In Re: Komma Harichandra Reddy and Others

Horwill, J.—The petitioners were convicted by the Stationary Sub-Magistrate of Pulivendla under Sections 147, 341 and 342, Indian Penal

Code, and the sixth petitioner u/s 323, Indian Penal Code, also; and they were fined Rs. 10 each on each count. The convictions and sentences

were confirmed by the appellate Court.

There was first an enquiry by the Stationary Sub-Magistrate of Pulivendla and the accused were discharged. The matter was then taken in

revision to the Sessions Judge, who thought that the order of discharge was improperly passed and ordered a further inquiry into the matter u/s

436, Criminal t Procedure Code. The Stationary Sub-Magistrate decided to summon the prosecution witnesses already examined; and upon being

told by the Sub-Inspector conducting the prosecution that it was not necessary to examine the prosecution witnesses, the Magistrate did not do so.

He presumably considered the evidence already on record and then framed a charge. The trial ended in a conviction.

It is now argued that the Magistrate was bound to begin the enquiry afresh. I find nothing in any section of the Criminal Procedure Code which

justifies this argument. When an order of discharge is set aside and further enquiry ordered, the enquiry recommences where it was left off at the

time when the improper order of discharge was passed. Further enquiry, as pointed out in Queen-Empress v. Balasinnathambi (1891) 1 M.L.J.

343 : ILR Mad. 334 (F.B.) does not mean merely an"" examination of witnesses, but a further consideration of the evidence; and the Magistrate

was therefore justified upon perusing the evidence in framing the charge.

Prior to the framing of the charge an accused is not entitled u/s 350, Criminal Procedure Code, to have a de novo enquiry. Section 350 gives

the accused a right to have a de novo trial. It has been held by this Court that the trial begins only after the framing of a charge. I can therefore see

nothing wrong in the proceedings of the Sub-Magistrate. It is however argued from Queen-Empress v. Hasnu ILR 6(1884) All. 367 Ram Dial v.

Emperor (1912) 14 I.C. 607 and Sahib Din v. The Crown I.L.R.(1922) Lah. 115 that the principle of natural justice requires that every

Magistrate should begin his enquiry afresh and see the witnesses for himself before he convicts the accused. I do not think that the Criminal

Procedure Code recognises or suggests that there is such a principle of natural justice. On the contrary, it negatives the existence of such a

principle; for it leaves the resummoning of witnesses entirely to the discretion of the Magistrate. He may feel that he would like to see a witness or

question him further; and Section 350(1) gives him authority to do so. If he does not feel it necessary to examine any witnesses afresh it is not

incumbent on him to do so. After the framing of the charge, he had in any event an opportunity of seeing the witnesses for himself during the further

cross-examination. This matter has come before this Court on many occasions, and was considered by Jackson, J., in Lakshmi Reddy v. Muni

Reddy (1930) 60 M.L.J. 524 : ILR Mad. 512 where he held that there was no obligation laid on the Magistrate to begin the enquiry afresh.

A further argument advanced is that even though the Magistrate is given a discretion to continue the enquiry from the place where it was left by

his predecessor he exercised the choice in favour of commencing the enquiry de novo by summoning the witnesses. I cannot agree that the

resummoning of the witnesses is tantamount to recommencing the inquiry; and even if it is true that the Magistrate, when he resummoned the

witnesses, contemplated recommencing the enquiry, he was not precluded from changing his mind before he recommenced the enquiry.

The evidence before the Courts below was considered sufficient by them to sustain a conviction; and I am not prepared to interfere in revision

with that finding.

The petition is therefore dismissed.