Ichalkaranji Municipal Council vs Praveen Shivgonda Patil and Another

Nishita Mhatre, J.—The Petitioner has approached this Court against the order of the Industrial Court dated 22.7.1998. By this order, the Industrial Court has allowed the complaint filed by Respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the ''respondent''). The Industrial Court has declared that the petitioner had committed an unfair labour practice under Items 6 and 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act. The petitioner has been directed to make the respondent permanent in service and to give him consequential benefits of permanency. The respondent had enlisted his name with the employment exchange. The petitioner wanted to fill in vacancies which were available and therefore called for names from the employment exchange. The Respondent''s name was submitted and after an interview he was selected to oversee the construction work in progress within the municipal limits. He was appointed on a work charged basis as a Deputy Engineer on the pay scale of Rs. 600 to Rs. 1150/ -. Since the respondent had worked for more than 3 years and he was not being made permanent in service he filed a complaint alleging unfair labour practices under Items 6, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act. In his complaint the respondent had stated that though he was designated as a Deputy Engineer he was a workman as defined u/s 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. He pleaded inter alia that he had been appointed on 2.3.1987; had been working uninterruptedly with the petitioner since then; his service record was unblemished; he had been continued on a work charged basis instead of being confirmed in service. The respondent also pleaded that he was performing work of a permanent nature and that sufficient work was available for making him permanent. He has also pleaded that certain resolutions had been passed by the petitioner creating additional posts of Deputy Engineers. The respondent then contended that there were permanent vacant posts of Deputy Engineers available with the petitioner despite which he was not being made permanent in service. The respondents therefore pleaded that he was entitled to permanency and that the petitioner had indulged in unfair labour practices under Items 6, 9 and 10 of the Schedule IV.

In response, the petitioner filed a written statement in which it was contended that the respondent was not a workman as his duties were supervisory in nature. The petitioner further pleaded that the respondent was employed on a work charged basis and therefore had no right to permanency. The petitioner denied the contention of the respondent that he had been continued in service without being made permanent only to deprive him of the status and privileges of a permanent workman. The petitioner denied that the work performed by the respondent was permanent in nature. With regard to the allegation of the petitioner that the Municipal Council had passed a resolution creating additional posts of Deputy Engineers the petitioner has replied thus:

as regards para 3F of the complaint the creation of post is not within the scope of the respondent. The Respondent can make a proposal but the sanction of the same is within the powers of the Govt. The contention that on permanency he will be entitled to Rs. 4,000/ - p.m. is incorrect.

With respect to the respondent''s contention that though permanent vacant posts of Deputy Engineers were available with the petitioner he had been denied permanency. The petitioner has replied thus:

As regards 4(I) of the complaint it is submitted that the vacant post if any has to be filed by following the procedure and the employees on the permanent staff Schedule shall have right of promotion in such post.

The petitioner then denied that it had committed any acts of unfair labour practices and, therefore, prayed that the complaint be dismissed.

The respondent led evidence before the Industrial Court. He has stated that he was working as a Deputy Engineer. He has described the nature of his work which was to prepare estimates and to draw maps and plans and to give technical sanction for certain types of work and to take measurements of the completed works of construction. He has stated that there were no other workers under his control or supervision nor had he ever sanctioned leave to any workers. He has further deposed that he had no right to issue memos or showcause notices to the employees nor any right to punish them. He has then averred that he was reporting to the City Engineer and could proceed on leave only with his sanction. The respondent has then stated that the nature of work that he was performing was being done by him throughout the year. He has mentioned that there was a difference of Rs. 4,000/ - per month between the pay that he was drawing and the amount paid to permanent employees. He has further stated that four junior engineers were appointed after him and made permanent. He has also averred that he had completed 240 days in service.

Significantly, the petitioner chose not to cross-examine the workman. Evidence was led by the petitioner on 9.7.1998. The petitioner examined its labour officer. He has mentioned the hierarchy of the Engineering Department, which was City Engineer, Additional Engineer, Junior Engineer, Sub Overseer, Mistry, Mukadam. He has admitted that the respondent was working under the control of the City Engineer on a work charged basis. The witness has described the duties performed by the respondent. He had to ensure that the material used for construction was in consonance with the norms and that in case it was found that the work was not upto the specifications it had to be stopped. He has stated that the respondent was employed for supervising the work of a stadium and that his work was not permanent in nature. The witness has admitted that the respondent''s grade was equivalent to class III workers which were filled by the selection board in accordance with the Government Circular. In his cross-examination the witness has admitted that in the resolution No. 788 of 18.2.1987 permitting the appointment of the respondent there is no indication that his appointment would be only to oversee the work of the stadium. This witness was unable to state the number of days of employment put in by the respondent. He has further admitted that no employee was appointed for the work of the stadium. He has also stated that the respondent was allotted work by the City Engineer and has conceded that the respondent had no right to sanction leave of other employees or to punish them or to allot work to any employee. The witness admitted that he had no record to indicate that the respondent was appointed only to work at the stadium. He has also admitted that the respondent''s name was included in the muster roll just as the names of other workmen.

