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Judgment
The petitioner has filed the writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate Writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the order dated August 19, 1987 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Kolhapur in I.D.A. Application No. 324 of 1985. By the impugned order it has been held that the respondent is entitled to receive from the petitioner a sum of Rs. 7,326.30 towards the difference of wages for the period from December 8, 1981 to September 30, 1985. The petitioner was directed to pay to the respondent the said amount. At the admission stage, the operation of the impugned order was not stayed. Consequently, the petitioner has made the payment to the respondent No. 1. Thus, it would appear that the writ petition has become infructuous. However, the counsel for the petitioner has stated that since similar claims are likely to be raised by other employees, it is necessary to decide the writ petition on merit.
The petitioner is a Co-operative Bank registered under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. The provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act are applicable to the said Bank. The Bank has adopted Standing Order applicable to its employees, which have been duly certified by the Commissioner of Labour, Bombay u/s 35-C of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. The Respondent No. 1 was appointed by the petitioner Bank as an Apprentice clerk on June 8, 1981 for a period of six months, which came to an end on December 8, 1981. In the appointment order issued to the Respondent No. 1, it was stated that "In case your services even after the expiry of period of your appointment through oversight continued thereafter, then thereafter your services will be considered as apprentice clerk only". Another appointment order was issued to the Respondent No. 1 on November 14, 1983 wherein he was appointed on the post of clerk with effect from November 1, 1983 in the regular pay scale. The petitioner''s was paid wages as per the daily rate prevailing at the time regularly, i.e. for the first year Rs. 10/-, for the second year Rs. 12/- per day and for the third year Rs. 17/- per day. The petitioner has also been made permanent in the service of the Bank with effect from November 1, 1986. The Respondent No. 1 moved an application before the Labour Court, Kolhapur u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, claiming an amount of Rs. 7,326.10 from the petitioner Bank being the difference in wages. The Respondent No. 1 in the application alleged that he was working as a Junior Clerk with the petitioner Bank from June 8, 1981 to October 30, 1985. He had attach to the application a chart showing the actual wages and the difference which is yet to be paid. This application was opposed by the petitioner by filing a reply. It was stated that the application is totally vague, false, misconstrued, illegal and proper. It was admitted that the Respondent No. 1 was in the employment of the petitioner with effect from June 8, 1981 as a clerk. It was submitted that he was appointed as Apprentice for a period June 8, 1981 to October 30, 1983 and subsequently with effect from November 1, 1983 he is made permanent in the petitioner''s service. It was denied that the respondent had been paid less amount of wages during the period from December 8, 1981 to September 30, 1985. During the period of apprenticeship, the Respondent No. 1 has been paid stipend, to which he was entitled.
On the basis of the aforesaid facts the impugned order came to be passed on August 19, 1987. The counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Labour Court has committed ar error of law in entertaining the application. The Labour Court has acted as if a reference u/s 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act is being decided. The Labour Court had no jurisdiction or power to interpret the provisions of the Standing Orders in an application u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is submitted that such an application is in the nature of execution proceedings. Therefore, the Labour Court could not have abrogated to itself the function of the Labour Court while deciding a reference u/s 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The counsel in support of the proposition has relied upon a Judgment of the Supreme Court given in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited Vs. The Workmen and Another, and Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Ganesh Razak and Another, . It the Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd.''s case, the Supreme Court has held that a proceeding u/s 33-C(2) is proceeding, generally, in the nature of an execution proceeding wherein the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from his employer, or if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the Labour Court proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money. This calculation or computation follows upon an existing right to the money or benefit, in view of its being previously adjudged, or, otherwise duly provided for. The Supreme Court further held as follows :
"13. In a suit, a claim for relief made by the plaintiff against the defendant involves an investigation directed to the determination of (i) the plaintiff''s right to relief; (ii) the corresponding liability of the defendant, including, whether the defendant is, at all, liable or not; and (iii) the extent of the defendant''s liability, if any. The working out of such liability with a view to give relief is generally regarded as the function of an execution proceeding. Determination No. (iii) referred to above, that is to say, the extent of the defendant''s liability may sometimes he left over for determination in execution proceedings. But that is not the case with the determination under heads (i) and (ii). They are normally regarded as the functions of a suit and not an execution proceeding. Since a proceeding u/s 33-C(2) is in the nature of an execution proceeding it should follow that an investigation of the nature of determinations (i) and (ii) above is, normally, outside its scope. It is true that in a proceeding u/s 33-C(2), as in an execution proceeding, it may be necessary to determine the identity of the person by whom or against whom the claim is made if there is a challenge on that score. But that is merely ''incidental''. To call determination (i) and (ii) ''incidental'' to an execution proceeding would be a perversion, because execution proceedings in which the extent of liability is worked out are just consequential upon the determinations (i) and (ii) and represent the last stage in a process leading to final relief. Therefore, when a claim is made before the Labour Court u/s 33-C(2) that Court must clearly understand the limitations under which it is to function. It cannot arrogate to itself the functions - say of an Industrial Tribunal which alone is entitled to make adjudications in the nature of determinations (i) and (ii) referred to above, or proceed to compute the benefit by dubbing the former as ''incidental'' to its main business of computation. In such cases determinations (i) and (ii) are not ''incidental'' to the computation. The computation itself is consequential upon and subsidiary to determinations (i) and (ii) as the last stage in the process which commenced with a reference to the Industrial Tribunal. It was, therefore, held in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. R. L. Khandelwal, 1968 I LLJ 58, that a workman cannot put forward a claim in an application u/s 33-C(2) in respect of a matter which is not based on an existing right and which can be appropriately the subject matter of an Industrial Dispute which requires a reference u/s 10 of the Act."
