In Re: Thangaraju

Swamikkannu, J.—This is an appeal by the accused Thangaraju against the judgment, dt. 30th April, 1980 in Sessions Case No. 89 of 1979 on the file of the court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Salem finding him guilty under S. 302, I.P.C. convicting him thereunder and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life. The case against the accused before the trial court is that on 18th February, 1979 at about 10 a.m. in Alamarrathu field in Chinnapunavasal village the accused Thangaraju intentionally cut his mother Alamelu Ammal with a spade and thereby the deceased died at that place instantaneously.

To substantiate the charge of murder against the accused, the appellant herein, the prosecution had examined before the trial court P.W.I to P.W.I2 and filed Ex. PI to Ex. P20. It also produced before the trial court M.0.1 spade, M.O. 2, bloodstained earth, M.O.3 gunny bag, M.O. 4 saree. and M.O. 5 petticoat.

x x x x

The discussion of facts is omitted. After referring to Ex. P 6, the confessional statement of accused recorded by the Judicial 2nd Class Magistrate, P.W.6 and other evidence the learned Judge held :

Therefore, it is clear from the evidence of P.W.6, that Ex. P6 confessional statement given by the accused is not tainted with any infirmity and that the statement had been recorded after observing all the formalities in accordance with the provisions of the procedural law of the land. Merely on the ground that the police station is situated adjacent to the court hall where the confessional statement had been recorded by P.W.6, it cannot be held that the confessional statement had been given by the accused only due to the pressure or influence exercised by the police. In his confessional statement, Ex. P6, the accused has stated that he saw his mother, the deceased herein, plucking the seedlings and this made him lose his self control, and that he acted in a violent manner without knowing the consequences of the same. In other words, the plea of the accused is that he has to be conferred the benefit of Exception 1 to S. 300, I.P.C. We are unable to uphold this contention emanated on behalf of the accused, appellant herein. Under no circumstances, it could be held that the plucking of the seedlings by no other person than a mother could cause a grave and sudden provocation on the part of the son so as to attract the benefits of Exception I to S. 300, I.P.C. It cannot be said that provocation of any nature had emanated from the deceased so as to make the accused, appellant herein, lose his self-control. After all, the deceased is an old woman. She had attained the matured age of 50 years. The accused is aged 26 years. It is nothing but a brutal attack that had been made with an intention which resulted in the death of the deceased instantaneously at the spot, and the attack was launched by none else than her own son who had attained the age of 26 years, whom she had given birth and reared upto the age of 26 years only to have her end at his hands. This is certainly a very, unfortunate case in which the accused had indulged in a grave crime of matricide. Under no stretch of imagination, can it be said that the accused, appellant herein, had acted in a manner without knowing the consequences of the same by being initiated by any grave or sudden provocation which in turn had resulted in an emotional outburst. Plucking the seedlings from a short area of 297 sq.ft. will not result in a great loss or harm to the owner thereof which would create a source of anger that would result in an emotional outburst. It cannot also be said that it was the last straw on the camel''s back. The learned counsel for the accused-appellant contends that the accused belongs to Udayar caste and is a milk vendor by profession and his social psychology has to be ascertained from the neighboring disciplines.

In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the accused appellant herein, refers to the following passage under the heading ''Emotional Behavior'' dealt with at page 178 in the revised edition of ''Social Psychology'' by Otto Klineberg, Columbia University, New York, January 1955 Edition, which runs as follows-

Even within our own society there are tremendous individual variations in the amount of expression. These may to some extent be due to organic factors, for example, to a relative stability or liability of the sympathy-coadrenal system There may be differences in trie threshold for emotions generally, or for one or another emotion in particular, making one person angry and another frightened more easily than the average. Individual training and experience will also play a part. In addition, there are undoubtedly great variations in this respect between different social and economic classes, as well as between different regions of the same country. In the United States there are marked contrasts between new England and the South on the one hand and the Middle West on the other. Probably in all countries the urban population is much livelier and more expressive than the rural. As for socio-economic classes, it is usual to find more obvious emotional expression in the poorer than in the wealthier groups. In the latter, there frequently develops the ideal of the ''gentleman'' who does not wear his heart on his sleeve. The traditional reserve of the Englishman is apparently the product of the most exclusive schools, just as the self control of the Chinese scholar was largely due to his education in the Confucian manner. In both cases other classes of the society were also affected, but not nearly to the same degree, so that a class distinction exists here as in other aspects of behavior.

