In Re: Madda Peda Brahmayya Alias Satyanandam

Subba Rao, J.—The accused was convicted u/s 302, Penal Code, and has been sentenced to transportation for life. The accused and P.W.

7 are husband and wife, P.W. 7 being his third wife. The husband and wife lived together happily and had a numbar of children. One

Narayanamurthi (the deceased) wag a neighbour of the accused, and it is in evidence that he led a wayward life. Somehow he was able to seduce

P.W. 7 and there is evidence that there was illicit intimacy between P.W. 7 and the deceased Narayanamurthi. The husband discovered her in a

compromising position twice, and on the second occasion as the accused threatened to put an end to their lives, the wife left the husband for her

parent''s house. On the morning of 80th March 1948, Narayanamurthi was found dead in his house, and the prosecution case is that he was

murdered by the accused. That there was sufficient motive for the accused to commit the murdec admita of no doubt. P.W. 7, See. tama, the wife

of the aocu3ed, admita in her evidence that the had illicit intimacy with Narayanamurthi and that she was discovered twice in a compromising

position. There is also other evidence to that effect.

The more difficult question is whether the accused was the person who stabbed Narayanamurthi, There is no direct evidence in the case. The

only important document on which the lower Court convicted the accused is the confession made by him before the Magistrate, Ex. P-16 in the

case. In this the accused gave in a detailed manner the reason for the-crime and the circumstances under which and the manner in which the

offence was committed. Before the Sessions Court, when the Sessions Judge put him a direct question with reference to the confession made by

him, he only stated ""I know nothing. I cannot sea after sunset. I sleep in the field."" It will, therefore, be seen that the accused did not give any

reason why he made a confession before the Magistrate. The learned Counsel appearing for him contended that the confession was not voluntary

and, therefore, should not be relied upon. He argued that the fact that the confession contained so many details and so many facts corroborating

the evidence in the case indicated that it could not have been a voluntary one. The elaborate manner in which the confession was made may well

have been due to the fact that the accused, in a penitent mood, intended to make a clear breast of all the facts known to him. The fact that a

confession is more elaborate than necessary or that it contains more particulars than are required at the particular stage does not necessarily show

that the confession was not voluntary.

It was nest contended that we should not act upon a retracted confession without corroboration on material particulars. As a question of law this

argument is not sound, at least so far as our High Court is concerned. It has been held in a number of cases, the latest being In re B, K. Rajagopal,

I. L. R. (1944) Mad. 308 : AIR 1944 Mad. 117 : (1944) Cri.L.J. 373, that a conviction can be based on a retracted confession without

corroboration if the reasons given by the accused for withdrawing the confection are palpably false. Ordinarily we should expect corroborative

evidence of a retracted confession. Though it is not a rule of law, as a rule of prudence it is generally unsafe to convict a person on a retracted

confession alone. This statement of law is concisely and accurately stated in Suker Dusadh and Another Vs. Emperor, .

As far back as in Queen v. Jhurree, 7 W. B. Cr. 48 it was held that a voluntary and genuine confession is legal and sufficient proof of guilt and this

deoision has never been overruled tough it has sometimes been said that the rule of prudence is in favour of seeking corroboration of a confession

which has been retracted.

But in this case we are satisfied that the confession was voluntary and represented the true state of facts. Indeed the accused did not even give any

reasons why he made the confession which he later on retracted. He did not give, for the obvious reason that the confession was-voluntary.

We, therefore, accept the confession made by the accused in the lower Court and hold that the learned Sessions Judge had rightly convioted

him. The appeal is dismissed.