In Re: the Pleaders Ram Gobind Sinha Verma and Others

Jwala Prasad, Ag. C.J.

These are the cases of six pleaders upon all of whom, except Ram Gobind Sinha Verma, notices have been issued by this Court calling upon them to show cause why they should not be suspended or dismissed under Sections 12 and 13, Legal Practitioners Act (Act 18 of 1879). The case of Ram Gobind Sinha Verma (M.J.C. 120), pleader of Monghyr, will be dealt with separately.

Pleaders Dharnidhar and Ram Charan Singh (M.J.C. Nos. 121 and 122) practise in the District Courts of Darbhanga Pleaders Ramadhin Singh, Sarjoo Prasad Singh and Har Shankar Das (M.J.C. Nos. 123, 124 and 127, respectively) practise in the District Courts of Monghyr.

There are certain points common to all these cases and it would be convenient to refer to them at the outset. These pleaders were admitted and enrolled as proper persons to be pleaders in the Subordinate Courts by the High Court, and certificates were issued to them under the orders of the High Court, authorizing them to practise in the Courts subordinate to the High Court under Sections 6 and 7, Legal Practitioners'' Act, They practised as pleaders on annually renewing their certificates up to the year 1930. They joined a movement started by the Indian National Congress called "The Civil Disobedience Movement," the object of which was to paralyze the Government by disregarding law and order by civil methods, as distinguished from the method of force and violence. Pleaders Dharnidhar and Ram Charan Singh were prosecuted for being members of an unlawful assembly in connexion with the taking out of a procession on what is called "Jawahir Lal''s Day" as a part of the civil disobedience movement, in spite of an order of the Magistrate forbidding it u/s 144, Criminal P.C. They admitted having taken out the procession in disobedience of the order u/s 144, Criminal P.C. They claimed the right to take out the procession and denied their liability to prosecution on the ground that they were only "civil resisters." They were convicted and sentenced to three months'' imprisonment each u/s 143, I.P.C., vide the judgment of the Subdivisional Magistrate, dated 21st November 1930.

Pleader Ramadhin Singh was bound down u/s 107, Criminal P.C., to keep the peace for one year, as he was taking an active part in connexion with the Civil Disobedience movement in organizing volunteers and in other activities such as, picketing of excise shops, instigating nonpayment of taxes, etc., in his capacity as President and Dictator of the Monghyr Congress Committee, tending to a breach of the peace: vide the judgment of the Subdivisional Magistrate of Beguserai, dated 26th September 1930. Upon his refusal to give security he was committed to prison: vide his application to the District Judge of Monghyr, dated 23rd July 1931.

Pleader Sarjoo Prasad Singh was convicted u/s 3, Police Incitement to Disaffection Act (Act 22 of 1922), for having in furtherance of the Civil Disobedience movement incited a police constable, who was a member of the police force, to withhold his services, remarking that the Government of the country was on the verge of destruction and that it was the duty of the constable under the circumstances to resign. He was sentenced to six months'' rigorous imprisonment. There was a clerical error in the notice issued to him in mentioning Act 12 of 1922 (Salt Act) due to the mistake in the statement of convicted pleaders forwarded by the District Judge of Monghyr with his letter No. 5, dated 23rd April 1931. This has not prejudiced the pleader concerned, for he admitted in this Court his conviction under the Police Incitement to Disaffection Act, the judgment whereof is on the record.

Pleader Hari Shankar Das was convicted u/s 17, Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908, and sentenced to six months'' rigorous imprisonment. He was a Dictator of the Monghyr Congress Committee which was declared by the Government to be an unlawful association under the said Act, and he used to dictate all the activities of the Congress in Monghyr after it was declared to be unlawful.

All these pleaders were released from jail in consequence of the settlement arrived at between the Viceroy and the Congress party, a statement whereof was published in Notification No. Section 48 Pol. dated 5th March 1931 in the Extraordinary Issue of the Gazette of India. Para 12 of the said statement commonly known as the "Irwin-Gandhi Pact", runs as follows:

Where the local Government has moved any High Court or has initiated proceedings under the Legal Practitioners Act in regard to the conduct of legal practitioners in connexion with the civil disobedience movement it will make application to the Court for permission to withdraw such proceedings provided that the alleged conduct of the persons concerned does not relate to violence or incitement to violence.