Yet another passage regarding aggressiveness is relied on by the learned counsel for the accused appellant herein, from this book at page 89 and it runs as follows-

Aggressive behavior is, of course, found widely in the animal kingdom. It must be borne in mind, however, that it is by no means an invariable rule of behavior. Cases of mutual help and co-operation also occur in abundance, even between members of different species. When aggressiveness is found it is frequently in association with other drives, such as self-preservation sex, and maternal love, and probably is not to be regarded as an end in itself......It has been amply demonstrated by Cannon (27) that in anger. there is a whole series of biochemical and physiological changes under the influence of the sympathetic nervous system and the adrenal glands. These changes prepare the organism for an emergency ; they include the liberation of glycogen from the liver so that in the form of glucose it may be used as a source of energy; the more rapid elimination of the products of fatigue; the quicker clotting of blood, so that wounds will not be so dangerous, the movement of blood from the digestive system to the muscles, so that these may act more efficiently, and so on. The general result of these changes is that in the presence of an enemy the organism may respond with am unusual output of energy over an unusually long period of time. These changes do occur in anger, but they occur also in fear and in excitements, they constitute an organic basis for violent emotional behavior in general, rather than for aggressiveness itself.

Referring to the above passage in the said book, the learned counsel for the accused-appellant submits that the accused being a man engaged in the profession of milk vending and his social status not being very much in par with a common civilized man, an act on the part of the mother plucking out the seedlings from the field was 6nough for him to lose his balance of mind and resort to violence. As such, it is submitted that the benefit under Exception 1 to S. 300, I.P.G. has to be given to the accused in this case, and the offence committed by the accused does not come under the purview of S. 302, LP.C. and comes only under Exception 1 to S. 300, I.P.C.

It is relevant in this connection to note that the plea of grave and sudden provocation has been pleaded even in his confessional statement Ex. P.6. The relevant passage in it reads as follows-

Exception 1 to S. 300, I.P.C. reads as follows-

Exception 1 : Culpable homicide is not murder" if the offender whilst deprived of the power of self control by grave and sudden provocation causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident.

The above Exception is subject to the following provisos-

First-That provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person.

Secondly-That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law" or by a public servant,

Thirdly-That the provocation is not given by anything done in the] lawful exercise of the right of private defence.

Explanation-Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact,

The first clause of S. 300 provides that it is murder if the offender had the intention of causing death. What is required is a finding as an actual fact that the accused desired to cause death whether as an end in itself or as a means to something else.

It is difficult to appreciate the difference between culpable homicide not amounting to murder and murder unless one keeps in mind the meaning and import of the word ''intention'' as used in the Indian Penal Code, and its purposeful separation from mere knowledge of the likelihood of the consequences. ''Intention'' in the Indian Penal Code is a specific and distinct state of mind which ought not to be mixed up with the other states of mind provided for in the Indian Penal Code. The Indian Penal Code recognizes besides ''intention'', knowledge of the likelihood of the consequence'', ''reason to believe the consequence to be likely'' and rashness and negligence as mens rea which will attract responsibility.

