HUDA (AMBALA) vs SHASHI BANSAL

THIS order shall dispose of above mentioned five appeals as they have arisen out of common order dated 11.11.2005 passed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Ambala whereby while accepting the complaints of all the five complainants, following directions have been given to the appellant-opposite parties: Complaint No. 365/04 (i) To withdraw the illegal demand of Rs. 2,75,994 and recalculate the amount on the basis of simple interest instead of compound interest. (ii) To execute the conveyance deed after clearing the outstanding dues in accordance with Clause (i). Complaint No. 333/04 (i) To withdraw the illegal demand of Rs. 1,06,003 and recalculate the amount on the basis of simple interest instead of compound interest. (ii) To execute the conveyance deed after clearing the outstanding dues in accordance with Clause (i). Complaint No. 367/04 (i) To withdraw the illegal demand of Rs. 58,140 and recalculate the amount on the basis of simple interest instead of compound interest. (ii) To execute the conveyance deed after clearing the outstanding dues in accordance with Clause (i). Complaint No. 368/04 (i) To withdraw the illegal demand of Rs. 61,707 and recalculate the same on the basis of simple interest instead of compound interest. (ii) To execute the conveyance deed after clearing the outstanding dues in accordance with Clause (i). Complaint No. 369/04 (i) To withdraw the illegal demand of Rs. 98,162 and recalculate the same on the basis of simple interest instead of compound interest. (ii) To execute the conveyance deed after clearing the outstanding dues in accordance with Clause (i). (iii) To pay Rs. 500 to each complainant as compensation for harassment caused to the complainants. (iv) To pay Rs. 200 as costs of proceedings to each complainant."

IN order to decide the appeals the facts of all the five complaints have to be noticed briefly. IN case Complaint Case No. 366 of 2004, Shashi Bansal v. HUDA, The facts of the case are that the complainant was allotted plot No. 931 measuring 500 sq. yards located in Sector-7, Urban Estate, Ambala City on a tentative price of Rs. 16,500 as per allotment letter No. 1K/931 E.O. 1627 dated 12.11.1974. 10% of the sale price was deposited with the application and the balance amount was paid in instalments to the opposite parties. The complainant paid instalments amount in time with the opposite parties. Thereafter, the Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1977) came into force. Subsequent, thereto, demand notices were received by the complainant wherein the opposite parties directed the complainant to pay the enhanced price of the said plot. The complainant paid the additional price of land on account of enhanced compensation. Thereafter, the complainant in order to get the conveyance deed executed in his favour in respect of the said plot approached the opposite parties as per letter dated 19.7.2001 to inform her about the outstanding dues upto 31.7.2001, along with statement of account. IN reply, the opposite parties as per letters dated 24.9.2001, and 17.5.2004 informed the complainant that a sum of Rs. 1,06,003 was outstanding towards the plot in question but the statement of account was not furnished to her. The complainant thereafter gathered information from the office of the opposite parties that compound interest had been charged on the enhanced amount. Terming the demand as illegal, the complainant invoked the jurisdiction of the District Forum seeking direction against the opposite parties to withdraw the demand of Rs. 1,06,003 illegally made from her and to recalculate the amount due to the complainant on simple rate of interest; to furnish the year-wise statement to her; to execute the conveyance-deed in respect of the said plot in favour of the complainant after deposit of the amount legally paid by her and to pay Rs. 3,000 as costs of proceedings. IN case Complaint Case Nos. 365, 367, 368 and 369 of 2004: Out of the remaining four complaints, three complaints were filed by Pawan Kumar in respect of plot Nos. 294, 139 and 293 located in Sector 7, Urban Estate, Ambala City which were allotted to him on a tentative price of Rs. 8970, Rs. 7,750 and Rs. 8,970 as per re-allotment letter Nos. 3919 dated 31.3.1992, 1017 dated 1.2.1994 and 3916 dated 31.3.1992 respectively. IN complaint filed by Subhash Chander, he was allotted plot No. 904 located in Sector 7, Ambala City as per letter No. 14M/904/E.O.1686 dated 22.11.1974 on a tentative price of Rs. 12,250. IN all these four complaint cases, the allottees had paid the entire price of the respective plots including the additional price in respect of the enhanced compensation. Thereafter, the opposite parties also demanded the amounts noticed hereinafter: IN F.A. No. 52 Rs. 61,707 and Rs. 72,005 