After their release from jail, the question arose whether their certificates entitling them to practise as pleaders should be renewed or not, for which they had applied to the District Judges concerned u/s 7, Legal Practitioners'' Act, and deposited necessary stamps. The District Judges referred the matter to this Court for instructions.

Rule 26-A, Ch. 1, Part V, General Rules and Circular Orders, Civil, Vol. 1, runs as follows:

If the District Judge or other officer authorized to renew certificates considers that the character or conduct of the pleader or mukhtear who has been ordinarily practising in the Court of the said Judge or officer, as the case may be, and who may apply for the renewal of his certificate u/s 7, Act 18 of 1879, is such that his certificate should not be renewed, he shall forward the said application with a statement of and the grounds for his opinion to the High Court for orders, and the High Court shall pass thereon such orders as it thinks fit.

The reference by the District Judges was not only in respect of these pleaders, but also in respect of other pleaders and this Court issued a general letter that in view of the "Irwin-Gandhi Pact" referred to above no proceedings under the Legal Practitioners'' Act against the guilty pleaders was necessary at present but that their certificates should not be renewed until a guarantee was given by them that they would not engage themselves in any political or other activities of a kind subversive of Government established by law, but would confine if; themselves to constitutional methods of advocating their political or other opinions. In pursuance of this instruction the District Judges concerned required the pleaders in question to give the undertaking as a condition precedent to the renewal of their certificates. They refused to do so. Thereupon the District Judges referred the cases of these pleaders to this Court.

The pleaders themselves have also come up to this Court, and have applied to have the orders of the District Judges refusing the renewal of their certificates cancelled, and to direct the renewal of their certificates. In their applications to this Court they have reiterated their refusal to give the undertaking referred to above, impugning it as being without jurisdiction, and stating that they have under the law and circumstances a right to have their certificates renewed without imposing any condition as to their future behaviour.

Regard being had to their admission of having taken part in the civil disobedience movement and to their having been convicted for committing illegal acts in furtherance of that movement and to the attitude taken by them in not giving any assurance of future behaviour, the Court issued notices upon them to show cause why they should not be dealt with and dismissed or suspended under Sections 12 and 13, Legal Practitioners'' Act.

In pursuance of the notices the pleaders have appeared and shown cause by means of arguments and submissions made on their behalf by their counsel. We have heard separate arguments in respect of these pleaders. Sir Ali Imam argued for pleaders Dharnidhar Das and Ram Charan Singh (M.J.C. Nos. 121 and 122) and Mr. P.E. Das for pleaders Ramadhin Singh, Sarjoo Prasad Singh and Hari Shankar Das (M.J.C. Nos. 123, 12-1 and 127). The common argument advanced on behalf of all of them is that the offences of which they were convicted do not imply a "defect of character" (to use the words of the section) which unfit them to be pleaders so as to bring them within the purview of Section 12, Legal Practitioners'' Act, and that they have been guilty of nothing showing moral turpitude or any conduct inconsistent with their duty as pleaders or as officers of the Courts so as to constitute "a reasonable cause" for being dealt with u/s 13(f) of the Act.

Now in the case of Shankar Ganesh Dabir v. Secy. of State AIR 1922 P.C. 351, the petitioner was a pleader on the roll of the practitioners who practised at Basim in the District of Akola, Berar. A movement was started in the Central Provinces for asking Government to abolish the Mehar Baluta system which then formed part of the land revenue of Berar. The pleader made speeches in support of the movement and in one of the public speeches he stated that the system was "unjust" and "illegal" and urged that the payment of Baluta should be stopped. The Subdivisional Magistrate was of opinion that

the petitioner''s act was such as to lead to disturbance of the public tranquillity although no disturbance has yet taken place,

and he accordingly bound him down u/s 107, Criminal P.C., for keeping the peace for one year. The order was confirmed by the District Magistrate, and the application of the pleader for revision to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner was dismissed. The Court of the Judicial Commissioner thereupon issued notice u/s 13, Legal Practitioners Act, and his sanad was cancelled until such time as he should satisfy the Court by his future conduct that he was fit for re-admission. The petitioner''s application to the Privy Council for leave to appeal was dismissed. Lord Buckmaster delivered the judgment of the Judicial Committee and observed:

The offence which he had committed was connected with an agitation against payment of the Mehar Baluta, and it appears that in the course of such agitation he did not confine himself to protests however vehement against the tax or against its injustice, but that he urged and organized resistance to payment, and he attempted to establish a system which would have impeded and might have defeated its recovery, with grave danger to the public peace.

