HOUSING BOARD, HARYANA vs Kartar Singh

WHETHER the pricing policy of the Housing Board, Haryana can be amended with retrospective effect to the deteriment of the consumer-allottees of its Middle Income Group and High Income Group Houses? WHETHER Clause 2(w) of the hire purchase tenancy agreement between the Board and the allottees gives the former a carte-blanche to revise such prices at the verge of seven years from the date of allotment? These inter-alia are the two crucial issues in this set of 85 connected appeals (First Appeal Nos. 51 to 122 and 124 to 136 of 1992) raising identical questions of law and facts. These are all directed against the same common order of the District Forum, Hisar. Learned Counsel for the parties are agreed that this order would govern all of them.

THE representative matrix of facts may be noticed from the main complaint case of ''Krishna Kumari v. THE Haryana Housing Board and Another''. Nearly eleven years ago the Housing Board, Haryana (hereinafter called the Board) had invited applications for registration for the allotment of built houses of different categories in its colony at Hisar and the last date to submit applications, therefor was the 30th of September, 1981 with an extension of three months for scheduled caste and backward classes. THEse houses were categorised as the Lower Income Group (L.I.G.) Middle Income Group (M.I.G.) Higher Income Group-I (H.I.G-I) and Higher Income Group-II (H.I.G. II). THE tentative price of the ground floor flats of the M.I.G, H.I.G-I and H.I.G-II was fixed at Rs. 39,400/-, Rs. 77,000/- and Rs. 1,00,000/-. THE specified different amounts were to be paid for the registration for these categories and the price was payable in monthly instalments to be recovered within eight to ten years. THE complainant applied successfully for a M.I.G house on the ground floor. But at the time of the allotment the tentative price of Rs. 39,400/- was enhanced to Rs. 68,755/-. THE complainant accepted the allotment and paid the proportionate instalments. But the matter did not rest there and the price was again enhanced in the year 1988 which also was accepted without demur by the complainant. However, in the year 1990 a further enhancement was demanded through demand notices and again acceded to. However, what broke the camel''s back was the last demand notice whereby Rs. 11,500/- was required to be paid up and the price of the house was escalated to Rs. 75,000/- and in addition to pay a compound interest of 15% on the above said amount. The complainant alongwith the other allottees made numerous representations to the authorities which fell on deaf car. It ha:; been pointed out that the Board has not issued any demand notices to'' the L.I.G category which were constructed simultaneously. It is further averred that the basic principle of allotment of houses by the Board was to give well planned and well designed houses to the people according to their status and income on a no profit and no loss basis. But the Board unmindful of its moto, increased and enhanced the price of the houses by nearly 100% and beyond the reach of the complainant and others like her. It was also the case that the Board had auctioned 81 houses of all categories in the same colony at a much less price and it wanted to cover the gap due to this auction by burdening the complainant and others in the shape of enhancement of land prices and cost of construction. The further averment is that 80 M.I.G type houses have been passed on to the Haryana State Government and 102 M.I.G houses were vacant which were equally liable for the enhanced costs, but leaving them out, the burden has been passed on to the complainant''s category. The specific plea was that all this was against the basic principle of no profit and no loss projected by the Board and instead they now wish to make sizeable profit against that avowed policy.

It is then the case that the Board had already levied unforeseen charges which were lying unused and were liable to be refunded with interest at 15% on the amount. It is pointed out that the houses and flats were got constructed in the year 1982- 83 and the enhancement of the cost of construction, therefor as late as in the year 1991 was unwarranted because at the relevant time the prices of material were far below than those prevalent now. It is also alleged that in fact the construction material used was sub-standard, with the effect that the roof of many houses had collapsed after their completion and these were reconstructed and this loss patently due to the negligent supervision of the Board, was also being demanded from the allottees. Substantial grievance is then made with regard to the secretiveness of the Board in so far as they have given not the least inkling of the method of calculation for the revised cost, nor the name of the Court or Arbitrator of the award, nor their amounts and the dates thereof have been indicated, nor any notice of the same given to the allottees. The primal grievance is against the notice demanding the deposit of Rs. 11,500/- within a period of 30 days and the relief claimed is that this demand be declared null and void and the Board be restrained from realising this amount.

