In re: Murthy

Rathnavel Pandian, J.—Referred Trial No. 6 of 1986 comes before us by way of reference made by the learned Sessions Judge of Chengalpattu for confirmation of the sentence of death imposed by him on the accused (Murthy aged about 29) in Sessions Case No. 135/85 on his file. The said accused Murthy has preferred the appeal C.A. 408/86 canvassing the correctness of the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge in the said S.C. 135/85, convicting him of an offence under S.449. I.P.C., undercharge No. 1, under S.302, I.P.C. (two counts) under charges Nos. 2 and 3 and under S.307, I.P.C. under charge No. 4 and sentencing to undergo imprisonment for life under each of the charges Nos. 1 and 4 and to death under charges 2 and 3, with a direction that the sentence of imprisonment for life shall merge with the sentence of death.

The crux of the indictment of the prosecution is that on 21.7.1985, at about 00.45 hours at Kalpakkam Department of Atomic Energy Township, Sadras East, at D. No. 88, the accused committed house trespass/by entering into the abovesaid building and committed the murders of one Jayasambal aged about 35 and one Vijay Anand, a boy aged about 12 years, by indiscriminately cutting and inflicting multiple injuries on their persons with a knife (M.0.2) after bolting the doors from inside, and that in the course of the same transaction, the accused also attempted to cause the death of P.W. 2 Kavitha Priyadarshini, a girl aged about 13, by indiscriminately cutting her with the same knife. To substantiate the above charges, the prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 17, filed Exs. P1 to P26 and marked M.Os.l to 32.

The brief facts of the case, as unfolded by the oral and documentary evidence, are as follows: Deceased Jayasambal (hereinafter referred to as D.1) was the first wife of P.W. 1, a medical practitioner in the Government Hospital at Sadras. Deceased Vijay Anand (hereinafter referred to as D.2) and the injured P.W. 2 are the son and daughter of P.W. 1 and D.1. At the time of the occurrence, they were all residing in the scene house. P. W.3 is the younger sister of D.1 and she was working as a Health Visitor at the T.A.E. Hospital at Kalpakkam. As she had joined the duty only on 4.7.1985, she was residing in the scene, house with her son aged about 3, since her husband was employed at Theni in Madurai District. P.W. 4 was working as a Typist in the State Bank of India at Kalpakkam Township Branch, and was residing adjacent to the scene house. P.W. 16, the Inspector of Police, was residing two houses away from the scene house. Ex. P17 is the rough sketch of the scene house alone with all details, and Ex. P18 is a rough sketch showing the scene house and the surroundings.

It was only about six or seven months before the occurrence, P.W. 1 with D.1, D.2 and P.W. 2 occupied the scene house and ear-her to that they were all residing at No. 6/26, Yadaval Street in Sadras, for about five years. P.W. 1''s second wife byname Shantha was staying in a separate house at Raja Street in the same locality. Through Sbantha P.W. 1 has got three daughters. P.W. 1 was also having a clinic at Pudupattinam and he was paying visits to the house of both his wives daily and used to stay in both houses two or three days.

The accused was working as a leprosy Inspector in the hospital where P.W. 1 was the Medical Officer. In due course of time the accused developed close association with P.W. 1 and was looking after ail the personal effairs of P.W. 1 in the houses of D.1 and Shantha. While so, D.1 developed white patches (a skin disease) on her right hand which P.W. 1 treated. As there was no improvement P.W. 1, suspecting leprosy, took his wife, to a medical officer at Madras, accompanied by the accused and got the treatment. The accused frequently visited the house of D.1 in Yadaval Street to administer the tablets for the said disease. Within two years the white patches had disappeared.

It seems that the accused had in the long run developed intimacy with D.1. At the end of December, 1984, one night P.W. 2 switched on the electric light to go to bathroom, but found to her shock her mother D.1 and the accused lying on the bed embrasing each other. That night, P.W. 1 was in the house of Shantha. P.W. 2, who had by then come to age, ran towards the garden crying. D.1 followed P.W. 2 and asked her as to why she was crying, to which P.W. 2 questioned the conduct of her mother D.1 and asked her as to whether it was not shameful on her part to behave like this, to which D.1 retorted questioning whether it was not shameful on the part of her father (P.W. 1) to have two wives at the same time. Then P.W. 2 warned her mother of the serious consequences if the matter was known to P.W. 1. When this conversation was going on, the accused, who had got up to the terrace peeped outside. P.W. 2 law the accused and threw a stone at him. D.1 promised P.W. 2 that she would not indulge in such kind of behaviour thereafter and requested P.W. 2 not to inform this to P.W. 1. Trusting her mother, P.W. 2 also agreed not to divulge this matter to P.W. 1. On yet another day, at the end of 1984, when the accused came to the clinic of P.W. 1, D.1, who had accidentally come to the elinic, found fault with P.W. 1 for allowing the accused to come to the clinic, but P.W. 1 advised her not to speak anything, in the clinic. It was only thereafter, P.W. 1 shifted his residence in the beginning of 1985 to the present scene house. After the said incident at the clinic, the accused was not frequently visiting either the clinic or the house of D.1 (scene house). P.W. 5, who was a pharmacist in the Government Hospital, Sadras, was residing in the room of the accused for three days and thereafter shifted his residence to the hospital itself. But, he was taking his bath in the room occupied by the accused, the ground floor of which was occupied by P.W. 6 and her family. P.W. 3 the younger sister of D.1 joined duty in the hospital at Kalpakkam as Lady Health Assistant on 4.7.1985 and was residing with her eon D.1''s house as stated supra.

On 16.7.1985 at 7 p.m. while P.W. 3 was sitting in the sofa in the house of D.1 and when D.1 was in the kitchen, the accused came there and asked P.W. 3 as to whether D.1 was there. P.W. 3 asked him as to who he was and then told D.1 about the accused. Then D.1 came to the hall and talked something to the accused, and thereafter went to the kitchen. P.W. 3 took her bed in the bed-room. The accused peeped inside the bed room and went away. Then P.W. 3 reported this matter to D.1 and D.1 told P.W. 3 that the accused was a man of bad character and that if he came there again P.W. 3 should tell him not to visit the house and that if he wanted to see the doctor, he could go to the clinic. As P.W. 3 was unwell, she did not go to the hospital on 17.7.1985. At about 2 p.m., that day the accused came there with a black bag in his hand and asked P.W. 3 about D.1. P.W. 3 said that D.1 was not available. Then the accused left that place. On the night of 20.7.1985, after taking supper as usual, D.1, D.2 and P.Ws.1 and 2 took their bed in the bed room. P.W. 3 took her bed in the hall with her child.

It is the evidence of P.W. 5 that on the night of the occurrence, while he and the accused were returning at 12.30 a.m., after attending the second show of the film "24 (24 hours), by riding a cycle, M.O.25, the accused told P.W. 5 that he must take revenge against a woman who had cheated him. When P.W. 5 asked as to who the woman was, the accused replied that he would reveal the name, but P.W. 5 would come to know about it at the appropriate time. Then, after leaving P.W. 5 at the dispensary, the accused left the place riding the cycle.