The Industrial Court has by its impugned order held that the respondent had proved that he was the workman and, therefore, the complaint was maintainable. The Industrial Court was of the view that the petitioner had not established that the respondent was performing the work which was supervisory in nature. The Industrial Court held that the petitioner had not established that the respondent was not covered by the definition of the workman u/s 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, held that there was evidence on record to indicate that the respondent had worked continuously since he was appointed in service. The benefits of the 4th Pay commission had been extended to him to a certain extent. The Industrial Court also accepted the case of the respondent that he had put in more than 240 days of unblemished service with the petitioner. The Industrial Court held that there was sufficient work available for him on the basis of the statement of the respondent. The Court then considered the G.R. Dated 9.2.1988 wherein it was mentioned that the appointments to certain posts were to be made by the Maharashtra Subordinate Selection Board. However, this G.R. was made effective from 10.2.1988 whereas the respondent was appointed in service from 2.3.1987. It is in these circumstances that the Industrial Court held that the G.R. does not govern the services of the respondent. The Industrial Court came to the conclusion that the workman had been denied the status and privileges of permanent employee and therefore held that there were unfair labour practices committed by the petitioner under Sections 6 and 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act.

Mr. Ingale, for the petitioner, submits that the complaint ought to have been dismissed for non joinder or misjoinder of parties as the State Government which was a necessary party was not arrayed as a Respondent in the complaint. He submits that the respondent was not a workman. According to him, he was appointed as a supervisor to oversee the construction of the stadium. He submits that the appointment of the respondent was on a work charged basis and therefore he had no right to permanency. The leaned advocate submits that the judgment of the Industrial Court is against the well settled principles of law that permanency can be extended to a person in employment only when sanctioned posts are available and when the appointment of such a person is in consonance with the rules applicable. He points out that in the present case the petitioner had been appointed without following the due procedure as no interview was held. According to him, it matters little whether the respondent has completed 240 days in service and the finding of the Industrial Court on this aspect is erroneous. He further submits that there were no sanctioned posts available for the respondent to be made permanent in service and that the Municipal Council could not create posts without the sanction from the State Government. Mr. Ingale, therefore, submits that the petition has to be allowed as the order of the Industrial Court is patently bad. Mr. Ingale also submits that the Bombay Civil Services Rules have been certified as the Standing Orders applicable to the petitioner on 6.5.1984. After the Bombay Civil Services Rules were replaced by the Maharashtra Civil Services Rules on 29.9.1989 all municipal employees working with the Maharashtra Municipal Councils are governed by those rules. He has placed reliance on several judgments which I will advert to presently.

The learned advocate appearing for the respondent on the other hand submits that all the contentions raised by Mr. Ingale before this Court do not find lace in the pleadings either before the Labour Court, Industrial Court or before this Court. He submits that there is no pleading regarding the misjoinder or non-joinder of parties. According to him, the other contention raised by Mr. Ingale that posts can be created only u/s 76 of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965 was not borne from the pleadings on record. According to him, no factual foundation has been laid by the petitioner in support of his contention that the respondent was not employed in accordance with the rules applicable or that there were no sanctioned posts available. He then submits that several admissions of the witness for the respondent indicate that work was available and that the respondent was qualified to do that work. He further submits that although the respondent had applied for the post of estate manager, it was the petitioner who chose to appoint him as a Deputy Engineer and that he has been working as such upto today. In these circumstances, the learned advocate by relying on certain judgments which I will consider at a later stage submits that no interference is called for by this Court under its writ jurisdiction.

The first submission of Mr. Ingale about misjoinder or non joinder of parties is misconceived. The complaint has been filed by the Respondent alleging unfair labour practices on the part of his employer. The State Government is not his employer and therefore is not a necessary party.

