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B. M. Lal, J.—Instant writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the LUCKNOW of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad for issuance of an order, direction or writ in the nature of Certiorari quashing the advertisement, corrigendum, notification and orders contained in Annexures 1 to 11 to the writ petition and further for issuance of an order, direction or writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the opposite parties not to interfere in running of following six sugar factories ;
I. The Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. Sathiaon, District Azamgarh.
The Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. Rasra, District Ballia.
The Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. Satna, District Aligarh.
The Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. Aurai, Bhadohi.
The Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd, Jewar, District Bulandshahar.
The Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. Sttltanpur.
At the hearing of this petition we indicated to Sri Umesh Chandra, former Advocate General and learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of petitioners that this Court would confine it to the preliminary point as to whether cognizance of this petition in respect of 5 sugar mills located outside the Oudh area, can be taken by the LUCKNOW of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad or the papers be transmitted to the main seat of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.
The actual controversy involved in this petition to be decided by this Court, which will also govern the fate of several other similarly circumstanced petitions pending in the LUCKNOW, centres round the basic question as to whether on the face of the provisions of 1st Proviso to Clause 14 of the United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948,(for short, the Amalgamation Order), notwithstanding express exclusion of the provisions of Civil Procedure Code (including the pro�visions of Sections 15 to 20 CPC) by the Civil Procedure Code Amending Act, 1976, (adding Explanation to Section 141 CPC) with effect from 121977, to the writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, after the Apex Court''s pronouncement in Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal (AIR 1976 SC 331) on 29875, applying the theory of partial cause of action ; Luckcow Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad has any jurisdiction to take cognizance in respect of the 5 sugar mills situated outside Oudh area?
At the very outset it is relevant to mention that in the instant case the actual lis partains to the State Government''s decision to sell aforesaid six mills to private sector. Naturally the sale, if finalised, will be given effect at the places where the mills are situated. Out of aforesaid six mills, five mills (shown at sl nos. 1 to 5 above) are situated outside the Oudh area being located at the districts Azamgarh, Ballia, Aligarh Bulandshahar and Bhadohi. Only one mill (shown at sl. no. 6 above) is situated in Oudh area being located at Sultanpur district. Here we may observe that LUCKNOW of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad has jurisdictionto take cognizance, entertain and decide the writ petition in respect of the sugar mill shown at sl. no. 6 above, namely the Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. Sultanpur but on the same analogy, in respect of other five sugar mills which are situated outside Oudh area, whether the LUCKNOW of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad has jurisdiction to take cognizance, entertain and decide the writ petition is to be decided in the instant petition
The capital of Uttar Pradesh being located at Lucknow most of the appellate and revisional forums are also located at Lucknow, therefore, apart from governmental functions, orders, notifications and enactments issued in exercise of sovereign powers of State, so many appellate and revisional orders are also passed at Lucknow even in respect of districts outside the Oudh area. Thus whether the dictum laid down in Nasiruddin''s case (supra) (vide paras 36 to 38 applying the theory of cause of action) which was pronounced on 29875, giving discretion to the litigant to exercise the right of dominus litis, would still prevail in respect of cause of action in writ jurisdiction whereas good deal of water has flowed under the bridges since then and CPC Amending Act, 1976, particularly its Sections 46 and 47 has come into force with effect from 121977 adding explanation to Section 141 CPC and whether in the instant case the litigant can choose its forum to institute the petition at LUCKNOW or main seat of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in respect of the sugar mills which are admittedly situated outside the Oudh area, ignoring the 1st Proviso of Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order in terms of the maxim ''GENERALIA SPECIALIBUS NON DEROGANT'' which means general things do not derogate from special.
Dealing with the controversy in issue, for the brevity of the case it is necessary to give in brief the history of U. P. State and High Court of Judicature at Allahabad including the Oudh Court, so as to make it clear that Lucknow continues to be capital of Uttar Pradesh since much prior to the Amalgamation Order, therefore, in this perspective it has to be considered as to whether mere issuance of any order, notification, enactment from Lucknow by the State of U. P. in discharge of its sovereign functions or by the revisional and appellate forums located at Lucknow, in respect of cases arising outside Oudh area, is sufficient basis to attract jurisdiction of the LUCKNOW.
In the instant case, only the notification in respect of 5 sugar mills which are admittedly located outside the Oudh area, has been issued from Lucknow as the capital of Uttar "Pradesh is located there.
