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Judgment
Sandeep Sharma
1.By way of present petition filed under S. 482 CrPC, prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioners-accused (hereinafter, ‘accused’) for
quashing of summoning order dated 1.4.2017, as well as consequential proceedings i.e. Case No. 165-1-11 pending before the Judicial Magistrate 1st
Class, Badsar, District Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh.
For having bird’s eye view, necessary facts as emerge from the record are that the respondent No.2-complainant (hereinafter,
‘complainant’) approached the learned Court below by way of a complaint under Ss. 406, 409 and 420 IPC, alleging therein that she had
approached the accused, who are bankers, for availing loan for purchase of a mini-truck (Mahindra & Mahindra 207 DI). On the request of
complainant, loan was availed on installments commencing from 1.2.2005 to 1.12.2008. As per complainant, she paid installments from time to time
and last installment of `17,000/- was paid in the month of June, 2007, but no receipt was issued to that effect. Allegedly, accused, illegally and forcibly,
took away the aforesaid vehicle of the complainant on 11.6.2007 on account of non-payment of installments. Complainant also lodged report to the
police but no action was taken against the accused. Complainant also personally requested the accused to release vehicle but despite her repeated
requests, vehicle was not released and as such, she was compelled to approach the competent Court of law. By way of complaint, complainant
alleged that on the assurance given by the accused, she waited till 6.5.2011, whereafter, she served a legal notice upon the accused, but they failed to
reply to the same. In nutshell, complainant alleged that since accused failed to return a sum of `47,573/-, they have committed criminal breach of trust
and have taken law in their own hands and embezzled and misappropriated valuable security of the complainant by playing fraud and as such, they be
punished in accordance with law.
Subsequently, learned Court below, on the basis of aforesaid complaint having been filed by the complainant, recorded preliminary evidence of
complainant, Urmila Devi, her husband Ajay Kumar, who was guarantor and official of the ICICI Bank, Shailender Vishnoi, who produced the record
and proceeded to pass impugned summoning order dated 1.4.2017, whereby accused came to be summoned for 6.6.2017. In the aforesaid
background, accused have approached this court in the instant proceedings filed under S. 482 CrPC, praying therein for quashment of summoning
order and consequential proceedings pending before Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Badsar.
Pursuant to notice issued in the instant petition, State of Himachal Pradesh has filed its reply, perusal whereof clearly suggests that the complainant,
Urmila Devi never reported the matter to the police, rather police made inquiry after having received orders of Judicial Magistrate 1st Class Badsar.
Police after having conducted inquiry, submitted its report, annexure R- 1. Police, in its inquiry reported that since complainant failed to pay
installments, bank officials after having informed the complainant, seized the vehicle in question and as such, no case, if any, is made out under Ss.
406, 409 and 420 IPC, against the accused.
At this stage, it may be noticed that careful perusal of zimni orders passed by court below suggests that on 22.12.2011, court below after having
received complaint, fixed matter for recording of preliminary evidence on 6.2.2014. Statement of complainant Umila Devi (CW-1) and her husband
Ajay Kumar (CW-2) was recorded on 28.11.2012, whereas, statement of official witness Shailender Vishnoi (CW-3) was recorded on 19.11.2013.
Subsequently, on 10.4.2014, court below considered the facts and circumstances of the case and felt it necessary to call for report of the police under
S. 202 CrPC and accordingly, sent a reference to Station House Officer, Badsar, with a direction to investigate the matter so as to ascertain as to
whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused for alleged commission of offences or not?
Careful perusal of order dated 17.6.2014, suggests that report under S. 202 CrPC was received by the court below, however, while passing
impugned order dated 1.4.2017, whereby accused came to be summoned, court below failed to take note of the report of the police, rather, it solely
placed reliance upon the statement of complainant, Urmila Devi and her husband Ajay Kumar, CW-2.
Having heard the learned counsel representing the parties and perused the material available on record, this court is persuaded to agree with the
contention of Mr. Vijay K. Verma, learned counsel representing the accused that there is no allegation, specific in nature, if any, against the Managing
Director of the Bank, rather, this court having carefully gone through the annexure P-1, finds that there is not even a whisper that what role was
actually played by the officials i.e. accused, while advancing loan or subsequently in receiving the installments. Complainant has simply stated in the
complaint that on her having made request, loan was advanced to her for purchase of vehicle in question. She has further stated that accused illegally
and forcibly took aforesaid vehicle of complainant into custody on 11.6.2007 and report to this effect was made by the complainant to the Police
Station Badsar, which fact has not been supported by the police. As has been taken note herein above, though complainant has named three persons
as accused in the complaint i.e. Managing Director, Director and Branch Manager of ICICI Bank, but there is no specific averment that what role
was played by them at the time of advancement of loan and its recovery, rather, papers for advancement were initiated through some agency i.e.