Continuing his Lordship further observed that these considerations led to the conviction of the petitioner u/s 107, Criminal P.C., and caused the conduct of the pleader to be brought u/s 13(f), Legal Practitioners Act, (Act 18 of 1879), which is not confined to acts done in a professional capacity.

In the case of Emperor Vs. Babus Rajani Kanta Bose and Another, Babus Rajani Kanta Nag and Another, Babu Annada Charan Roy and Babu Surendra Kumar Nag, a Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that it is inconsistent with the duties of a pleader to join in a hartal to boycott the Court, his duty being to co-operate with the Court in the orderly and pure administration of justice. In the circumstances of the case and regard being had to the cases being first of the kind the Court dealt with the pleaders leniently and gave them a warning.

In the case of a Second Grade Pleader, Ramachandrapur AIR 1924 Mad. 129 the pleader was convicted and sentenced to one year''s rigorous imprisonment for refusing to give security u/s 108, Criminal P.C., having made speeches inciting the people not to pay taxes and to boycott the English Courts. He applied for renewal of his certificate under the Legal Practitioners Act. The District Judge brought to the notice of the High Court of Madras the facts leading up to his conviction. The High Court issued notice to the pleader u/s 13(f), Legal Practitioners Act, directing him to show cause why he should not be dealt with under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the High Court. In showing cause he expressed no regret for the tone of his speeches nor did he give any promise for future behaviour. The Court refused to renew the certificate, permitting him to apply again for the certificate on his satisfying the Court of a genuine change in his attitude. Reference may also be made to the case of the Government Pleader, High Court, Bombay v. Jagannath Maheshwar [1909] 33 Bom. 252. In that case the pleader presided at a public meeting held for the purpose of expressing sorrow for and sympathy with Mr. Tilak who was convicted at a trial at the criminal Sessions. One of the resolutions passed at the meeting reflected upon and denounced the conduct of the Judge who presided over the trial. The pleader was suspended for six months and directed to deliver up the sanad, with liberty to apply for it again six months after.

In re Jivanalal Varajaray Desai [1920] 44 Bom. 418 the legal practitioners concerned, two of whom were advocates, one was a vakil of the High Court of Bombay and three were pleaders, joined a movement called "Satyagraha Sabha" which was started as a protest against the Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act (Act 11 of 1919) and signed a pledge where by they bound themselves:

to refuse civilly to obey those laws and such other laws as the committee to be hereafter appointed may think fit.

The District Judge of Ahmedabad brought the fact to the notice of the High Court and asked for orders of the High Court, as the question appeared to him to be general to all districts. The High Court issued notices upon the barristers and vakils under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent and upon the pleaders under Clause 56, Bombay Regn. 2 of 1837, which corresponds to Section 13, Legal Practitioners'' Act. The High Court held that the pledge signed by the legal practitioners amounted to a refusal to obey the laws referred to in the pledge, and although they as citizens had a right to criticize the laws and to take every means to induce the Government to withdraw them, they had no right to refuse to obey them so long as they were the laws of the country. However, in view of the fact that the Satyagraha Sabha had become quiescent and that it was not necessary to anticipate that anything worse would follow, their Lordships contented themselves with giving the lawyers concerned a warning, leaving them to be dealt with more severely if their conduct should become worse.

Similar was the view taken in In re Abdul Rashid AIR 1924 Lah. 123. It was held there that:

If an advocate or a vakil deliberately joins or continues to be a member of an association which has been declared to be unlawful under the provisions of a statute, he renders himself liable to disciplinary action by the High Court. He may not like a particular measure and he is entitled to protest against it and agitate for its repeal by all lawful means. But so long as if is the law of the land, it is his duty to obey it and not to act in defiance of its provisions.

In that case the lawyers concerned were convicted and sentenced to six months'' rigorous imprisonment u/s 17(1), Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1908 for being members of the National Volunteers Association after it was declared to be unlawful u/s 15 of the said Act. Considering however the fact that these were the first cases of the kind and that the lawyers concerned had no intention of causing a breach of the peace their Lordships thought that a warning to them would meet the ends of justice.