IN the reply filed on behalf of the appellant Board as many as eight preliminary objections were raised. However, it suffices to refer to only three of them namely the objection as to the juris diction of the District Forum on the ground that the parties were governed by the Haryana Housing Board Act, 1971. Secondly that by virtue of Clause 2(w) of the hire purchase tenancy agreement, the allottees were bound to pay the enhanced final cost as demanded and thirdly that the subject-matter of allotment by the Board does not fall under the definition of goods as defined in the Sales of Goods Act. On merits the factual averments in Para Nos. 1 to 7 were admitted with the clarification that the notices to the L.I.G. allottees were not issued because there was no increase in the final cost of these houses. Para 8 of the complaint was partly admitted, but the specific plea taken was that the demand notices were issued to the applicants due to the finalisation of the cost as per pricing policy of the Board. This stand resting primarily on the pricing policy is reiterated in para 9 of the reply, whilst admitting that a few tenements were disposed of by the Board in auction, but the proceeds of the same either on the side of loss or profit had not been passed on to the complainant or other allottees. In reply to Para 10 the stand is that enhanced demand now is only due to the finalisation of the cost worked out as per pricing policy of the Board. It is also the case that the 86 houses allotted to the Haryana Government were also being charged with the enhanced cost which has been duly paid by the concerned departments, whilst the enhanced cost of unallotted houses has not been attributed to the allottees.

WITH regard to unforeseen charges, it is again the plea that this has been charged as per pricing policy in order to meet such expenses which may be incurred in the future and consequently the complainant was not entitled to the refund thereof nor any interest thereon. It stands admitted that the roofs of certain constructed houses had fallen, but the reconstruction of the demolished roofs have not been included in the finalisation of the cost, as alleged in the complaint. Indeed the burden of the song in the reply is its reliance on the pricing policy and the shelter taken under Clause 2(w) of the H.P.T. agreement between the Board and the allottees. Inevitably the prayer is that the complaint be dismissed. It bears repetition that the aforesaid resume is representative of the facts and the respective pleas of the parties. There were as many as 67 complaints pertaining to the categories of M.I.G houses. There were six complaints filed by the Oriental Insurance Company Limited also, which were covered by the H.I.G (II) on similar grounds. There were other similar complaints with regard to the different categories of houses as well. Since all the aforementioned complaints raised common issues of law and facts, these were consolidated by the District Forum and tried together. As the factual background was not in serious dispute, no oral testimony was adduced and the parties rested themselves contend with the documents placed on the record which were not the subject-matter of any challenge. The primal reliance of the Board was on Annexures R-1 to R-5.

THE District Forum on a consideration of the material before it dismissed, the preliminary objections with regard to the jurisdiction whilst relying on a number of authorities of the National Commission as also of other State Commissions. On merits it came to the conclusion that there was hardly any justification in revising the cost of houses from time to time and it amounted to a unilateral fixing of prices. It was held that the details of this enhancement indicate that 60% of the cost now fixed as final one includes the amounts thereof to the extent of 66% towards charges for interest and profit leaving the balance of only 30% towards land charges and construction charges. This criteria on the face of it was held to be unjustified and unwarranted. It was noticed that the Board had virtually doubled its tentative price within four to five years and thereafter increase the same in the year 1988 and then in 1990 and lastly again in 1991 under the garb and colour of the final cost. Relying upon the order of the Chandigarh State Commission in Punjab Housing Board''s Case and holding that the Board''s policy of enhancement from time to time just to suit its own purposes was arbitrary and unsupportable, all the complaints were allowed and the demand notices were struck down.

FROM the aforesaid resume of the pleadings, the evidence, and the findings of the District Forum the salient feature of the set of appeals which emerges is that it was more than a decade ago that applications for different categories of houses were invited in 1981. The construction of this colony was completed within 2 to 3 years thereof and the allotment letters and possession of most if not all of the houses were delivered over around July 31,1984. As the representative figure, the tentative price of an M.I.G flat originally fixed at 39,400/- was enhanced to nearly rupees 69,000/- at the time of allotment itself. However, it was enhanced substantially again in the year 1988. Yet again in the year 1990, a further enhancement was made and demanded which was acceded to. The proverbial straw that has broken the camel''s back has now come in the year 1991 in the shape of the demand notice for another Rs. 11,500/- immediately and interest charges etc. which will raise the price of the aforementioned category of houses to a round figure of rupees 80,000/- only. It is against the aforesaid background that the stand of the appellant-Housing Board has to be appraised. Mr. Batra, their learned Counsel first somewhat ritualistically rather than seriously reiterated afresh the preliminary jurisdictional objections which were pressed before the District Forum and stand rejected. The somewhat hackneyed argument that the Board being a creature of the Haryana Housing Board Act was exclusively governed by the said statute and therefore beyond the pale of consumer jurisdiction was raised. A corollary thereof that being a statutory body it was also exempted from the scope of the Consumer Protection Act was advanced. The stand that the subject matter of allotment by the Board was immovable property and thus not within the definition of goods as defined in the Sale of Goods Act was also urged. The aforesaid jurisdictional objections have only to be noticed and rejected because they are concluded against the appellants by the binding precedents of the National Commission. It is therefore, unnecessary to examine them afresh on merits. Way back in U.P. Housing & Development Board v. Garima Shukla & Others I (1991) CPJ 1 (NC), the National Commission rejected the arguments which are sought to be raised before us now. Thereafter, that view has held the field and has been followed by innumerable judgments of the National Commission itself as also of the State Commissions all over the country. The District Forum in rejecting the preliminary objections has referred to a catena of authorities in paragraph 10 of its order and it is unnecessary to repeat the same. Therefore, it suffices to mention that for the reasons recorded and affirming the view of the District Forum and judgments relied upon by it, the preliminary objections somewhat half-heartedly raised by the appellant-Board must fail.