The next submission of Mr. Ingale that the respondent is not a workman is unsustainable. The respondent has led evidence before the court indicating the nature of work that he was performing. Mr. Ingale points out that the respondent was a supervisor and therefore excluded from the definition of workman since he was drawing more than Rs. 1,000/ - per month as his pay. The use of the word "supervisor" is in my opinion is incorrect. The appointment order of 25.2.1987 which is in Marathi indicates that the respondent was appointed to oversee all construction work undertaken within the limits of the Municipal Council. He was appointed as a Deputy Engineer on the pay scale of Rs. 600 to Rs. 1150/ - on a work charged basis. The resolution relied on by Mr. Ingale which led to the respondent''s appointment is dated 9.2.1988. The contention that the respondent was a supervisor and therefore excluded from the definition is unsustainable. Moreover, although the respondent led evidence to establish the nature of work performed by him, the petitioner did not think it fit to cross-examine him. The evidence led by the petitioner also does not controvert the respondent''s contention about the nature of work that he was performing. The Industrial Court has concluded that the work of the respondent was technical in nature inasmuch as he was expected to oversee whether the quality of material used for the construction works undertaken within the municipal limits was upto the specified requirements. This kind of work cannot by any stretch of imagination be termed as supervisory. It is not the petitioner''s case that the respondent was supervising men or the work done by others. The mere fact that he had to ensure that the quality of the work was good or as per the specifications would not necessarily mean that he was a supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The nature of the work that he was performing indicates that it was technical and therefore, he was a workman u/s 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and, consequently, an employee u/s 3(5) of the MRTU and PULP Act. Mr. Ingale relies on the judgment in the case of H.R. Adyanthaya Vs. Sandoz (India) Ltd., etc. etc., in support of his submission that the respondent is not a workman. This judgment in my opinion, does not disentitle the Respondent to the reliefs claimed as he was doing a work which was technical in nature. The word "technical" must be construed ejusdem generis with the words "skilled", "manual" or "non-manual" or the genre of the words mentioned in the definition.

The next submission of Mr. Ingale is that the respondent was appointed on a work charged basis and that his appointment was only for overseeing the construction of a stadium. The Industrial Court has in my opinion, rightly observed that the appointment letter does not mention this fact. As stated earlier, the appointment letter stipulates that the respondent was being appointed by the Municipal Council on a work charged basis to oversee the construction work which was undertaken within the limits of the municipal council. There is evidence on record to indicate that the work which the respondent was entrusted with was available through the year and continued to be available even when he filed the complaint. The respondent''s appointment was not for a particular project as sought to be made out by the learned advocate. Affidavits and resolutions cannot add to the stipulations contained in appointment order. Once it is held that the work that the respondent was performing was not limited to a particular project but was available throughout the year it is necessary to ascertain whether he is entitled to relief claimed in the complaint namely of permanency.

In the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others Vs. Umadevi and Others, , the Supreme Court has held that within the constitutional scheme of public employment in the country in appropriate cases the executive or the Court would have the right to regularise an appointment made after following the due procedure even though a non-fundamental element of that process or procedure has not been followed. However, the Supreme Court has put a caveat to this proposition inasmuch as such regularisation in service cannot be permitted if the appointment itself is in clear violation of the constitutional scheme and the statutory rules made in that behalf. The Court has delineated the difference between regularisation and granting confirmation or permanency in service by referring to its earlier judgments. The Court observed:

We have, therefore, to keep this distinction in mind and proceed on the basis that only something that is irregular for want of compliance with one of the elements in the process of selection which does not go to the root of the process, can be regularised and that it alone can be regularised and granting permanence of employment is a totally different concept and cannot be equated with regularization.

Thus, in order to ascertain whether the appointment of the respondent was regular and as a consequence he was entitled to permanency it would be necessary to consider how the respondent was appointed. There is evidence on record before the Industrial Court to the effect that vacancies were available for the post of estate manager. These posts were sought to be filled by calling for names from the employment exchange. The respondent''s name was one amongst many which was sent by the employment exchange. He has selected after an interview was held. That interview was conducted by the Municipal Council. A resolution as passed by the Municipal Council, appointing the Respondent as a Deputy Engineer on a work charged basis since the respondent who was interviewed for the post of estate manager was found more suitable than others and because he was experienced. The reliance placed by the petitioner on the G.R. of 9.2.1988 to contend that the appointments to certain posts are to be made by the Maharashtra Subordinate Selection board does not carry the case of the petitioner any further. This resolution indicates that it took effect from 10.2.1988 whereas the petitioner had appointed the respondent on 2.3.1987. Therefore, this resolution does not govern the appointment of the respondent. Thus, the petitioner''s entry into service was undoubtedly legal and in accordance with the prescribed norms and therefore regular.

