In Re: K. Venkappa and Others

Ayling, J

The petitioners have been convicted of an offence u/s 283, Indian Penal Code, by leaving a ""prabha"" lying in a public road for 24 hours so as to

cause obstruction.

The first point argued is that the abandonment of the ""prabha"" was due to the action of the Sub-Magistrate (prosecution witness No. 2), who

stopped the procession of the accused and others accompanying it: and that therefore the accused committed no offence. It is certain that the Sub-

Magistrate apprehending a breach of the peace stopped the progress of the procession. According to his own account (which there seems no

reason to distrust) he simply told the accused to go and bring their elders. According to the defence version, he threatened to fire on the

processionists if they persisted in going on. In neither case can it be said that the Magistrate''s action justified or excused those carrying the

prabha"" in leaving it in the ''middle of the street in such a way as to cause obstruction even for a short time, to say nothing of 24 hours. This plea

cannot be accepted.

It is next represented that the accused were prejudiced by the hurried nature of the trial. I find no ground for holding that this was the case.

Lastly it is argued on the authority of The Queen v. Khader Moidin I.L.R., (1882) Mad., 235, that in the absence of evidence of obstruction to

any particular individual a conviction u/s 283, Indian Penal Code, cannot stand. The evidence on record shows that the road at the place in

question is three yards wide, while the prabha"" was two yards wide. Consequently as long as the ""prabha"" remained on the road no vehicle could

pass, and even a foot-passenger could not pass without inconvenience. This amounts to saying that the ""prabha"" could not fail to cause obstruction

to any person who had occasion to pass along the road which is admittedly a public one: and though obstruction to any individual is not expressly

proved, it is a matter of necessary inference. I very much doubt whether the ruling in the case above quoted was ever intended to apply to a case

of this kind: and, if it were, with due deference to the learned Judges responsible for it, it seems to me to go too far (of. Mayne''s Criminal Law of

India, 3rd Edition, paragraph 403). The only other Madras case quoted to me is Queen-Empress v. Virappa Chetti I.L.R., (1897) Mad., 433.

That was an appeal against acquittal. The court, while expressing some doubt as to the applicability of Section 283, Indian Penal Code, pointed

out that the case undoubtedly fell u/s 290, Indian Penal Code, and ordered a retrial.

In the present case also, there is clear evidence to support a conviction u/s #290, Indian Penal Code, which renders the offender liable to

exactly the same punishment as Section 283.

Under these circumstances there seems to be no ground for interference, and the petition is dismissed.