Coming now to our own High Court, a Special Bench of the Court dealt with the case of In Re: Babu Madahva Singh, Vakil, who was convicted u/s 17(2), Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1908, and sentenced to six months'' rigorous imprisonment for being a member of the Shewakdal Volunteers which was declared to be an unlawful assembly. After serving his sentence he applied for renewal of his clerk''s license. The matter was brought to the notice of the High Court by the District Judge of Saran where the pleader was practising, and notice was served by the High Court upon the pleader asking him to offer any explanation of his past conduct and as to his future attitude towards offences of the nature of which he was convicted. The restriction for enrollment of volunteers was withdrawn and hence he contended that he acted in perfect good faith and upon sincere conviction and hence his act did not come under the purview of the Legal Practitioners'' Act. As regards his future attitude he said that he did not intend to commit any offence against the law. It was held that he deliberately took the law into his own hands and defied the order of constituted authority and if he had expressed regret at an early stage he would have been let off with a warning accepting his assurance as to his future conduct, but as he took a different attitude he was suspended for six months u/s 8, Letters Patent which has been held to correspond with Sections 12 and 13, Legal Practitioners Act.

In a recent case Manendra Prasad Vs. Ranchi Regional Development Authority and Another, the pleader was convicted for having led a batch of Satyagrahis to the sea coast and not; only instigated them to manufacture salt and break the Salt law, but actually joined in the operation of salt-making. He was first given a warning which proved ineffective and was then sent up and convicted and sentenced to six months'' imprisonment u/s 9, Salt Act. On a reference made to the High Court by the District Magistrate of Balasore under Sections 12 and 13, Legal Practitioners'' Act, the High Court suspended the pleader for six months.

Sir Ali Imam relied upon the case of G., a pleader, AIR 1929 Rang. 352. The pleader was convicted of an assault which was an outcome of a drunken brawl and also u/s 11, Burma Gambling Act. He was further convicted under Sections 506 and 509, I.P.C., for intimidating and assaulting a woman. It was held that the conviction of the petitioner was not; in itself sufficient to show a defect of character which unfitted him to be a pleader within the meaning of Section 12, Legal Practitioners'' Act, but that the conduct of the pleader brought him under the disciplinary Section 13(f) of the Act, and that in the circumstances of the case a warning to the pleader was considered sufficient, observing that the repetition of such conduct might make it necessary to take severer action against him.

A resume of the aforesaid cases would show that the pleaders in question brought themselves by their conduct within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Court, when being members of the civil disobedience movement they committed illegal acts in furtherance of that movement, took the law into their own hands and defied the order of constituted authority.

It is contended that Section 12, Legal Practitioners'' Act, has no application, for in order to apply that section two conditions are necessary: (1) that the lawyer concerned should have been "convicted of a criminal offence" and (2) that the offence committed must imply "defect of character" which makes him unfit to be a pleader or mukhtear. Stress has been laid upon the expression "criminal offence" in the section and it is said that the conviction of every offence or infringement of law would not make a lawyer liable under the section but that he must be convicted of a criminal offence which must not be deemed to have been lightly used in the section.

Mr. Das adopted this argument of Sir Ali Imam and added that the

legislature had used the words "criminal offence" and those words meant, as defined in Section 40, I.P.C.

Now the Legal Practitioners'' Act has not defined these words nor has it adopted the definition of the word "offence" as given in the Penal Code. That definition is meant for the word "offence" used in that Code only. Hence the definition of "offence" as given in the General Clauses Act will apply to the word used in Section 12, Legal Practitioners'' Act. In the General Clauses Act the word has been defined to mean "any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force." The Criminal Procedure Code has adopted this definition in Section 4(o) as the procedure prescribed by the Code for dealing with an offence applies to the Penal Code as well as to offences under any other law in the absence of any special procedure provided by those laws. The word "crime" or "criminal" has not been defined in the Indian Statutes. The word "crime" has been defined in Halabury''s Laws of England, Vol. 9, p. 232, as an

unlawful act or default which is an offence against the public arid tenders the person guilty of the act or default liable to legal punishment; while a crime is often also an injury to a private person who has a remedy in a civil action, it is an act or default contrary to the order, peace and well-being of society that a crime is punishable by a State.

