Hira Lal vs State Of Himachal Pradesh

Rakesh Kainthla, J

The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 86 of 2023, dated 29.07.2023, reg stered at Police Station Dharampur, District Solan, H.P., for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (in short “IPC”).

It has been asserted that the petitioner was falsely implicated in the present FIR. He was arrested on 29.07.2023. The charge-sheet has been filed before the Court, and the petitioner’s custody is not required. The grounds of arrest were not communicated to the petitioner, which violates his fundamental rights under Article 22 of the Constitution of India, and the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vihaan Vs State of Haryana & Anr., decided on 07.02.2025. The petitioner had earlier filed a petition before the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Solan, but it was dismissed on 05.08.2025. There is no likelihood of the petitioner’s absconding. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions which the court may impose; hence, the petition.

The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police station received a call on 29.07.2023 that one person was lying near the Yug Homestay. The police went to the spot and found one person lying dead, whose name was found to be Kashmir s/o Ishar. He had suffered multiple injuries, and his clothes were blood-stained. Informant, Yugal Thakur, made a statement to the police that he is running Yug Homestay. He had stayed in the Homestay on 28.07.2023. He heard some noise at about 01:00-01:30 am. He came out and saw that Hira Lal (petitioner) and Puran Chand were beating Kashmir with sticks. Kashmir stated that his arm was fractured. He rescued Kashmir from Hira Lal (petitioner) and the co-accused. Puran Chand revealed that Kashmir was teasing his mother and wife They dragged Kashmir towards Subathu. He found in the morning that someone was lying unconscious at 300 meters from the Homestay. He went to the spot and identified the person as Kashmir. Virender informed the police. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The petitioner and the co-accused produced the sticks wi h which the beatings were given to Kashmir. The samples we e collected and sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory (SFSL), Junga. As per the result of analysis, human bl d stains were found on the stones/concrete, Nail clippings, Shirt, Pyjama, T-shirt and lower of Kashmir Chand from the spot. The result of the DNA analysis is awaited. The charge-sheet was filed before the Court on 16.08.2024. The matter is now listed for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses on 04.12.2025. No FIR has been lodged against the petitioner. The petitioner is involved in the commission of a heinous crime. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

I have heard Mr Anirudh Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.

Mr Anirudh Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The grounds of arrests were not communicated to him. There is a delay in the progress of the trial, and the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being violated. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released n bail.

Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner is involved in the commission of a heinous crime. He sought repeated adjournments during the trial. The charges could only be framed on 02.07.2025 and the statements of witnesses were recorded on 17.09.2025. The delay is attributable to the petitioner, and he cannot take advantage of his own wrongs. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the record carefully.

The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:

- (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail

In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of pers nal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while gran ing bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, pa as 7 -9)

“7. It is th s obvio s that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if c nvicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue.

8 . Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]

Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)

In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)

“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the c urt has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature f evidence in support thereof, the severi y of he punishment which conviction will entail, the cha ac e , behaviour, means and standing of the accused, ci cumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public r State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)

This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)

“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.

Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the actual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)

In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, his Court held that although it is established that a cou t considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate disc ssion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail.

In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 S 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)

“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:

(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;

(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;

(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;

(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;

(vi) likelihood of the ffence being repeated;

(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and

(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)

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One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)

“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied)

Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, but the gravity and heinousness of the crime should weigh with the Court while considering the bail petition. It was observed at page 308:

The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating ot er troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.

It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….”

The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

It was submitted that the petitioner was not informed of the grounds of arrest, and this violated the petitioner’s fundamental right under Article 22 of the Constitution of India. This submission cannot be accepted. The petitioner was arrested in 2023, and it was laid down by the Karnataka High Court in RIYAZ H.Y. v. NIA, 2025 SCC OnLine Kar 34 that the requirement of communicating the grounds of arrests is prospective. It was observed:

“21. The judgment in Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2025) 5 SCC 799, which has followed Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576: (2024) 3 SCC (Cri), cannot have a retrospective effect.”

The matter is pending consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme C urt f India in State of Karnataka by Arasikere Town Police Station Versus Hemanth Datta @ Hemantha @ Baby and Anr SLP (Crl) 9295/2025, and nothing more is required to be said at t is stage.

The status report shows that the informant, Yugal Thakur, had rescued Kashmir from the petitioner and the co-accused. As per the report of the Medical Officer, Kashmir died due to the head injury sustained by him; therefore, prima facie, there is sufficient material to connect the petitioner to the commission of an offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC.

It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress of the trial, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this consideration. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of this Court in Hemant Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2025:HHC:21396). This submission will not help the petitioner. In Hemant Kumar’s case (supra), the Court had noticed that the learned prosecutor had requested to call the PWs at serial Nos 1 to 4, and only one witness was examined within 1 ½ years. Thus, the delay was attributable to the p osecution, who insisted upon the production of witnesses at serial numbers 1 to 4 only. In the present case, the delay is not attributable to the prosecution, as would be apparent from the orders sheets, and no advantage can be derived from the cited judgment.

A perusal of the order-sheets shows that an adjournment was sought on behalf of the petitioner on 15.05.2024. It was asserted on behalf of the petitioner on 04.07.2024 that a supplementary charge-sheet was not filed, and the charges should be framed only after the receipt of a supplementary charge-sheet. Supplementary charge-sheet was filed and copies were supplied on 03.10.2024. Thereafter, the matter was listed for consideration of the charge, and the charges were ultimately framed on 02.07.2025. These order-sheets show that the framing of the charges was stalled till 02.07.2025, and since a person cannot take advantage of his own wrong, therefore, the plea regarding the delay in the progress of the trial will not be available to the petitioner.

The petitioner is prima acie involved in the commission of a heinous offence which is punishable with capital punishment. Considering the g avi y of the offence and the severity of the punishment, the petitioner is not entitled to bail.

No other p int was urged.

In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed.

The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.