I.D. Jain vs Madan Lal Jain

Sunil Gaur, J.—The order impugned in this petition is of 26th May, 2003, vide which trial court has summoned the petitioner as an accused

in Criminal Complaint No. 1321 of 2006 titled as ""Madan Lal Jain v. I.D. Jain"", u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, r/w Section 420 of the

IPC.

Quashing of not only the aforesaid summoning order but also of the abovesaid complaint is sought by the petitioner by contending that the basic

ingredients of the offence alleged are not made out as it is not disclosed in the above said complaint that the cheque in question had been issued by

the petitioner/accused in discharge of, whole or in part of the debt or other liability and therefore, statutory presumption u/s 139 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act does not arise against the petitioner. Reliance has been placed upon decisions reported in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia and

Others Vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and Others, ; Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd., etc. Vs. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd. and Others, ;

Mr. Charanjit Singh Vs. Dr. Merchant Banking Services Ltd., and Indian Oil Corporation Vs. NEPC India Ltd. and Others, , to contend that

when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as

made, prima facie establish the offence.

After having heard both the sides and upon perusal of this case, I find that there is no dispute with the aforestated legal position. It would be

pertinent to refer to the averments made in Para-6 of the complaint in question, to find out as to whether the dishonoured cheque of Rupees five

lakhs only was for a consideration or was without any consideration. Para-6 of the complaint, Annexure-P-1, reads as under:

that on making payment of Rs. 10,00,000/0 (Rupees ten lacs) only as detailed above including cheque No. 743276 dated 27-08-1999 for Rs.

Five lacs, the accused got sale deed executed and registered in the names of his three brothers namely Sh. Mahinder Singh Jain, Sh. Surender

Kumar Jain and Sh. Naresh Kumar Jain, sons of Sh. Rameshwar Das Jain, resident of 99, Priya Enclave, delhi vide document Regd. No. 1176,

Book No. 1, Volume No. 759 on pages 168 to 173 in the office of Sub-Registrar, S.D. No. VIII at Geeta Colony, East District, Delhi.

In the case of K.I. George v. Mohd. Master (1999) 97 Comp Cas 664, it has been said that the statutory presumption available u/s 139 of

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can be rebutted by the accused by adducing evidence. So, the burden of proof is on the accused and the

evidence available on record will have to be appreciated by bearing in mind the above fact regarding burden of proof.

I am of the considered view that from the complaint Annexure-P-1, prima facie case is made out against the petitioner and therefore, neither the

aforesaid complaint nor the order vide which the petitioner has been summoned, suffers from any illegality or infirmity.

The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings as

highlighted by the Apex Court in the case of Indian Oil Corporation Vs. NEPC India Ltd. and Others, are as under:

i. A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety,

do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused.

For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a

meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint is warranted while examining

prayer for quashing of a complaint.

ii. A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceedings is found to have been

initiated with mala fide/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.

iii. The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with

abundant caution.

iv. The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the

complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the

complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence.

v. A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; (c ) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A

commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal

offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to

commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed of, is not by itself a ground to quash the

criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not.

In the instant case, no case for invoking extraordinary inherent jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C. is made out in this case. Resultantly, Criminal

M.C. No. Crl. M.C. No. 84/2007 is dismissed with the observation that anything stated herein shall have no bearings on merits at trial of this case.

Crl. M.A. No. 269 of 2007 is disposed of as infructuous and Crl.(M) No. 8616/2007 Crl.(M) No. 10964/2007 are without merit and are

dismissed as such.

This petition and aforesaid applications, are accordingly disposed of.