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Judgment
21 paragraphs · 903 wordsD.S. Tewatia, J.—This appeal arises out of a claim petition tiled by Gurdas Mal claiming compensation to the tune of Rs. 72,500/- for his leg injury which he sustained in an accident with Truck No. PNR. 1818 on 8th August 1964 at 9 a.m.
The petitioner alleged in the petition that on the day of the accident he was coming back from his lands from village Bajra to Ludhiana side Rohon road when the offending Truck No. PNR-1818 coming from the opposite direction on the same road driven rashly and without blowing born struck him after coming on the wrong side of the road and its wheels passed over his leg which later on, on the on set of gangrene, had to be amputed in Miss Brown Hospital, Ludhiana, to which be was removed in a tonga from the place of the accident.
Hukam Chand driver, Abnash Lal owner of the offending truck, and the Premier Insurance Company Ltd., who were impleaded as the respondents to the said petition, contested the petition.
On the pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal framed the following issues:
Was the accident due to the negligence of the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident ?
Is the claim application time-barred and are there any valid reasons for condoning the delay ?
What is the quantum of compensation due if any and from whom to whom ?
Is the application not properly filed and has the claim been compromised and with what affect ?
Relief.
The Tribunal found issues 1 to 4 against the respondents and in favour of the petitioner. Under the issue pertaining to the quantum of compensation it held the petitioner entitled to the payment of Rs. 13,844/- as damages.
Mr. M.S. Liberhan appearing for the appellants has urged that the Tribunal erroneously ruled out of consideration the evidence regarding the compromise. He also further stressed that the evidence of A.S.I. Sunder Dass clearly proved that the truck driver was not responsible for the accident and the Tribunal, without any cogent reasons, ruled out of consideration his testimony.
I find no merit in the contention advanced by the learned counsel.
The esse set up by the driver Hukam Chand was that the truck had not even touched the petitioner and that out of compassation he had removed the petitioner to the hospital. If that was the position, then where was the necessity of the police being informed and for the recording of the statement of the petitioner by the A.S.I. The doctor was examined as A.W.1 and not a single question was put to him about the fact as to whether the petitioner was in a position to make a statement which he is alleged to have made, according to A.S.I. Sunder Dass. Nor any effort was made to get his signatures verified, which they ought to have done since he had denied that he has signed the statement.
In view of the above it cannot be said that the Tribunal ruled out of consideration the testimony of A.S.I. Sunder Dass, as also the documentary evidence, without any valid and cogent reasons.
The learned counsel for the appellants has not challenged the veracity of the witnesses who had deposed that the accident occurred as a result of rash and negligent driving of the offending truck by Hukam Chand driver. Hence I hold that the Tribunal has rightly found both issues 1 and 4 in favour of the petitioner.
As regards the quantum of compensation, the learned counsel for the appellants argued that the compensation awarded for special diet and towards dejection and unhappiness in the petitioner''s future life could not, in law, be allowed. He maintained that so far as the inclining of expenses for special diet was concerned, not a word was said as to whether he had taken any special diet and had incurred any expenditure thereon;
It is no doubt that that the petitioner had not in so many words said that he had either taken special diet or had spent any amount thereon. He had merely indicated that he had spent Rs. 2,500/- on his treatment. Special diet being part of treatment, so by implication it has to be taken that he had claimed damages for the special diet.
As far as the compensation under the head of dejection and unhappiness of the petitioner''s future life is concerned, I do not think the learned counsel is right in submitting that the same is not permitted by law. I have myself in Prem Nath v. Punjab State (1973) 75 P.L.R. 117 allowed Rs. 1,000/- as compensation under that head.
Lastly, the learned counsel for the appellants stressed that the Tribunal had not given any cogent reason for finding issue No. 2 against the respondent-appellants. Issue No. 2 pertains to limitation.
It is not doubt true that the application was time-barred, but on the record sufficient explanation is forthcoming. The petitioner was an indoor pattern from 9th August, 1964 to 23rd October, 1964 and in the meantime he had an heart attack also. In view of that, he had sufficient cause not to institute the present petition in time. Hence the contention advanced is repelled.
For the reasons stated, there is no merit in this appeal and the same stands dismissed with costs.