At about 00.45 hours on the night of 20/ 21.7.1985, P.Ws.1 to 3 got up on hearing someone tapping at the door and pressing the calling bell. P.W. 1 came to the hall, put on the switch and peeped through the window and found the accused standing outside the house. When P.W. 1 asked the accused as to what the matter was, the accused replied that some of the relations of P.W. 1 had come to the house of Shantha in a car to take P.W. 1 to Pondicherryas P.W. 1''s mother was seriously ill at Pondicherry. P.W. 1, believing the representation of the accused, opened the door. The accused entered the hall, having a black rexin bag (M O 1) in his hand. The accused asked for water. P.W. 1 gave him water and went inside the bed room, put on his pant and shirt and came to the hall and asked the accused to go ahead of him en the cycle and that he would follow him in his scooter. So saying P.W. 1 moved by the side of the fridge to take the key of his scooter. The accused suddenly and quite unexpectedly rushed into the bed room, closed the door and locked it from inside. P.W. 1, on getting a terrible shock and becoming panicky, tapped at the door and asked the accused to open the door. P.W. 3 also did so. But the accused did not open the door. P.W. 2, who had by then got up from the bed, saw the accused closing the door and locking it from inside and also taking M.6.2 knife from the bag M.O.1 and indiscriminately cutting on the face, neck, hands and several other parts of the body of her mother who was by then sleeping on the cot with D2. D2 got up and tried to save the life of his mother. But the accused cut D2 also with M.O.2 indiscriminately. P.W. 2 intervened and she too was cut by the accused on the hands, head, face etc, with M.O.2. By this time, P.Ws.1 and 3 came outside the house and witnessed the incident taking place inside the bed room, through the window which was opes, and pleaded with the accused not to cut. It may be pointed out here that P.W. 2, as a result of the injuries, had lost her eye-sight in her left eye. At the time the accused attacked D1, D2 and P.W. 2, all of them raised a hue and cry from inside the bed room. But, neither P.W. 1 nor P.W. 3 could render any help as they were standing outside the room and they could only raise a hue and cry and pleaded with the accused ''don''t cut, don''t cut''. As both the children shouted (Ayyo, Daddy, save us), P.Ws.1 and 3 finding no way to go into the bed room, again came into the hall and tapped at the door and shouted. Within a short time the distress cry coming from the room had slowly subsided and come to an end. On hearing the yelling noise of the victims and the cries of P.Ws.1 and 3, P.W. 16, the Inspector of Police, who was residing two or three houses away from the scene house, reached the scene place and found through the window the accused standing inside the bed room with the weapon of offence M.O.3 in his hand. By that time,, P.W. 4 also came there and found the accused inside the bed room, and P.Ws.1 and 3 standing by the side of the window. P.W. 16 shouted to the accused to open the door., Thereafter the door was opened and the accused came out of the room leaving M. Os. 1 and 2 inside the room. P.W. 16 caught hold of the accused. P.Ws.1 and 3 rushed inside the room and found D.1 and D.2 lying dead in a pool of blood and P.W. 2 raising a meek groan saying "daddy, daddy". P.W. 1 brought P.W. 2 to the hall and gave her first aid. At the instance of P.W. 1 P.W. 3 went to some other house and phoned up the hospital to send the ambulance. P.W. 15, Head Constable attached to the Kalpakkam; Police Station, on coming to know about the incident, came to the scene house with two constables. P.W. 16 got a written complaint Ex. PI from P.W. 1 at about 1.30 a.m., and handed it over to P.W. 15 and directed him to get it registered. Accordingly, P.W. 15 went to the station and registered Ex. P1 as a case in Crime No. 83/85 under Ss. 302 and 307, I.P.C., Ex. P12 is the printed R.I.R. P.W. 15 sent Exts. P1 and P 12 to the Court and copies of the same to all the concerned officials,

P.W. 16, after sending Uhe injured P.W. 2 to Chengalpattu Hospital for treatment in the ambulance, came to the police station at 2 a.m., taking the accused with him. He got the copy of Ex. P12 from P.W. 15. At the station he seized the bloodstained pant and shirt of the accused, M.Os. 23 and 24 under Ex. P15 attested by two other witnesses. He examined the accused and kept him in the lock-up. At about 6 a.m., he inspected the scene place and prepared an observation mahazar Ex. P16 in the presence of witnesses. He drew a rough sketch of the scene house, Ex. P17 and another rough sketch of the scene locality under Ex. P18. Then he sent a requisition to the Judicial First Class Magistrate of Chengalpattu to record the dying declaration from P.W. 2. He caused certain photographs of the scene to be taken through P.W. 14. Between 8 a.m., and 10.35 a.m. he held inquest over the dead body of D1, during the course of which he examined P.Ws.1, 3 and 4 and others and prepared the inquest report, Ex. P14. Between 10 40 a.m. and 1.15 p.m., he held inquest over the dead body of D2, examined the same witnesses and prepared the inquest report Ex. P13. Exs. P28 to P32 are the photographs and negatives. Then he entrusted both the dead bodies with P.W. 12, a police constable, and directed him to take the dead bodies to the Chengalpattu Hospital, with the requisition Ex. P2 for conducting the autopsies. At about 2 p.m. he seized M.O.2 under Ex. P19, from the scene bedroom. Then, he seized the blanket, bed sheet pillows, a transistor and three books, which were all blood-stained, which were all found on the cot (Marked as M.Os. 11 to 17), under Ex. P20. Then he seized three blood-stained bet-sheets, pillows, braziers etc., which were in the room (marked as M.Os.18 series and 19 to 22), and a cut portion of human hair, under Ex. P21. He then seized the blood-stained cement plaster MO. 26 under Ex. P22. By 3.45 p.m. he seized M.O.1 under Ex. P23. He also seized M.O. 25 cycle which was kept in front of the house under Ex. P24. All the mahazars were attested by witnesses. He examined P.Ws. 5 and 6 and others. As the accused had some injuries in his hand,. P.W. 16 sent him to the Chengalpattu Hospital for treatment and thereafter to the Court for remand. At 7.30 p.m. he went to the Government Hospital, Chengalpattu, but he could not examine P.W. 2 as she was unconscious. On that night be returned to Kalpakkam and examined P. Ws. 14 and 15.

11, P.W. 9, who was in charge of the Casualty Department of the Chengalpattu Medical College Hospital, on the night of 20/21-7-1985, examined the injured P.W. 2 at 2.30 a.m., and found on her person the following eleven injuries:

An incised injury on the right side of the face of about 5" x 4" x 1" in size lateral to right eye,

A linear incised injury extending from the over margin of right eye-lid to the root of the nose and extending to the forehead, size 7" x 3" x 2" x 1" in size present.

