H.S.E.B. and Others vs Raj Pal Singh

Swatanter Kumar, J.—CM. No. 183-C of 1999 was filed by the appellants Haryana State Electricity Board under Order 41 Rule 5 read with Section 151 C.P.C. praying for stay of the operation of the judgment and decree dated 21.4.1997 passed by the learned First Appellate Court.

Notice of this application was issued to the counsel for the respondent. As the learned Counsel for the parties intended to address arguments in detail on the said application, therefore, with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties, Regular Second Appeal itself was taken on board and heard finally.

Shri Raj Pal Singh, plaintiff had filed a suit for declaration with consequential relief of mandatory injunction against the employer, the Haryana State Electricity Board, defendant in the suit. It was pleaded that he was appointed on daily wages on 7th March, 1980. Thereafter, he was promoted as daily wagers line man in January, 1983 and vide order dated 3rd August, 1989, he was promoted as work charge lineman with effect from 11.11.1987. A show cause notice was issued to him on 17th January, 1992. The charge against him was that he had submitted a false/forged certificate while seeking employment on 31st December, 1979. As a result of this, he was terminated from service, vide order dated 16th October, 1992, which he challenged in the suit on various grounds including that no inquiry was held in accordance with law, no chargesheet was served upon him and order of termination was not passed by the Competent Authority.

The suit was contested by the defendants, who took a preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of the suit and also that no notice was served upon the department before filing of the suit. According to the department, plaintiff had admitted that he had submitted fake and bogus certificate and it was stated that inquiry was conducted in accordance with law.

The learned trial Court vide its order dated 23rd July, 1993 framed the following 9 issues:-

Whether show cause notice dated 17.1.1992 and termination order dated 16.10.1992 are null and void, as alleged? OPP.

If issue No. 1 is proved, then whether plaintiff is entitled for the relief of mandatory injunction as prayed for against defendants? OPP.

Whether the plaintiff has not locus standi to file the suit? OPD.

Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD.

Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his own act and conduct from filing the suit? OPD.

Whether the civil court has got no jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit? OPD.

Whether the suit is bad for want of service of prior notice to the defendants? OPD

Whether plaintiff has got no cause of action to file the suit? OPD

Relief.

Having permitted the parties to lead evidence on the aforestated issues, the learned Trial Court answered all the material issues in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants and thus decreed the suit of the plaintiff grating him all consequential benefits and directed the department to implement the judgment within three months from the date of the decree i.e., 21st April, 1997. The judgment and decree of the learned Trial Court was assailed in appeal, of course, unsuccessfully by the department. The learned first appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 12.11.1997 dismissed the appeal without any order as to costs, giving rise to this Regular Second Appeal.

Learned counsel appearing for the appellants has argued that the judgments of the learned Courts below are contrary to the settled principle of law and they had no jurisdiction to set aside the order of termination dated 16.10.1992.

On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that the entire departmental proceedings are vitiated for violation of principle of natural justice and as such the judgment of the learned courts below do not call for any interference.

At the outset, I would refer to the findings recorded by the learned trial Court n violation of principle of natural justice and statutory rules.

".......The conclusion of the vigilance enquiry was that the plaintiff and Karamvir had produced bogus experience certificate and they were helped by Shri O.P. Anand, AEE and Shri H.K. Sharma, Xen in order to compensate them for the domestic jobs they had been performing at their residence. The Law Officer recommended action to be taken against the plaintiff and Karamvir under Rule 20 of the Industrial Employment (standing orders) Punjab (Haryana First Amendment) Rules, 1969. Consequently, Shri J.P. Singh was appointed as Enquiry Officer.

It appears from the show cause notice Ex. P.6 that the enquiry was conducted against the plaintiff under Rule 7 of HSEB Employment (Punishment and Appeal) Regulations, 1990. Needless to say that the Rule 7 provide the procedure for inflicting major penalty. As per the procedure, first of all, the charge sheet alongwith statement of allegations and list of documents and witnesses had to be supplied to the plaintiff."

The aforesaid, findings were upheld by the learned First Appellate Court, which had discussed the law governing the subject at some length. There cannot be any dispute in regard to the fact that the departmental proceedings against the respondent could be initiated or taken under the Haryana State Electricity Board Employment (Punishment and Appeal) Regulations, 1990. The rules specifically provide as to how the department inquiry against the delinquent official be conducted, where the disciplinary authority wishes to impose major penalty. The learned Courts below have come to a concurrent finding of fact that there has been violation of statutory rules as well the principles of natural justice. At this stage, it will be appropriate to mention that a common inquiry was conducted against the respondent and one Shri Karamvir on identical charge that they have submitted forge and fabricated certificate. A common inquiry was conducted and common report was submitted in relation to both these persons. However, Karamvir filed a Civil Writ Petition before this Court challenging the order terminating his service dated 16.10.1992 and the order of the appellate authority dated 19.11.1993 dismissing his appeal. The writ petition was registered at Civil Writ Petition No. 3935 of 1994 titled as Karamvir son of Shri Ganga Ram v. The Haryana State Electricity Board and Ors., which was allowed and the order of termination was set aside. The order dated 24.10.1994 passed in the said writ petition reads as under:-

"After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and perusing the paper-book, we are convinced that the impugned order dated 16.10.1992, a copy of which is annexure P-11 to the writ petition, terminating the services of the petitioner, was passed without following rules and no opportunity whatsoever was granted to the petitioner and no regular inquiry in the matter was conducted. In this view of the matter, the impugned order is quashed. As a consequence the petitioner will be entitled to all the consequential benefits. However, it will be open to the respondent-Board to proceed against the petitioner in accordance with rules and regulations, if so desired.

The writ petition is allowed with costs, which are quantified at Rs. 1,000/-.

Sd/- Amarjeet Chaudhary, Judge.

October 24, 1994. Sd/- G.C. Garg, Judge."

In view of the above, the only further question that can arise for consideration is whether the applicant suffers a prejudice as a result of the aforestated violation or not. Even the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma 1996(2) S.L.R. 41, had held that violation of statutory rules and principles of natural justice, where it adversely effect the case of the delinquent official within the element of prejudice would be inbuilt and would vitiate the order and inquiry. The present case is certainly one of the kind, where prejudice to the delinquent official is writ large. His right to defend himself has been jeopardised by the violation of the rules by the department. In fact the statutory regulations as well as principles of natural justice has been given complete go bye by the appellants and the entire process of departmental inquiry surfers from the element of arbitrariness and apparent vice.

Consequently, I have no hesitation in dismissing the appeal preferred by the appellants-board. Resultantly, this Regular Second Appeal is dismissed with costs, which are assessed at Rs. 2,000/-.