In the civil law, responsibility for injury is determined by the well known fore-knowledge test which fixes liability if the injury was actually foreseen or if it would have been foreseen by an average reasonable person in the position of the wrong doer. The basis of the test is the maxim that every man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his Act. How this intention imputed to the wrong doer is very different from the intention of the Indian Penal Code, for, it includes besides the intention of the Indian Penal Code, the other three states of mind as well. In other words, intention under the Indian Penal Code is but a fraction of ''intention'' referred to in the maxim -Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. This maxim is as old as English criminal law. mens rea means only guilty mind. In English law there can be no crime without a guilty mind or corrupt mind. The maxim is the bedrock of the English Common law of Crimes and it amounts ''to no more and no less than that all crime is characterised by and necessarily involves, some form of culpable intentionality." In other words, according to Stephen, it ''means no more than that the definition of all or nearly all crimes contains not only an out-ward and visible element, but a mental element varying according to the different nature of different crimes." The two important elements that constitute a crime, from the point of view of the offender are: (1) conduct on his part or act or action as it is known forming the physical act which is objective, and (2) a state of mind or mental element that is blameworthy according to law which is necessarily subjective, usually proved as an inference from the facts and circumstances of a case or with the aid of presumptions, such as that, a man intends the natural consequences of his act, R v. Sheppard. 1810 R & R 169.

The maxim, actus nan facit roum nisi mens sit rea has been rather severely criticized by Stephen, J. in R v. Tolson, 1889 23 Q. E. D. 185 on the ground that it does not mean a particular state of mind and it is ''confusing to call so many dissimilar states of mind by one name.'' This criticism is rather academic and does not in any way detract from the soundness of the maxim as embodying the foundations of English Criminal Jurisprudence. On it turns the entire English Common Law of Crimes. The term actuaries or criminal act may either be an act or an omission as it is understood or a mere state of fact or facts, and, mens rea as related to the actuaries or as the latter''s motive force may have reference to any of the states of mind in the doing of the act such as intention, knowledge, negligence, rashness and the like. The maxim carries with it the two basic elements of a crime ; whether in English Common Law or under the Indian Penal Code, viz., conduct or act on the part of the actor or doer and the state of mind with which the act is done. An act does not make a person guilty unless the mind is guilty, that is the maxim.

In order, therefore, the actus may be reus the mens with which the act was done must be rea. That is why an act does not become a crime unless the mind with which it is done is also criminal. When we speak of intentional doing or act we mean also intentional non-doing or omission. A mere act unaccompanied by any of the recognised states of mind is nothing from the point of view of criminal law. An act in the sense that a wild bird is shot or a wild rabbit is killed is not considered by modern criminal law.

Regarding mens rea in his ''A Treatise on the Law of Crimes'', Mr. N. Arunachalam, M. A, M. L, Advocate, High Court, Madras and part-time Lecturer, Law College, Madras, published by Tilak and Co, 1953, observes as follows-

Acts that are done in a state of unconsciousness are completely excused by any system of modern criminal law for the reason that the mens which must become rea in order that the actus may be reum is totally absent; it is as if the person doing an act from total unconsciousness is merely a robot or automaton, mindless and soulless, and it would be an act of utter cruelty, nay barbarism if anyone should think of punishing such an individual. That is why a somnambulist, a lunatic, or a person who is drunk involuntarily and under the influence of the drink or drug does not understand the nature of the act or does not understand that that which he is doing is either wrong or contrary to law, is excused in criminal law for his unconscious acts. To the same category belongs the act of a person who is an infant, a child below seven years and an act done by accident or an act done under compulsion. These are all acts that are done unaccompanied by any mind, strictly so called, much less a criminal mind and, therefore, these acts are excused under criminal law.

In India, as in England, every homicide is murder unless the accused proves some mitigating circumstances to reduce it to manslaughter. But, as pointed out by Lord Sankey in Waolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1935 A. C. 462 this is certainly not the law in England. There, as in India, it is for the prosecution to establish beyond doubt the prescribed mens rea for murder (i.e., malice after thought). The generally accepted view is, however, that SS. 299 and 300 are distinguishable on the basis of the mens rea specified and that exceptions apart, every case of culpable homicide is not necessarily murder. In fact, in many cases, the accused have been acquitted of the charge of murder and convicted of the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder although there was no question of the applicability of any of the Exceptions to S. 300, the decisions were based on the ''fine but appreciable'' distinction between Ss. 299 and 300. Vide Reg v. Govinda, AIR 1 Bom. 342 Inder Singh v. The Crown, 10. Lah. 477 Garbar Paitde v. Emperor, 7 Pat 638 and Willie (William) Slaney Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh,

