In re: Kollipara Veakamma

Sadasiva Aiyar, J.—The petitioner who was the plaintiff before the District Munsif''s Court could have appealed to the District Court against

the Munsif''s decree if she considered that that decision was legally wrong. If she had done so and if she failed even in appeal she could have come

up in second appeal to this Court ""-as a suit relating to a claim for maintenance.

Instead of doing so she has put in this revision petition u/s 115 C.P.C. 225 days after the District Munsif''s decision. This is not a case in which

no appeal lies"" to the High Court and hence Section 115 cannot apply. There is no question of jurisdiction, perversely illegal decision, or material

irregularity of procedure involved but only a question whether the District Munsif committed an error of law in allowing the plaintiff''s Vakil''s

consent to bind the plaintiff in the decision of the suit. It is admitted that the Vakil''s Vakalat empowered him to compromise the suit but the

contention is that without a special and separate Vakalat (other than the engagement Vakalat which empowered the Vakil to compromise) the

Vakil''s consent to the rate of maintenance proposed by the other side is not binding on the plaintiff.

I see no reason to hold that a Vakil who has got a Vakalat empowering him to compromise an action should get a second Vakalat which

contains the same power simply because the first Vakalat empowers him to do other things also besides empowering him to compromise. A Vakil

in the Indian Courts is both the solicitor who acts and a counsel who pleads for his client. In Mathews v. Munster (1887) 20 Q.B. 111, it was held

that, where the defendant''s counsel in the absence of the defendant and without his express authority assented to a verdict for the plaintiff for �

350 with costs and withdrew all imputation? against the plaintiff, the settlement was a matter which was within the apparent general authority of

counsel and was binding on the defendant. In Butler v. Knight (1867) 36 L.J. Ex. 66 it was held that, even when the client had expressly prohibited

her solicitor to accept any compromise and even though she had obtained judgment and decree, she was, bound by the act of her solicitor in

accepting a compromise so far as the other party was concerned, if that other party had no notice of any limitation having been imposed on her

solicitor''s authority and that her only remedy lay in an action for negligence against her solicitor. In the present case the Vakil had express authority

to compromise the suit. I think that serious inconvenience would result to the administration of justice by courts if, even after a Vakil has been given

power to compromise the suit by the plaintiff who engages him and after the opposite party on the faith of that Vakalat has offered terms of

compromise which were accepted and acted upon and after the court had, on the faith of the assurance of the legal practitioners passed its

decision by their consent, the plaintiff should be allowed to take the objection that she did not give a special second Vakalat mentioning only the

power to compromise. There is no allegation even in the Revision Petition that she had prohibited the Vakil to compromise the suit notwithstanding

that the Vakalat to act gave him such power and that defendant knew that her Vakil had no such power (that the Vakalat gave him such power is

spoken to by her Vakil who was examined in the Revision Petition case; see Mr. Gomaji Row''s order on the Review Petition.)

The Privy Council held in Rajnunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Singh (1839) 2 M.I.A. 253 that when a Vakil admitted that the rental of a

Zemindary in dispute was a certain sum the admission was binding on his client. Jagapathi Mudaliar v. Ekambara Mudaliar ILR (1898) M. 247

was a case in which the Vakalat did not give power to the Vakil to compromise the suit. (That there is no distinction between Vakil and counsel in

these matters is clear from Venkatanarasimha Naidu v. Bashyagarulu Naidu ILR (1899) M. 538.

This petition in revision put in by the plaintiff is therefore rejected.