On merits the primal challenge of Mr. Batra for the appellants has been inter-alia a twofold one. Firstly the sheet-anchor of their case is the alleged pricing policy for revising the cost of houses in their various schemes. Learned Counsel primarily rested himself squarely on the said pricing policy as amended from time to time and as incorporated in Annexure R.4. It was his case that the appellant-Board after full consideration had framed a considered pricing policy even prior to the allotment of the houses to the respondents in 1981 itself. It was argued that the validity of the said pricing policy was not in terms challenged in the complaints or in any replication and apparently was not raised or urged in arguments before the District Forum as well. On the foundation of the said pricing policy as of now it was the submission that the cost of the houses had been calculated stricto-sensu in accordance with the said policy. Consequently according to the learned Counsel no fault can be found with the same. It was highlighted that the said pricing policy was uniformly applicable to all the housing schemes and has been even-handedly applied not only to the respondents but to all other allottees of the Board''s colonies as well.

SECONDLY, the basic submission of Mr. Batra was that admittedly a Hire-Purchase Tenancy Agreement (Annexure R.1) stands executed betwixt the Board and the respondents. Clause 2(w) of the said agreement empowers the Board to revise the final price of the houses within the time mentioned therein. According to the learned Counsel, the Board had therefore, an unfettered right to revise and enhance the cost of the houses at any time within seven years of the date of allotment. Herein, it was the case that this revision and enhancement though done on the very verge of the expiry of seven years, was yet marginally within the said limitation. Consequently according to the appellant the validity of this enhanced revised price could not be questioned. It was submitted that the District Forum has failed to give an in-depth consideration to the aforesaid two crucial aspects in the order under appeal. Reliance was placed on Bareilly Development Authority & Another v. Ajay Pal Singh & Others., AIR 1989 SC 1076 and Avtar Singh Sahi & Others v. State of Haryana & Another., AIR 1991 (1) Punjab & Haryana 249. Before one adverts and analyses in depth the aforesaid twin submission of the appellant, it is necessary to advert to a factor which stands out like a sore thumb. Herein, admittedly the appellant Board has chosen to levy substantial registration charges against all the respondents by including them in the revised cost. These are being levied at a high rate of 14% of the cost of the house. What is of patent significance is the fact that throughout it was the categoric stand of the respondents that the Housing Board had never actually paid any registration charges nor in the eye of law was it liable to do so. It was the respondent''s case that this arbitrary and unauthorised levy is being imposed upon the respondents under the cloak of assumed or fictional registration charges which have never been paid by the Board. The question whether this had been done being patently one of fact, was well within the knowledge of the appellant-Board. However, there was persistent vacillation and evasion on this ground and a curious hesitation to lay its cards on the table. However, the issue being crucial and pressed to the core by the respondents, the learned Counsel for the appellant very fairly agreed to and ultimately filed his considered statement and stand dated May 27,1992 on the point to the following effect:- "h) As regards the registration charges it is submitted that the registration charges have been demanded in accordance with the decision whereby it was decided that the registration charges shall be demanded wherever the same have been included in the tentative cost. In 1981, when the present colony was initiated, the Board had to pay registration charges to HUDA. However, on 4.11.1986, it was decided that the HUDA shall not demand registration charges from the Board."

IT is manifest from the above that at no stage whatsoever were any registration, charges paid by the Board with regard to the land under the housing colony. Indeed it was ultimately conceded that more than five years ago on November 4, 1986, it had already been decided that there was going to be no levy of registration charges on the Board. Nevertheless the Board for reasons which remained unexplained has chosen to levy a wholly unauthorised charge and till the end persisted in the same. Mr. Surya Kant, the learned Counsel for the respondents had submitted that in view of the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 3, sub-section (2) of Section 31 and sub section (1) of Section 39 of the Haryana Housing Board Act, 1971 read with Section 16 and other relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, there was no question of any registration charges being paid in the intergovernmental transfers between the Haryana Urban Development Authority and the appellant-Board. According to him, for this very reason no registration charges had been paid from the inception of the Scheme in 1981 till today and in the eye of law are not leviable at all. It is unnecessary to discuss the aforesaid legal aspect as the question of fact is concluded in favour of the respondents. It is now conceded on behalf of the appellant that neither had the registration charges been paid till date nor were they leviable expressly because of the agreement with the HUDA not to levy the same.