An incised injury on the ocoipital region of scalp �V� shaped, of about 7" x 2" with fracture of skull bane present.

Multiple incised injuries over the scalp of occipital region of about 4" x 2" x 1" in size present exposing bane fracture of skull bones present.

Two incised injuries on the back of the neck of about 6" x 4" x 2".

An incised injury on the right upper arm of about 7" x 2" x 1� in sizs present.

An incised injury on the right forearm of about 6*'' x 4" x 4" exposing muscles over the lateral aspect near elbow right side present.

S. An incised injury on the back of the forearm of about 3" x 2" x 1" near wrist.

An incised injury on the little finger and ring finger present,

An incised injury on the dorsum of the left hand of about 3" x 2" x 1" in size present.

An incised injury on the right hypothenar eminence of about 4" x 4" x 2" in size present.

According to the doctor, the injured was conscious and was answering questions and also reported the manner of causation of injuries, stating that the injuries were caused due to assault by a known person with a knife on the night of 20th July, 1985 at Sadras at her residence.

P.W. 10, who was the Radiologist in the hospital took X-rays of the skull and right arm of P.W. 2 and found multiple fractures in the skull parieto-occipital region on both sides and fracture of radius upper third with injury on the soft tissue muscles in the right fore-arm. P.W. 10 has given his opinion under Ex. P6. P.W. 9 has given his opinion on the report of the Radiologist and the opinion of the Ophthalmologist who found the left eye-wound as grievous, as P.W. 2 had lost the power of vision on the left side on account of the injury, that the eye-injury was grievous in nature and injuries Nos. 3, 4 and 7 were also serious. According to P.W. 9, injuries Nos. I to 11 found on P.W. 2 could have been caused by a weapon like M.O. 2 at the time and in the manner alleged. He issued the wound certificate Ex. P5. The doctor would further state that the multiple injuries sustained by P.W. 2, particularly the head injury, were endangering to the life of P.W. 2 and that but for the timely treatment, her survival was doubtful.

P.W. 8, Reader in Forensic Medicine attached to the Chengalpattu Medical College Hospital, on receipt of the requisition Ex. P2 from P.W. 16, commenced the postmortem examination on the body of D2 at 11.30 a.m. on 22nd July, 1985 and found the following 21 external injuries:

Incised-like wound with clean-cut margin, measuring 11 cms x 4 cms, bone deep, starting from the hair line occupying the right frontal and parietal bones and cutting the bone to the same length and a piece of the right frontal bone 2 cms x 1/2 cms having been chopped away.

Incised-like wound with clean Cut margin 10 cms x 1 cm, bone deep, on the left parietal bone 1 cm, from the midline cutting the bone 8 cms, in length.

Incised-like wound with clean-cut margins 6 cms x 0.8 cm, bone deep. Vault of the skull 3 cm. to the right of the injury No. 2.

Incised wound with clean cut-margins 11 cms x 3 cms x 1 cm, starting 1 cm, front of the upper part of right ear running forwards across the right eye and over the nose cutting it into two parts completely with fracture of right maxilla and nasal bones. The right eye was missing. The floor of the orbit was fractured.

Chop wound 6 cms x 1.5 cms x 11 cms, over the right cheek 3 cms from the right ear and 1 cms, below injury No. 4 with bevelling of the skin on the right side.

An incised wound with clean cut margins 8 cm x 1. 5 cms, bone deep, left cheek starting from the left ear running forwards across the face 1 cm, below the left eye taw wards the nose.

An incised-like wound with clean cat margins starting from the angle of the lower jaw left side running upwards and backwards cutting the ear lobe and lateral 1/3rd of (sic) of the left ear over the occipital region on both sides exposing the bone with comminuted fracture of the occipital bone right side, with tear of the dura and laceration of the right Occipital lobe of the brain.

An incised wound with clean cut margins right side of the neck 12 cms x 8 cms, cutting the muscles, vertebra and the spinal cord at the level of 3rd and 4th cervical vertebrae.

An incised wound with clean cut margins starting from the inner and of right clavicle running downwards over the sternum measuring 6 cms x 3 cms x 3/4 cms.

Incised wound with clean cat margins measuring 6 cms x 2.5 cms, on the right side of the chest running obliquely starting from the 8th right intercostal space to the lOth intercostal space, exposing the diaphragm.

An incised wound with dead cut margins 3 cms x 1.5 ems, muscle deep on the upper third of outer aspect of right upper arm.

An incised wound clean cut margin 12 cms x 4 cms, over the back of right forearm just below the elbow joint cutting the muscles and both bones of forearm upper third.

An incised wound with clean Cut margins 4 cms x 1.5 ems, bone deep 2 cms below injury No. 12 over the inner border of right forearm.

A chop wound with clean cut margins measuring 4 cms x 1.5 cms x 1 cm, on the'' ulnar border of right palm with bevelling of outer margin.

An incised wound with clean cat margin involving the web of right ring and middle fingers cutting the same 3 cms. deep.

A chop wound with clean cot margins 2 cms x 1 cm, bone deep, with bevelling of skin on the inner side of right thenar eminence.

Chopping of left little finger at matacarpo phalangeal joint with skin intact.

Incised wound with clean cut margins measuring 8 cms x 4 cms on the back of left wrist cutting the 2nd to 5th matacarpal bones,

Incised wound with clean cut margins measuring 6 cms x 2 cms 1 cm back the injury No. 18 with cutting of all matacarpal bones.

Multiple scratch abrasions (a) 14 cms x 0.4 cm on the right side of chest starting from the anterior axillary fold running obliquely downwards over the front of chest upto xyphisternum, and (b) 10 cms, x 0.2 cm, starting from the 7th intercostal space for 11th intercostal space over the lateral aspect of left side chest.

Sub-aracanoid haemorrhage over the temporal, parietal and occipital lobes of the brain on the left side and parietal and occipital lobes on the right side with laceration of the right occipital lobe of the brain.

The stomach of D2 contained 300 grams of undigested rice particles. The medical Officer is of opinion that the deceased would appear to have died of shock and haemorrhage due to the multiple injuries and death would have occurred about 24 to 36 hours prior to the post-mortem examination and injuries Nos. 1 to 19 and 21 were possible due to assault with M.O.2 and injury No. 20 due to scuffle, or in an attempt to ward off the assault with M.O.2 at which time the tip of M.O.2 would have caused that injury. According to him, injury No. 8 was necessarily fatal and the other injuries were also serious and the said injury No. 8 could have been caused with M.O.2. Injury No. 21, which was injury to the brain, was also, in his opinion, sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause of 4 death, and death in this case should have been instantaneous. He issued the postmortem certificate Ex. P3.

On the same day, P.W. 8 conducted the post-mortem examination of the body of D1, commencing it at 1.20 p.m., and found the following 19 external injuries:

An incised wound 6 cms x 3 cms with clean cut margins just below that left ear running obliquely downwards and forwards and 3 cms, in depth, exposing the muscle.

