High CourtsSingle Bench

Imranuddin Riyazuddin Malik vs Sheikh Abdulhamid Abdulrashid and Others

Gujarat High Court · Decided on 7 February 2008 · Citation: (2008) 02 GUJ CK 0102

HON’BLE JUDGES
S.R. Brahmbhatt, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 — Section 359, 5(11) · Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 106
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Civil Revision Application No. 1321 of 2000 and Civil Application 924 of 2008
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Judgment

21 paragraphs · 2,535 words

S.R. Brahmbhatt, J.—Heard the counsels for the parties. The petitioner/Original Appellant- Defendant No. 1 had preferred this Civil Revision Application challenging the judgment & decree passed by learned Extra Assistant Judge, Vadodara, in Regular Appeal No. 56 of 1997, where under Appellate Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment & decree dated 31/3/1997 passed in Rent Suit No. 235 of 1983 by Learned Additional Small Cause Judge, Vadodara.

2.

Facts in brief deserves to be set out in order to appreciate the controversy in the present petition:

The petitioner who was the defendant in the suit had to face the suit being Rent Suit No. 235 of 1983 filed by the original plaintiff for possession on the ground of non-user of commercially rented property and demise of the tenant, i.e., father of the present petitioner/original defendant No. 1. Said suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff by judgment & decree dated 31/1/1997. The Small Cause Court accepted the plea of the plaintiff that the defendant No. 1/present petitioner did not have any right to be continued in the suit property nor did he inherits tenancy right as urged by the defendant No. 1. Being aggrieved & dissatisfied with the said decision the defendant No. 1 preferred Regular Appeal No. 56 of 1997 before the District Court, Vadodara which also was dismissed vide order dated 8/9/2000 and the Appellate Court confirmed the judgment & decree of the Small Cause Court. Present Civil Revision Application is arising therefrom as the defendant in the suit has preferred to challenge the decree of the Appellate Court dated 8/9/2000 confirming the judgment & decree of the Small Cause Court.

3.

This Court on 14/2/2001 issued Rule and granted ad-interim relief which is continued since than. The Respondent was constrained to prefer Civil Application No. 924 of 2008 for appropriate direction & orders contending that the suit had been decreed in his favour and the mesne profit was also ordered to be paid, despite that because of operation of the interim order the possession is not with him and no money whatsoever for usage of the property and or withholding of the property is paid and by now the amount payable has come to Rs. 1,00,280/-.

4.

During course of submissions on earlier occasion it transpired that the heirs were required to be brought on record. This Court vide order dated 4/2/2008 in Civil Application No. 1015 of 2008 permitted the heirs to be brought on record and accordingly in the main matter the heirs have been brought on record.

5.

Shri. Bukhari, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner mainly contended that the tenanted premises was rented to the petitioner''s father who died somewhere in the year 1980 and on the tenanted property his father was running the business of garage in the name of Empress Garage. After demise of father of the present petitioner/ori. defendant No. 1, grandfather was continued in the premises as the defendant No. 1 was minor at the relevant time. Shri Bukhari submitted that in view of provision of Section 5(11)(c)(ii) of The Bombay Rents, Hotel And Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 [hereinafter referred to Rent Act for the sake of brevity] defendant can be said to be entitled and capable of inheriting tenancy right inuring and available to his father who was tenant at the relevant time. Shri. Bukhari has drawn this Court''s attention to the deposition on page 73 which he has produced to indicate that by conduct of the original plaintiff it can well be said that he had permitted usage and continuation of usage of said premises to the defendant''s grandfather who was the natural guardian to continue the business of garage in the suit premises and he paid even advance rent as could be seen from the deposition on the compilation. The advance rent had also been paid and deposition to that extent is available on record which had been accepted by the landlord. In view of these, the findings of the trial court which was confirmed by the Appellate Court being patently erroneous and contrary to the material on record deserves to be quashed and set aside. Shri Bukhari has invited this Court''s attention also to the relevant provisions of Mahomedan law, especially to Section 359 in respect of guardian of the property of a minor and submitted that in case of property of minor the father''s father is entitled to act as guardian. Shri Bukhari submitted that the garage in question can be said to be deceased''s estate or in other words the garage in question could be said to deceased''s interest in the estate which will be taken care of by the guardian of the minor as minor would inherit the same, and from that view of point the minor who has been helping grandfather in the business can be said to be the person inheriting tenancy rights in the commercial premises. Therefore the findings of the trial court as well as the Appellate Court deserved to be quashed and set aside.