In the Municipal Corporation of Delhi''s case (supra), it was held that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmen''s entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power u/s 33-C(2) of the Act. It is only when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognised by the employer and thereafter for the purpose of implementation or enforcement thereof some ambiguity requires interpretation that the interpretation is treated as incidental to the Labour Court''s power u/s 33-C(2) like that of the Executing Court''s power to interpret the decree for the purpose of its execution. The power of the Labour Court u/s 33-C(2) extends to interpretation of the award or settlement on which the workman''s right rests.
Keeping the aforesaid judgments in view, it has to be examined as to whether the exercise undertaken by the Labour Court is within the powers of the Labour Court u/s 33-C(2). A perusal of the order shows that the Labour Court has interpreted the Standing Order No. 4(2)(a) which defines permanent employee and Standing Order No. 4(2)(d) which defines the term apprentices. The Labour Court has, held that by virtue of the Standing Order No. 4(2)(a) once an employee has completed a period of six months service, he is deemed to be a permanent employee. It is held that the right of the Respondent No. 1 to receive the wages can be computed by interpreting the two provisions of the Standing Orders. A perusal of the Standing Orders which have been attached with the Writ Petition shows that the Standing Orders have been settled by the Commissioner of Labour u/s 35(2) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 for employees in the Co-operative Banks mentioned in the schedule appended thereto. The petitioner Bank finds mention in the schedule. The Standing Orders apply to all employees employed in the Bank. Under Standing Order 4, employees are classified into 4 categories being permanent employees, probationers, temporary employees and apprentices. Standing Order 4(2)(a) defines that a permanent employee means an employee who has been appointed as such in writing by the Bank and includes an employee who has completed a total probationary period of six months continuous service with the Bank. Standing Order 4(2)(d) defines apprentice to mean employee who is a learner and is paid an allowance during the period of his training; provided that no employee shall be classified as an apprentice if he has had training for an aggregate period of six months.
The counsel for the petitioner does not deny the legal position that the Standing Orders are statutory in nature and have a binding effect on the bank and the employees. This being so, it would be difficult to agree with the submission of the counsel for the petitioner that the interpretation of the Standing Orders was not incidental to the decision of the application u/s 33-C(2). Even a perusal of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra), would show that it has been held that the Labour Court has the power to interpret an award or a settlement on which the workman''s right rests. The position of the Standing Orders cannot be said to be of a lesser status than that of a settlement or an award which may have been arrived at between the employer and employee. Even in the earlier judgment, in the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation, (supra) it is also held that it would be permissible for the Labour Court to interpret and to adjudicate on matters which are incidental to the computation of the benefit claimed by the workman.
The counsel for the respondent workman has cited a number of judgments to the effect that it is open to the Labour Court when exercising power u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act to interpret the various provisions of the settlements and awards. The counsel has referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court in 1968 II LLJ 840 in case of State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Verma (C.S.). In that case, the Labour Court has interpreted the provisions of Sastri Award. It was held that an application in question was maintainable by the Labour Court and the Court while interpreting the provisions of Sastri Award had not travelled beyond the provisions of Section 33-C(2). In that case, an appeal by special leave was filed against the order of the Labour Court upholding the claim of the workman for supervisory allowance in an application u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act from the commencement of the new definition of workman i.e. August 29, 1956 to December 31, 1961. The case of the appellant Bank was that the workman was not a workman immediately after Sastri Award and the Labour Appellate Tribunal''s decisions were given, and the award and the decision did not apply to him and the change in the definition could not make them applicable to him. It was held that this is wrong approach. The award and the decisions regulated the enrollments of services in the banks and created categories. Anyone opting for the conditions of service under the Award and the decision stood to gain if by any legislation his status was changed to his advantage. This is what had happened in the case of the workman. He was a supervisor, but not entitled to an allowance. After the change in the definition of workman, he was entitled to take advantage of the award by reason of the legal change in his status as status as supervisors became workmen. It was argued that because the claim of the workman that he was a supervisor-workman was being disputed, Section 33-C(2) does not apply. The said argument was rejected by holding that the dispute in the case fell within the powers of the Labour Court u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the Labour Court was right in holding that the workman was entitled to the special allowance.