S. 304, I.P.C., which provides punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder repeats the expressions as to materia stated in S. 299. But S. 304, I. P. C, is also applicable in cases where, though the mens rea of the higher type specified in S. 300 is present, the exceptions to S. 300 also apply. Sometimes a Judge while sentencing an accused under S. 304 not merely relies on one of the Exceptions but also on the fact that the mens rea is of the lower type mentioned in S. 299-Vide Chamku Badhwa v. The State 1954 Cri. L..T. 1676, and Thommen Thomas Vs. State of Kerala, . The application of the Exceptions implies that notwithstanding that the act is done with the mens rea specified in S. 300 the offence is still culpable homicide not amounting to murder and at the same time there is the finding that the mens rea is of the lower type mentioned in S. 299. This leads one to doubt whether in such cases any effort has been made to determine the specific intention or knowledge actually present and it tends to obscure the distinction referred to in the previous paragraph.

A jumbled reference to the different clauses of S. 300, without indicating which of them is applicable while distinguishing between SS. 299 and 300 tends to blur the distinction further- vide State Vs. Bhairu Sattu Berad and Others, , and Charan Singh and Others Vs. State, .

In Willie (William) Slaney Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, , following a heated exchange of words between the accused and the deceased, the accused slapped the deceased on the cheek. The deceased lifted his fist. The accused gave one blow on the head of the deceased with a hockey stick with the result that the skull was fractured. The deceased died in the hospital 10 days later. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J., observes-

It is obvious that the appellant did not intend to kill the deceased ; the evidence of the doctor is that the injury was likely to result in fatal consequences. This by itself is not enough to bring the case within the scope of S. 300. There is nothing to warrant us to attribute to the appellant knowledge that the injury was liable to cause death or that it was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death. The fact that Donald lived for ten days shows that it was not sufficient in that ordinary course of nature to cause death. The elements specified in S. 300, I.P.C., are thus wanting. We take the view considering all the circumstances that the offence is the lesser one.

In England the much discussed decision of the House of Lords, in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith 1960 3 W.L.R. 546, had adopted the objective test in determining intention. Such a criterion would be wholly out of place under the Indian Penal Code. Notwithstanding it is not unusual for judges to rely on the maxim to determine intention under the Code. The intention to cause bodily injury is common to S. 299, CI. (2), and S. 300, CI. (2) and the only difference between them is that under the latter there should also be the knowledge that the injury is likely to cause the death of the person to whom the injury is caused. As this additional element of knowledge is subjective, it should be inferred from the evidence as a matter of fact and should not be imputed to the accused. S. 3C0, CI. (2) then really appears to be a combination of CI. (2) and CI. (3) of S. 299, which from the standpoint of responsibility is equated with an intention to cause death and hence liability for murder. Vide : AIR 1939 245 (Lahore)

S. 300, CI. (3), I.P.C., reads :-

If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

This clause is distinguishable from CI. (2) of S. 299 on the basis of the higher degree of probability of death resulting from the injury denoted by the expression ''sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death''. Prof. Alan Gledhill considers the distinction between an injury likely to cause death and the one sufficient in the course of nature to cause death artificial and observes-

In many cases the result of a trial must turn on the medical evidence and a man''s life may depend upon the unchallenged opinion on the nature of the injury, given by a not over-competent member of the subordinate medical service who has performed a casual autopsy.

(See Prof. Alan Gledhill ''The Indian Penal Code in the Sudan and Northern Nigeria'' Year Book of Legal Studies, 1900 Department of Legal Studies, Madras, p. 17).

These clauses, CI.2 of S. 299 and C1.3 of S. 300 are not only difficult to understand in the abstract but lead to considerable arbitrariness in their application to any given case.

The view has been expressed in interpreting the third clause of S. 300 that not only should the injury be intentionally inflicted but that the accused should have further intended that it should be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would convert the clause into one of intention to cause death, i.e., Cl. (i) of S. 300. It is not possible to see how ''intention to cause bodily injury intended to be sufficient to cause death'' is different from intention to cause death (See AIR 1939 245 (Lahore)

Another view is that if any serious injury is intentionally inflicted and that injury actually caused death, it is to be regarded as sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death ; the case would fall under CI. (3) of S. 300 - Vide The Public Prosecutor Vs. Koramutla Narasigadu and Others, .