as per letter dated 21.9.2001 and 17.5.2004 in respect of plot No. 294, in F.AA. No. 53 Rs. 90,010 and Rs. 1,13,602 as per letters dated 11.9.2001 and 17.5.2004 in respect of plot No. 139, in F.A. No. 54 Rs. 58,140 and Rs. 68,010 as per letters dated 17.9.2001 and 17.5.2004 in respect of plot No. 293, from Pawan Kumar complainant as enhanced price on account of the enhanced price of the land along with interest in all these above state complaints, in FA No. 58 Rs. 2,75,994 and Rs. 3,07,752 as per letter dated 24.9.2001 and 17.5.2004 in respect of plot No. 904 allotted to Subhash Chander on account of enhanced price of the acquired land along with interest, in F.A. No. 48 Rs. 1,06,003 as per letter dated 24.9.2001 and 17.5.2004 in respect of the plot No. 931 allotted to Shashi Bansal on account of enhanced price of the acquired land along with interest. Notices under Section 17(1) of the Act, 1977 were issued to the complainants in this regard. The complainants asked the opposite parties to furnish the details of the amount claimed so as to enabling them to deposit the amount demanded. Thereafter, notice under Section 17(2) of the Act, 1977 was served upon the complainants whereby they were afforded opportunity to explain their position with regard to the demand made. IN answer to the notice, they appeared before the Estate Officer, HUDA and demanded the details of the amount, which they were required to pay. They were assured that the necessary details would be furnished to them but without effect. The complainants approached the opposite parties with the request that they were willing to pay the enhanced price and interest as per the terms and conditions of the allotment letter but were informed that they were required to pay compound interest @ 15% per annum on the demanded amount on additional price for the period of delay. Forced by these circumstances the complainant filed the present complaints seeking direction against the opposite parties to withdraw the illegal demand notice above and to recalculate the outstanding amount of the additional price on the basis of simple interest instead of compound interest at the rate mentioned in the demand notices, to execute the conveyance deed in their favour and also to pay Rs. 3,000 as costs of proceedings in each case. The complaints were contested by the opposite parties. IN the separate written statements filed in each of these complaints, a common objection was taken that the dispute raised by the complainant in each of the complaint relates to the interest which involves issue of pricing and the same cannot be adjudicated by the District Forum under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1986). They also raised the plea of estoppel and locus standi. On merits it was pleaded that the demand made in the notices served upon the complainant related to the outstanding amount in respect of the additional price on account of the land compensation and interest payable by the complainant. On appraisal of the pleadings of the parties and evidence adduced on record the District Forum accepted the complaint and issued the directions noticed earlier. It is against this order, the present appeals have been filed. Learned Counsel representing the parties have been heard at length. Learned Counsel representing the appellants while assailing the order dated 11.11.2005 of the District Forum had made three-fold submission before us. Firstly, that the dispute raised by the complainants pertain to interest and such dispute involving pricing and interest, cannot be adjudicated upon under the Act, 1986, as the interest is one of the components of price. Reliance was placed on case Delhi Development Authority v. Kamini Chopra, I (1996) CPJ 285 (NC), Housing Board Haryana v. Kartar Chand, etc., I (1995) CPJ 7 (NC) and Gujarat Housing Board v. Datania Amrit Lal Ful Chand, III (1993) CPJ 351 (NC). Secondly, that the District Forum gravely erred in coming to the conclusion that compound interest on the delayed payment cannot be charged by the opposite parties. Thirdly, that the impugned order dated 11.11.2005 so passed by the District Forum has not been dated separately by the President and other Members and for that reason the provisions of Rule 4(9) of the Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 2004 read with Section 15 of the Act have been violated and for that reason illegality committed in this regard justify the the acceptance of the appeals in all the cases. In support of the stand taken reliance has been placed on case Housing Board Haryana v. Housing Board Colony Welfare Association and Others, I (1996) CLT 108 (SC)=III (1995) CPJ 28 (SC)=AIR 1996 SC 92. In this regard it was also contended by him that the settled proposition of law is required to be followed and support in this regard was