In the case of Moghal Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co. [1889] 23 Q.B.D. 598 at p. 606, Lord Esher, M.R., observed:

An illegal Act which is a wrong against the public welfare, seems to have the necessary elements of a crime.

Similar is the meaning given to the word "crime" in Bouver''s Law Dictionary. "Crime" is defined as an act committed or omitted in violation of a public law forbidding or commanding it; a wrong which the Government notices as injurious to the public and punishes in what is called a criminal proceeding in its own name. It generally denotes an offence of a deep and atrocious dye. Crimes are defined and punished by statutes and by the Common law, and they embrace every indictable offence and include all immoral acts which tend to the prejudice of the community and are punishable criminally by Courts of justice: 2 East 5, 21; State v. Doud 7 Conn. 386. An "offence" may not be indictable but only punishable summarily by the forfeiture of a penalty. In a restricted sense it is the doing that which a penal law forbids to be done or omit to do what it commands. In this sense it is merely synonymous with crime. It is in this sense that the word has been used in the Indian statutes. The words "criminal offence" used in Section 12 would therefore mean an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code as well as any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force which is indictable and punishable criminally by Courts of justice.

Now pleader Ramadhin Singh was bound down u/s 107, Criminal P.C., to keep the peace and was sent to jail for refusing to give security. He was therefore not convicted of any criminal offence.

Pleaders Dharnidhar and Ram Charan Singh were convicted and sentenced to three months u/s 143, I.P.C., which is a criminal offence.

Pleader Sarjoo Prasad Singh was convicted u/s 3, Police Incitement to Disaffection Act (Act 22 of 1922) and sentenced to six months and pleader Hari Shankar Das was convicted u/s 17, Criminal Law (Amendment) Act and sentenced to six months. These are offences respectively under those Acts and triable under the Criminal Procedure Code by virtue of Section 5(2) of that Code. These four pleaders were therefore convicted of "criminal offences" within the meaning of the expression used in Section 12, Legal Practitioners Act. But this is not enough to apply the section. As laid down by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Rajendra Nath, In the matter of [1899] 22 All. 49 whereas the propriety in law or in fact of the conviction cannot be questioned in the exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction, the Court has to inquire into the nature of the crime in order to decide whether the offence was of such a nature as to imply defect of character which would render the lawyers concerned unfit to be members of the legal profession.

Considering the nature of the offences of which these pleaders were convicted it is doubtful that their conviction was in itself sufficient to show a defect of character within the meaning of Section 12, Legal Practitioners Act and in this we adopt the view taken by the Rangoon High Court in the case of G, a pleader, AIR 1929 Rang. 352, the case relied upon by Sir Ali Imam. In all the decisions referred to in this judgment acts similar to those committed by the pleaders in these cases were dealt with u/s 13(f), Legal Practitioners'' Act, and we have no doubt that the facts and circumstances connected with the acts of which these pleaders were convicted or were bound down bring them within the disciplinary jurisdiction u/s 13(f) of the Act. The words "reasonable cause" are wide enough to cover these cases.

All these pleaders joined the civil disobedience movement the object of which was to paralyze the Government by refusing to obey the law civilly and not by force or violence. The word "disobedience" itself connotes the doing of something which is forbidden by law as was held in Re Jivanlal Varajaray Desai [1920] 44 Bom. 418. Pleaders Dharnidhar and Ram Charan Singh, who were convicted u/s 143, I.P.C., for disobeying the orders of the Magistrate not to take out a procession, themselves claimed to be "civil resistors" which is another expression for "civil disobedience," that is, doing a thing which is forbidden by law. Pleader Ramadhin Singh took an active part as a dictator and president of the Monghyr Congress Committee and was organizing volunteers and other activities tending to a breach of the peace. He was bound down u/s 107, Criminal P.C. He refused to give security and went to jail. The case is similar to the case of the Second Grade Pleader, Ramachandrapur AIR 1924 Mad. 129, and the Privy Council case of Shankar Ganesh Dabir v. Secy. of State AIR 1922 P.C. 351 where the pleaders were bound down u/s 107, Criminal P.C., for making speeches and instigating people to disobey the law. Pleader Sarjoo Prasad incited a police constable to withhold his services in furtherance of the civil disobedience movement and broke a special law as was done in the case of Manendra Prasad Vs. Ranchi Regional Development Authority and Another, .