BEFORE parting with this aspect of the case it may be noticed that admittedly the levy of registration is in no way covered by the pricing policy to which reference in some detail follows. Equally Clause 2(w) of the Hire-Purchase Tenancy Agreement does not even remotely warrant the levy of registration charges later in the revised cost. It is somewhat manifest that the imposition of these charges nearly seven years after the date of allotment is neither warranted by the pricing policy nor by the Hire Purchase Tenancy Agreement between the parties.

TO sum up on this score, it is plain that the registration charges were in fact never paid or even payable. Equally their levy was neither warranted by the pricing policy nor came within the ambit of Clause 2(w). The somewhat secretive and hesitant stand of the Board on this question and the attempt t impose this amount on the respondents does not show its action in a favourable light. Any attempt to justify the same is utterly futile and indeed materially damages the appellant''s case. Reverting now to the pricing policy which is the foundational basis of the learned Counsel for the appellant''s contention, it seems apt to notice the same in extenso vide Annexure R.4 as amended from time to time till the year 1990 its very heading shows:- "HOUSING BOARD HARYANA, CHANDIGARH Pricing Policy of the Board as approved vide Agenda No. 90.6(13.5.85) and as amended vide item No. 95.1 (16.2.86) & 96.6 (31.3.86), 98.3 (4.11.86) & 110.4 (7.8.89), 104.14, 108.21 (13.2.89) and 115.11 (27.9.89). 1. Cost of Land 2. Admn. charges @ 2% on land cost. 3. Interest from the date of purchase of land to the date of completion on point No. 1 & 2 above. 4. Construction cost plus development cost of land (if any). 5. Administrative charges @ 10% on construction cost and land development cost (where development work being done by the Board). 6. (i) Interest for half of construction period on 4&5 above. (ii) Interest on total cost (Col. No. 1 to 5) is also charged from the date of completion of houses to the date of completion of development work in case the development work of land is completed after construction of houses. (iii) Additional interest for 3 months is also charged on total cost (Col. No. 1 to 5) to cover up allotment activities of houses. 7. Profit wherever applicable to each category on 1 to 6 above. (5% in MIG and 10% in HIG). 8. Unforeseen charged @ 5% on land cost/construction cost/development cost (Item No. 1 & 4). 9. Collection charges @ 1/2% on Item No. 1 to 8 (1% in case of scheme secured against Bank Guarantee). 10. 1/2% services charges on the schemes sanctioned after 1.4.87 on MIG & HIG schemes. Note : Watch & Ward charges on account of non-occupation of houses from the date of completion to the date of. actual possession are also to be included in cast at the time at its finalisation as per Agenda Item No. 104.14 & 108.21 (13.2.89) on the basis of actual expenditure incurred on this account, if any."

What deserves pointed attention in the context of the aforesaid pricing policy is the fact that herein the transaction between the appellant Board and the respondents stood finalised on or around July 31,1984 when the possession of their houses was given and the earlier allotment letter and the subsequent Hire Purchase Tenancy Agreement were executed. Clearly enough, the matter between the parties was concluded as it stood on that date. It is not in dispute that the Board had a pricing policy prior to the allotment to the respondents. Indeed it was Mr. Batra''s stand himself that the Board had always rested itself on a uniform standard pricing policy alone. Consequently the matter of revised cost between the appellant-Board and the respondents had to be determined by the pricing policy as it stood on the date of the allotment orders or at the latest by the date of the execution of the H.P.T. agreement between the parties. However, there is no manner of doubt that the said pricing policy has thereafter been unilaterally amended by the Board itself. The appellant Board''s own document Annexure R.4 shows that it was amended on May 13, 1985, February 16, 1986, March 31,1986, November 4,1986, August 7, 1986, February 13, 1989 and September 27, 1990. It is common ground that the primal reliance by the appellant-Board is now on pricing policy Annexure R.4 as it exists today with amendments upto September 27, 1990.

