities that in terms of paragraph 27AA and clause 16 and 29 of Appendix A of the Scheme of 1952 the exemption granted to the plaintiff company for depositing the employees’ and employers’ contribution as per the statutory provisions with the exempted trust fund automatically stands revoked once there has been an acquisition or transfer of any kind. In the instant case, the plaintiff company on being taken over by another entity in terms of the resolution plan approved by the NCLT under the provisions of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 will amount to acquisition or at least a transfer of any kind. This will automatically attract the provisions of clause 16 and 29 of Appendix A read with paragraph 27AA of the 1952 Scheme for which the funds lying with the trust are required to be transmitted to the Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation (in short, EPFO) in terms of the statutory provisions. The money lying with the trust on having not been transmitted to the EPFO is clear in violation of the statutory provisions. It is the further case of the PF authorities that the employer is liable for any deficit or shortfall in the amount which was required to be deposited after deduction with such trust fund along with applicable interest and penalty co-extensively with the trustees and the trust.

On behalf of PF authorities provisions of Sections 16, 17 and 18 of the PF Act has also been placed before this court to elucidate the responsibility of the employer and that of the trust apart from a writ petition filed by the plaintiff company before the High Court at Punjab and Haryana which has now been withdrawn by the present management of the plaintiff company.

It is also the case of the PF authorities that there has been financial loss for consecutive 10 years from 2012-2013 which is evident from the report of a third party auditor engaged by the PF authorities. A copy of the said report has been placed before the Court is taken on record. The report also suggests that the exemption should have been withdrawn with effect from 1st April, 2015. It is the further case of the PF authorities that serious fraud has been committed in this matter and as such the order of investigation by SFIO is not only justified but should be continued. The PF authorities also say that the ad interim order dated 16th June, 2026 as corrected by the order dated 18th June, 2026 should not be vacated as any money which may be found to be siphoned off cannot be received and will cause serious detriment to the interval of the employees of the plaintiff company.

Submission on behalf of the plaintiff.

It is submitted by the plaintiff that admittedly the copy of the plaint is annexed to the interlocutory application. It is also the case of the plaintiff that the defendants/respondents have been made aware that a suit has been filed. It cannot, according to the plaintiff, therefore be contended that the defendants/respondents were not aware about the statements made in the plaint. The annexures to the plaint are separately annexed to the application and, as such, it cannot also be said that the defendants/respondents were not aware or could not look into the annexures to the plaint for making submissions. It is an admitted position that a copy of the application has been served along with the copy of the plaint annexed thereto. It may be correct that the plaint has not been separately served but there has been substantial compliance of the provisions of Order 39 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short, CPC) and, as such, the order should not be vacated on such ground as contended by the defendants/respondents. It is further submitted that there has been no suppression of any material fact. The allegation made by the respondents that the particulars of the police complaint were not disclosed in the plaint though the suit was instituted subsequent to the registration of FIR does not hold good if the events are chronologically taken note of. The plaint was verified and affirmed so as the application, on 8th June, 2026. On the same day the police complaint was lodged at around 4.30 pm with the police station which will be evident from the endorsement on the receipt copy annexed to the supplementary affidavit filed in this application. The police complaint and the FIR were made and registered after affirming the plaint. By referring to paragraph 61 it is submitted that a clear indication has been given in the plaint that the plaintiff shall rely upon the FIR or any complaint that may be made as the plaint was contemplating to make such complaint. There is, as such, no suppression of fact far less suppression of material fact.

In course of argument, the plaintiff has further made the following submissions:

The First Information Report (in short, `FIR’) in terms of the complaint made by the plaintiff on 8th June, 2026 was registered on 18th June, 2026 i.e. subsequent to institution of the suit by presenting the plaint and passing of the order dated 16th June 2026 and 18th June, 2026. In this regard the plaintiff has referred to page 63 of the supplementary affidavit in support of the date and time when the FIR was registered. The plaintiff says that neither the fact of making of the complaint nor the registration of the FIR can or could have been included in the plaint due to their respective filing and/or registering dates and time since the plaint and petition were verified and affirmed on 8th June, 2026. The FIR was, in fact, registered after the initial order dated 16th June, 2026 was passed which was corrected by the order dated 18th June, 2026. The plaintiff at the earliest opportunity has brought such facts to the notice of the Court by filing the supplementary affidavit which was affirmed on 30th June, 2026, apart from making a statement in the plaint which demonstrate the fact that the plaintiff was contemplating to make a complaint. There is, as such, no suppression of any fact far less material fact which requires the ad interim order of injunction to be discharged and/or varied under the provisions of Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short, `CPC’).