The proper view to take is that the bodily injury suffered by the deceased and found sufficient to cause death should be actually intended by the offender. Whether the injury intended by the accused and actually caused is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or not must be determined objectively as a question of fact. In Virsa Singh Vs. The State of Punjab, , (see also Rehman v. Emperor, Naga Khwet v. The King AIR 1941 Rang 318, Faqira Vs. State, , and Thannoo Vs. State, the Supreme Court observes-

To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under S. 300 ''thirdly''; first, it must establish quite objectively that a bodily injury is present ; secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved ; these are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some o her kind of injury was intended. Once thes3 three elements are proved to be present the enquiry proceeds further; and fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause the death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.

Though it has thus emphasized that the accuser''s anticipation of the nature of the consequences is immaterial sometimes we find that the knowledge of the accused as to the injury being sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death is considered as being material.

Proof. Alan Gledhill after referring to CI. (3) and CI. (2) of S. 300, observes-

...why, in the case of a victim of normal health and strength, should the knowledge of the consequences of the injury intended to be caused be irrelevant, if it is essential when death is caused to a person suffering from bodily disease or infirmity? Why, again, when the victim is a person of normal health and strength must the intended injury be sufficient in the ordinary course of natures when intention to cause injury likely to cause death is enough if it is caused to an infirm person ?

In some cases, knowledge of the accused that the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death is discussed while applying S. 300, Cl.(3). In this regard, the decisions in Public Prosecutor v. Ramaswami Nadar 1940 2 M.L.J. 928 : 52 L.W.224, Nga Obu Pe v. Emperor 39 Cri. L.J. 217 are referred to. Knowledge of the accused can only be relevant under S. 300, CI. (2) but not under S. 300, CI. (3). From the above, it is clear that the sub-divisions of the state of mind leads to practical difficulties. Further, the presumption as to intention and knowledge, sometimes, is scarcely more than a speculation in the absence of anything in the evidence to disclose the actual mental condition of the accused. This clause has probably been introduced by the framers of the Indian Penal Code, so that persons in whose cases it may be difficult to prove an absolute intention to kill may not escape liability.

S. 300, clause (4) reads -

If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or bodily injury as aforesaid.

Exception 1 to S. 300 provides-

Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender whilst deprived of the power of self control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident

The Supreme Court in K.M. Nanavati Vs. State of Maharashtra, has answered the questions

(1) who is the reasonable man and what is the standard of reasonableness ?

(2) Does it refer to the man on the Clapham omnibus as in English law, i.e. to a mythical man of reasonable prudence ?

(3) Is there an abstract standard of reasonableness to be applied faithfully in every case ?

In the negative, and has stated that the standard of reasonableness varies from one social group to another. Subba Rao, J. observed-

What a reasonable man will do in certain circumstances depends upon the customs, manners, way of life, traditional values, etc. in short, the cultural, social and emotional background of the society to which an accused belongs. In our countrys there are social groups ranging from the lowest to the highest state of civilization. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any standard with precision ; it is for the court to decide in each case, having regard to relevant circumstances.

In other words, the test is not what a reasonable man judged by some abstract standard would do, but what a reasonable man belonging to the same social group as the accused would do. To put it differently, if the accused is found, as a matter of fact, to be a reasonable man, would he have done what he actually did ? The objective test is that qualified by the circumstances mentioned by the Supreme Court.

In Nanavati''s case, referred to above, when Sylvia, the accused confessed to her husband that she had illicit intimacy with the Ahuja (deceased) who was not present there, it can be assumed that he (husband) had momentarily lost his self control. But then, appellant drove his wife and children to a cinema, left them there, went to the shop, took a revolver on a false pretext, loaded it with six rounds, did some official business there and drove his car to the office of the deceased Ahuja and shot him. Three hours since the knowledge of the illicit intimacy had elapsed and, therefore, there was sufficient time for him to regain his self control even if he had not regained it earlier. The facts of the case did not attract the provision of Exception 1 to S. 300, I.P.C.

