In Re: M. Perumal Pillai and Others

Suryamorthy, J.—This is a revision against the Judgment of the Learned Sessions Judge of Salem dismissing C.A. No, 552 of 1976 and

confirming the order of confiscation passed by the Collector of Salem in S.R. No. 394/75 J3 dt. 28th March, 1976.

The Sub Inspector of Police, Food Cell, C.I.D., Salem, inspected the business premises of Thiru Perumal Pillai, a T.N.P.R.D. wholesale dealer

at Namagiripet on 10th October, 1975 in the presence of the father of the licensee and found an excess stock of 42 bags of paddy not covered by

any purchase bills and not accounted for in the stock register. The excess stock was seized by the Sub Inspector, and proceedings were initiated

under S. 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act.

At the enquiry held by the Collector, it was contended by the revision petitioners that the 42 bags of excess stock were brought by three

agriculturists just a few hours before the seizure, that since the first revision petitioner was away at Narasingapuram and his father and brother were

at their residence, the stock could not be accounted for and that the stock would have been brought into account later. The first revision petitioner

also filed receipts to prove that he was regularly surrendering levy paddy to the authorities. He also filed certificates from the Village Officers to

prove that the three agriculturists referred to above had harvested paddy in their respective lands.

The Collector was not satisfied with the ""genuineness of the claim of the three agriculturists"". He said that

even assuming that the paddy bags seized were sold by these three agriculturists, they should have been brought into account by the licensee

through issue of purchase bills and entries in the stock register. Except the bland statement of the accused and his father, there is no evidence, oral

or written available to substantiate the claim, of the accused On the other hand the police have observed the proper procedure and the stocks have

been seized in the presence of two independent witnesses and the father of the accused. The counsel for1 the accused presumably on second

thoughts, produced certain affidavits after about a week- Two of these affidavits are from the neighbors of the accused who are supposed to have

been accidentally present at the. time of the seizure. A perusal of their affidavit proves that they are concocted and unreliable. The third affidavit is

from the brother of the accused himself, who naturally supports the version of the accused The fourth affidavit is from a cooly who is supposed to

have been present at the time of the seizure: This is also an after-thought as the Police or the other witnesses have not stated anything about his

presence in the search list.

Therefore, the Collector came to the conclusion that the first revision petitioner was keeping 42 bags of paddy in his shop without bringing them

into account and has thereby violated the conditions of his license and directed the confiscation of the paddy. This Order of the Collector was

confirmed by the Principal Sessions Judge of Salem, The observation of the Collector that except the bland statement of the accused and his father

there is no evidence, oral or written available to substantiate the claim of the first revision petitioner herein proceeds on the assumption that ah

opportunity was given to him to adduce evidence and he failed to avail himself of the same. A summary procedure has been resorted to by the

Collector and no witness has been examined either en the side of the Police or on the side of the revision petitioner. Therefore, this reason given by

the Collector for disbelieving the case of the first revision petitioner is untenable. No other valid reason has been given'' by the Collector to

disbelieve the case of the first revision petitioner.

The learned counsel for the revision petitioners relies on a decision of the Supreme Court in K.L. Subbayya Vs. State of Karnataka, wherein the

provisions of S. 54 of the Karnataka Excise Act, 1966 (Mysore Act 21 of 1966) have been considered. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court

have observed in that case that

the inspector who searched the car of the appellant had not made any record of any ground on the basis of which he had a reasonable belief that

an offence under the Act, was being committed before proceeding to search the car and thus the provisions of S. 54 were not at all complied with

This therefore, renders the entire search without jurisdiction and as a logical corollary vitiates the conviction. we feel that both Ss. 53 and 54

contain valuable safeguards for the liberty of the citizen in order to protect them from ill-founded or frivolous prosecution or harassment. The point

was taken before the High Court which appears to have brushed aside this legal lacuna without making any real attempt to analyse the effect of the

provisions of Ss. 53 and 54. The High Court observed that these two Sections were wholly irrelevant. With due respect we are unable to approve

of such a cryptic approach to a legal question which is of far-reaching consequence. It was, however, suggested that the word ''place'' would not

include the car, but the definition of the word ''place'' under the Act clearly includes vehicle which would include a car. Thus the ground on which

argument of the petitioner has been rejected by the High Court cannot be sustained by us We are satisfied that there has been a direct non-

compliance of the provisions of S. 54 which renders the search completely without jurisdiction.

In P. Ramachandra Chetty Vs. Secretary, Ministry of Food, Govt. of India, New Delhi and Others, on which reliance is placed by the learned

counsel for the petitioner, it has been observed that

CI. 11(b) of the Andhra Pradesh Pood Grains Dealers Licensing Order does not admit of any doubt that even at the time of entering or searching

the premises, there must be reasonable belief that any contravention has been or is likely to be committed. That ''reason to believe'' is a condition

precedent to vest any jurisdiction in the officers either to enter the premises to make any search. In the absence of such reasons-able belief, the

entry and the consequent search has been vitiated. The mere fact that subsequently they discovered some discrepancy in the stock on hand and the

position of stock as entered on the notice board, cannot make good the reasonable belief which an officer it bound to have initially before he

makes an entry. The subsequent discovery of any material cannot be equated to the initial reasonable belief.

Subsequently it has been held that:

a fishing or roving enquiry is not permissible to call out material for formulating a reason to believe subsequently- In other words, the reasonable

belief must exist before the officer makes a seizure of the grounds under the above two cases. But CI. (11)(h) of the A.P. Foodgrains Licensing

Order also enjoins upon the requirement of reasonable belief before even an entry is made into the premises. Thus under this order, unless such a

reasonable belief exists as to the likelihood of any contravention being committed or has been committed there is no power in the officers to make

such an entry.

The ratio of these two cases is applicable to the facts of the instant case. There is nothing on record to prove that before entering the business

premises of the first revision petitioner the Sub Inspector of Police, Food Cell, C.I.D. had reason to believe that any contravention of the provision

of the Tamil Nadu Paddy and Rice (Regulation of Trade) Order, 1974 has been committed or is being committed or is about to be committed.

Therefore, the entire search is illegal and consequently the proceedings culminating into an order of confiscation are also invalid. Hence the order of

confiscation is set aside and the revision is allowed.