Pleader Hari Shankar Das was convicted u/s 17(2), Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, for directing the activities of the Congress after it was declared unlawful. This is a case similar to that of Abdul Rashid, In re AIR 1924 Lah. 123 and a decision of this Court in In Re: Babu Madahva Singh, Vakil, p> 37. As to the case of Hari Shankar Das, Mr. Das contended that as he

had been convicted under a special law which had become law for some time and had ceased to be the law after some time, that is to say, he was convicted of an offence which was temporarily made an offence by virtue of a notification,

he cannot be dealt with again under the Legal Practitioners'' Act. He said that:

where a statute made a new offence, which was in no way prohibited by any law and provided special procedure to proceed against the offender, no penalty other than that enacted in the special statute could be imposed on the person.

In short he submitted that as his client was convicted for a special offence which was not part of the ordinary penal laws he should not be once again convicted under the Legal Practitioners'' Act. He applies this contention also to the case of Sarjoo Prasad Singh who was convicted under a special law, namely, the Police Incitement to Disaffection Act. In support of his contention Mr. Das cited Queen v. Hall [1891] 1 Q.B.D. 747. In that case it was held that an offence by an overseer within the meaning of Section 51, Parliamentary Registration Act, 1843 (6 and 7 Vict. C. 18), is not an indictable misdemeanour upon the ground that an express remedy and a particular penalty was provided for by the Act itself for a wilful neglect of the duty the remedy by indictment is excluded. This has no application to the present case. Here Hari Shankar Das and Sarjoo Prasad Singh were tried and convicted for offences committed under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, and the Police Incitement to Disaffection Act respectively. There is no question of any indictment or trial for the same offence under any other law and there is no question of punishing them over again for those offences. The same remark applies to the case of Chandi Pershad v. Abdur Rahman, Sub-Overseer, Monghyr Municipality [1995] 22 Cal. 131, at p. 139, cited by Mr. Das in which it was held that where the Municipal Act provides for penalty for an act or omission, and there being no indication in the Act of any intention to make a delinquent also liable to punishment under the Penal Code, he cannot be prosecuted and made liable under the Penal Code.

The question is whether the acts committed by the pleaders concerned bring them within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Court of which they are officers under the Legal Practitioners'' Act. In the case of Ex parte Brounsall [1778] 2 Cowper 829 Lord Mansfield said:

This application is not in the nature of a second trial or new punishment. But the question is whether, after the conduct of this man, (i.e., in stealing the guinea) it is proper that he should stand free from all suspicion .............. and it is on this principle that he is an unfit person to practise as an attorney. It is not by way of punishment, but the Courts in such cases exercise their discretion whether a man, whom they have formerly admitted, is a proper person to be continued on the roll or not. Having been convicted we think the defendant is not a fit person to be an attorney.

This point was considered in the case of Abdul Rashid, In re AIR 1924 Lah. 123 where the lawyers concerned were dealt with under the Legal Practitioners'' Act after their conviction u/s 17(1), Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, and also by this Court in the case of In Re: Babu Madahva Singh, Vakil, where the vakil was dealt with under the Legal Practitioners'' Act after his conviction u/s 17(2), Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, although the restriction for enrollment of volunteers was subsequently withdrawn and the act was no longer illegal as in the case of Hari Shankar Das where the notification declaring the Congress Committee to be an unlawful association had been withdrawn. The contention of Mr. Das therefore must be overruled.

It is thus clear that the pleaders in question by the illegal acts committed by them in connexion with the civil disobedience movement which led to their prosecution and conviction and to the preventive action taken by the Magistrate u/s 107, Criminal P.C., have brought themselves under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Court vested u/s 13(f), Legal Practitioners Act, which gives to the Court a very wide discretion as held by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Re Sarvadhikari [1907] 29 All. 95 at p. 45 (of 34 I.A.) and their application for renewal of their certificates must be treated as if it was an application for admission where the Court has to see whether they are proper persons to be officers of the Court and to be trusted with the interest of suitors as observed by Lord Blackburn and Lord Cockburn in In re Hill [1868] 3 Q.B.D. 543.