Our Temple of Justice was consecrated in 1866 under a Royal Charter issued by the Queen Victoria, the British Sovereign, wilh the nomenclature High Court of Judicature for the North Western Provinces at Agra under Letters Patent of the 17th March, 1866. The day was 8th June, 1866, marking the birth of our Court. On that historic day six Judgesthe entire complement of the Courtquietly walked in, took their seats and began the day''s work as if totally oblivious of the great transition from the Sudder Diwanny Adawalat and Sadar Nazamat Adawalat to a High Court. The Indian High Courts Act 1861. enacted by the British Parliament, gave to the Crown the authority to establish High Courts at Calcutta, Madras, Bombay and at one other place. In the year 1868, High Court was shifted from Agra to Allahabad and later came to be known as High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
In 1834, the Upper Provinces were separated from the Bengal Presidency to be governed by the newly constituted Agra Presidency with its headquarters at Allahabad Fort, but in 1836 the Presidency was supreseded by a Lt. Governorship of the NorthWestern Provinces with headquarters at Agra. In 1858 the headquarters of the Government were again shifted to Allahabad.
Avadh, after its annexation in 1856, had been placed under a Chief Commissioner but in 1877 it also came under the jurisdiction of the Lt. Governor and the whole territory was named as ''NorthWestern Provinces and Avadh''. This area was named as ''United Provinces of Agra and Avadh'' in 1902. In 1921, after the implementation of India Constitutional Reforms, the area came under the jurisdiction of a Governor. A Legislative Council was formed at Lucknow in 1921 and after the elections of 1920 and the seat of the Government was shifted from Allahabad to Lucknow in the same year. The shifting of the Secretariat from Allahabad to Lucknow was complete by 1935 making Lucknow the capital of the State. The Province was named ''United Provinces'' in 1937 and subsequently from 26 January, 1950, its name has been changed to ''Uttar Pradesh''. (See, A Guide to the Records in the U. P. State Archives. Pages 6 & 7).
In 1834, Allahabad was made the seat of Government of the NorthWestern Province.
In February 1858, Lord Cannin announced the formation of the whole of the North Western Provinces into a lieutenant Governor''s Pro�vince retransferring the seat of Government from Agra to Allahabad, however, the retransfer of the High Court followed in the year 1868. (See, The Journal of the Allahabad Historical Society, Allahabad, July. 1962, Annual number. Vol. 1, page 56).
Beginning with the formation of Legislative Council at Lucknow in the year 1921, subsequently most of the important government offices, including the secretariat and the legislative wings, were transferred to Lucknow.
(See, Gazetteer of India, U. P.)
On 7th February, 1856, Oudh comprising 12 districts namely: Lucknow, Faizabad, Sultanpur, Rae Bareli, Pratapgarh, Barabauki, Gonda, Bahraich Sitapur, Kheri, Hardoi, Unnao, was annexed to the British Empire. Annexation of 1856, brought the British system of administration of justice with some flexibility and the highest court of appeal, the Judicial Commissioner''s Court was established at Lucknow under the Government of India Order dated February 4, 1856.
By the Oudh Civil Courts Act 1879, the Judicial Commissioner was constituted the head of the judiciary. In the year 1901, United Provinces of Agra and Oudh was created. The judicial administration in the two regions of the provinces, however, continued to remain separate. Subsequently the Oudh Civil Courts Act, 1879 was repealed by the Oudh Courts Act, 1925 and the Court of Judicial Commissioner was replaced by the Oudh Chief Court with jurisdiction extending over the same area.
(See, Chapter I, Clause 1(2) of Oudh Courts Act, 1925.)
The two judicial administrations wielded jurisdiction over the two separate regions of the United Provinces for many years. Though the capital of the United Provinces continued at Lucknow since the year 1921 yet the Chief Court in Oudh used to exercise its jurisdiction only in respect of Oudh area.
Ultimately both Chambers of the Legislature of the United Provinces presented addresses to the Governor to amalgamate the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and the Chief Court in Oudh and the said addresses were submitted to the GovernorGeneral, who in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 229 of the Government of India Act 1935, and all other powers enabling him in that behalf promulgated the Amalgamation Order, 1948 whereby the High Court in Allahabad and the Chief Court in Oudh have been amalgamated and since then they constitute one High Court by the name of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.