The plaintiff then submits that the contention of the respondent nos. 1, 2,3 and 5 to 8 that the plaintiff does not have any cause of action to file and maintain the suit or the plaint does not disclose any cause of action is untenable apart from the fact that there is no application for rejection of plaint on such ground. On a holistic reading of the plaint it will appear that the plaintiff company being an “establishment” under the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (in short, `PF Act’) was granted the exemption for maintaining the trust fund for the purpose of depositing the employees contribution after deducting the same as per the provision of PF Act along with the employers contribution and other statutory charges as applicable. In the event there is a shortfall in the amount required to be deposited in the trust fund as per the statutory provision it is the liability of the plaintiff as the employer and an “establishment” under the PF Act to make good such shortfall along with the applicable interest and penalty as per the statutory provisions. The plaintiff, therefore, remains liable to the employees as also the PF authority and the appropriate Government who had granted the exemption to the plaintiff company. The plaintiff then says by referring to page 796 that the defendant nos. 5, 6,7 and 8 continued to remain as trustees along with the defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 4 even after reconstitution that took place on 16th December, 2023. The said defendants, therefore, cannot absolve their responsibility and liability as trustees just by contending that there is no shortfall without giving the amount which is now lying with the trust fund or was there with the trust on the triggered date from which the Resolution Plan approved by the National Company Law Tribunal (in short, `NCLT’) in respect of the plaintiff company become operated. The pleadings in paragraphs 61, 63 and 64 of the plaint according to the plaintiff clearly disclose the reasons for which the plaintiff has come to Court.

The defendant nos. 1 to 8 have strenuously argued that the order directing investigation by SFIO could not have been passed either in law or on the facts of the case and as such should be vacated. The main thrust of the argument is that SFIO can be directed to investigate into the affairs of the company in view of the provisions of Section 211 and 212 of the Companies Act, 2013 and that can be directed only by the Central Government. Assuming without admitting that there has been defalcation of the trust fund then also the same does not form part of the affairs of the plaintiff company for which investigation by SFIO could be directed. Moreover, a complaint before a competent authority to investigate has been made by the plaintiff in relation to the self-same set of allegations. An FIR has been registered and as such the investigation is in progress. At this stage SFIO cannot be invited to make investigation on the same issue. Furthermore, the PF Authorities under the provisions of Section 7A of the PF Act have wide powers to investigate and take appropriate measures against and erring establishment. The matter relates to defalcation of money of the provident fund trust. It is, therefore, well within the jurisdiction of the PF Authorities to investigate the same. While considering the arguments advanced by the defendant nos. 1 to 8 one cannot lose sight of the fact that the plaintiff is the “establishment” before the PF Authorities has six units spread over India. The exempted provident fund trust is where the statutory deductions from the salary and wages of the employees, staff and workers of all the six units of the plaintiff company with employer’s contribution has to be deposited. All the employees, staff and workers of the plaintiff company are to get their retiral and/or terminal benefits from a single trust fund. Moreover, a unit in a particular zone is under the control of the Regional Provident Fund Authorities of that zone. The exemption is, however, granted to the plaintiff company as an establishment under the PF Act and not to the separate units. The plaintiff company is, therefore, subject to different Regional Provident Fund Authorities where it has a unit. It is apparent from the record that the Regional Provident Fund Authority, Northern Zone had issued notice revoking the exemption in connection with the Rohtak unit of the plaintiff company at Haryana which was challenged by the company prior to the present management took over the same in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and not before this Court within the jurisdiction whereof the plaintiff’s registered office is situated. In such a fact scenario for the PF Authorities to proceed against the plaintiff company there has to be a coordinated action from all the Regional Offices wherein the records of a particular unit is situated. It is also evident from the documents produced by the PF authorities that the Regional Provident Fund Commission has to request the Central Board of the Provident Fund authorities in taking an action against the plaintiff company. It may so happen that after an enquiry/investigation there is no shortfall in respect of the contribution of a particular unit. The Regional Provident Fund Authority of that zone in such a case may not find it necessary to proceed against the plaintiff or the exempted trust fund in connection with such unit. At the same time on a preliminary investigation if the SFIO finds that there is no truth in the plaintiff’s allegation then no further proceeding will take place against the defendants no.1 to 8. The power of the provident fund authorities to carry out investigation under the statutory provisions are also limited. The provident fund authorities at the highest can impose penalty and recover interest on the deficit amount and recover the same from the establishment to replenish any shortfall in the deposit. The provident fund authorities are not empowered to carry out a full fledged enquiry in case of alleged defalcation. If the PF authorities do not find any shortfall at the first instance they may not proceed for further enquiry unless non-payment is reported. The police authorities in West Bengal can investigate into the allegation of defalcation very conveniently within the State of West Bengal. However, there are five other units in different States the Police Authorities of this State may not find it convenient to investigate outside the State of West Bengal when the documents are spread over several States under the jurisdiction of the different regional provident fund commissions In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, an agency like SFIO is a more preferred agency for the purpose of investigation.