IT is then not in dispute that at no stage were the respondents consulted or even intimated of any change in the pricing policy subsequent to the execution of the H.P.T. agreement with them. Admittedly, these changes were made unilaterally by the Board. IT is somewhat elementary that the concluded agreement between the parties cannot be easily altered to the detriment of the respondents by any or every unilateral amendment of the pricing policy made by the Board. The crucial question therefore is whether the respondents can be levied with charges on the basis of the unilateral amendments made in the pricing policy by the Board long after the date of the allotment and handing over the possession of the houses. It is somewhat instructive to view the matter in its larger perspective. By now it is well settled that even with regard to the laws enacted by the Parliament or the State Legislature that these can have only prospective effect unless the Legislature expressly in terms give retrospectivity to them and further has the power to do so. What is true of primal Legislation is doubly true of subordinate Legislation made under such acts. In particularity the Haryana Housing Board Act, 1971 authorises the State Government to frame rules by notification under Section 73. The Board under Section 74 is then authorised to make regulations only with the previous sanction of the State Government and also on the condition that these are consistent with the Act or any rules framed there under. In exercise of the powers under Section 74, the Board has framed the Haryana Housing (allotment and sale of tenements) Regulations, 1972. It is common ground that the pricing policy of the Board is not contained in any regulation framed by it. It is merely a creature of the resolutions framed from time to time by the Board. Even these resolutions are not giving the least inkling that they are to effect the already concluded rights of the parties. Even otherwise, the Haryana Housing Board can have no unfettered powers to give retrospective effect to whatever changes it may chose to make in its pricing policy. It bears repetition that even the rules and regulations framed under the Act cannot have retrospective effect, far from the mere resolutions of the Board framing a pricing policy from time to time. It is somewhat axiomatic that subsequent changes in this policy cannot have retrospective effect to the prejudice of already concluded and existing rights of the parties.

INDEED faced with the aforesaid impossible hurdle Mr. Batra could not cite any chapter or verse to establish the stand that the pricing policy of the Board as amended from time to time can have retrospective effect. As an issue of fact, it is not in dispute that the levies on the respondents are now being made under the pricing policy as altered over nearly seven years after the matter stood concluded between the parties in mid 1984. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, the answer to the question posed at the very out-set is rendered in the negative. It is held that the pricing policy of the Board cannot be amended with retrospective effect to the detriment of the consumer allotees of its Middle and Higher Income Group houses. Once it is held as above, it is plain that the main plank of the appellant''s argument falls to the ground. What was being relied upon foundationally on the appellant''s behalf is the pricing policy (Annexure R.4) as amended upto September 27, 1990. The whole calculation of the revised cost is admittedly being made on that basis, even though the rights and liabilities between the parties stood concluded earlier nearly six years on or around July 31, 1984. This attempt of the appellants to give retrospectivity to the pricing policy as amended from time to time and the reliance thereon as the bed-rock for revising the costs seven years after allotment appears to us as both unwarranted and indeed unauthorised one. In fact, the whole case of the appellant stands warped on that account, and the calculations of the levy vitiated thereby.

ONE may now advert to the substantial unforeseen charges at the rate of 5 per cent on land cost/construction cost and development cost which have been added to the revised cost under challenge. A bare look at the pricing policy Annexure R.4 quoted above would show that thereby at least three subsequent Item Nos. 8,9 and 10 and the note thereto have been added to the pricing policy long after the time of the allotment made in favour of the respondents. These items were not part and parcel of the pricing policy when the contract stood concluded between the parties. Undoubtedly now under Item No. 8, unforeseen charges have been indiscriminately imposed against all the respondents. It bears repetition that these unforeseen charges found no basis in the pricing policy as it existed prior to the contract between the parties. Consequently the levy of unforeseen charges upon the respondents under the cloak of a subsequent additions therein is wholly unauthorised and unwarranted.