Mahindra and Mahindra Finance and subsequently loan was advanced through Collection Manager, who has not been named in the complaint.
If averments made in the complaint are read in their entirety, same clearly suggest that complainant was in default of making payment and as such,
it can not be said that Bank officials unlawfully seized the vehicle, rather, there is material on record i.e. report of police, that the Bank officials prior
to taking custody of vehicle, intimated the complainant that since she has failed to make payment, vehicle in question is being taken away by the Bank.
True it is that by now, it is well settled that when prosecution at its initial stage is sought to be quashed, test to be applied by the court is whether
uncontroverted allegations made prima facie establish offence but, in the case at hand, as has been taken note herein above, there is no specific
allegation by name against the accused rather, there appears to be bald allegation of the complainant. There is no allegation that a particular accused
i.e. Managing Director or the Director of the bank illegally seized the vehicle or caused damage to the complainant, rather, in the entire complaint,
there are bald and vague allegations against accused, who are sought to be arrayed as accused.
Interestingly, the learned Magistrate below, while issuing process against the accused failed to take not of the report of the police, wherein it was
specifically recorded that the officials of Bank prior to having taken custody of vehicle, had actually intimated the complainant that since she has failed
to pay the installments, vehicle is liable to be seized, as such, no case under Ss. 406, 409 and 420 IPC is made out. Otherwise also, while issuing
process, magistrate/court concerned is/was always under obligation to record its satisfaction about prima facie case against the person(s) sought to be
arrayed as accused, but in the case at hand, there is no such satisfaction recorded, rather, the Magistrate below has simply, on the statement of
complainant and her husband, proceeded to summon accused against whom definitely there are no specific allegations contained in the complaint.
At this stage, reliance is placed upon a decision rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in GHCL Employees Stock Option Trust v. India Infoline Ltd.
(2013) 4 SCC 505, wherein it has been held as under: 12. From bare perusal of the complaint and the allegations made therein, we do not find in any
of the paragraphs that the complainant has made specific allegations against respondent Nos.2 to 7. In paragraph 2 of the complaint, it is alleged that
respondent Nos.2 to 6 are looking after the day-to-day affairs of the Company. With whom the complainant or its authorized representative interacted
has also not been specified. Although in paragraph 11 of the complaint it is alleged that the complainant on numerous occasions met accused Nos.2 to
7 and requested to refund the amount, but again the complainant has not made specific allegation about the date of meeting and whether it was an
individual meeting or collective meeting. Similarly, in paragraph 17 of the complaint, there is no allegation that a particular Director or Managing
Director fabricated debit note. In the entire complaint there are bald and vague allegations against respondent Nos.2 to 7. 13. There is no dispute with
regard to the legal proposition that the case of breach of trust or cheating are both a civil wrong and a criminal offence, but under certain situations
where the act alleged would predominantly be a civil wrong, such an act does not constitute a criminal offence. 14. Be that as it may, as held by this
Court, summoning of accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Hence, criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. The order of
Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. The Magistrate
has to record his satisfaction with regard to the existence of a prima facie case on the basis of specific allegations made in the complaint supported by
satisfactory evidence and other material on record. 15. In the case of Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia and Another Etc. vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao
Angre and Others Etc. AIR 1988 SC 709, this Court held as under: “7. The legal position is well-settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage
is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It
is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the
interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the
opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal
prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a
preliminary stage.†16. In the case of Punjab National Bank and Others vs. Surendra Prasad Sinha, AIR 1992 SC 1815, a complaint was lodged by
the complainant for prosecution under Sections 409, 109 and 114, IPC against the Chairman, the Managing Director of the Bank and a host of officers
alleging, inter alia, that as against the loan granted to one Sriman Narain Dubey the complainant and his wife stood as guarantors and executed
Security Bond and handed over Fixed Deposit Receipt. Since the principal debtor defaulted in payment of debt, the Branch Manager of the Bank on
maturity of the said fixed deposit adjusted a part of the amount against the said loan. The complainant alleged that the debt became barred by
limitation and, therefore, the liability of the guarantors also stood extinguished. It was, therefore, alleged that the officers of the Bank criminally
embezzled the said amount with dishonest intention to save themselves from financial obligation. The Magistrate without adverting whether the
allegations in the complaint prime facie make out an offence charged for, in a mechanical manner, issued the process against all the accused persons.