The same injury No. 1 running upwards and backwards with an intervening skin of 2 cm, cutting the pinna of the left ear and over the whole of the left occipital region up to midline exposing the bone. The occipital bone showed an incised wound measuring 8 cms x 0.3 cms,...

An incised-like wound with clean cat margins measuring 13 cms x 1 cms, over the left temporal region 3 cms, above the left ear cutting the temporal bone and a triangular piece of temporal bone (1.5 cms at its maximum breadth) was found depressed tearing the duramater and portion of the brain was found coming out of the wound.

Incised like wound with clean cut-margins 6 cms x 3 cms, bone deep, cutting the bone involving the same length over the left parietal region 2 cms, above injury No. 3.

Incised-like wound with clean cut margins 3 cms x 2 cms x bone deep, 8 cms above tho right ear.

Incised like wound with clean cut margins 3 cms x 2 cms x bone deep on the right occipital region with comminuted fracture of the right parietal bone tearing the dura through which brain was teen coming out.

Incised like wound with clean cut margins 3 cms x 2 ems x bone deep on the left frontal region, 1 cm, above and in front of injury No. 3.

Incised like wound with clean cut margins measuring 4 cms x 3 cms x 1/2 cm on the right cheek.

An incised like wound with clean cut margin involving the whole of right side of the lower jaw with cutting of right half of the mandible and fracture and dislocation of the tempero-mandibular joint.

An incised like wound with a clean cut margins 6 cms x 4 cms x 1/2 cm, starting from the inner end of the right clavicle, running upwards and to the left side of the neck over the sternum and the wound was found tailing, cutting the skin along upto the anterior border of the left sterno-mastoid muscle.

An incised like wound 3 cms x 2 cms, x 1/2 cm, involving the right 2nd intercostal space.

Incised like wound 4 cms x 2 cms x 1 � cm, 1� cms, just below injury No 11.

Incised like wound 2 cms x 2 cms, x 1/2 cms, on the left 2nd intercostal space.

Incised like wound with clean cut margins involving the whole of the lateral and medical aspect of left upper arm cutting the muscles and the humerus.

Incised wound with clean cut margins 8 cms x 4 cms with laceration of the subcutaneous fatty tissues, 3 cms, above injury No. 14.

An incised wound 15 cms x 8 cms, seen at the centre of the back in between the scapulae, muscle deep.

Multiple abrasions measuring from 14 cms x 1/2 cm to 2 cms, throughout the back.

All the internal organs were pale with early autolytic changes.

Sub aracanoid haemorrhage with laceration of both the parietal bones of the brain near the vault.

The stomach contained 200 grams of partly digested rice particles. The medical officer is of opinion that the deceased would appear to have died of shock and haemorrhage due to multiple injuries and death would have occurred 24 to 36 hours prior to the post mor tern examination, that injuries Nos.1 to 16, and 19 could have been caused due to Assault with a knife like M.O.2, that injury No. 17 could have been caused due to the blade portion of M.O.2 coming into contact with that portion of the body in a scuffle and that all the injuries over the head, viz., injuries 1 to 7 were necessarily fatal and death would have been almost instantaneous.

P.W. 11, another medical officer, who examined the accused, found on his person the following injuries viz,

(1) Incised wound at the base of left index finger 1 cm x 1/4 cm x skin deep.

(2) diffuse swelling and tenderness on the dorsum of left hand, and

(3) abrasion of left and-linear.

P.W. 11 treated the accused as an out-patient. In this opinion, all the above injuries were simple in nature. According to him, if a person is assaulting two or three persons with a knife like M.O.2, due to the handling of the knife in those circumstances injury No. 1 was possible, injury No. 2 possible due to a scuffle and injury, No. 3 could have been caused by coming into contact with a rough surface. He issued the wound certificate Ex. P7.

P.W. 16 in continuation of his investigation sent articles except M.O.2 to the Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Tirukkalikunram on 22.7.1985. On the same day at about 8.30 a.m., he went to the hospital and examined P.Ws.2, 9, 10 and 11. At 11 a.m., he seized the blood-stained garments of P.W. 2 (M.Os.9 and 10) under Ex. P5. Then he examined P.W. 8. He seized M.Os.3 to 8 worn by D1 and D2 under Ex. P26. He examined some more witnesses at Kalpakkam. On 23.7.1985 he gave a requisition to the Court for sending them for chemical examination and also gave a requisition on the same day to the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Chengalpattu for recording the statement of the accused under S.164, Crl.P.C, but subsequently he came to know that the accused was not inclined to give any such statement under S.164, Crl.P.C.

Subsequent, investigation was, undet the orders of the Superintendent of Police handed over to P.W. 17, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Kancheepuram. P.W. 17, after verifying the investigation already done by P.W. 16, examined P.W. 7 on and 23.7.1985 and also some more witnesses. P.W. 13, who was then Head Clerk in the Court of the Judicial Second Glass Magistrate, Tirukkalikundram, states that the material objects were sent for chemical examination as per the requisition sent by the Inspector P.W. 16 under the covering letter under the original of Ex. P9. Exs.P10 and P11 are the reports of the Chemical Examiner and the Serologist respectively. After completing the investigation, P.W. 17 laid the charge-sheet against the accused on 27.9.1985.

When examined under S.313, Crl.P.C., with reference to the incriminating piece of evidence appearing against him, the accused would admit the relationship of D1, D2 and P.W. 2 with P.W. 1 and their residing first at Yadaval Street, and then shifting to the scene house, about his assistance to P.W. 1 both in the hospital and in his house and also about his accompanying P.W. 1 and D1 to Madras for the treatment of the said disease of D1 and about his frequent visits to the house of D1 for giving medicine to her, but would deny the evidence of P.W. 2 that he was found one day inside the bed room lying with D1 in an embracing position and P.W. 2 finding fault with D1. However he would admit about Dl telling her husband at the clinic that P.W. 1 should not associate himself with the accused. With regard to the other incriminating pieces of evidence, viz., about his coming to the scene house at midnight and tapping at the door and perpetrating the attacks on the deceased (D1 and D2) and P.W. 2 and about his having been secured by P.W. 11, he would state that he would not remember anything. The other portion of the prosecution evidence is denied by him. He examined one witness as D.W.1 who is so other than his uncle''s son arid who has married the younger sister of the accused. According of D.W.1, while the accused was 13 years old, D.W.1, the accused and some other boys all went to a well to take bath, that the accused while he dived into the water had sustained injury on his head, as a result of which he sustained some kind of mental aberrations, that in spite of the native treatment he was not completely cured and that the accused used to quarrel with the boys in the street and beat them. He would further state that he was not properly dressed and would not attend to his work regularly and that once on account of the mental imbalance he beat the wife of D.W. 1. He would add that in general the accused was suffering from lunacy with lucid intervals.