APART from the above, it is common ground that these unforeseen charges were not only levied but collected earlier. Indeed it was the demand of the respondents in the complaint itself that they were entitled to refund of the unforeseen charges with interest because no exceptional event had taken place nor anything expended on an item which had remained unforeseen. At no stage in the pleadings or in the arguments before us could it be shown as to what was the nature of the expenses against which these unforeseen charges had been appropriated. Even today, the Board was unable to take this commission or the respondents into confidence as to the expenses which have been actually incurred for unforeseen events or were apprehended even after the expiry of seven years from the concluded contract. This indeed indicates a remarkable lack of veracity to say the least. An organization of the kind of the Board is expected to have a somewhat better foreseeability after the expiry of nearly seven years. It seems to us that the Board is ritually imposing this levy of unforeseen charges without in any way incurring or apprehending such expenses even at the present stage. There seems no option but to hold that both as a matter of law and equally of fact the imposition of unforeseen charges and its retention without any explanation how it has expended is wholly unsustainable and unauthorised. What next strikingly meets the eye is the arbitrary recategorisation of houses by the Board. Admittedly for the purpose of revising the costs it has unilaterally chosen to recategorise the middle group houses as high income group houses. Mr. Batra, the learned Counsel for the appellants fairly conceded that by virtue of this recategorisation, the owners of the M.I.G. houses came within the ambit of the levy of much higher charges than they were otherwise liable to pay. Clearly enough, the detailed ten items of the pricing policy do not give even a hint or any authorisation for recategorisation, the houses at all. Mr. Batra was otherwise at a loss to indicate the source for this power of unilateral recategorisation of houses which had been themselves advertised by the Board in their respective categories. The last ditch attempt to defend this recategorisation was on the alleged basis of a loan agreement said to have been drawn up between the appellant-Board and the Housing and Urban Development Corporation Ltd., New Delhi (HUDCO). It is somewhat plain that the aforesaid defence of the appellant for the unauthorised recategorisation is an argument of desperation. What first calls for notice in this context is the fact that no such plea whatsoever was taken on behalf of the appellant either in the pleadings or in the arguments before the District Forum. This apart we are unable to see how any agreement arrived at by the appellant Board and the HUDCO can adversely affect the rights of the respondents. At the behest of the learned Counsel for the appellant we had looked through the loan agreement dated July 30, 1983 between the appellant and the HUDCO. We are unable to construe any of its clauses as warranting a recategorisation of a category of houses earlier widely advertised as such into either a higher or a lower category. The provision of the said agreement on which reliance was placed by Mr. Batra is with regard to the interest payable in respect of the loan and the proviso to its stipulations. Patently enough, this governs the inter se rights of the appellant-board and the HUDCO on the quantum of the interest payable by the debtor to its creditor. It does not seem to warrant or authorise a recategorisation of the houses to a level higher than the one which was held out and so advertised. Apart from this, the basic fact which has to be kept in mind is that an agreement subsequent to the original advertisement and invitation for applications in 1981 executed between the Board and HUDCO on July 30, 1983 cannot bind the consumer-allottees adversely. Such a power has necessarily to stem from either a statutory provision or from an express agreement between the appellant Board and its allottees. Admittedly, there is no such stipulation inter-parties. Admittedly, neither the pricing policy which is the sheet-anchor of the appellant nor clause 2(w) of the H.P.T. agreement in terms warrant such a recategorisation. There is thus no option but to hold that this re-categorisation which as a consequence entailed levy of higher charges is not easily supportable. The levy of the same on this somewhat shaky foundation cannot therefore, be sustained.

The imposition of compulsory profit in the revised cost has been forcefully assailed on behalf of the respondents. In their pleadings, the respondent-complainants have taken up the firm position that the appellant-Board under the Act and the Regulations is a welfare institution for providing housing to the society in general or its relatively weaker sections at a no profit and no loss basis. It is axiomatic and indeed could not be denied before us that the appellant-Board is not a commercial concern created with the object of generating large profits through its activities. Indeed, the whole tenor of the Act and the Regulations framed thereunder appear to be contrary to any profit-making. As the preamble of the statute says it is "an Act to provide for measures to be taken to deal with and satisfy the need of housing accommodation." This apart in the written reply made on behalf of the appellant-board before the District Forum in all the complaints the firm averment therein that the Board was working on a no profit an no loss basis were not expressly controveted and in fact it stood admitted that this was its basic spirit and motto. Nevertheless in the revised cost a compulsory profit at a fairly higher level as 10 per cent on a category of houses owned by the respondents, was levied.

IN the pricing policy there was a reference to profits wherever applicable. The levy of compulsory profits is neither mandated nor within the parameters of clause 2(w) of the H.P.T. agreement with the respondents. Unable to find any alternative Mr. Batra again attempted to clutch at a straw by saying that the loan agreement between the appellant-Board and the HUDCO would authorise this levy as well. What has been stated above earlier with regard to the recategorisation applies Mutatis mutandis to this argument as well and it is unnecessary to retread the same ground again. Plainly enough, the agreement between the creditor-HUDCO and the borrower-Board cannot operate to adversely affect the third party rights of the respondents who were in no way party or even aware of any such transaction. This levy again is thus unwarranted under the agreement between the parties and on the present pleadings contrary to the professed motto of the Board. The levy of an average interest on all the respondents indiscriminately has then been forcefully assailed. It was argued that the same was plainly inequitable and virtually an attempt to rob Peter to pay Paul. It is not in dispute that most if not all the respondents paid the installments and took possession-of their respective houses in or around July 30,1984. However, a number of other allottees herein as elsewhere took possession later or paid their installments subsequently or defaulted in the payment thereof. The levy of interest therefore, has to be on an individual basis and on the facts of each case. A generalised or an average levy of interest only on all of the respondents who were in default could not be easily supported on behalf of the appellants. In striking an average of interest and burdening each respondent irrespective of the fact whether in a particular case any interest amount was leviable at all or there had been any delay or default on his part seems unauthorised and has been done as a rule of the thumb. The District Forum has firmly taken the view that herein the Board was bound to calculate interest and charge it accordingly, and not to strike an arbitrary average and levy the same indiscriminately. The learned Counsel for the appellants could not advance any meaningful argument or decision in support of their case. We do not find any adequate reason to differ from the well-reasoned order and affirm the said findings.