6.

Shri Bukhari further submitted that provision of the Rent Act are in fact to be construed in proper spirit for which they have been framed. The Legislature have enacted this provision so as to protect the tenants from arbitrary and unscrupulous handling of tenanted property in the hands of landlords. This provision therefore deserves to be viewed in its proper perspective. Shri Bukhari in support of this submission cited decision of the Apex Court in case of Gian Devi Anand Vs. Jeevan Kumar and Others, . He placed special reliance upon the observations made by the Apex Court in para-39 and submitted that the rented premises if it was a commercial premises then it assumes a different importance. The rented premises which is used for commercial purposes is in fact the source of livelihood for the entire family. If the source of livelihood is kept alive then the shelter for residents could be obtained it in another premises also, but if the tenancy right is not inherited, the family who is faced with tragic departing of breadwinner is also evicted from the commercial premises then it would militate against the very spirit of Rent Controlling Act. In view of this the provisions of Section 5(11)(c)(ii) deserves to be interpreted in such a fashion that it may serve ends of justice and the person like the petitioner may not be uprooted or be deprived of the family business which has been running in the premises for years. Shri Bukhari has also relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of H. Shiva Rao and Another Vs. Cecilia Pereira and Others, and submitted that the Rent Controlling being a beneficial legislation the provision confirming immunity to the tenant against eviction by the landlord be construed accordingly and relying upon the decision Shri Bukhari reiterated his aforesaid submission that the working of Section 5(11)(c)(ii) in the instant case would work untold hardships to the petitioner and therefore, the entire conduct of the landlord qua premises deserves to be taken into consideration while deciding this Civil Revision Application. He submits that the impugned order did not take care of this aspect at all. The trial court as well as the Appellate Court ought to have considered that the grandfather was certainly not an alien to the family and in his capacity as such he was in-charge of the welfare of the minor and accordingly he was fending the family of the deceased tenant. In this set of circumstances the trial court as well as Appellate Court ought to have appreciated the fact that tenancy rights were inherited by defendant and he ought to have been permitted to continue in the occupation of the said premises. The decision of the appellate court as well as that of the trial court therefore deserves to be quashed and set aside as being erroneous and contrary to the provisions of law, and also contrary to the facts on record.

7.

Shri. Trivedi, learned advocate for the opponent vehemently submitted that the decision of the trial court as well as the Appellate Court need not be interfered with in the revisional jurisdiction of this Court, especially when the glaring facts coming out from the record would indicate that the premises is situated in prime locality of Vadodara city and is being held under the interim order of this Court where the petitioner has not bothered to make payment of a single farthing towards either rent or mesne profit. This in itself is sufficient to throw overboard the petition. Without prejudice to the submission, Shri. Trivedi has further submitted that the provision of Section 5(11)(c)(ii) is unequivocally clear in respect of its applicability. The provision of law is to be interpreted only when the statute leaves any scope for such interpretation in law and the unequivocal language employed by the legislature in existing Section 5(11)(c)(ii), the provisions needs to be applied to the facts & circumstances of the present case which has been rightly done by the trial court as well as the Appellate Court and, therefore, no interference is called for at this stage under the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.

8.