The High Court refused to quash the complaint and the matter finally came to this Court. Allowing the appeal and quashing the complaint, this Court
held as under: “6. It is also salutary to note that judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment. The complaint
was laid impleading the Chairman, the Managing Director of the Bank by name and a host of officers. There lies responsibility and duty on the
Magistracy to find whether the concerned accused should be legally responsible for the offence charged for. Only on satisfying that the law casts
liability or creates offence against the juristic person or the persons impleaded then only process would be issued. At that stage the court would be
circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all the relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process
lest it would be an instrument in the hands of the private complainant as vendetta to harass the persons needlessly. Vindication of majesty of justice
and maintenance of law and order in the society are the prime objects of criminal justice but it would not be the means to wreak personal vengeance.
Considered from any angle we find that the respondent had abused the process and laid complaint against all the appellants without any prima facie
case to harass them for vendetta.†17. In the case of Maksud Saiyed vs. State of Gujarat and Others (2008) 5 SCC 668, this Court while discussing
vicarious liability observed as under :- “13. Where a jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint petition filed in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is required to apply his mind. The Penal Code does not contain any provision for attaching vicarious
liability on the part of the Managing Director or the Directors of the Company when the accused is the Company. The learned Magistrate failed to
pose unto himself the correct question viz., as to whether the complaint petition, even if given face value and taken to be correct in its entirety, would
lead to the conclusion that the respondents herein were personally liable for any offence. The Bank is a body corporate. Vicarious liability of the
Managing Director and Director would arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in the statute. Statutes indisputably must contain provision
fixing such vicarious liabilities. Even for the said purpose, it is obligatory on the part of the complainant to make requisite allegations which would
attract the provisions constituting vicarious liability.†18. From bare perusal of the order passed by the Magistrate, it reveals that two witnesses
including one of the trustees were examined by the complainant but none of them specifically stated as to which of the accused committed breach of
trust or cheated the complainant except general and bald allegations made therein. While ordering issuance of summons, the learned Magistrate
concluded as under :- “The complainant has submitted that the accused Nos.2 to 6 are the directors of the company and accused No.7 is the
secretary of the company and were looking after the day to day affairs of the company and were also responsible for conduct and business of the
accused No.1 and some time or the other have interacted with the complainant. I have heard arguments on behalf of the complainant and perused the
record. From the allegations raised, documents placed on record and the evidence led by the witnesses, prima facie an offence u/s 415, 409/34/120B is
made out. Let all the accused hence be summoned to face trial under the aforesaid sections on PF/RC/Speed Post/courier for 2.12.2008.†19. In the
order issuing summons, the learned Magistrate has not recorded his satisfaction about the prima facie case as against respondent Nos.2 to 7 and the
role played by them in the capacity of Managing Director, Company Secretary or Directors which is sine qua non for initiating criminal action against
them. Recently, in the case of M/s.Thermax Ltd. & Ors. vs. K.M. Johny & Ors. 2011 (11) SCALE 128, & ors. while dealing with a similar case, this
Court held as under :- “38. Though Respondent No.1 has roped all the appellants in a criminal case without their specific role or participation in the
alleged offence with the sole purpose of settling his dispute with appellant-Company by initiating the criminal prosecution, it is pointed out that appellant
Nos. 2 to 8 are the Ex-Chairperson, Ex- Directors and Senior Managerial Personnel of appellant No.1 â€" Company, who do not have any personal
role in the allegations and claims of Respondent No.1. There is also no specific allegation with regard to their role 39. Apart from the fact that the
complaint lacks necessary ingredients of Sections 405, 406,420 read with Section 34 IPC, it is to be noted that the concept of ‘vicarious liability’
is unknown to criminal law. As observed earlier, there is no specific allegation made against any person but the members of the Board and senior
executives are joined as the persons looking after the management and business of the appellant-Company.â€
After having carefully gone through the averments contained in the complaint as well as material placed alongwith the same, this court has no
hesitation to conclude that the magistrate below, while issuing process has not bothered to peruse the contents of complaint as well as material placed
alongwith the same to see whether prima facie case, if any, is made out against the accused or not? Contents of complaint having been filed by the
complainant are wholly irrelevant as far as commission of offences under aforesaid provisions of law is concerned. Besides this, the persons, who
allegedly came to seize the vehicle have not been arrayed as accused by the complainant, nor the officials of the Mahindra and Mahindra Finance
have been named as accused, as such, no proceedings could have been initiated on the basis of the complaint, against the petitioners/accused who
have not been attributed any role by the complainant.