So far as the contention of the defendant nos. 1 to 8 that investigation by SFIO can only be directed by the Central Government is also unacceptable. The powers of the High Court being a Court of record with the authority to exercise constitutional jurisdiction cannot be fettered by referring the provisions of Section 212 of the 2013 Act. In an appropriate case if the Court finds that an investigation is required where the business of the plaintiff company is spread out Pan India, the Court can always direct SFIO to carry out the investigation. The authority granted under Section 212 of the 2013 Act to the Central Government does not require the Court to request the Central Government to engage SFIO to investigate into the affairs of the plaintiff company as that will lead to the Central Government sitting on appeal over the order of the High Court while it orders investigation by SFIO. The object of the provisions of Section 212 of the 2013 Act is to provide a check and balance from frivolous complaint being made by one set of directors or share-holders against the other to spoil the functioning of a company as it is often found allegation of fraud levelled to invite SFIO to investigate. This does not curtail the powers of the High Court to order investigation by SFIO in an appropriate case. Furthermore, the exemption under the PF Act is granted to the “establishment” being the plaintiff company in the instant case. The plaintiff company under the statutory mandate is required to deduct the requisite amount from the salary and wages of its employees, staff and workers and deposit the same with its contribution (employer’s contribution) to the exempted trust fund. The deduction and the employer’s contribution is reflected in the books and accounts of the plaintiff company. The allegation of the plaintiff is defalcation of such money. To adjudicate defalcation it is to be also seen whether the correct amount was deducted and with the employer’s contribution was deposited in the trust fund from time to time. The money deducted and the employer’s contribution, therefore, forms part of the affairs of the plaintiff company. Even if the money on being deposited with the trust fund changes its identity and character then also the issue of deduction and employer’s contribution remains as affairs of the plaintiff company being the exempted establishment for which investigation by the SFIO under the provisions of Section 212 of the 2013 Act can also be directed. In a supplementary proceedings under Section 94 of CPC, the Court is empowered to pass interim orders for the ends of justice. Since the matter relates to the social security benefits of employees, staff and workers of the plaintiff company which not only has statutory approval but is also recognised under the constitutional framework this Court feels to be in the facts of the case to direct investigation by SFIO for the ends of justice. Furthermore, the Court can appoint an expert under the provisions of Section 45 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (now Section 39 of Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) to come to a conclusive finding as to the variety of the allegations. Investigation by SFIO can in such a case be treated to be an expert today.

So far as the submissions made by the respondent no. 9 and 13 are concerned, on a plain reading of the plaint, it cannot be held at this stage that the said defendants are neither a necessary nor a proper party. The prayer for expunging their respective names made without any specific application, for such purpose are considered and rejected at this stage.

This Court is also not required to clarify the scope of the interim order with regard to the bank accounts which the respondent no. 1 and 3 claimed to be not their accounts but the accounts maintained in the name of their family members as it appears from the accounts on which particulars are provided clearly shows that either the respondent no. 1 or the respondent no. 3are joint holders of such account. Even if, the respondent no. 1 and 3 are not the first account holder, as joint account holders can operate the account.

In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I do not find any potential substance in the argument of the defendant nos. 1 to 8 to either vacate or vary or discharge or modify the order dated 16^th June, 2026 as corrected by the order dated 18^th June, 2026 which has been further extended from time to time.

The applications being GA/2/2026 and GA/3/2026 do not require any further consideration independently as the contents thereof has been elaborately argued by the parties. GA/2/2026 and GA/3/2026 are, accordingly, dismissed.

The application being GA/1/2026 requires to be heard on affidavits.

Let affidavit-in-opposition be filed by 3^rd September, 2026. Affidavit-in-Reply thereto, if any, be filed by 30^th September, 2026.

Let this matter appear in the monthly list of October, 2026.

The interim order initially passed on 16^th June, 2026 and corrected by the order dated 18^th June, 2026 which is in subsistence till 3^rd August, 2026 is extended till disposal of GA/1/2026.

Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties on priority basis after compliance with all necessary formalities.

Stay of operation of the order is prayed for by the respondent nos. 1 to 8, the prayer is considered and rejected.