This being the legal position, it would be difficult to hold that the interpretation of the Standing Order was not incidental to compute the amount of wages which were due to the Respondent No. 1. The counsel for the Respondent No. 1 has also referred to Voltas Ltd. Vs. J.M. Demello and Another, . In the said case, it is held as follows at p. 314 :
"Proceedings u/s 33-C(2) are analogous to execution proceedings and a Labour Court called upon to compute benefits claimed by a workman is in the position of an executing Court and as such competent to interpret an award where there is a dispute as to the rights thereunder or as to its correct interpretation. Obviously, if the award is unambiguous, the Labour Court is bound to enforce it, and under the guise of interpreting it, it cannot make a new award by adding to or subtracting anything therefrom. Although it cannot go behind the award, it is nevertheless competent to construe the award where it is ambiguous and to ascertain its precise meaning, for, unless that is done, it cannot enforce the award when it is called upon to do so by an application u/s 33-C. A claim u/s 33-C(2) postulates that the determination of the question about computing in terms of money may in some cases have to be preceded by an inquiry into the existence of the right. Such an inquiry is incidental to the main determination assigned to the Labour Court by that sub-section. While enquiry into the question as to the existence of such a right, and construing the award, the Labour Court can look into the demand by the workmen in order to ascertain whether the award under which the right is claimed was or was not beyond the scope of the demand; in other words, whether the award was within jurisdiction."
It is a matter of record that the Respondent No. 1 was employed as an apprentice clerk on June 8, 1981. This period of six months under the Standing Orders came to an end on December 8, 1981. Thereafter the order appointing the Respondent No. 1 on the post of clerk in a permanent capacity was issued on November 14, 1983. The question before the Labour Court was whether or not the recital in the appointment order dated June 8, 1981 was contrary to the Standing Order or not. The recital, in the appointment order was to the effect that in case the services of the workman are continued even after the expiry of the period of apprenticeship, he will be deemed to continue as an apprentice only. This recital is apparently contrary to the Standing Order 4(1)(a) which clearly stated that a permanent employee means an employee, who has been appointed as such in writing by the Bank. This is one category of permanent employee. Second part of the Standing Order 4(1)(a) is "and employee who has completed a total probationary period of six months with the bank". This clause has to be read in conjunction with 4(1)(d) which clearly provides that no employee shall be classified as an apprentice if he has training for an aggregate period of six months. Admittedly, the Respondent No. 1 had been appointed on June 8, 1981. The appointment order itself states that the six months period shall come to an end on December 8, 1981. That being so, it becomes obvious that Respondent No. 1 has to be treated as on probation with effect from December 8, 1981. After the expiry of six months period, the Respondent No. 1 could no longer be treated as an apprentice. The petitioners wrongly treated the Respondent No. 1 as an apprentice till November 14, 1983. Having wrongly treated workman as an apprentice against the Standing Orders, the petitioners cannot be permitted to take the plea that they can take advantage of their own wrong. Keeping these facts and circumstances in view, the Labour Court rightly has come to the conclusion that the action of the petitioners was contrary to the certified Standing Orders. Since the Standing Orders have statutory force, they can legitimately be interpreted by the Labour Court while exercising its power u/s 33-C(2).
It has been held time and again by the Supreme Court that the Labour Court has a power to interpret settlement and award in order to compute the wages u/s 33-C(2). These matters are treated as incidental to the main issue. The settlements and awards are generally arrived at between the parties under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Standing Orders are also framed and certified under the Industrial Disputes Act. Settlements, awards and Standing Orders deal with the conditions of service of the employees. Thus, the same principles would have to apply when interpreting Standing Orders as though that are applied, while interpreting awards and settlements.
Thus, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the Court is of the view that the Labour Court has not committed any error of jurisdiction. Consequently, the impugned order deserves to be upheld. Thus, the writ petition is dismissed with no orders to costs.
Rule discharged.