The learned trial Judge, for the elaborate discussions made in his judgment and the reasons assigned therein, found the accused guilty of the charges and accordingly convicted and sentenced him as afore-mentioned. Hence this appeal and the Referred Trial.

There cannot be any controversy indeed there is none that this is a very tragic and pathetic case of a horrifying double murder, in which the lives of a middle-aged woman and her 12 year old son had been put an end to by the accused by mercilessly cutting them indiscriminately with the knife MO. 2, causing 19 injuries on the person of Dl and 21 injuries on the person of D2, resulting in their instantaneous death, besides attempting to cause the death of P.W. 2, a teen-aged girl by inflicting a number of incised injuries on her person resulting in the loss of her left eyesight, that too in the bed-room under the very eyes of the only protector of the family, viz., P.W. 1 husband of D1 and father of D2 and P.W. 2, who, being placed in a helpless situation, was unable to render any help to these victims in spite of the pathetic plea from the children to save them from the hands of the heartless accused who be haved like a wild beast and blood-thirsty monster. There is abundant overwhelming evidence in the present case, both direct and circumstantial, clinchingly and satisfactorily establishing that the accused and the accused alone was responsible for the perpetration of the crimes on the ill fated day.

P.W. 1 the injured P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 consistently and cogently depose that it was the accused who entered into the bed-room and perpetrated the crimes in question. P.W. 4 and P.W. 16, the Inspector of Police, who rushed to the scene of occurrence on hearing the yelling noise of the victims and the distress cries of P.Ws.1 and 3, have given evidence stating that they through the window saw the accused standing inside the bed room having the blood-stained weapon of offence M.O. 2 in his hand. Of the witnesses, P.Ws.1 to 4, 15 and 16 state that the accused was secured at the scene place itself. The accused in his statement under S. 313 would not specifically deny the evidence of these witnesses, but would state in general "I do not remember". Therefore, in view of the above unassailable evidence available in the case, we without any reservation or compunction, come to the conclusion that the prosecution has established that it was the accused who criminally trespassed into the house of P.W. 1 and murdered D1 and D2 and attempted to cause the death of P.W. 2.

At this stage, we would like to point out that there is absolutely no controversy or dispute about the facts of the case by the defence.

Mr. N. Natarajan, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the accused, without disputing the facts of the case and the overt acts attributed to the accused, advanced his argument contending that the facts and circumstances of the case would clearly indicate that the accused, at the time of the commission of the offence, was suffering from insanity and he, by reason of such unsound ness of mind, was incapable of knowing the nature of the act be had perpetrated or what he was doing or that he was doing what was either wrong or contrary to law, and hence he would be entitled to the benefit of S. 84 of the I.P.C., and consequently for an acquittal on the ground of legal insanity. According to him, the absence of motive for the murder, the manner and time of murder and the conduct of the accused in not trying to escape from the scene of occurrence, would all indicate that the accused was not of sound mind at the time of the commission of the acts attributed to him.

The issue before us for determination, therefore, is whether the accused, at the time of the perpetration of the crimes, was suffering from a disease of mind, which disease had the effect of dethroning or robbing off the reasons or producing a defect of reason so that by reason of unsoundness of mind he was incapable of knowing the nature and quality of the act he was doing or that he did not know that his action was wrong or contrary to law.

(1) The necessary ingredients to be proved for the invocation of S. 84, I.P.C.

S. 84, I.P.C, reads as follows:

Act of a person of unsound mind. Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.

This section is based on the principle that an act does not constitute an offence unless done with the requisite mens rea, i.e., the guilty intention. The essential ingredients of the section are as follows :

(1) The accused must at the time of the commission of the act, be of unsound mind ; and

(2) The unsoundness of mind must be such as to make the accused, at the time when he is doing the act charged as an offence, incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.

According to this section, unsoundness of mind, to exempt a person from criminal responsibility, must reach that degree which is described in the latter part of the section. It is not every kind of unsoundness of mind that would exempt a person from responsibility for a crime by invoking the section; but it is only unsoundness of mind which materially impairs the cognitive faculties of the mind that can form a ground of exemption from criminal responsibility, the nature and the extent of the unsoundness of mind required such as would make the offender incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he is doing what is wrong or contrary to law.

John de Mayne in his Criminal Law, Second Edition, at page 410. Paragraph 184, has expatiated S.84 of the I.P.C. as follows:

The Penal Code contemplates, as ground of exemption from criminal responsibility, two completely different mental conditions arising from unsoundness of mind, viz., an incapacity (1) to know the nature of the act; (2) to know that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law. Of these, the first seems to refer to the offender''s consciousness of the bearing of his action those who are affected by it; the second, to his consciousness of its relation to himself, Each species of consciousness is ordinarily present to the mind of a normally sane person. Either, or both, or neither may be absent from the mind of one who is mentally diseased. The absence of both or either relieves the offender from liability to punishment.

This section is based on the answers given by the learned Judges to the House of Lords in the famous decision in Mc Naughten''s Cast (1843)10 Cl.& F. 200=8 E.R. 718 in which the law was clearly laid down in England that it is not in every case of insanity that the accused will be exempt from criminal liability, but it is only in cases in which the accused, by reason of his unsoundness of mind, is incapable, at the time of his committing the offence, of knowing what be is doing or that he is doing something wrong. The draft Penal Code proposed by Lord Macaulay in 1837 contained two sections, viz., (1) S.66 reading

nothing is an offence which is done by a person in a state of idiocy

and S.67 reading

nothing is an offence which is done by a person in consequence of being made or desirous at the time of doing it.

The draft provisions were apparently shadowed in the final stages owing to the formulation of the tests laid down in Mc Naughten Rules. The result is the provision of S.84 of the Penal Code. But, mere unsoundness of mind is not ipso facto a ground of defence under S.84, I.P.C, unless, in consequence of such a unsoundness, the accused was incapable, at the time of his committing the alleged offence, or knowing either the nature of his act or that the act was either wrong or contrary to law. The words "the nature of the act� refer to the bearing of the act in relation to other persons, viz., the victims and the words "that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law� refer to the bearing of the act in relation to the doer himself, that is to say, the accused''s own responsibility for it. Thus, where a person accused of an offence is found to have been insane at the time of the commission of an alleged offence, the following questions are possible, They are:

(1) The insanity might have been such as to deprive him of the power of knowing the nature of his act. This may mean either that be was not aware of what be was doing or was not aware of the consequences of what he was doing. (2) Even assuming that the accused, at the time when he did not act, was not so insane as not to be aware of what he was doing or of its consequences, he might still be immune from criminal liability if he was incapable of knowing that his act was either wrong or contrary to law. Where the accused, owing to his insanity, was incapable of knowing the nature of his act at all, the question whether he was capable of knowing that it was wrong, morally or legally, cannot arise. Such question can only arise on the footing that the accused, in spite of his insanity, was aware of what he was doing and of its consequences.