The Supreme Court in the case of Punjab State Electricity Board and Others Vs. Jagjiwan Ram and Others, held that the work charged employees are engaged for execution of a specific work of project. Their engagement comes to an end on completion of the work of project. In the facts of the case before the Supreme Court, it was found that generally speaking work charged employees are engaged for execution of a specified work of project and that their duties and responsibilities are substantially different from those of regular employees. However, in the present case, though the respondent was issued an appointment order in which it was mentioned that he was appointed on a work-charged basis, the appointment order does not disclose that his appointment was for a particular work or project. In fact, it reveals that the appointment was to oversee all the construction work which was being undertaken within the local limits of the municipal council. The evidence on record indicates that such work continued well beyond the period of three years. Therefore, although the petitioner''s appointment order indicates that the respondent''s appointment was on a work charged basis, he was continued in service for over three years and there is evidence on record establishing that such work was continuously available. The term ''work charged'' was a misnomer.

The question that arises is whether there were posts available for making the respondent permanent in service, despite which the petitioner failed to do so. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative then it would mean that the petitioner had indulged in an unfair labour practice under Items 6 and 9 of Schedule IV. Mr. Ingale relies on the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court (Rebello, J., as he then was) in the case of Municipal Council and another Vs. Mrs. Jaiwantabai Meshram and others, in support of his contention that the Municipal Council cannot create posts and no relief of permanency can be granted by any Court. In this judgment, the learned Judge has held that to grant the relief of permanency to the workmen who were employed on daily wages for a long period of time, there must be posts available with the Municipal Council. The Municipal Council had in that case sought a sanction from the Director of Municipal Administration for the creation of posts. However, that sanction had not been received and, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of that case, the learned Judge held that the order of Industrial Court directing the municipal council to make the workmen permanent in service could not be upheld. It was held that when no posts were available the question of making the workers permanent would not arise. In the present case, there is no evidence at all on record to indicate that such posts are not available. The Supreme Court in the case of Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and Another Vs. Casteribe Rajya P. Karmchari Sanghatana, has observed thus:

We find merit in the submission of Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned Senior Counsel that Standing Orders are contractual in nature and do not have a statutory force and breach of Standing Orders by the Corporation is itself an unfair labour practice. The concerned employees having been exploited by the Corporation for years together by engaging them on piece rate basis, it is too late in the day for them to urge that procedure laid down in Standing Order No. 503 having not been followed, these employees could not be given status and principles of permanency. The argument of the Corporation, if accepted, would tantamount to putting premium on their unlawful act of engaging in unfair labour practice.

It was strenuously urged by the learned Senior Counsel for the Corporation that industrial court having found that the Corporation indulged in unfair labour practice in employing the complainants as casuals on piece rate basis, the only direction that could have been given to the Corporation was to cease and desist from indulging into such unfair labour practice and no direction of according permanency to these employees could have been given. We are afraid, the argument ignores and overlooks the specific power given to the Industrial/Labour Court u/s 30(1)(b) to take affirmative action against the erring employer which as noticed above is of wide amplitude and comprehends within its fold a direction to the employer to accord permanency to the employees affected by such unfair labour practice.

In the present case, the respondent fulfills the criteria that he was appointed in accordance with law as his name was one of those obtained by the Municipal Council from the employment exchange. He was interviewed and was found suitable for the post. There is not even a whisper in the written statement filed by the petitioner nor any evidence led by it that the appointment of the respondent was irregular or illegal. Besides this, there is no pleading at all that no posts are available to grant the respondent permanency. In fact the respondent in his complaint has stated categorically that there are permanent vacant posts of Deputy Engineers available despite which he has been denied that post. This statement has not been denied by the Petitioner except as aforesaid. In these circumstances, it must be concluded as has been done by the Industrial Court that the very fact that the Respondent was continued on a work charged basis for years together shows that the motive of the Petitioner was to deprive the Respondent of the status and privileges of a permanent employee.

In my view, the Industrial Court has committed no error at all by concluding that the Petitioner had committed an unfair labour practice under Items 6 and 9 of the Schedule of the MRTU and PULP Act and consequently allowing the complaint.

Petition dismissed. Rule discharged. No costs.