Hybrid Seeds and Pesticides, Abohar vs State of Punjab

R.L. Anand, J.

M/s Hybrid Seeds and Pesticides, Mandi No. 1, Abohar, District Ferozepur through its partner Mr. Anil Kumar, and Mr. Rakesh Kumar have filed the present petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C. read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India, against the State of Punjab, for the quashment of complaint under Sections 3(k)(i), 17, 18 and 33, punishable under Section 29(1) of the Insecticides Act, 1968 (for short ''the Act'') read with Rule 27(5) of the Insecticides Rules, 1971, as well as all the consequential proceedings arising out of the said complaint pending in the Court of Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Abohar.

The case set up by the petitioners is that petitioner No. 1 is a licensed dealer and is carrying on the business in the name and style of M/s Hybrid Seeds and Pesticides. The Chief Agricultural Officer, Ferozepur has granted dealer''s licence to the petitioner for the purpose of selling, stocking, exhibiting different types of insecticides/pesticides. Petitioner No. 1 is selling the pesticides/insecticides manufactured by registered manufacturers. Petitioner No. 2 is the partner of M/s Hybrid Seeds and Pesticides, Mandi No. 1, Abohar (petitioner No. 1).

On 6th March, 1997 the Insecticides Inspector inspected the premises of the petitionerfirm and drew the sample of monocrotophos 36% S.L. manufactured by M/s Bharat Insecticides Limited, 201, Shivalik House1, Karampura Complex, New Delhi, from 5 litre original packing of Monocrotophos 36% S.L. bearing batch No. 1025 having manufacturing date 8.6.1996 and the expiry date 7.6.1997 and took the samples in three loose packing from the said 5 litre original packing. The sample was taken from the sealed container which was lying in the same state as it was obtained from the manufacturer and it was properly stored and manufactured by registered manufacturers. After exercising due diligence, the petitioners could not ascertain that the sample taken from the original packing will not conform to ISI specification. After taking the sample one part of the sample was sent to the Senior Analyst, Insecticide Testing Laboratory, Ludhiana, vide letter No. Spl1 dated 11th March, 1997 by Shri Ishwar Chander of the office of the Chief Agricultural Officer, Ferozepur. From the test report it was found by the Analyst that the sample did not conform to the ISI specification in its active ingredient percentage as the sample contained 20.44% active ingredients instead of 36% and the same was found misbranded by the Insecticide Analyst. The report of the Analyst is Annexure P.1 on the record.

After the sample was found misbranded, the petitioners received copy of the Analyst''s report along with the show cause notice dated 19th March, 1997. The petitioner gave detailed reply to the show cause notice on 3rd April, 1997. In the reply it was specifically stated that the Insecticide Inspector took the sample from the sealed intact original container and the insecticide was being sold in the same state in its original packing as received from the manufacturers and the same was stored properly and it remained in the same state as the petitionerfirm acquired from the manufacturer. The petitioners specifically stated that the sealed intact sample was taken by the Insecticide Inspector from the proper storing in a perfect and good condition and the petitioners were entitled for protection under Section 30(3) of the Act as the petitioners had purchased the insecticides from the licensed manufacturer and the sample was taken from the sealed intact container. It was further alleged that while purchasing the insecticides the petitionerfirm performed due and reasonable diligence and the petitioners with reasonable and diligence could not come to know that the sealed intact container purchased from licenced manufacturer contained misbranded insecticide and alleged that the analysis report received by the petitioners was defective and was unacceptable to the petitionerfirm and showed their intention to adduce the evidence in contravention of the said report in accordance with the provisions of Section 24(3) of the Act and claimed protection under Section 30(3) of the Act. It is also alleged by the petitioners that the manufacturer of the insecticide had also applied for the retesting of the second part of the sample which was allowed by the Chief Agricultural Officer vide letter dated 24th April, 1997 but the same was not sent by the Chief Agricultural Officer to the Central Insecticide Laboratory for retesting on the pretext that the manufacturer did not appear to send it for retest. According to the petitioners, as per the provisions of Section 24 of the Act, if the manufacturer or the dealer showed his intention to controvert the report of the regional laboratory, then the second part of the sample is to be sent for retesting.