(2) Meaning of the expression "unsoundness of mind'':- The expression "unsoundness of mind" is not defined in the Code; but the Courts have treated this expression as equivalent to insanity which is not a legal term and there is no such thing as a legal definition of insanity. The word "unsound� is lexically defined in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as follows:

Unsound;

(1) of persons, etc;

Not physically sound; unhealthy, deceased......

(2)......

(3) not mentally sound or normal; not sane

Black''s Law Dictionary, 5th (1979) Edition, defines the words "unsound mind" thus:

Known legal term referring to one who from infirmity of mind is incapable of managing himself or his affairs. The term, therefore, Includes insane persons (see insanity). It exists where there is an essential privation of the reasoning faculties, or where a person is incapable of understanding and acting with discretion in the ordinary affairs of life.

The term ''insanity'' is defined in this Dictionary as follows:

The term is a social and legal term rather than a medical one, and indicates a condition which renders the affected person unfit to enjoy liberty of action because of the unreliability of his behaviour with concomitant danger to himself and others. The term is more or less synonymous with mental illness or psychosis. In law, the term is used to denote that degree of mental illness which negates the individual''s legal responsibility or capacity.

Clanville Williams in his Text Book on Criminal Law, Second Edition (1983) at page 643, posed a question "what is a defect of reason, from disease of the mind?" and answered it saying;

�A disease of the mind� is no longer in medical use though doctors (psychiatrists) are still prepared to humour the lawyers by saying in Court that a particular person suffers or does not suffer from it. The current medical phrases are mental illness and (a wider expression) mental disorder. But, these do not precisely indicate the meaning of ''disease of the mind''. The Judges in Mcnaughtens case (1843) 10 Cl. & F. 200=8 E.R. 718 appear to have used the phrases convertibly with ''insanity''. But, this is an equally baffling expression. Lawyers used to believe that insanity was a medical term, yet psychiatrists have long declared that they do not know what it means, and assert that it can only be a legal concept, which in fact it is. Insanity is a social judgment founded upon, but not precisely representing a medical diagnosis.

In the Corpus Juris Secondum, Vol.9, at page 509, the meaning of the term "unsound" is given as follows:

In its plain, ordinary and usual sense the word �unsound� means not sound, not hale; not solid; defective; infirm; diseased; and it is sometimes used as meaning the condition of being rotten.

In volume 5, at page 58, the word �mind'' is defined as follows:

In its legal sense a term meaning the ability to will, to direct, to permit, or to assent. Mind and money are sometimes regarded as convertible terms and as synonymous.

In Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43, the meanings of the expressions ''unsound mind'' and ''unsoundness of mind'' are given as follows:

The words ''unsound mind'' are legal, and not medical, words.

�Unsoundness of mind'' exists where there is essential deprivation of reasoning faculties, and unless minds betray total lack of understanding of idiocy or delusion, they cannot properly be considered ''unsound''.

By the usage of the expression ''unsoundness of mind'', which expression is by the Courts treated as equivalent to ''insanity�, S.84 limits the exemption from liability to those cases where the cognitive features are completely impaired and not to cases where the insanity affects only emotion and the will. Under this section it is not insanity, of every description that will be a defence to a criminal charge. From the medical point of view there are Many states of mind which may amount to insanity. But this section draws a distinction between medical insanity and legal insanity. ''Unsoundness of mind'', which may amount to insanity from the medical point of view, will not necessarily be legal in sanity for the purpose of this section so as to confer immunity for the insane person from criminal liability for any act done by him while he is in that state of mind. To satisfy the requirements of this section it must be proved that at the time of committing the act the accused person was labouring under such a defective reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or as not to know that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. In this connection, the following observations made in Mayne''s Criminal law. Second Edition, at page 413, paragraph 188, may be quoted:

Insane delusions, as distinguished from delusions arising from a disordered state of the senses, spring from a diseased state of brain. The delusion is the outward and visible, sign of the disease; but the disease itself must have preceded the delusion, and continues silently to vitiate the mind, snapping the reason, warping the intelligence, and perverting the emotions. The disease may break out at any moment In a fresh direction and with new symptoms. A man who imagines himself a teapot, may, apparently, be the victim of a perfectly harmless fancy. But it is obvious that such a notion cannot continue, unless his powers of observation, comparison and inference are completely undermined. Where the existence of insane delusions is established and especially where it is shown that they lead to the offence, the facts are very valuable, as evidencing the prisoner''s state of mind at the time of the offence. It must not, however, be assumed that he did, or could have contemplated the surrounding facts with the same unclouded mind as an ordinarily sane person''. (The underlining is ours).

(3) The nature of insanity required: The term ''insanity'' is not clearly defined either in the medical or in the legal literature, and sanity is said to exist when the brain and the nervous system are in their conditions and the mental functions of feeling and knowing can be performed in their usual manner. Insanity is an abnormal state when one or more of the abovesaid mental functions is not performed in the normal way or not performed at all due to some defect or disease of the mind. Instead of furnishing a clear and workable definition of insanity, authoritative medical books give only descriptions of various states of mind such as total insanity, partial insanity, moral insanity, impulsive insanity, pyromania and kleptomania, and cases of insanity are numerous. But, what we are concerned in a case where in insanity is set up a defence is whether the accused, at the time of committing the offence, was labouring under such defect of reason from disease of mind viz., insanity, as not to Know the nature and quality of the act he was doing or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. See also the text book on Criminal Law by Smith and Hogan, 4th Edition (1979), under the caption ''insanity'' at page 139.

(4) Burden of Proof: The next question relates to the burden of proof in a case where S.84 is invoked. It is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be Innocent and therefore the burden lies always on the prosecution to prove beyond all reasonable doubt not only the actus reus but also the mens rca. This general burden never shifts and it always rests on the prosecution. But, the invocation of S 84, I.P.C., in a given case, being an exception, the burden of proving the existence ot circumstances bringing the case within the said exception lies on the accused and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances. Under S.105 of the Evidence Act read with the definition of the expression "shall presume� in S.4 thereof, the Court shall regard the absence of such circumstances as proved unless, after considering the matters before it, it believes that the said circumstances existed or their existence was so probable that a competent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the proposition that they did exist. To say in other words, the Court will have to rebut the presumption that circumstances did so exist, by placing material before the Court sufficient to make it consider the existence of such circumstances so probable that a prudent man would act upon them.

Before citing the various judicial authoritative pronouncements rendered by the Supreme Court and various High Courts expatiating the principle of law on this aspect, it would be worthwhile to mention here that in the Mcnaughten''s case (1843) 10 Cl.&F. 200 : 8 E R. 718 after the verdict of "not guilty on the ground of insanity" was given by the jury, it appears that the direction given to the jury and the verdict came under much criticism in Parliament and outside, and consequently the Judges were asked by the House of Lords to give their opinion, and to this the Judges gave the answer as follows:

The jurors ought to be told in all cases that every man is to be presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction, and that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the time of the committing the act, the party accused was labouring under such defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if be did know it, that he did not know one was doing what was wrong.