In Gyanendra Kumar Vs. The State of U.P., a month before the assault the deceased had attempted to outrage the modesty of the appellant''s wife. It was held that the interval between that incident and the assault is too long to afford to the appellant the benefit of the plea of grave and sudden provocation.

In Dattu Genu Gaikwad Vs. The State of Maharashtra, it was held that what is grave and sudden provocation in one set of society may not be grave provocation in another. Besides this there can be no grave and sudden provocation where there is time to cool down.

In Amrithalinga Nadar Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, , it was held that the chase of the deceased and P.W.3 by the appellant and four other accused was immediately after the main occurrence and was hardly any appreciable interval of time between the scuffle and giving of the fatal blow by the appellant. The later part of the incident followed upon the earlier as its sequel and there was no time for reason to interpose and passions to cool down. It is apparent that the fatal injury was caused by the appellant to the deceased without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. It was held that the case of the appellant falls clearly within the fourth Exception in S. 3C0, I.P.C. and the appellant can be held guilty only for the offence under S. 304, Part 1 of the I.P.C.

In Hansa Singh Vs. State of Punjab, the appellant on seeing the deceased committing the act of sodomy on his son, lost his power and self control and it was undoubtedly a grave and sudden provocation for him which led him to commit the murderous assault on the deceased. It was held that the accused had committed an offence punishable under S. 304, Part II, I.P.C. So, the sentence was altered from life imprisonment (under S. 302, I.P.C.) to already undergone (which was almost seven years).

Mr. N. Arunachalam, M.A., M.L. Advocate, High Court, Madras, Part time Lecturer, Law College, Madras in his "A Treatise on the Law of Crimes" published by M. L. Tilak and Co., Luz House, Madras 4, in 1953, has dealt with the subject ''Grave and sudden provocation'' at pages 250 and 251 as follows -

Provocation may take any form or shape. It may be by words or gestures or acts and if these things can excite violent passion tending to cause bodily violence, they will be sufficient enough within the meaning of the section. It must always be borne in mind that the provocation which resulted in loss of self control of the accused must not have been one sought after by the accused or voluntarily provoked by him and the provocation must be sudden and grave. In R v. Lochan the accused had suspicions about his wife''s loyalty to him. He saw her leaving his house at night. He followed her with a hatchet. He found her having connection with another person and at once killed her. This was held to be murder. It can be seen that this provocation, however, grave, was sought after or voluntarily provoked by the accused himself. So it was, he was found guilty of murder. On the other hand, in R v. Sheik Budhoo 1868 S.W.R. Cri. 38, the accused for ten years had no suspicion of the fidelity of his wife. One day when he came home, he found his wife in a compromising situation with another This sight maddened the accused who killed both his wife and her paramour. He was found guilty of only culpable homicide not amounting to murder and was also dealt with leniently.

If there is an interval of time between the provocation and the act done much will turn upon the kind of provocation that was given so as to decide the '' continuance of the gravity and suddenness of the provocation at the time of doing the act. Normally, of course" lapse of time might change the character of the provocation into one of resentment and resentment is no excuse for killing. There maybe exceptional cases in which in spite of lapse of time, the provocation may be considered sufficient enough to continue until the doing of the act. In Abalu Das v. R the accused found a man X enter his house at night, at the invitation of his wife. He found his wife having connection with X. Accused was enraged. He caught hold of X, dragged him outside and took him some distance and then gave him severe beating as a result of which X died. The circumstances in which X was found in the house of the accused on the night of the crime were sufficient to cause grave and sudden provocation. The nature of provocation was such that it was bound to continue long enough to influence the feelings of the accused. It was found that when the beatings were given to the victim the accused was continued to be moved by the grave and sudden provocation of the sight of the illicit intercourse of his wife with X.