The Department did not consider the reply to the show cause notice and without sending the sample to the Central Insecticide Laboratory, the present complaint was filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Abohar, on 29th May, 1997. In the said complaint the petitioners have been summoned to appear in the Court of SubDivisional Judicial Magistrate, on 4th July, 1997. The case further set up by the petitioners is that the shelf life of the Insecticide had already expired before the appearance of the petitioners in the Court as the expiry date of the insecticide was 7th June, 1997. Therefore, the petitioners lost their valuable right to get the second part of the sample tested from the Central Insecticide Laboratory in order to controvert the report of the Analyst of Insecticide Testing Laboratory, Ludhiana.

Both the petitioners have been summoned. According to the petitioners, the summoning order is manifestly unjust and harassment is being caused to the petitioners unnecessarily as they have not violated any provision of the Act because the sample was taken from the sealed container and the petitioners were entitled to the protection of Section 30(3) of the Act.

With the above averments, the petitioners have prayed for the quashment of the complaint as well as the summoning order.

I am disposing of this petition with the assistance rendered by Shri S.C. Khunger, Advocate, at the motion stage itself without issuing notice to the State of Punjab. However, I summarise again the allegations contained in the petition. The petitioners have filed the present petition mainly on the ground that the sample was taken from a sealed container and as the petitioner are the dealers, they could not know about misbranding of the contents of the sealed container and thus they are protected under Section 30(3) of the Act and in the given circumstances the liability, if any, is that of the manufacturer or of the distributor and not of the dealer. The second plea which has been taken up by the petitioners is that the manufacturing company also applied to the authorities for the retesting of the second part of the sample, which was allowed by the Chief Agricultural Officer vide letter dated 24the April, 1997, but the same was not sent by the said Officer to the Central Insecticide Laboratory on the ground that the manufacturer did not appear to send it retest. Now the point for determination is whether on both the pleas, which have been taken by the present petitioners, the proceedings, i.e. the complaint and the summoning order can be quashed for the benefit of the petitioner or not ?

Many propositions of law would arise and the first would be as to what is the scope of the provisions of Section 482, Cr.P.C., which lays down that nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. A plain reading of the above provision would show that the powers are exceptional in nature and it has been repeatedly held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court that such exceptional powers should be used sparingly and in rarest of the rare cases. The second proposition of law which has emerged out is what is the nature of the order which has been passed by the learned Magistrate. It is the case of the petitioners themselves that they have only been summoned. The order is interim in nature and can be recalled by the learned Magistrate under Section 245(2), Cr.P.C., on being satisfied that the complaint was nothing but an abuse of the process of law and that the summoning order is required to be recalled. The petitioners have not adopted the remedy and they have come directly to the High Court for the quashment of the proceedings by filing the present petition, which in the opinion of this Court ought not to have been filed by the petitioners; rather they should have approached the learned Magistrate in order to convince him for the dismissal of the complaint itself. Assuming for the sake of arguments, if it is taken that the summoning order is not interlocutory or interim in nature, but it has adjudicated some rights in favour of the State and against the petitioners, even then this Court is of the opinion that the provisions of Section 482, Cr.P.C., cannot be invoked because if the order is not interlocutory in nature, but has adjudicated the rights against the petitioners, then the remedy lies in the revision and not in the proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. This remedy again has not been adopted by the petitioners, justifying this Court not to interfere with the proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. A third aspect of the case is that even if it is taken for the sake of argument that the provisions under Section 482, Cr.P.C., are independent in character and are not controlled by the provisions of revision or under Section 245(2), Cr.P.C., still it has to be seen whether this Court can usurp the powers of the Magistrate, who has summoned the petitioners as accused after applying his judicial mind. Until and unless it is shown that the summoning order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or manifestly illegal and is liable to be set aside without making any further inquiry, in that eventuality alone the proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C., could be invoked, as has been laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the various guidelines given in the famous case reported as State of Haryana and others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, 1991(4) RCR (Crl.) 383 : AIR 1992 Supreme Court 604. For the sake of convenience, the said guidelines are reproduced as under :