Subclause (1) of Clause 5 of the Amalgamation Order provides that the person, who immediately before the appointed day, is the Chief Justice of the High Court in Allahabad shall be the Chief Justice of the new High Court.
Subclause (1) of Clause 7 of the Amalgamation Order provides that the new High Court shall have, in respect of the whole of the United Provinces, all such original, appellate and other jurisdiction as, under the law in force immediately before the appointed day, is exercisable in res�pect of any part of that Province by either of the existing High Courts.
Subclause (2) of Clause 7 of the Amalgamation Order provides that the new High Court shall also have in respect of any area outside the United Provinces all such original, appellate and other jurisdiction as under the law in force immediately before the appointed day is exercisable in respect of that area by the High Court in Allahabad.
It is pertinent to mention here that a bare perusal of above refer�red provisions of Clause 7 of the Amalgamation Order makes it manifest that under subclause (1) of Clause 7 all powers and jurisdictions in res�pect of whole of the United Provinces exercisable by both the High Courts immediately before the appointed day, have been saved and vested in the New High Court and under subclause (2) of Clause 7 all powers and jurisdictions in respect of any area outside the United Provinces exercisable by the Allahabad High Court (not by the Chief Court ia Oudh) immediately before the appointed day have been saved and vested in the new High Court.
Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order reads as under :
"The new High Court, and the judges and division courts thereof, shall sit at Allahabad or at such other places in the United Provinces as the Chief Justice may, with the approval of the Governor of the United Provinces, appoint :
''provided that unless the Governor of the United Provinces with the concurrence of the Chief Justice, otherwise directs, such judges of the new High Court, not less than two in number, as the Chief Justice, may, from time to time nominate, shall sit at Lucknow in order to exercise in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh, as the Chief Justice may direct, the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in the new High Court. Provided further that the Chief Justice may in his discretion order that any case or class of cases arising in the said areas shall be heard at Allahabad."
Thus the preliminary point referred above, depends upon the interpretation of the expression "shall sit at Lucknow in order to exercise in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh" used in the 1st Proviso to Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order.
Clause 2 of the Amalgamation Order provides that ''The Interpreta�tion Act 1889'' applies for the interpretation of this Amalgamation Order as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of Parliament.
Section 32 of the Interpretation Act, 1889, (dealing with the provisions as to exercise of powers and duties) provides that where an Act passed after the commencement of Interpretation Act confers a power or imposes a duty, then, unless the contrary intention appears, the power may be exercised and the duty shall be performed from time to time as occasion requires.
Here in the instant case, the Ist Proviso to Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order confers a power and imposes a duty on the judges of this Court to sit at Lucknow (If and when nominated by the Chief Justice) in order to exercise the jurisdiction of this Court in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh. The only intention which appears to be for insert�ing the first proviso is that the Judges shall sit at Lucknow in order to exercise in respect of cases arising in the Oudh area alone. There does not appear any contrary intention. Therefore, the Judges must exercise the power and perform the duty only in respect of Oudh area and not out�side the Oudh area.
The Oudh area has been determined and demarcated by the Chief Justice in exercise of powers conferred by the Ist Proviso to Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order and the Oudh area is comprised of 12 districts mentioned above. There is no dispute or doubt in this regard.
The elementary rule of interpretation is that when the question arises as to the meaning of a certain provision in a statute, the intention of the legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole, and what precedes and what succeeds and not merely at the clause itself. In the words of Chinappa Reddy, J :
"Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted."
(See Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Invest'' ment Co. AIR 1987 SC 1023) & (Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G. P. Singh, former Chief Justice M. P. High Court at page 11.
In the instant case the text which requires interpretation is ''shall sit at Lucknow in order to exercise in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh''. The context in whtch this text has been used is that the two different High Courts have been amalgamated by the Amalgamation Order. Prior to amalgamation both the High Courts were exercising jurisdictions within their respective territories and the Judges of both the High Courts were sitting at two different places within their respective territories but after the amalgamation both the High Courts constitute one High Court i. e. the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and the terri�tories of both the High Courts constitute the territory of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. In this context Clause 14 provides that from the appointed day the Judges of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad shall sit at Allahabad or at such other places as the Chief Justice may appoint with the approval of the Governor and in this context Ist Proviso to Clause 14 uses the expression ''shall sit at Lucknow in order to exercise in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh''. Thus in this context if entire provision of Clause 14 is read together, the true intent ingrained in expression appears to be that the Judges shall sit at Lucknow in order to exercise power and jurisdiction vested in the High Court in respect of cases pertaining to Oudh area alone and not pertaining to the area outside the Oudh area. By no stretch of imagination, it can be assumed that the Judges while sitting at Lucknow can exercise power and jurisdiction in respect of any area outside the Oudh area.