Now, this Court deems it necessary to elaborate upon the scope and competence of this Court to quash the criminal proceedings while exercising
power under Section 482 of Cr.PC. Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled State of Haryana and others vs. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1)
SCC 335 has laid down several principles, which govern the exercise of jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Before pronouncement
of aforesaid judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court, a three-Judge Bench of Hon’ble Court in case titled State of Karnataka vs. L.
Muniswamy and others, 1977 (2) SCC 699, held that the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the
proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed.
Relevant para is being reproduced herein below:- “7....In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if
it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require
that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve
a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a
criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like
would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though
justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a
proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the
State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.â€
Subsequently, Hon’ble Apex Court in Bhajan Lal (supra), has elaborately considered the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C.
Subsequently, Hon’ble Apex Court in Vineet Kumar and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr., while considering the scope of interference under
Sections 397 Cr.PC and 482 Cr.PC, by the High Courts, has held that High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that
allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to
quashed. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further held that the saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is
designed to achieve a salutary public purpose i.e. a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or
persecution. In the aforesaid case, the Hon’ble Apex Court taking note of seven categories, where power can be exercised under Section 482 of
the Cr.PC, as enumerated in Bhajan Lal’s case, i.e. where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge, quashed the proceedings
Hon’ble Apex Court in Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293, while drawing strength from its earlier judgment titled as
Rajiv Thapar and Ors v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330, has reiterated that high Court has inherent power under Section 482 Cr.PC., to quash
the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of
charge, but such power must always be used with caution, care and circumspection. While invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C., the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their
defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts and the material adduced on record itself overrule the veracity of the allegations
contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a
reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court
would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process
of the court, and secure the ends of justice. In the aforesaid judgment titled as Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293, the
Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “22. The proposition of law, pertaining to quashing of criminal proceedings, initiated against an
accused by a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “the Cr.P.C.â€) has been dealt with by
this Court in Rajiv Thapar & Ors. vs. Madan Lal Kapoor wherein this Court inter alia held as under: (2013) 3 SCC 330, paras 29-30) 29. The issue
being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., if it chooses to quash the initiation of the
prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all
stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in
the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences, inasmuch as, it would
negate the prosecution’s/complainant’s case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always
be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. the High Court has to be fully
satisfied, that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and
indubitable facts; the material produced is such, as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused;
and the material produced is such, as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the
prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the
necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be
justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a
reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court
would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process
of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to
determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C.:- 30.1 Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the material is of sterling and
impeccable quality? 30.2 Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled
against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as
would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false. 30.3 Step three, whether the material relied
upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the
prosecution/complainant? 30.4 Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the
ends of justice? 30.5 If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal
- proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would
save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear
that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.â€
Hon'ble Apex Court in Asmathunnisa v. State of A.P. (2011) 11 SCC 259, has held as under: “12. This Court, in a number of cases, has laid
down the scope and ambit of the High Court's power under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C.
though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down
in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the
notice of the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute.
The law has been crystallized more than half a century ago in the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 wherein this Court has
summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. This Court summarized the
following three broad categories where the High Court would be justified in exercise of its powers under section 482: (i) where it manifestly appears
that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence but there
is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge."" 14. In Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna
Shivalingappa Konjalgi and Others (1976) 3 SCC 736, according to the court, the process against the accused can be quashed or set aside : ""(1) where
the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely
no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2) where
the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and
arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers
from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like"". 15. This court in
State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy & Others (1977) 2 SCC 699, observed that the wholesome power under section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High
Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court
or that the ends of justice requires that the proceedings ought to be quashed. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil
and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment
or persecution. In this case, the court observed that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered
according to laws made by the Legislature. This case has been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of this court and other courts.â€
Hon'ble Apex Court in Asmathunnisa (supra) has categorically held that where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is
capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and where the complaint
suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like, High Court
would be justified in exercise of its powers under S. 482 CrPC.
From the bare perusal of aforesaid exposition of law, it is quite apparent that exercising its inherent power under Section 482 of Cr.PC., High
Courts can proceed to quash the proceedings if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process
of the law.
In view of above, petition at hand is allowed. Summoning order dated 1.4.2017, as well as consequential proceedings against the accused i.e. Case
No. 165-1-11 pending before the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Badsar, District Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh are quashed and set aside.
Pending applications are disposed of. Interim directions, if any, are vacated. Record of the learned Court below be sent back forthwith.