Hukam Chand And Others vs State Of Himachal Pradesh And Others

Anoop Chitkara, J

This petition coming on for admission this day, the Court passed the following:

FIR No.

Dated

Police Station

Sections

23/2020

09.03.2020

Ramshehar, Police District Baddi, HP.

452, 323/34 IPC

1.Seeking quashing of FIR and subsequent proceedings, the accused came up before this Court by filing the present petition under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure, 1973. They have arraigned the victim as 2nd respondent.

On 8 th March, 2020, police officials of Police Station Ramshehar, received an informatin about a quarrel. On reaching the spot the complainant /2nd respondent herein, informed the police officials about the incident. He alleged that on 8th March, 2020, at about 7.00 p.m., when he reached his home, then he noticed one boy sitting in the kitchen alongwith his wife. He asked the boy about his identity but he kept quiet. His wife told him that the boy had come from her maternal home. When such boy refused to leave then he slapped him, on which he left the house. After that, he took dinner and slept with his wife in the room. At about, 9.00 p.m., that boy broke open the door of his room and three persons caught him and asked him why he gave beatings to the boy. After that they administered beatings to him. Based on this information, the above captioned FIR has been registered against the present petitioners.

3 Ld. Counsel for the parties submitted that the parties have resolved the criminal dispute between them and seek quashing of the FIR mention above and closure of all consequential proceedings.

Ld. Additional Advocate General contended that the High Court could not quash FIR solely based on the settlement/compromise between the complainant and the accused, without even considering the gravity and seriousness of the offences alleged against the accused person because the offences alleged were against the society at large and not restricted to the personal disputes between the parties.

ANALYSIS:

The following aspects would be relevant to conclude this petition:-

a. The reason for quarrel was that the complainant had slapped the boy on whose complaint the accused, who are related to him, got agitated and questioned the complainant. Be that as it may, the parties have compromised the matter between them because they are close relatives.

b. The parties have amicably settled the matter between them in terms of the compromise (Annexure P-2). The 2nd respondent stated that he has no objection in case present FIR and consequent proceedings are quashed. Statements of the parties stand recorded and placed on record.

c. In the given facts, the occurrence does not affect public peace or tranquility.

d. The rejection of compromise may also lead to ill will, and the purpose of criminal jurisprudence is reformatory in nature and to work for bringing peace in family and society.

e. The pendency of trial affects career and happiness.

f. Even if this case is put to trial, the parties are likely to maintain the stand they have taken in this compromise, which is expected to result in the accused's acquittal.

g. Accused are the first offenders.

h. The accused are facing prosecution for the last more than one and a half years.

In Ram Prasad v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1982) 2 SCC 149, Supreme Court holds,

The appellants, who are the accused and the complainant, Shri Ram, who was the person injured as a result of firing, have appeared before us and stated that they wish to compound the offence. The offence for which both the appellants have been convicted is one under Section 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, but having regard to the nature of the injury sustained by Shri Ram, we think that the proper offence for which the appellants should have been convicted was under Section 324 read with Section 34. Shri Ram received only one injury on the shoulder and that was also in the nature of simple hurt. We would, therefore, convert the conviction of the appellants to one under Section 324 read with Section 34. Since the parties belong to the same village and desire to compound the offence, we think, in the larger interest of peace and harmony between the parties and having regard to the nature of the injury, that it would be proper to allow the parties to compound the offence.

STAGE OF QUASHING FIR:

In Ashok Chaturvedi v Shitul H. Chanchani, 1998(7) SCC 698, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds that the determination of the question as regards the propriety of the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance and issuing process need not necessarily wait till the stage of framing the charge. The Court holds, "...This argument, however, does not appeal to us inasmuch as merely because an accused has a right to plead at the time of framing of charges that there is no sufficient material for such framing of charges as provided in Section 245 of the Criminal Procedure Code, he is debarred from approaching the court even at an earliest (sic earlier) point of time when the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence and summons the accused to appear to contend that the very issuance of the order of taking cognizance is invalid on the ground that no offence can be said to have been made out on the allegations made in the complaint petition. It has been held in a number of cases that power under Section 482 has to be exercised sparingly and in the interest of justice. But allowing the criminal proceeding to continue even where the allegations in the complaint petition do not make out any offence would be tantamount to an abuse of the process of court, and therefore, there cannot be any dispute that in such case power under section 482 of the Code can be exercised..."

