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Judgment
12 paragraphs · 285 wordsA. Alagiriswami, J.—The petitioner has been convicted by the Special First Class Magistrate, Shevapet, u/s 75 of the Madras City Police
Act, for having been guilty of indecent behaviour in a public place, that is a tea-shop and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 10. The only point argued
is that a tea-shop cannot be said to be a public place. '' Public place '' is defined in Section 3 of the Act as meaning a place including a road, street
or way, whether a thoroughfare or not, and a landing place to which the public are granted access or have a right to resort or over which they have
a right to pass. In Mangubhai v. Emperor AIR 1930 Bom. 369, a hotel has been held to be a place-to which the public are permitted to have
access. In the Crown Prosecutor v. Moonooswamy ILR (1910) Mad. 83, an arrack-shop has been held to be a public place within the meaning
of Section 75. In Natarajan v. State (1963) M.W.N.172, a barber''s saloon has been held to be a public place, as defined in Section 3 of the City
Police Act. There is no doubt that a tea shop is a place to which the public can have access and they have a right to resort to a tea-shop and the
keeper of the tea-shop cannot exclude any person who comes to his hotel to be served refreshments. It is, therefore, quite clear that the tea-shop
in this case would be a public place and consequently it should be held that the petitioner has been rightly convicted for having behaved indecently
in a public place.
The Criminal Revision Case is, therefore, dismissed.