Grave and sudden provocation may be of any variety and it depends on facts and circumstances of each case. It is always a question of fact. The person killed must be the person who gave the grave and sudden provocation. The person killing must be the person who was provoked in the manner aforesaid. Grave and sudden provocation in the sense in which it is meant and the limitations subject to which it is meant and the limitations subject to which it can be pleaded within the meaning of S. 300, Exception 1, apply also to the offences falling under Ss. 334 and 335, viz, voluntarily causing hurt and,: voluntarily causing grievous hurt; and Ss. 352 and 358, viz, assault or criminal force otherwise than on grave and sudden provocation and assault or criminal force on grave and sudden provocation.

It will not be provocation if it is sought or if it is on account of lawful conduct or if it is on account of lawful exercise of the right of private defence.

Not only words, but also acts may constitute a sufficient provocation. The nocturnal visit of a thief, or of a man for the purpose of intrigue, are acts which would inflame the passions of any man. There may, however, be acts which some people may look on with equanimity, while they may throw others into a paroxysm of the deepest rage. Such are acts done in violation of one''s caste or customs. In such cases, the fact that the provocation is unreasonable is nothing. If it is an act which is sufficient to provoke a person in the position and situation of the accused, it is a sufficient extenuation. It is quite impossible to hold that a person will be deprived of the power of self control merely by being slapped, even two or three times, on the back. Being slapped on the back would not be sufficient provocation. It may have been sudden, but it is certainly not grave.

In the instant case, the point of law is, whether the plucking of the paddy seedlings from the field belonging to her (deceased Alamelu Ammal) and which had been leased in favour of another son can be said to cause grave and sudden provocation for the accused-appellant so as to attract the benefit under Exception I to S. 300, I.P.C. This can be answered only in the negative. The accused had been entertaining a grievance against his mother, in that she had not given on lease the seven kuzhis of land for his cultivation. This had created in his mind a kind of inexplicable fire. The accused, appellant herein, had been nurturing hatred against his mother. So, on the day of the occurrence, when the deceased was plucking the transplanted paddy seedlings from her field cultivated by her another son, P. W. 4, Marudha Udayar, the dissatisfaction and hatred entertained by the accused got exploded and assumed a tremendous and horrible stature which resulted in the accused-appellant cutting the deceased and causing her instantaneous death.

The spade in question is a formidable weapon. It had a broad and lengthy iron portion. The accused would have been certainly aware that the attack with such a weapon would result in the death of the victim. If is relevant in this connection to note that the portions of the body in which the cuts were inflicted with the spade by the accused on the deceased were the vital parts of the body of the deceased. Therefore, the intention of the accused is easily gathered from the fact that the injuries were inflicted on the vital parts of the body of the deceased. In the instant case, the death was instantaneous after the receipt of the injuries by the deceased. Therefore, the fact that the injuries were inflicted on the vital parts of the body of the deceased, that for inflicting the injuries, a formidable weapon was used, and the nature of the injuries inflicted on the deceased clearly go to show that the accused has committed an offence which is certainly punishable under S. 302, I.P.C. As I already said, the accused had been entertaining a grievance that the land belonging to the deceased was not given on lease to him by her. Under the circumstances, it is clear that it is the accused, appellant herein, who had resorted to the act of violence in this case. There is absolutely no material available in evidence on record, to hold that some other person had been responsible for the injuries on the deceased or that there is existence of any reasonable doubt under the circumstances so as to hold that the accused appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. Therefore, the trial court is correct in having held the accused guilty of the offence punishable under S. 302, I.P.C. We confirm the conviction of the accused-appellant herein under S 302, I.P.C.

The accused had resorted to violence against his own mother in the field belonging to her. It cannot be said that the accused, appellant herein, was not aware of the consequence of his action. From the evidence available on record it is clear that the accused-appellant herein had the intention to do away with the deceased. When the deceased was engaged in plucking the paddy seedlings from the filed belonging to her, the accused appellant had taken the opportunity to accomplish his intention to do away with the deceased. We confirm the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed on the accused, appellant herein under S. 302, I.P.C. by the trial court. We find no merit in the appeal. The appeal is therefore, dismissed.