In Kunstocom Electronics (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. Gilt Pack Ltd. and another, (2002) 2 SCC 383, Para 8, Hon'ble Supreme Court Held that "...There is no hard and fast rule that the objection as to cognizability of offence and maintainability of the complaint should be allowed to be raised only at the time of framing the charge."

JURISPRUDENCE ON QUASHING:

In the present case, the offences are not compoundable under Section 320 CrPC. However, the law is almost settled by larger benches judgments of Supreme Court that the offences, those are not listed as compoundable, under Section 320 CrPC, can also be compounded, and the procedure to follow would be by quashing the FIR, and consequent proceedings.

In R.P. Kapur v State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866, a three-member Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court holds,

"[6]. ...It is well established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily, criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding, the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such case, it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal Court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under S. 561-A, the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 561-A in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings, and that is the effect of the judicial decisions on the point (Vide : In Re: Shripad G. Chandavarkar, AIR 1928 Bom 184, Jagat Chandra Mozumdar v. Queen Empress, ILR 26 Cal 786, Dr. Shankar Singh v. State of Punjab, 56 Pun LR 54 : (AIR 1954 Punj 193), Nripendra Bhusan Roy v. Gobina Bandhu Majumdar, AIR 1924 Cal 1018 and Ramanathan Chettiyar v. Sivarama Subramania, ILR 47 Mad 722 : (AIR 1925 Mad 39).

In Parbatbhai Aahir v State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641, a three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court, laid down the broad principles for quashing of FIR, which are reproduced as follows:

[16]. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:

16 (i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;

16 (ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

16 (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;

16 (iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;

16 (v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;

16 (vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;

16 (vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;

16 (viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;

16 (ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and

16 (x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.

REASONING:

The incident pertains to the year 2020 and the accused are facing prosecution for the last more than one and a half years. In case the proceedings are not quashed it will lead to ill will and animosity. Thus, keeping in view the nature of allegations and in the entirety of facts and circumstances of this case, this is a fit case where the FIR needs to be quashed based on the compromise entered into between the complainant and the accused.

This Court has inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to interfere in this kind of matter. Given the entirety of the case and judicial precedents, I am of the considered opinion that the continuation of these proceedings will not suffice any fruitful purpose whatsoever. The Court is inclined to invoke the inherent jurisdiction under section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR and all subsequent proceedings in the peculiar facts and circumstances.

In Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association v State of Himachal Pradesh, 2018 (4) Crimes 324, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds "[47]. As far as Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 135 of 2017 is concerned, the appellants came to this Court challenging the order of cognizance only because of the reason that matter was already pending as the appellants had filed the Special Leave Petitions against the order of the High Court rejecting their petition for quashing of the FIR/Chargesheet. Having regard to these peculiar facts, writ petition has also been entertained. In any case, once we hold that FIR needs to be quashed, order of cognizance would automatically stands vitiated."

In Shakuntala Sawhney v Kaushalya Sawhney, (1979) 3 SCR 639, at p 642, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the finest hour of Justice arises propitiously when parties, who fell apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship or reunion.

Given above, because of the compromise, this is a fit case where the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is invoked to quash the proceedings mentioned above. The FIR mentioned above is quashed, and all the consequential proceedings are also quashed and set aside. The bail bonds are accordingly discharged. All pending application(s), if any, stand closed.

In the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the petition is allowed in the aforementioned terms.

Copy dasti.