Immudipattam Janakirama Kumara Kondama Subramania Nachimuthu Bommayya Naicken Ayyan Avergal vs C. Subramania Iyer

Krishnan, J.—In this case the question arises in the execution of the Decree in O.S. No. 714 of 1911 on the file of the principal District

Munsif of Dindigul. The plaintiff obtained a decree against the then Zemindar of Ayakudi for a certain sum of money. That Zemindar died in 1917

and this is an application made by the plaintiff for attachment of certain sums of money payable to the present Zamindar under a lease which was

granted by the previous Zamindar who was the judgment debtor, but for a period subsequent to the death of that Zamindar. The decree is sought

to be executed against the present Zamindar as the legal representative of the late Zamindar against the assets in his hands. The present Zamindar

objected to the attachment and contended that this money could not be treated as assets in his hands as it was his own money and further more

that the matter could not be gone into in execution. The Munsif gave effect to the plea that the matter could not be gone into in execution and

referred the plaintiff to a suit, but, on appeal to the appellate Court, the learned Subordinate Judge held that the matter should be decided in

execution proceedings and has remanded the application to the lower Court for disposal on the merits. The appeal to us is by the present Zamindar

who contends that the order of the lower appellate Court is not right.

It is clear to us that the money that has been attempted to be attached in this case cannot be considered to be the assets of the late Zamindar at

all, for it is money that has accrued due, under the lease of the Zamindar, after the late Zamindar''s death and after the estate had passed into the

hands of the present Zamindar by right of survivorship. It is true that, if the plaintiff (judgment creditor) is able to show that his debt was for a sum

of money borrowed for the benefit of the estate, u/s 4 of the Impartible Estates Act, his debt would be a debt binding on the impartible estate and

he would be entitled to enforce his debt as against the estate in the hands of the present Zamindar; but, by proving that the debt was borrowed for

the benefit of the Zamindari, the Zamindari does not become the assets of the late Zamindar in the hands of the present Zamindar. The only thing

that results is whether the plaintiff will be able to enforce his debt against the impartible estate in the hands of the present Zamindar.

We think that such a question could not be decided in execution proceedings. The view of the Subordinate Judge that the question is one of

determining what are the assets of the late Zamindar is not correct. The question is one of enforcing a new liability that would be created against the

estate in the present Zamindar''s hands by proof that the debt was borrowed for the benefit of the estate. The plaintiff''s proper remedy is to bring a

suit, and, after obtaining a declaration that his debt is binding on the impartible estate and upon the income that has accrued due from the impartible

estate in the hands of the present Zamindar, to apply then in execution of his decree to have it executed against such property.

An application has been made to us that the execution petition should itself be converted into such a suit and that the respondent (judgment-

creditor) should be allowed to go on with his execution application amended into a suit. We think that this cannot properly be done, for what he is

applying for in the present application is to attach certain monies as being the assets of the late Zamindar, and after attachment of such monies, to

pay them over to him in satisfaction of his decree debt. In a suit such a prayer as that of attachment of monies, cannot be included. He will have,

after obtaining a declaration if he can that these monies are liable for his decree debt, to put in a fresh application for attachment and payment of

those monies in satisfaction of his decree debt.

The Order of the lower Court must therefore be reversed and that of the District Munsif must be restored. The appellant will have his costs of

this appeal but we do not interfere with the orders as to the rest of the costs.