The fact that the pleaders concerned refused to give an undertaking for future behaviour aggravates the situation and shows that the frame of their minds to disobey the established law of the country which they evinced before their conviction is not altered and that it is merely in abeyance so long as they say the Irwin-Gandhi Pact endures. On being asked by this Court they said that they are bound by the Pact not to disobey the law and they would not do so, but if the Pact is broken they are not sure what they would do. We however as observed by Heaton, J., in the case of Jivanlal Varajarey Dasai [1920] 44 Bom. 418, referred to above need not anticipate that anything worse will follow and we must deal with the cases and the circumstances as they stand at present. The terms of the settlement between the Government and the Congress party called the "Irwin-Gandhi Pact" did not apply to the cases of the pleaders in question but in the spirit of that settlement the Court did not want to take action under the Legal Practitioners Act against them if the Court had been assured that they have altered the frame of their minds so as to be worthy of being officers of the Courts and instead of being the breakers of law they would assist the Courts in the administration of law and justice. Keeping this in view and considering the fact that this was their first offence of which they ware convicted, that in none of the cases any violence was used or was attempted and regard being had to the fact that they had practically been under suspension up to now we think that a warning would be sufficient in the cases of pleaders Dharnidhar Das, Ramcharart Singh, Ramadhin Singh and Hari Shanker Das. With this warning we direct that their certificates be renewed.

Pleader Sarjoo Prasad Singh (M.J.C. 124) was convicted u/s 3, Police Incitement to Disaffection Act (Act 22 1922), of having induced a police constable to withhold his services and deserves to be more severely dealt with. Accordingly we suspend him from practice for three months with effect from today that is, up to 15th November 1931, when the civil Courts will reopen after the long vacation.

I may mention that Mr. P.B. Das has raised a preliminary objection. His contention was that the High Court had no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under the Legal Practitioners Act and to serve notices upon the pleaders to show cause why they should not be dealt with under Sections 12 and 13 of the Act. He said that the pleaders in question were practising in the Courts subordinate to the High Court and were officers of those Courts which alone were competent to take an action against them under the Act and to report to the High Court for orders, He has further urged that the pleaders were not officers of the High Court and the High Court could not initiate proceedings suo motu against them, though of course it is said that the High Court could act under the Letters Patent in respect of advocates of the High Court. The contention of Mr. Das is without any foundation. The High Court is empowered by Section 6, Legal Practitioners Act, to make rules for the qualifications, admission and certificates of proper persons to be pleaders of the Subordinate Courts and upon the admission of every person as a pleader it is under the orders of the High Court that certificates are signed and issued to the pleaders to practise in the Subordinate Courts, and the certificates are renewed by the District Courts under the rules framed by the High Court u/s 7 of the Act. Under Sections 12 and 13 it is the High Court that can suspend or dismiss a pleader, the district and subordinate Courts may report a case to the High Court for final orders of suspension or dismissal as the case may be. Section 13 expressly says that the High Court may suspend or dismiss a pleader after such inquiry as it thinks fit.

It is thus clear that the High Court can suo motu take action for either suspension or dismissal of a pleader or can act upon the report submitted to it by the district and subordinate Courts. There is nothing in the Act to prevent an action being taken by the practitioner being convicted of an offence committed in the course of the civil disobedience movement and of their having refused to give an undertaking not to engage themselves in any political or other activities of a kind subversive of Government as established by law was brought to the notice of the Court by the District Judges concerned and the petitioners in their own petitions to this Court asking to be heard in connexion with the reference made by the District Judges admitted the above facts. The High Court therefore was in possession of the facts and circumstances which appeared to the Court sufficient to take disciplinary action against the pleaders tinder Sections 12 and 13, Legal Practitioners'' Act. Mr. Das said that he had been at some pains to go through every case that had been decided under the Legal Practitioners Act; although he might be wrong he had not discovered any case in which the High Court on its own motion had issued notices. This was obviously under a misapprehension as was at once pointed out to him by the Court that in some of the cases already referred to by Sir Sultan Ahmad notices were directly issued by the High Court on its own motion, though at that time the references could not be given. These cases are Shankar Ganesh Dabir v. Secretary of State AIR 1922 P.C. 351, Second Grade Pleader, Ramchandrapur AIR 1924 Mad. 129 and In re Jivanlal Varajaray Desai [1920] 44 Bom. 418 where action was taken and notices issued by the Judicial Commissioner, Central Provinces, in the first case and the High Court of Madras in the second case and the High Court of Bombay in the third case at their own instance when the conduct of the pleaders concerned came to their knowledge during the course of hearing of matters relating to their convictions. The contention of Mr. Das is overruled.

