In Re: Sureman Singh and Another

In the Letters of Administration Case No. 22 of 1959, the second Additional District Judge of Patna made an order on the 28th September, 1961 that letters of administration be granted to the two petitioners on their furnishing security up to the value of the property in question with one surety in accordance with Section 291 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, hereinafter called the Act. The Nazir was directed to buy stamp of Rs. 270/- on deposit of the amount by the petitioner through chalan No. 2140, dated the 4th March, 1959, for preparing the letters of administration. A draft security bond was filed. After removal of certain defects a fresh draft was filed. Eventually, on the 26th September, 1962 the following order was made by the Additional District Judge:--

"Perused the report of the Nazir. Draft of surety (security) be accepted. This draft be made over to the advocate of the applicant so that he might get a surety (security) prepared by the applicant and file the same in the Court by 14-11-62."

This draft seems to have been received by some one on behalf of the petitioners on the 13th November, 1962, as appears from the marginal note in the order sheet against order No. 47, dated the 26th September, 1962. No step was, however, taken by the petitioners who were granted the letters of administration on the 14th November. 1962. None responded to the call of the Court also on the 14th November, 1962. In the circumstances, the learned Additional District Judge in his order No. 48, dated the 14th November, 1962, said ". . . . . I have got no other alternative than "to cancel the grant made by my order D/- 28-9-61." Inform".

The petitioners thereafter filed an application in the Court below for recall of the order dated the 14th November, 1962, and to restore the case to its original file. This application has been dismissed by Order No, 51, dated the 6th December, 1962. The petitioners have preferred the first appeal from Order No. 48, dated the 14th November, 1962, and the miscellaneous appeal from Order1 No. 51, dated the 6th December, 1962.

In support of the first appeal Mr. L.M. Sharma stressed the point that the grant of the letters of administration could not be revoked on the ground it has been done by the learned Additional District Judge. The grant can be revoked or annulled for just cause as exhaustively enumerated in the Explanation appended to Section 263 of the Act. Failure on the part of the persons to "whom the letters of administration" was directed to be granted, counsel submitted, even assuming it to be a case of failure on their part, cannot justify in law revocation or annulment of the grant. Whatever other kind of order could be or might have been made by the Court, the contention on behalf of the appellants is that the Court had no jurisdiction to revoke or annul the grant of the letters of administration.

In our opinion, the argument put forward on behalf of the appellants is sound and has got to be accepted as correct. Relying upon several earlier decisions of the various High Courts a learned single Judge of the Madras High Court has pointed out in T, Arumuga Mudaliar, T. Arumuga Mudaliar and Another, that the words "just cause" as explained in the section are exhaustive and not merely illustrative. That being so, justification for the revocation or annulment of the grant must be found within one of the Clauses (a) to (e) of the Explanation appended to Section 263 of the Act. None of the clauses permits the revocation of the grant on the ground of the failure of the persons to whom the grant has been made to furnish the security bond as required by Section 291 of the Act.

It may well be that the letters of administration could not be actually granted under the seal of the Court in the form set forth in Schedule VII in accordance with Section 290 of the Act before the furnishing of the bond with one or more surety or sureties, as the case may be, u/s 291. The persons in whose favour the order of grant has been made may not be able to administer the estate unless they are armed with the grant under the seal of the Court, in the form set forth in Schedule VII, and, therefore, the mere order in their favour may remain to all intents and purposes a useless order. It may further well be that a person committing wilful default and deliberately disobeying the orders of the Court in regard to the furnishing of the bond u/s 291 of the Act, may be liable for disobedience of the order of the Court and fit to be proceeded against for its contempt. Without expressing any final opinion as to what may follow as a result of the failure of the persons in whose favour the grant of the letters of administration has been made, although indicating a possible consequence, we are firmly of the view that revocation or annulment of the grant cannot in law follow as such a consequence. The view which we have expressed above finds some support from the decision of the Privy Council in AIR 1924 198 (Privy Council) .

We accordingly allow the first appeal, set aside the order dated the 14th November, 1962, of the Court below and direct it to give a fresh opportunity to the appellants to furnish the required bond with the surety and thereafter to proceed in the case in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made.

In view of the order which we have made in the first appeal, it is manifest that the miscellaneous appeal has become infructuous and is dismissed as such.

As nobody has appeared to oppose either of the appeals, there will be no order as to costs.