In the oft quoted leading decision of the Supreme Court on this aspect, viz., Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakker Vs. State of Gujarat, , Subba Rao, J. as he then was, speaking for the Bench, has observed as follows:

The accused has to satisfy the standard of a ''prudent man''. If the material placed before the Court, such as, oral and documentary evidence, presumptions, admissions or even the prosecution evidence, satisfies the test of ''prudent man'' the accused will have discharged his burden. The evidence so placed may not be sufficient to discharge the burden under S.105 of the Evident Act, but it may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of a judge as regards one or other of the necessary ingredients of the offence itself. It may, for instance, raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the Judge whether the accused had the requisite intention laid down in S.299 of the I.P.C. If the Judge has such reasonable doubt, he has to acquit the accused, for in that event the Judge has such reasonable doubt, he has to acquit the accused, for in that event the prosecution will have failed to prove conclusively the guilt of the accused. There is no conflict between the general burden, which is always on the prosecution and which never shifts, and the special burden that rests on the accused to make out his defence of insanity.

Then, their Lordships have laid down the law thus:

The doctrine of burden of proof in the context of the plea of insanity may be stated in the following propositions: (1) The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed the offence with the requisite mens rea; and the burden of proving that always rests on the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial. (2.) There is a rebuttable presumption that the accused was not insane, when he committed the crime, in the sense laid down by S.84 of the I.P.C.; the accused may rebut it by placing before the court all the relevant evidence--oral, documentary or circumstantial, but the burden of proof upon him is no higher than that rests upon a party to civil proceedings. (3) Even if the accused was notable to establish conclusively that he was insane at the time he committed the offence, the evidence placed before the court by the accused or by the prosecution may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as regards one or more of the ingredients of the offence, including mens rea of the accused and in that case the court would be entitled to acquit the accused on the ground that the general burden of proof resting on the prosecution was not discharged." (The underlining is ours).

Then their Lordships held in the same decision:

Whether the accused was in such a state of mind as to be entitled to the benefit of S. 84 of the I.P.C., can only be established from the circumstances which preceded, attended and followed the crime.

In yet another decision Bhikari Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, , the Supreme Court reiterated the above principle laid down in Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakker Vs. State of Gujarat, , observing thus:

S.84, I.P.C., can no doubt be invoked by a person for nullifying the evidence adduced by the prosecution by establishing that he was at the relevant time incapable of knowing the nature of the act or what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. Now it is not for the prosecution to establish that a person who strikes another with deadly weapon was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or of knowing that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. Everyone is presumed to know the natural consequences of his act. Similarly everyone is also presumed to know the law. These are not facts which the prosecution has to establish. It is for this reason that S.105 of the Evidence Act places upon the accused person the burden of proving the exception upon which he relics.... If upon the evidence adduced in that case, whether by the prosecution or by the accused, a reasonable doubt is created in the mind of the Court as regards one or more of the ingredients Of the offence including mens rea of the accused, be would be entitled to be acquitted. This is very different from saying that the prosecution must also establish the sanity of the accused at the time of the commission of the offence despite what has been expressly provided for in S.105 of the Evidence Act.

The above two decisions of the Supreme Court were quoted with approval by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Jayasena v. Reginam 1970 I A.E.R. 219 wherein the Privy Council had to deal with the burden of proof in criminal cases in an appeal from Ceylon which was governed by the Evidence Act and the Penal Code similar to those in this country. In this connection, it would be relevant to cite the decision in Henry Parry''s case 14Crl. Appeal 48 rendered by the Court of Criminal Appeal in England, where the learned Chief Justice said :

Every man is presumed to be sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his acts unless the contrary is proved. To establish insanity it must be clearly proved that at the time of committing the act the party is labouring under such defect of reason as not to know the nature and quality of the act which he is committing--that is, the physical nature and quality as distinguished from the moral--or, if he does know the nature and the quality of the act he is committing, that he does not know that he is doing wrong......''.

The above passage had been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Ahmadullah, . See also Karma Urang Vs. Emperor, , Narain Shah v. Emperor AIR 1947 Pat 228, Ashiruddin Ahmed v. King AIR 1949 Cal. 182, Govindaswami, Inre 1965 M.L.J. Crl 878, Jai Lal Vs. Delhi Administration, , Navier Marolly. In re 1970 L.W. (Crl.) 149 : 1970 M.L.J. Crl. 718, State v. Laemos AIR 1970 Goa, Daman & Diu, 1 = 1970 Crl, Thangavelu Atari In re 1971 L.W. Crl. 54, K.M. Thomas In re 10. 1971 L.W. Crl. 269, and Ratan Lal Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, , In all the above decisions, it has also been clearly pointed out that the crucial point of time for ascertaining the state of mind of the accused is the time when the offence was committed.

As laid down by the Supreme Court in Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakker Vs. State of Gujarat, , the accused under S. 105 of the Evidence Act has to prove the existence of circumstaaces bringing the case within the exception of S. 84, I.P.C., and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances, and to put it in other words, the accused will have to rebut the presumption that such circumstances did not exist. Therefore, the presumption is a reputable one. Whether the accused was in such a state of mind as to be entitled to the benefit of S. 84 can only be established from the circumstances which preceded, attended and followed the crime, the circumstances being the motive or the absence of motive for the attack, whether there was deliberation and preparation for the act, whether it was made in secrecy, the manner and method of the attack, the behaviour of the accused before and after the commission of the crime, etc.

Standard of proof required from the accused for invoking S. 84, I.P.C. The standard of proof required to be established by the accused in not of the degree expected from the prosecution is establishing the gait of an accused in a criminal case. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakker Vs. State of Gujarat, , even if the accused as not able to establish conclusively that he was innocent at the time when he committed the offence, the evidence placed by him before the Court or by the prosecution may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the Court is regards one or more of the ingredients of the offence including the mens rea of the accused and in that case the Court has to acquit the accused on the ground that the general burden of proof resting on the prosecution was not discharged.

A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Machi Parvaiah Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, , after referring to the decision of the Kerala High Court in Unniri Kannan Vs. State, that of the Delhi High Court in Shanti Devi Vs. The State, , the judgment of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh, High Court in Dharmadas v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1985 1 ALT 16, and the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Sanna Eranna v. State of Karnataka 1983 Crl. L.J. 619 has pointed out thus:

We would, however, reiterate that the decisions in the above cases do support the proposition that in a case where the conduct of the accused in committing an act demonstrates an abnormality, the prosecution should place before the Court some evidence to indicate that the accused was in a proper state of mind at the time when he committed the alleged offence. Even if no evidence is forthcoming regarding the conduct and behaviour of the accused preceding, attending and following the commission of the offence, the court can look into the acts which serve to ascertain whether they provide intrinsically the chief evidence of insanity.