"In following categories of cases, the High Court may in exercise of powers under Article 226 or under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., may interfere in proceedings relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. However, power should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases:

(1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provision of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

Where allegations in the complaint did constitute a cognizable offence justifying registration of case and investigation thereon and did not fall in any of the categories of cases enumerated above, calling for exercise of extraordinary powers or inherent powers, quashing of FIR was not justified."

A critical study of the above guidelines would show that the present case is one which involves a disputed question of fact and would require some evidence in order to adjudicate the plea of the petitioners and in these circumstances the provisions of Section 482, Cr.P.C., cannot be invoked.

I have stated at the very outset that the petitioners wanted to avail the benefits of the provisions of Section 30(3) of the Act and the point for adjudication would be in these circumstances whether this Court in the proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C., can go into the questions which have been posed by the petitioners in the petition itself. Before I advance further with this judgment, I would like to quote the provisions of Section 30 of the Act itself for ready reference :

"30. Defences which may or may not be allowed in prosecutions under this Act.

(1) Save as hereinafter provided in this section, it shall be no defence in a prosecution under this Act to prove merely that the accused was ignorant or the nature or quality of the insecticide in respect of which the offence was committed or of the risk involved in the manufacture, sale or use of such insecticide or the circumstances of its manufacture or import.

(2) For the purposes of Section 17, an insecticide shall not be deemed to be misbranded only by reason of the fact that

(a) there has been added thereto some innocuous substance or ingredient because the same is required for the manufacture or the preparation of the insecticide as an article of commerce in a state fit for carriage or consumption, and not to increase the bulk, weight or measure of the insecticide or to conceal its inferior quality or other defect; or

(b) in the process of manufacture, preparation or conveyance some extraneous substance has unavoidably become intermixed with it.

(3) A person not being an importer or a manufacturer of an insecticide or his agent for the distribution thereof, shall not be liable for a contravention of any provision of this Act, if he proves

(a) that he acquired the insecticide from an importer or a duly licensed manufacturer, distributor or dealer thereof;

(b) that he did not know and could not, with reasonable diligence, have ascertained that the insecticide in any way contravened any provision of this Act; and

(c) that the insecticide, while in his possession, was properly stored and remained in the same state as when he acquired it."

The above would show that these are the defences to the criminal charge which have been initiated by the State. So far as the position of law is concerned, if the accused wants to bring his case to one of the defences, either under the general law or under the special law or he wants to prove a particular fact to exonerate himself, the onus will be upon him and not upon the complainant/State. The case set up by the petitioners is that they did not know nor they could possibly know that the contents of the sealed container were misbranded and in these circumstances, the liability, if any, is of the manufacturer. The word ''proves'' is of much significance which suggests that a proof is required in order to prove a fact a this proof can only be led by the accused before the Magistrate in order to convince him that they did not and could not know with reasonable diligence that the insecticide in any way was contravening the provisions of the Act and that the insecticide while it was in their possession was properly stored and remained in the same state when the Insecticide Inspector acquired it. It is also the settled principle of law that the averment made in the petitions are not part of the evidence.