sought from the observation made in case Dwarikesh Sugar Industries v. Prem Heavy Engg. Works, II (1997) CLT 468 (SC)=1998 ISJ (Banking) 214. Opposing the submission made it has been vehemently urged by the Counsel representing the respondent-complainants that dispute raised in these appeals is not in respect of pricing of the allotted plots to the complainants but is in respect of the terms of the allotment letters issued to them and whether on the basis of counter-factual obligation, compound interest could be charged by the opposite parties on balance amount to be paid by the complainant on amount of enhanced compensation so determined for the delayed period and for that reason cases cited have no application to the controversy raised in these appeals. In support of the stand taken reliance has been placed by him on unreported judgment bearing F.A. No. 457 of 2006 ''Haryana Development Authority v. Sohan Lal'' decided on 4.4.2006. As regard the compound interest claimed by the opposite parties in respect of the delayed period of payment it was submitted that where agreement does not provide payment of the compound interest, it cannot be charged. Reference in this regard was made to the decision of the Hon''ble National Commission in Revision Petition No. 40 of 2005 decided on 3.2.2005 in case titled Estate Officer HUDA, Ambala v. Gurdial Singh. Regarding the other submission made it was used by the learned Counsel for the complainants that cursory examination of the impugned order would reveal that date has been mentioned on the right side of words ''Announced'' and further has been signed by the President and Members and for that reason there has been no violation of Rule 4(9) of the Rules and Section 15 of the Act, 1986 and as such no assistance can be had by the appellants from the cited cases.

It is manifest from the narrated facts of the complaint cases coupled with the stand taken by the opposite parties in the written statement filed that primarily dispute has been raised with regard to the action of the opposite parties in claiming compound interest on the delayed payment in respect of the instalment/enhanced price as noticed in detailed earlier. A cursory examination of the allotment letter issued to each of the complainant produced on record would show that it has nowhere been mentioned that the complainant shall be liable to pay compound interest on the delayed period of instalments as well as enhanced compensation in respect of the allotted plot. Position of law in this regard has been well settled because where the agreement does not provide for charging of compound interest or interest with periodical interest, then compound interest cannot be charged. In these cases the letter of allotment only impose the liability upon the complainants to make payment of interest for the delayed period. Therefore, on the additional price for the period of default, the opposite parties can only charge simple interest and not compound interest from the complainants in these cases. In Revision Petition No. 40 of 2005, Estate Officer HUDA Ambala v. Gurdial Singh decided on 3.2.2005 (supra) decided by the Hon''ble National Commission reference was made to the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in SBI v. Ganjam, I (1995) BC 619=1994 (3) PLR 435 and observed as under: "Coming to the merits of the case, we find as per law laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in its judgment (supra) held that where the agreement does not provide for payment of compound interest then it cannot be charged. Nothing has been brought before any Consumer forums by the petitioner that charging of compound interest was as per terms of the agreement be it letter of allotment or re-allotment or any other document. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that they are charging interest as per the Policy of HUDA. Policy is not on record, but what we see from the material on record is that as per instructions of HUDA 3.1.1985 when there is outstanding amount, simple rate of interest has to be charged up to the issue of recovery notice and thereafter compound rate of interest had been charged. Thus, in view of the judgments of Hon''ble Supreme Court (supra), in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, the petitioner cannot charge compound rate of interest on the strength of instruction, of which the complainant or any consumer is oblivious. It may also be mentioned that in large number of judgments with regard to HUDA only, this Commission has held HUDA can charge only simple rate of interest."

In view of the above noted position of law there is hardly any merit in the stand taken from the side of the appellant that opposite parties were entitled to charge compound interest on the delayed payment of instalments of enhanced price.