We respectfully agree with the above observation and hold that though there is no burden cast on the prosecution to establish negatively that the accused was not of unsound mind when he committed the offence in question, yet, if in a given case there are circumstances preceding and attending the commission of the offence including the previous history of the offender, indicating an abnormal behaviour, then it is for the investigating agency to probe with an unbiased approach into the circumstances and place before the Court all the materials that are available thereby rendering assistance to the Court to find out whether those circumstances do really have any bearing on the mental faculties of the accused at the time of the commission of the offence and decide whether or not the accused, at the time of the commission of the offence, was of unsound mind incapable of knowing the consequences of his act or that what he had done was either wrong or contrary to law. Even in the absence of any evidence forthcoming from the accused regarding his conduct and behaviour at the time of the commission of the offence, the Court can look into the various circumstances preceding, attending and following the commission of the offence for arriving at the conclusion whether the accused was mentally impaired and suffering from unsoundness of mind so as to be entitled to exemption from criminal liability as contemplated under S.84, I.P.C.

We shall now examine the facts of the present case in the light of the above principles of law, and see whether at the time of the commission of the offence the accused''s powers of perception had been impaired to the extent of making him incapable of knowing the nature of the act or what he had done was either wrong or contrary to law;

There are various circumstances in this case preceding attending and following the commission of the offence, showing that the accused herein was not suffering from any disease of the mind, which disease had the effect of dethroning or robbing off the reason or producing defect of reason so that be did not know the nature and quality of the act he did or that he did not know that it was wrong or contrary to law. Firstly, there was a strong motive for the accused to snap the life-thread of D.1, because D1, who was initially sharing bed with him and giving him the sexual pleasure, had, after P.W. 2 saw D1 and the accused lying on the bed in an embracing position and found fault with D1, not only stopped him from coming to her house thereafter bat also insulted him in the clinic by finding fault with P.W. 1 for allowing the accused to come to the clinic. In these circumstances, the accused, had become enraged and aggrieved at the conduct of D1 who had deprived him permanently of the sexual connection he had with her so far and also due to the insult he suffered at her hands. This motive is fortified by the evidence of P.W. 5 who has deposed that while he and the accused were coming after attending the second show of the film at 12.30 a.m., the accused expressed to him his desire to take revenge against a woman who had cheated him, though he did not give the name of the said woman, and immediately left the place riding the cycle. It is significant to note that this occurrence took place on the same night within fifteen minutes after the accused had left the company of P.W. 5. Secondly, there is strong evidence with regard to the preparation for the offence. P.W. 6, states that the accused borrowed from her the knife M.O.2, the weapon of offence, on the previous Wednesday, stating that he wanted to have the knife to cut a chicken in the house of P.W. 1. Thirdly, the manner in which he perpetrated the crime clearly indicates that he went to the scene house with the determination to do away with D1. This is proved by the conduct of the accused in going to the scene house riding the cycle at past mid-night, tapping at the door and making a false representation to P.W. 1 in order to persuade him to open the door and then entering into the bed room by diverting the attention of the doctor by asking him for '' water. Then, inside the bed room he brutally attacked D1, who was sleeping on the bed, also attacked D2, and P.W. 2 when they intervened and tried to rescue their mother, by, inflicting numerous injuries on their persons in order to silence them for ever. He had closed the door of the bed room from inside as soon as he entered it, so that P.W. 1 and others could not enter into the room and prevent him from carrying out his desire of murdering D1. Of course, he should have anticipated that he would definitely be caught after he carried out his desire. But, the circumstances attending the case show that the accused was so much aggrieved and enraged against D1 and he was determined to kill her oven at the risk of his life. Therefore, the contention of Mr. Natarajan that there is absence of motive for the murder in this case is totally untenable. The circumstance with regard to the manner and time of murder at odd hours cannot also go in aid of his defence to prove the insanity, because P.W. 5''s evidence makes it clear that the accused along with him had, before committing the heinous crime, witnessed the second show of the film "24 hours" in which, as elicited in the cross-examination of P.W. 5, there were murders of five women by a person who was a victim of betrayal at the hands of those victims. Perhaps, the determination of the accused in this case who had carried the knife borrowed from P.W. 6 with him to the theatre to do away with D1, had, on seeing the film depicting four murders of women, had got accelerated and made him rush to the scene house and fulfil his desire of putting an end to the life of D1. The other circumstance relied upon by Mr. Natarajan is the conduit of the accused in not trying to escape from the scene of occurrence. This contention cannot be accepted because the accused was caught by no less a person than the Inspector of Police of that locality, viz, P W.16, and within a short time, a Head Constable and two other constables also came to the scene house. The accused could not escape from the bed room even through the back door, because P.Ws.1, 3, 4 and 16 had been running hither and thither outside the scene house by the side of the bed room, all along witnessing the attack perpetrated by the accused on the victim. The evidence of D.W.1 cannot go in aid of the plea of insanity for the following reasons, viz. (1) the plea of insanity is not even suggested to any of the prosecution a witnesses in the cross-examination; (2) the evidence of D.W.1 is highly interested in that he has married the younger sister of the accused and (3) the uncorroborated evidence of D W.1 that the mental faculties of the accused had got impaired when he was 13 years old on account of a hit on his head while diving in a well and thereafter he was very often behaving very rudely quarrelling with the boys and beating them up, is not worthy of acceptance so as to hold that he was insane at the time of the commission of the offence. Above all, there is no medical evidence in this case on this aspect.

Hence, viewed from any angle, by no stretch of imagination can it be suggested that the accused is entitled to the benefit of the exception contained in S. 84, I.P.C., because the overwhelming evidence and the attending circumstances available in this case positively and demonstrably show that the accused committed the murders of D1 and D2 and attempted to cause the murder of P.W. 2, knowing full well the nature and consequences of his acts and with a fully understanding that what he did was wrong as well as contrary to law.

Now, coming to the proper sentence to be inflicted on the accused, we have no compunction in our mind that the murders of D1 and D2 and the brutal attack on P.W. 2 while the three defenseless victims were in the bed room in the midnight, are pre-meditated, pre-planned, cold-blooded and gruesome in nature, diabolical in conception and extremely cruel in execution, committed under the very eyes of the husband of D1 and the father of D2 and P.W. 2, who was unable to protect their lives in spite of the fact that the children were yelling, pleading for help. Therefore, we are of the view that only the extreme penalty of law, viz., the sentence of death and death alone will meet the ends of justice.

In the result, we confirm the convictions and the sentences of death imposed on him (two counts) under charges 2 and 3 and also the sentence of imprisonment for life under each of the charges 1 and 4, with a direction that the sentences imposed under charges 1 and 4 shall merge with the sentence of death imposed under charges 2 and 3. The appeal is dismissed and the referred trial is disposed of accordingly.