Faced with this difficulty, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the complaint there is not an iota of allegation made by the Government Inspector of the effect that the accused knew that the contents of the sample were misbranded and that the sealed container was not stored at a proper place. I do not subscribe to the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners because negative allegations are not supposed to be incorporated in the complaint. A perusal of the complaint filed against the petitioners would show that there are specific allegations that the sample which was taken, had been misbranded and for that reasons the petitioners are guilty. It is the petitioners who are taking defence under Section 30(3) of the Insecticides Act and they can only succeed by proving and by leading such cogent evidence as is required under the law in order to bail them out from the allegations. In order to acquit themselves from the allegations, evidence is required, which can only be led in the trial Court and not before the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C., and the averments made in the petition cannot be taken as evidence in the light of the specific allegations made against the petitioners in the complaint.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon some case law reported as Birbal v. State of Punjab, 1993(1) RCR 687 ; Amar Khad Store v. State of Punjab, 1996(3) RCR 140 and Criminal Misc. No. 14847M of 1996 (M/s Sudesh Traders, Mandi No. 1, Abhoar, and another v. State of Punjab), and it has been submitted that it is the view of this Court that when the sample has been taken from a sealed container, the liability of the dealer cannot arise. I am not in a position to subscribe to the argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners because in none of the cited authorities this point which I am going to discuss in the present judgment, was ever discussed by their Lordships. Rather this point came up for hearing in twothree judgments of this Court and I would like to refer to the latest judgment reported as Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab, 1997(2) RCR 679, where it was specifically held that in order to avail the benefit of Section 30(3) of the Act the accused has to prove that he was ignorant of the quality of insecticide and he could not know with reasonable diligence that the insecticide in any way contravened the provisions of the Act. Further it was laid down therein that the accused had to prove that the insecticide was rightly stored. His Lordship categorically held that there was no valid ground to quash the proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. The questions of facts are involved which can only be gone into and decided by the trial Court. There is no answer to this proposition of law which in the opinion of this Court has been rightly laid down by his Lordship because this view is in controversy with the law laid down in Ashwani Kumar Bhakoo v. State of Punjab, 1994(1) RCR 349 , where it was held that all the grounds mentioned in Section 30(3) of the Act are questions fact and must be proved like any other fact by leading evidence in the trial Court. Mere averment in the petition cannot be deemed to be evidence. In the light of these two authorities I have been left with no other option but to hold that the first and frontal plea, which cannot be taken by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the contents have been taken from the sealed container and, therefore, the liability, if any, it is the manufacturer/distributor. The petitioners have equally efficacious remedy either under Section 245(2) or under Section 397, Cr.P.C. Reliance can be placed on Khinni and others v. State of Haryana, 1997(2) RCR 732 , wherein this Court took the view that there cannot be quashment under Section 482, Cr.P.C., where the petitioners have the alternative remedy available to them, which is equally efficacious and they have not availed it of. I am further strengthened by the citation reported as T.L. Jain v. Mahesh Chand, 1997(2) RCR 734 , wherein it was held that where the Magistrate after recording preliminary evidence summons the accused and the accused files a petition in the High Court for the quashment of the complaint and the summoning order, the High Court will not quash the proceedings at that stage because the accused could approach the Magistrate for quashing even before the entire evidence of the complainant is completed and that the accused could plead that there was no worthwhile evidence against him in the complaint. It was held in this authority that the provisions of Section 482, Cr.P.C., can be invoked only if on the face of it appears to the High Court that the complaint was frivolous, false or vexatious generated malice or illwill towards the accused.

Now I proceed and discuss the second proposition of law which has been set up in the petition itself that the manufacturer also applied to the authorities, i.e., the Chief Agricultural Officer, for sending the second sample for analysis and so much so the petitioner made a request in that regard and that when the petitioners appeared before the Magistrate, the shelf life of the insecticide had already expired and in these circumstances a prejudice is likely to be caused to the petitioner and consequently, the proceedings are liable to be quashed. In this regard I would like to refer to the relevant provisions which are contained in Section 24 of the Insecticides Act, and the said provisions are reproduced as follows :

"24. Report of Insecticide Analyst. (1) The Insecticide Analyst to whom a sample of any insecticide has been submitted for test or analysis under subsection (6) of Section 22, shall, within a period of sixty days, deliver to the Insecticide Inspector submitting it a signed report in duplicate in the prescribed form.

(2) the Insecticide Inspector on receipt thereof shall deliver one copy of the report to the person from whom the sample was taken and shall retain the other copy for use in any prosecution in respect of the sample.