The above interpretation further stands fortified by the following statement of Lord Halsbury :
"The subjectmatter with which the legislature was dealing, and the facts existing at the time with respect to which the legislature was legislating are legitimate topics to consider in ascertain�ing what was the object and purpose of the legislature in passing the Act,"
"See Herrvn v. Rathmines and Rathgar Improvement Commissioner (1892) AC 498 (HL) P. 502 ; referred to in Herrietta Muir Edwards v. AG of Canada, AIR 1930 PC 12C, P. 125).
In the instant case the fact existing at the time of amalgamation was that in respect of Oudh area, the jurisdiction of High Court was being exercised by the Chief Court in Oudh. The Chief Court in Oudh was not exercising any jurisdiction in respect of any area outside the Oudh area whereas even at that time the capital was located at Lucknow (situated within Oudh area) and entire governmental functions were being discharged from Lucknow and sovereign powers of State Government were being exer�cised from Lucknow as are being exercised today. Despite that, Chief Court in Oudh sitting at Lucknow was not having any jurisdiction in res�pect of areas outside the Oudh area. In the Amalgamation Order there is no whisper to enlarge of enhance the field of territorial jurisdiction of LUCKNOW.
For the purposes of interpreting the provisions of first proviso to Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order, following words of Hon''ble Kapur, J. (in CIT Mysore etc. v. Indo Mercantile Bank Ltd. AIR 1959 SC 713 at p. 717) are also quite helpful :
"The proper function of a proviso is that it qualifies the generality of the main enactment by providing an exception and taking out as it were, from the main enactment, a portion which, but for the proviso would fall within the main enactment. Ordinarily it is foreign to the proper function of proviso to read it as providing something by way of an addendum or dealing with a subject which is foreign to the main enact�ment."
Normally a proviso does not travel beyond the provision to which it is a proviso. It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular provision of a statute only embraces the field which is covered by the main provision. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as proviso and to no other.
(See Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax AIR 1955 SC 765 at p. 769).
Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order mainly deals with the place of sitting of Judges of the New High Court. The main provision of Clause 14 provides that the Judges and division Courts of new High Court shall sit at Allahabad or at such other places as the Chief Justice may appoint with the approval of Governor. This main provision is controlled by the first proviso added to it which provides that in case with the con�currence of Chief Justice the Governor does not direct otherwise at least two Judges nominated by the Chief Justice shall sit at Lucknow. Such Judges shall sit at Lucknow in order to exercise jurisdiction & power vested in the High Court in respect of cases arising in Oudh area. Thus it is the first proviso which makes Lucknow a place of sitting for the purpose of exercise of jurisdiction & power vested in the High Court in respect of a limited area and that is Oudh Area. Therefore, while sitting at Lucknow the exercise of jurisdiction is confined to Oudh area alone and not beyond that. Thus the first proviso restricts the exercise of jurisdiction in respect of cases pertaining to Oudh area, and makes the exercise of power depen�dent on the place of sitting.
Clause 7 of the Amalgamation Order confers jurisdiction on the new High Court. The jurisdiction is conferred on the High Court and not on the Judges. The Judges exercise the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court. The first proviso to Clause 14 imposes reasonable restriction on the exercise of jurisdiction while sitting at Lucknow. The theory of cause of action in view of the provisions of subclause(2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India comes into play where the question pertains to the territorial jurisdiction of two different High Courts. That is not the position here. Here the case is well within the territorial jurisdiction of new High Court. The only question is whether the jurisdiction can be exercised in respect of cases pertaining to districts outside the Oudh area while sitting at Allahabad or while sitting at Lucknow. Therefore, the theory of cause of action referred to above is absolutely eliminated in the present situation and in our considered opinion according to the true intent embodied in the first proviso Clause 14, the exercise of juri�sdiction while sitting at Lucknow is confined to Oudh area and is not extended beyond the Oudh area.