Mr. Das further said that the action taken by the High Court has caused considerable embarrassment to his clients and he complained of there being no charge framed against them and no evidence taken, which was essential for an action u/s 13 of the Act, under which it is not enough to prove the mere conviction of a legal practitioner. Now, the notices served upon the pleaders in this case are similar in their terms to those issued by the High Courts in similar circumstances in the cases referred to above and notably in the case of In Re: Babu Madahva Singh, Vakil, The facts have been clearly stated in the judgments of the criminal Courts which were admitted by the pleaders in the various petitions filed by them in the District Courts and in this Court and they were also admitted on questions being put to them by this Court. They have offered no explanation with respect to their conduct proved by the judgments and admitted by them. They simply question the jurisdiction of the Court and the propriety of the proceedings under the Legal Practitioners'' Act. It must be remembered as held in the cases already referred to, that disciplinary proceedings under the Act are neither criminal nor civil and the Court has inherent power to apply such rules of procedure as may ensure a fair trial of the matter requiring adjudication. What is essential is that the party should have proper notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard. Far from complaining of any reasonable opportunity being given to them, the pleaders were themselves anxious to have their cases heard and disposed of immediately and they were indignant to a postponement of their cases. We have acted merely upon the facts disclosed in the judgment of the oases and the facts admitted by the pleaders. They distinctly said that they had no explanation to give or evidence to offer. There is no substance in the contention of Mr. Das and it is accordingly overruled.

Now as to the case of pleader Ram Gobind Sinha Verma (M.J.C. 120), upon whom no notice under Sections 12 and 13, Legal Practitioners Act, was issued. The pleader was prosecuted u/s 17 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1908, but the case against him was withdrawn under the terms of the amnesty. He applied for renewal of his certificate and the District Judge asked him to sign an undertaking thus ho would not engage in any movement subversive of the Government as constituted. He refused to give the said undertaking and applied to the District Judge for renewal of his certificate u/s 7, Legal Practitioners Act without such condition. The District Judge has sent his application to this Court, and the pleader has applied that he may be heard in the matter. We have accordingly heard the learned advocate appearing on his behalf and have considered the circumstances of the case. The District Judge does not give any opinion of his and has forwarded a copy of the opinion of the District Magistrate who says that the petitioner was not concerned in any offence involving violence or moral turpitude. In the circumstances we do not think any action under the Legal Practitioners Act is necessary against him and therefore direct that his certificate may be renewed.

It must be recognized however that the Court takes a very severe view of the matter and a repetition of an improper conduct of the pleaders concerned would be severely dealt with. The words of Coutts-Trotter, J., in the Madras case of the Second Grade Pleader, Ramchandrapur AIR 1924 Mad. 129 might with advantage be referred to:

I want to make it as clear as I can, that speaking for myself, the last thing that I think that we should consider ourselves concerned with in the ordinary way is what the political opinions of anybody are, whether they are members of the legal or any other professions. But while the Courts will always uphold the liberty of the subject in thought or speech an applicant who comes to ask for the issue or renewal of a sanad is applying to be treated as a part of the machinery for the maintenance of law and order in the body politic and to take an active part in administering for the other subjects of the Crown the benefits that may be supposed to result from the upkeep of law and order. It is intolerable and illogical that a man should seek that law and order should be disobeyed, that taxes are not to be paid and that all public offices are to be abandoned in order to paralyze the very life of the body politic, apart altogether from any other views he may entertain as to the desirability of the personal or particular members of the Government he attacks or the particular character of the transaction carried on in these Courts. With these matters I have nothing to do. But I feel assured that this Court could not without stultifying itself issue a certificate to a man who with the same breath that he is asking for it, cuts himself off and announces his intention to do his best to cut off others from the life of the State.

We hope that the observations made above will have a wholesome effect upon all the pleaders concerned.

Let the certificates of all the pleaders except that of Sarjoo Prasad Singh be renewed at once.

Wort, J.

I agree.

Kulwant Sahay, J.

I agree.

Fazl Ali, J.

I agree.

James, J.

I agree.