COMING to the other issue raised from the side of the appellant, the matter stands decided by this Commission in First Appeal No. 457 of 2006 titled ''HUDA v. Sohan Lal'' decided on 4.4.2006 (supra) wherein it has been laid down that the observations made in the case "State of Gujarat v. Rajesh Kumar Chiman Lal Barot and Another, 1996 (2) Apex Court Journal 585, have no relevance to the dispute raised because no dispute regarding pricing has been raised in the appeal filed. It was also observed that the dispute was raised was in terms of the allotment letter issued to the complainant whereby the compound interest cannot be charged on the balance amount to be paid by the complainant on account of the enhanced compensation determined for the delayed period and the bilateral agreement speaks about the liability has to be construed as simple interest and not compound interest. Similar observations were also made in case Haryana Urban Development Authority through its Estate Officer v. Arjun Dass Popli, III (2006) CPJ 8=2006 (1) C.P.C. 707. In view of the position explained above there is no force in the stand taken from the side of the appellants in this regard. Coming to the last submission, Rule 4(9) of the Rules clearly provided that order of the District Forum shall be signed with the date by the Members of the District Forum. Constituting the Bench and shall be communicated to the parties free of charge. In this case the examination of the impugned order would show that compliance of the above rules has been done because date of the order as 11.11.2005 has been mentioned after typed word "Announced" on the left side of the last page of the order and on the right side signature of President and Members have been appended. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants appears to be that in terms of the above stated rule date should appear under the signature of President and Member who has announced the order on 11.1.2005. Such a construction does not flow from the rule referred to above and for that reason the submission made by the learned Counsel for the appellant in this regard has to be rejected outrightly. In fairness to the learned Counsel for the appellants, reference was made to the case Housing Board Haryana v. Housing Board Colony Welfare Association and Others (supra). The facts of that case were that the District Forum by its order dated 22.10.1992 had allowed the complaints and quashed the additional demand made by the appellant Board. The appellant Board had filed three appeals on 30.11.1992 before the State Commission against the above mentioned order dated 22.10.1992 quashing the additional demand. The State Commission took the view that all three appeals filed were beyond the prescribed period of limitation under Section 15 of the Act, 1986, and as no sufficient cause for condonation was pleaded, dismissed all the three appeals as barred by time. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the State Commission passed in First Appeal Nos. 380, 390 and 391 of 1992, the appellant Board preferred revision petition before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi being Revision Petition Nos. 66 to 68 of 1993. The National Commission maintained the order of the State Commission and dismissed all the three revisions by common order dated 7.1.1993 impugned in those appeals. Thereafter, the matter was taken before the Hon''ble Supreme Court, and it was contended from the side of the appellant Board that President of the District Forum had pronounced the order on 22.10.1992 in open Court and after such pronouncement of the order he proceeded on leave. The President had not signed the said order before proceeding on leave and for that reason the same was not available to the appellant. The said order was however attested and certified on 30.10.1992, a copy whereof was furnished to the appellant on 3.11.1992. Since 19.11.1992 was Sunday, the appeals before the State Commission were filed on 30.11.1992. On the basis of these facts it was contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that appeals were filed within one month from 30.10.1992, the date on which attested and certified copy of the orders were supplied to the appellant. In support of the stand taken reference was made to Rule 10(4) of Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1988) which made it obligatory on the part of the District Forum to furnish signed and dated copy of the order free of charge to the appellant and such a copy was furnished to the appellant on 30.10.1992 and for that reason the appeals were filed before the State Commission on 30.11.1992, would be within the prescribed limitation under Section 15 of the Act and as such there was no question of making any application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The other contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant was that the appellant-Board could not have filed the appeals against the order of the District Forum on the basis of mere pronouncement thereof in the open Court unless the contents of the order were made available to the appellant for the purpose of preparing the appeal and challenging the same in the higher Forum and for that reason the State Commission as well as the National Commission committed a serious error in dismissing the appeal by coming to the conclusion that the revisions were barred by time and no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was pleaded. After taking notice of the provisions of Section 15 Rules 4(10) and 8(3) of the Rules, 1988. It was observed in Para Nos. 11 and 12 of the judgment as under: "11. From the scheme of the Act it becomes apparent that the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 has been enacted with object to provide for better protection of the interest of the consumers, as a measure for economical and speedy remedy for the settlement of their dispute and matters connected therewith. It is with this object in view that Rule 4(10) has also been made. It provides for communication of the order of the District Forum to the parties free of charge in order to avoid the delay as well as to save the parties from the burden of expenses that may be incurred for obtaining the certified copy. If the rule itself enjoins a duty for communicating the order of the District Forum duly signed and dated to the parties free of charge, there will hardly be an occasion for the parties to make an application for obtaining a certified copy thereof. Thus, Section 15 of the Act, cannot be read in isolation but it has to be read along with Rules 4(10) and 8(3) of the Rules and a combined reading of Section 15 and the Rules reproduced above gives an impression that the purpose, object and intention of these statutory provisions is to protect the interest of the parties before the District Forum by making it obligatory on the District Forum to provide a copy of the order duly signed and dated by the members of the Bench and the period of limitation prescribed with regard to the filing of an appeal shall be computed as commencing from the date of communication of the order in the manner laid down in Sub-rule 9(10) of Rule 4.