Shri. Trivedi has also drawn attention of this Court to the deposition of concerned witnesses and submitted that, this very petitioner had projected himself to be a boy of about 12 to 13 years and helping his father in his garage business with a view to take advantage of provision of Section 5(11)(c)(ii), whereas in the deposition of the said witness it has come out clearly that he did not help his father in the garage business as he could not have done so, as he was said to be only 3 to 4 years of age at the relevant time. Shri Trivedi invited this Court''s attention to the deposition wherein the petitioner has stated that he would produce school leaving certificate indicating correctness of the date of birth, and he has stated before the court to examine his mother, and his uncle. The trial court clearly recorded that the defendant has not produced any material or evidence to indicate that he was at the relevant time aged 12 to 13 years and helping his father nor has he examined witnesses which he has cited to be examined in his deposition. In this facts & circumstances of the case the trial court was well within its right to draw adverse inference u/s 106 of Evidence Act and, therefore, the decision of the trial court can not be found fault with and it has rightly been not found favour with the trial court and the Appellate Court and this Court may not therefore interfere with the findings of the courts below.

9.

Shri. Trivedi has further relied upon the decision of this Court in case of (Bai) Induben Alias Dhanbai v. Saiyed Mahmad Jiya and Ors. reported in 1985 G.L.H. 138 in support of his submission as to how provision of Section 5(11)(c)(ii) is to be applied in such cases. The decision is though not strictly on the point but the relevant observations go to show that how the Courts are called upon to apply said provision. Shri. Trivedi submitted that, in view of this, revision application deserves to be dismissed with cost and no time shall be granted to the petitioner who has been keeping the premises under the stay of this Court without making even an attempt for mesne profit and or so called rent and is enjoying premises in prime locality of the city like Vadodara.

10.

This Court heard learned Counsels of the parties, perused records & proceedings and compilation placed on record of the petition. Section 5(11)(c)(ii) deserves to be set out as under:

(11)tenant means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for any premises and includes-

(a) xxxxxxxxxx

(aa) xxxxxxxxx

(b) xxxxxxxxx

(c)(i)xxxxxxxx

(ii) in relation to premises let for business, trade or storage, any member of the tenant''s family carrying on business, trade or storage with the tenant in the said premises at the time of the death of the tenant as may continue, after his death, to carry on the business, trade or storage as the case may be, in the said premises and as may be decided in default of agreement by the Court.

11.

It can well be said this Section is absolutely unequivocal in its provision. It provides that the tenant''s family member for inheriting rented commercial premises has to fulfil two conditions; namely he has to be a family member and he has to be associated and doing business along with the tenant at the time of his death for attracting the provision of inheriting tenancy right. Bearing this provision in mind the records & proceedings deserve to be examined. This Court hastens to add that the Court needs to bear in mind this is a revision and inherent limitation imposed upon the Court needs also to bear in mind while examining the plea raised by the petitioner

12.

The deposition of the petitioner before the trial court with regard to his age and his assertion about his helping his father at the relevant time, and also his assertion with regard to his claim for inheriting tenancy and for that his statement of examining his mother as well as one more witness his uncle go to show that those assertions were made with a view to project himself to be a man who was helping his father in the garage business at the time of his demise. Thus the trial court has rightly observed that no cogent evidence worth the name is brought on record by the defendant No. 1/present petitioner. The trial court has rightly drawn adverse inference in light of this proceedings. Therefore no fault could be found with the decision of the trial court. The trial court has at length discussed all the points including the point of so called advance rent accepted by present opponent and recorded that it was the say of the plaintiff that the money orders were accepted under protest. Assuming for the sake of examining the statement that the rent was paid, the trial court was not called upon to decide the said issue nor has been an issue even raised before the trial court and therefore, the petitioner can not now be permitted to agitate this point denovo in the revision petition. Suffice it to say that, this Court is of the considered view that the decision rendered by the trial Court and confirmed by the Appellate Court suffer from no infirmity so as to call for interference from this Court under the revisional jurisdiction. This petition therefore deserves to be dismissed and accordingly it is dismissed. Rule discharged. Interim relief granted earlier shall stand vacated. No order as to costs.

13.

In view of dismissal of the petition, the petitioner is granted time to vacate the premises within four weeks from today.

14.

In view of the order passed in Civil Revision Application, no order in Civil Application No. 924 of 2008 and the application is accordingly disposed of. No cost.