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Judgment
5 paragraphs · 1,037 wordsFIRST Appeal Nos. 339 and 359 of 1993 are cross appeals directed against the same order of the District Forum, Hissar. They stand concluded by our order in FIRST Appeal No. 118 of 1993, Haryana Urban Development Authority, Hissar v. Madan Mohan Gandhi decided on the 17th of June, 1993 and affirmed by the National Commission in Revision Petition No. 326 of 1993, Chief Administrator, HUDA v. Madan Mohan Gandhi, decided on the 8th of September, 1993. this order will govern both of them.
THE facts may be noticed from First Appeal No. 339 Haryana Urban Development Authority v. R.D. Khurana. Way back on the 12th of October, 1989 one Sh. S.K. Mehta had been allotted plot No. 62 in the colony developed by the Haryana Urban Development Authority which was later on transferred to the complainant Sh. R.D. Khurana on the 31st of August, 1990. It was his case that in accordance with the terms and conditions all the payments had been paid except the last one which was due only on 11th of April, 1993. THE allegation was that both in the terms and conditions and also in the offers and promises made by the officers of the HUDA at the spot an expeditious delivery of possession was extended out to the applicants-consumer. However belying such promises the relevant area had not at all been developed by the HUDA and consequently possession had not been offered to him, thus causing irreparable financial loss and mental harassment to him. Inter alia relief of interest on the deposited amounts was claimed apart from possession. In the reply to the complaint filed by the HUDA the broad matrix of facts had been admitted including the allotment of the plot and the payment of the instalments etc. But the plea was that the area could not be developed so far, and possession consequently could not be offered, but still the stand was that the complainant was bound to pay the remaining instalments and was not entitled to any interest thereon. The complainant in his replication reiterated his stand to the hilt.
The District Forum on the appraisal of the material before it found the case fully covered by Haryana Urban Development Authority, Hissar v. Madan Mohan Gandhi (Supra) and accordingly directed the payment of interest at the rate of 18% on the deposited amount.
MR. A.S. Gulia, the learned Counsel for the appellant-HUDA being patently bereft of any argument on merits because of the stone wall of precedent against him bad resorted to hyper-technicalities. It was belatedly sought to be contended that the complaint was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Forum because the value of the plot allotted to the respondents-consumer was Rs. 1,73,500/- . On that score the order of the District Forum was sought to be assailed. The argument has only to be noticed and rejected. What first is manifest on the record is the fact that the purported objection of the pecuniary jurisdiction was never seriously pressed at the threshold nor at the stage of arguments. Herein any reference thereto is conspicuous by its absence in the order under appeal. It deserves highlighting that the appellant-HUDA was represented by Sh. Sheoran, Asstt. District Attorney at the time of trial and it has been expressly recorded that he was given a full hearing. It is plain on the present record that neither any preliminary objection nor at the final stage of the argument was any threshold plea of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction was urged or pressed before the District Forum. The same must therefore necessarily be deemed to have been waived. At the same can hardly be entertained. This Commission has consistently taken the view that the threshold objection of territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction must be urged and pressed as preliminary objections and it is not open to the litigants to set on the fence & when the matter goes against them on merits, to then resurrect the ghost of lack of jurisdiction. Altogether apart from the above, the objection on the score of pecuniary jurisdiction is otherwise ill-founded. It observes highlighting that the primal relief claimed by the complainant was claim of interest only and some compensation for harassment and non-delivery. In Dr. B.S. Gaba v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Another, I (1991) CPJ 631 it was concluded as follows on this point:- "In short, wherein terms a claim of compensation is pleaded in a consumer complaint, then both the value of goods and services and the said claim have to cross the same hurdle of the pecuniary jurisdiction of one lakh in order to exclude the District Forum." In view of the aforesaid ratio it is obvious that the claim of interest and compensation was far below a sum of rupees one lac and consequently the District Forum was fully clothed with the pecuniary jurisdiction to try the matter.
ONCE the aforesaid hyper-technical submission is out of the way it bears repetition that the appeal of the HUDA is concluded against it by Madan Mohan Gandhi''s case. Therein the identical question had arisen and whilst dismissing the appeal preferred by the HUDA. The rate of interest was enhanced to 18% which indeed has been now awarded by the District Forum herein. Because of the affirmance of the view of the Commission in revision by the National Commission no further argument is obviously now permissible. For the foregoing reasons First Appeal No. 339 of 1993 must fail and is hereby dismissed with costs which are assessed at a sum of Rs. 500/- only. In the Cross Appeal No. 359 of 1993 the complainant-consumer has now raised the claim of compensation of two lacs. However, patently enough there is not the least foundational base therefore. It is common ground that no evidence of any special damage was led on behalf of the complainant. In this context the award of interest at the rate of 18% thus more than amply meets the ends of justice. We find not the least ground for interfering in the quantum of relief granted by the District Forum. This appeal must also fails and is dismissed. However, without any order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.