THE substantial levy of the alleged arbitration charges on the respondents has then been rightly assailed on their behalf. It was their case that even by the time of delivering possession to them and the substantial enhancement of the assessed tentative cost as advertised, the said charges had already been included therein. Despite this firm stand neither before the District Forum nor before us any details as to the quantum of arbitration charges or the time when they came to be incurred could be indicated nor was the stand of the respondents adequately repelled that the substantial amount of arbitrary charges if any, had already been included in the earlier enhancement of costs, specifically from the originally advertised price till the year 1990. Yet again, it appears that the imposition of the arbitration charges is again levied by the rule of the thumb than on any sound foundation existing on the present record. It remains to advert to Clause 2(w) of the HPT agreement which as already noticed is another sheet-anchor of the appellants. Relying thereon, their learned Counsel wished to justify the present revision of costs in a blanket manner on the basis thereof. It was virtually the case that the said Clause gave an unfettered power to the Board to revise the costs within a period of seven years. Since in this context the whole controversy revolves around the said provisions it is apt to notice it in extenso. It suffices to mention that this is virtually in pari-materia with a similar condition No. 9 in the order of allotment Ann. R.3. The aforesaid Clause 2(w) reads as under :- "2(w) If after the receipt of the final bills for the construction of tenements or as the result of a land award or arbitration proceedings, or enhancement in cost of land on any account, etc., the Board considers it necessary to revise the price, as already specified it may do so and determine the final price payable by the hirer who shall be bound by this determination and shall pay dues, if any between the final price so determined and price paid by him including the price paid in lump-sum provided that no change in the price shall be made after 7years from the date of alloment".

EVEN a plain reading of the aforesaid provision would make it manifest that it does not give an unfettered power to the appellant Board to revise the cost for any or every reason. Indeed as the opening part of the Clause 2(w) indicated, it is only on the basis of four specific grounds that such a revision is permissible. These are (i) on or after the receipt of the final bills for the construction of tenements (ii) as the result of land award (iii) for arbitration proceedings (iv) for enhancement in the cost of land on any account. The aforesaid conditions are clear and categoric and have to be precisely construed. Therefrom it would clearly appear that any subsequent final revision upto the time of seven years from the date of the allotment can only be on the firm basis of the aforesaid four stipulations. EVEN when asked specifically Mr. Batra could not bring the whole gamut and the specific heads of revised cost within the four corners of the above conditionalities. It is not the case that the final bills for the construction of tenements have been received now as the basis for any enhancement. The present revision is not at all on the basis of any land award or the enhancement in the cost of land on any other account. As already indicated the Board has singularly failed to show that the arbitration charges are subsequent to the earlier substantial enhancement of the advertised tentative cost. It would be otherwise clear from the reading of the whole of the H.P.T agreement that Clause 2(w) thereof is an exceptional one and that any enhancement or revision of price under the provisions has to be on the aforesaid four foundations and no other. It would appear that the appellant Board is construing Clause 2(w) as an omnibus provision which gives them the right and power to enhance and revise the cost for any and every reason, it may choose to do so. Any subsequent enhancement under this provision has to be within the parameters of the four basic postulates spelt out therein. The alleged pricing policy which as already shown is a mere unilaterally creature of the Board from time to time cannot travel beyond the circumscribed limit of Clause 2(w). It is the admitted position that herein the levies made for the revised cost are beyond the arena laid out by Clause 2(w) and thus patently contrary thereto.