(3) Any document purporting to be a report signed by an Insecticide Analyst shall be evidence of the facts stated therein, and such evidence shall be conclusive unless the person from whom the sample was taken has within twentyeight days of the receipt of a copy of the report notified in writing the Insecticide Inspector or the Court before which any proceedings in respect of the sample are pending that he intends to adduce evidence in controversion of the report.

(4) Unless the sample has already been tested or analysed in the Central Insecticides Laboratory, where a person has under subsection (3) notified his intention of adducing evidence in controversion of the Insecticide Analyst''s report, the Court may, of its own motion or in its discretion at the request either of the complainant or of the accused, cause the sample of the insecticide produced before the Magistrate under subsection (6) of Section 22 to be sent for test or analysis to the said laboratory, which shall make the test or analysis and report in writing signed by, or under the authority of, the Director of the Central Insecticides Laboratory the result thereof, and such report shall be conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein.

(5) The cost of a test or analysis made by the Central Insecticides Laboratory under subsection (4) shall be paid by the complainant or the accused, as the court shall direct."

According to subsection (2) of Section 24, it is the Insecticide Inspector who shall deliver one copy of the report of the Insecticide Analyst to the person from whom the sample was taken and shall retain the other copy for use in any prosecution in respect of the sample. In the present case the sample was taken from the dealer. One copy of the sample has been sent to it as required under Section 24(2) of the Act. According to subsection (3) of Section 24, the person from whom the sample was taken is allowed to notify in writing the Insecticide Inspector or the Court before which any proceedings in respect of the sample are pending that he intends to adduce evidence in controversion of the report, and he himself exercises his right within 28 days from the receipt of the copy of the report. As per Section 24(4), once the right has been exercised under subsection (3), the Court may, of its own motion or in its discretion at the request either of the complaint or of the accused, cause the sample of the insecticide produced before the Magistrate under subsection (6) Section 22 to be sent for test or analysis to the said laboratory, which shall make the test or analysis and report in writing signed by, or under the authority of, the Director of the Central Insecticides Laboratory the result thereof, and such report shall be conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. In the present case, vide Annexure P.2, the petitionerfirm challenged the report of the Analyst and expressed its desire to adduce the evidence in controversion of the said report. The case set up by the petitioners is that the life of the shelf had expired on 7th June, 1997 and in these circumstances they had lost their valuable right for sending the second sample for analysis from the Central Insecticide Laboratory and, therefore, they are entitled to acquittal. They are also attacking the report on the plea that even the manufacturing company expressed its similar desire.

Before I proceed further, I may state that if the provisions of Section 24 of the Insecticides Act, 1968 are read in depth, the report of re test has been given to the accused from whom the sample was taken. It cannot be assumed even for a moment that the interests of the manufacturer/distributor would clash with the dealer. The dealer has expressed his desire to challenge the report of the Analyst. The case set up by the petitioner is that when they received the information from the Department about the misbranding of the sample, no criminal proceedings were pending. When they appeared before the Magistrate the life of the shelf had already expired and in these circumstance they are entitled to acquittal and the complaint is liable to be quashed. This argument was also considered by this High Court in M/s Agro Acids, near Sangam Cinema, Amritsar, and others, v. State of Punjab, 1997(2) All India Criminal Law Reporter 109, and his Lordship was pleased to hold as under :

"6. In my opinion, if the interpretation sought to be put on the language used in Section 24(3) is accepted, that will lead to defeating the provisions of the Act. Rule of interpretation of the language of a statute is that the language of a statute should be interpreted in a manner that the object of the Act is furthered and not defeated. If in reply to the show cause notice the petitioners had urged that the second portion of the sample be sent for reanalysis where was the bar that they could not appear before the Court and pray that other portion of the sample, retained in the office of Chief Agricultural Officer, be sent for reanalysis to the Central Insecticides Laboratory...."