In the facts and circumstances stated above, the date of pronouncement of the order in the open Court by itself cannot be the starting point for determining the period of limitation under Section 15 of the Act; it has also to be shown that the order of the District Forum so pronounced was duly signed and dated by the members of the District Forum constituting the Bench and the same was communicated to the parties free of charge. That being so, it has to be appreciated that mere pronouncement of an order in the open Court will not be enough but under the scheme of the Rules a copy of the said order has also to be communicated to the parties affected by the said order so that the party adversely affected therefrom may have a fair and reasonable opportunity of knowing the text, reasons and contents thereof so as to formulate grounds of attack before the appellate or higher Forums. In the absence of such communication of signed and dated order, the party adversely affected by it will have no means of knowing the contents of the order so as to challenge the same and get it set aside by the appellate authority or the higher Forums."

It was further stated in Para No. 13 as under: "13. In the present case as laid before the State Commission the appellant contended that the order was pronounced by the District Forum in the open Court on 22.10.1992. It was not signed and dated as the President had proceeded on leave soon thereafter and, therefore, neither the reasons on which the said order was based were known nor a copy thereof was furnished to the appellant-Board so as to know the reasons and contents of the order. It was also the case of the appellant that on an inquiry by the Counsel for the appellant-Board he was informed by the Stenographer of the President that the order would be dictated and typed after the return of the President and that the copy would be made available to the parties only on 30.10.1992 under the signature of the President and the copy was in fact made available to the Counsel for the appellant only on 3.11.1992. It may be pointed out that Shri Tirath Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant-Board before the National Commission had filed his own affidavit affirming these facts which have not been controverted by the respondents. On the contrary the reply filed in this Court by Shri K.C. Chug, President, Housing Board Colony Welfare Association, Kurukshetru on behalf of the respondents has admitted that in the present case free copies were ready with the office on 30.10.1992 which were collected by the Counsel for the answering respondent on 30.10.1992 whereas the Counsel for the petitioner got the same on 3.11.1992. From these facts it is abundantly clear that the copies were duly signed and dated by the members of the Forum on 30.1.1992. That being so the period of limitation in view of the above discussion will commence from the date on which the copies of the order were ready and made available i.e. 30.10.1992. In the present case the appeals were filed before the State Commission on 30.11.1992 and since 29.11.1992 was Sunday, the appeals were prima facie within time. In these facts and circumstances there was no question of making any application for condonation of delay in filing the appeals as there was no delay at all."

The reference in detail has been made to the above observation because learned Counsel representing the appellants contended that above observation would govern the controversy raised in the present appeals. From the above stated facts there cannot be any doubt that the primary controversy raised was that as to whether the appeals have been filed within limitation and for that reason it was held that the period of limitation would commence from the date on which the copy of the order were ready and made available of such communication of signed and dated order, the party adversely affected by it will have no means of knowing the contents of the order so as to challenge the same. In this case 15 days delay in filing the appeal has been condoned. Again it is not a case where common order has not been signed by the President and Members and dated as noticed earlier. Therefore, the facts and observations made in the above mentioned cases do not support the stand taken from the side of the appellants in this regard and the submission so made from the side of the appellants has to be rejected. For the aforesaid reasons there is no merit in the above stated five appeals and the same are consequently dismissed. Appeals dismissed.