In Re: Nagindas Chanusa

Shah, J.—The only question in this application is as to the Order of compensation. On the merits there Js nothing to be said in support of the application. But it is argued that as the accused were discharged on the 13th of January and the order of compensation was made on the 28th of January, the provisions of Section 250 contained in Clause (b) of the proviso have not been complied with inasmuch as the Magistrate has not stated in Writing in his order of discharge or acquittal his reasons for awarding compensation. It is argued that in consequence of this non-compliance with the provisions of the section the order is bad. No doubt the wording of the clause lends colour to the argument urged on behalf of the applicant. But in this case the notice to the complainant to show cause why an order of compensation should not be made against him was given on the same day as the order of discharge and practically in the same proceeding. The order of compensation was made after hearing the complainant some days later below the order of discharge. On these facts it seems to me that Clause (b) of the proviso has been sufficiently complied with; and that the Magistrate in directing the compensation to be paid has stated in writing practically in his order of discharge his reasons for awarding the compensation. The mere fact that the order came to be made some days after the order of discharge does not, in my opinion, affect the question. This view seems to accord with the view taken by this Court in Emperor Vs. Punamchand Hirachand, . The only differentiating fact here is that the order of compensation was made not on the same day as the order of discharge, but on a subsequent day fixed on the application of the complainant for an adjournment to show cause in response to the notice which was issued on the same day on which the accused were discharged.

I would accordingly discharge the rule.

Hayward, J.

I concur. The compensation order is part of the order of discharge, though completed some days later. The common sense view ought, in my opinion, to be taken of the obvious intentions of the provisions of Section 250 of the Criminal Procedure Code. This was the view held when the order which was on different pieces of paper was held to be one order by this Court in the case of Emperor Vs. Punamchand Hirachand, . The contrary and highly technical view taken by single Judges of the Allahabad High Court in the cases of In the Matter of the Complaint of Safdar Husain I.L.R (1903) All. 315 and Ram Singh v. Mathura I.L.R(1912) All. 354 was not followed in a subsequent case before the Allahabad Bench in the case of Ghurbin Koeri v. Khalil Khan I.L.R(1914) All. 132. They got over the difficulty in that case by having recourse to Section 537 of the Criminal Procedures Code. My own view is that upon a practicable interpretation of the provisions of Section 250 it would not really be necessary to have recourse even to the saving provisions of Section 587 of the Criminal Procedure Code.