The other judgment on this argument is M/s Hindustan Chemicals Industries v. State of Punjab, 1997(2) RCR 192, and in para No. 4 of the judgment his Lordship gave the rely as follows :

"4. ........ In my opinion the use of words "the Court before which any proceedings in respect of the sample are pending" should not be given such narrow interpretation. In the contemplation of law, the prosecution shall be deemed to be pending before the Magistrate after the Insecticides Analyst had conveyed the result of analysis to the Chief Agriculture Officer. .. .. .."

In the opinion of this Court also this is the correct interpretation given by his Lordship in both the judgments because this interpretation can advance the interests of justice, otherwise a very anomalous position would arise and the penal provisions of the Insecticides Act can be defeated by the dealer/manufacturer or a distributor under the garb of a wrong plea that since the life of the shelf had already expired, a very valuable right had been lost. Every dealer/manufacturer or a distributor would try to prolong the proceedings in order to ensure that as and when they appear before the Magistrate in pursuance of the summoning order, the life of the shelf must be expired so that they can take a defence that their socalled valuable rights have been defeated on account of the inaction adopted by the Government Inspector. In this very context I want to quote an illustration. Suppose the life of a sample is going to expire on 1st January, 1997 and the sample is taken only week ago within the date of the expiry of the sample. The sample is sent to the Laboratory from where it is found to be misbranded. By the time the dealer or the distributor wants to exercise his right under Section 24 of the Act the life of the shelf would expire. Can it be said that in these circumstances there can be no prosecution and the answer of this Court is in the negative. In the opinion of this Court, the dealer can apply to the Magistrate before whom the proceedings are ultimately to be launched, with a request that the second sample be sent to the Central Insecticides Laboratory and the Magistrate in these circumstances will ensure that the sample is re tested. Now the ancillary point which I also want to answer at this stage is whether a distributor or a manufacturer has any independent right to request the Court for sending the sample for reanalysis. Again I would like to reply in the negative. The correct interpretation of Section 24 of the Act, in the opinion of this Court, would be that when the manufacturers or the distributors are summoned under the Insecticides Act to face the liability, they can only convince the Magistrate that the report earlier obtained was incorrect, but they cannot make a separate request to the Magistrate for the retesting of the second sample. In this respect I would like to quote the opinion of this Court in the case reported as Jhajhan Lal Gupta v. State of Haryana, 1996(3) RCR 42, wherein it was held that the manufacturer can challenge the report of the Analyst but he cannot get the sample retested before launching prosecution against him.

In the light of the above, I would like to sum up my discussion by urging that the proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C., cannot be invoked in the present case as the case of the petitioners is not covered under the guidelines laid down by the hon''ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported as State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal (supra) as equally efficacious remedy is available under Section 245(2), Cr.P.C., and they can also take the benefit of the dictum of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case reported as K.M. Mathew v. State of Kerala and another, 1992(1) RCR (Crl) 232 : 1992 Crl. LJ 3779. They could even file a revision petition treating the summoning order as final. Independently, present is a case where the provisions of Section 482, Cr.P.C., cannot and should not be invoked as the provisions of this section are supposed to be invoked sparingly and in exceptional cases. It has also been held that the disputed questions of fact cannot be gone into in the proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. The averments made in the petition are not evidence. The defences which are taken by the dealer under Section 30(3) of the Insecticides Act are the defences on facts, which can only be proved by leading evidence before the Magistrate and inquiry cannot be embarked upon the High Court while exercising the inherent powers under Section 482, Cr.P.C. The proceedings will be deemed to be pending within the meaning of Section 24 of the Insecticides Act since the person from whom the offending sample was taken has been informed about the report of the Public Analyst. Such a person can exercise his right by applying to the Magistrate that the second sample may be sent for reanalysis and the ancillary point is also answered that the distributor/manufacturer has no independent right to request to Court for sending the second sample for reanalysis. They can only challenge the first report which has gone against the person from whom the sample was taken into possession.

In the light of the above discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the judgments and the case law relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners are not helpful for the petitioner. The petition is devoid of any merit and same is dismissed in limine at the motion stage itself.