YET again the firm stand taken on behalf of the appellant Board is that it is only on the verge of seven years that the Board is to finally revise the price irrespective of other consideration. As we read this provision, it clearly indicates the said seven years is the outer limit. Indeed it is intended to operate as a limitation clause beyond which no revision of cost for any reason whatsoever can be made. This period is the maximum and not the minimum as the Board is lop-sidedly reading it to mean. The Board being a statutory body had undertaken to render the services to the respondents under the Act and the Rules and regulations framed thereunder and an obvious result thereof is that it must do so efficiently and expeditiously within a reasonable time. It is plain that herein the construction of tenements was completed in the year 1984 and the bills and costs thereof, if not finalised prior to that would ordinarily not take more than a year thereafter for completion. It follows that the revised price if necessary must be made with a reasonable time and it is in no way to be construed that such a revision must be done only on the verge of seven years. Indeed the respondents are entitled to know as soon as may be as to what is the ultimate bill, they have to foot for the tenements provided by the Housing Board. The sword of Damocles of a revised price is not to keep on hanging over their head mandatorily for a full seven years. Of course on an exceptional ground and for established reasons, the Board is entitled to show that it could not finalise a particular levy earlier. It appears to us that the appellant Board itself and its learned Counsel have been making a distorted reading of this Clause to imply that they must wait for full seven years and hold the respondents to ransom for any revised cost which they may chose to levy, and meanwhile unilaterally alter the pricing policy or the conditions thereof with retrospectivity. We would wish to emphasise that a statutory organisation like the Board with its sound status rendering the services to the public under the Act has to proceed with reasonable expedition, in finalising the costs as early as may be. Barring exceptions and peculiar circumstances, a period of three years after the completion of tenements should normally be amply sufficient to do so. To invariably extend the same to the verge of seven years is neither warranted by the clause nor by the patently implied terms of the services held out to the public by the Board. If it inordinately delays and procrastinates in the rendering of a basic service like housing undertaken by it (as declared in its preamble) under the statute constituting it - ''An Act to provide for measures to be taken to deal with and satisfy the need of housing accommodation'' it would patently come within the ambit of a deficiency in the services which it is statutorily bound to render. It would follow from the above that the Clause 2(w) basically relied upon by the appellant Board neither entitled it to revise the cost for any and every whimsical reason nor does it warrant them justifiably to keep the finalisation of cost hanging for a full seven years. The answer to the second question posed at the very out-set has, thus, to be rendered in the negative. It has to be held that Clause 2(w) aforesaid of the H.P.T agreement betwixt the Board and allottees does not give the former a carte balanche to revise such price at the verge of seven years from the date of allotment.

It remains to advert to the authorities relied upon by the learned Counsel for the parties. On behalf of the appellant''s basic reliance was on ''Bareilly Development Authority & Another v. Ajay Pal Singh & Others'' (supra). However, a close perusal thereof would indicate that this judgment in no way advances their case. The true ratio thereof in their Lordship''s own words was as under :- "In view of the authoritative judicial pronouncements of this Court in the series of cases dealing with the scope of interference of a High Court while exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in cases of non-statutory concluded contracts like the one in hand, we are constrained to hold that the High Court in the present case has gone wrong in its finding that there is arbitrariness and unreasonableness on the part of the appellants herein increasing the cost of the houses/flats and the rate of monthly installments and giving directions in the writ petitions as prayed for."

ON the aforesaid premise their Lordship set aside the judgment of the Allahabad High Court which had chosen to interfere in the writ jurisdiction under Article 226. It is plain that no such issue arises here at all and the case is of the mark. Indeed this authority boomerangs on the appellant. Therein, it has been observed that in such a situation the rights and obligations of the parties inter-se being purely contractual are governed by the precise terms of the concluded contract. As has already been indicated above, the respondents main grievance is that there is a patent violation of Clause 2(w) of the H.P.T. agreement subsisting between the parties. We have already held in their favour that this is indeed so. The other decision in ''Avtar Singh Sahi & Others v. State of Haryana & Another'' (supra) relied upon by Mr. Batra is equally off the mark. Therein the only question adjudicated upon by the Division Bench was whether the price of plots allotted by the Improvement Trust can be subsequently increased because of a higher award to the original owner of the land acquired in proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. Plainly enough this is not even remotely the question here because admittedly the revised price is not rested on the basis of any increase in the land cost.

IN the other hand Mr. Surya Kant'' reliance on behalf of the respondents on AIR 1992 Punjab and Haryana 32 ''Ram SINgh v. Chandigarh HousINg Board'' is somewhat meanINgful. ThereIN the INcrease IN price for more than double the tentative price mentioned IN the advertisement by the HousINg Board was held to be unreasonable and arbitrary and was accordINgly quashed. To finally conclude, it is plain that the levy of registration charges was unwarranted and unauthorised; the retrospectivity sought to be given to the pricing policy of the Board is contrary to law; the imposition of unforeseen charges is unsustainable, the re-categorisation of M.I.G houses is unsustainable under Clause 2(w) of H.P.T.A, the charging of compulsory profit is in contravention of the Board''s motto; the imposition of average interest on all respondents is inequitable; the arbitration charges have not been explained; and Clause 2(w) of H.P.T agreement between the parties has been misconstrued by the Board and has been patently contravened. We have already held earlier in paragraph 12 on the basis of the National Commission''s judgment in ''U.P. Housing and Development Board v. Garima Shukla & Others'' (supra) that these cases come squarely within the ambit of a consumer dispute. On the appellant''s own showing the Board has undertaken to perform services in connection with providing houses to public. The afore-mentioned factors would obviously indicate a deficiency in the rendering of those services in which entitled the respondents to the relief granted by the District Forum in its order under appeal. For the additional reasons, recorded, we up-hold and affirm the said order.

FOR the foregoing detailed reasons, all these appeals must fail and are hereby dismissed with costs which are assessed at Rs. 100/- in each appeal, in view of the representation of all the respondents by common Counsel. Appeals dismissed with costs.