The rule of context permits reference to other statutes in pari materia. As stated above the expression ''cases arising in such areas'' used in the first proviso to Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order is pari materia to the similar expression used by Hon''ble The President of India ia the notificatiors issued under subsection (2) of Section 51 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. Hon''ble The President of India used this expression while assigning work to the respective Benches of various High Courts in respect of cases arising in the revenue districts and in almost all notifications revenue districts have been mentioned.
In Ram Rakh Vyas v. Union of India (AIR 1977 Rajasthan 248) a division Bench of Rajasthan High Court (the judgment delivered by Hon''ble Mr. Justice A. P. Sen, a distinguished Judge of that Court as he then was, lateron elevated to the Supreme Court) dealing with the same issue particularly interpreting the expression ''arising in the district of ruled in para 31 of the judgment as follows :
"The words ''arising in'' must, in the context, mean ''pertaining to the districts of or ''arising from''. Any other meaning given to these words would result in a construction reductio ad absurdum. If a provision in a remidial statute is reasonably capable of two constructions, that construction should be preferred which furthers the policy of the Act and is more beneficial to those in whose interest the Act may have been passed."
In the aforesaid case, the short controversy was that Hon''ble the President of India in exercise of the powers conferred by State ReOrgani�sation Act, 1956, established permanent Bench of Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur vide notification dated 81276. In that notification territorial jurisdiction of Jaipur Bench was demarcated by using the expression''in respect of cases arising in the districts'' and further a list of the districts had been mentioned, i.e. Ajmer, Alwar, Bharatpur, Bundi, Jaipur, Jhalawar, Jhunjhun, Kotash, Sawai Madhopur, Sikar and Tonk. In this notification too the provisions akin to the provisions of second proviso to Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order have been made to the effect that the Chief Justice of that High Court may, in his discretion, order that any case or class of cases arising in any such district shall be heard at Jodhpur.
Jodhpur is the main seat of Rajasthan High Court. The contro�versy involved in that case was the same as is involved in the instant case, i e. between the main seat at Jodhpur and its Bench at Jaipur.
Thus in the similar background Rajasthan High Court interpreted the words ''arising in the districts of to mean ''pertaining to the districts of or ''arising from'' and held that the cases pertaining to the districts Ajmer etc. referred above are to be heard at Jaipur Bench and the cases pertaining to the districts a located for the main seat are to be heard at Jodhpur. In that case too, Nasiruddin''s case (supra) was taken into consideration in para 35 of the judgment and the opinion expressed in that regard was that Nasiruddin''s case was distinguishable,
In that case Rajasthan High Court further ruled that :
"The pecuniary interest as an Advocate, if any, cannot override the larger interest of the general public for whose benefit the permanent Bench at Jaipur has been created."
Meaning thereby, the Benches are being created to facilitate the litigant public and not the Advocates, therefore, if jurisdiction of the main seat or the Benches is demarcated by districts or by using the expression ''cases arising out of certain districts'', the main seat or the Benches of High Court get territorial jurisdiction accordingly on the line of demarcation.
In the instant case, as stated above, Lucknow continues to be capital of Uttar Pradesh since much prior to the Amalgamation Order and before the amalgamation two parallel High Courts were running, one at Allahabad and the other at Lucknow. Though the capital was located at Lucknow within the area of territorial jurisdiction of the Chief Court in Oudh and governmental functions in discharge of sovereign powers were being performed at Lucknow even with regard to the districts outside the Oudh area, yet the Chief Court in Oudh was having no jurisdiction with regard to the districts outside the Oudh area despite the fact that partly cause of action used to arise within the Oudh area. The territorial jurisdiction of the Chief Court in Oudh was demarcated and confined to 12 districts referred above by the Act of 1925 and with regard to the same territorial jurisdiction, the Judges are required to sit at Lucknow after the Amalgama�tion Order came into force. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that while sitting at Lucknow, the Judges can exercise jurisdiction beyond the 12 dis�tricts. Mere issuance of any order, notification or enactment from Lucknow will not confer any special jurisdiction on the Judges sitting at Lucknow to take cognizance in the cases pertaining to the districts outside the Oudh area.
It may also be mentioned here that in exercise of powers urder Section 51(3) of the State Reorganisation Act, the Chief Justice of Bombay High Court had issued a notification creating a Bench of the High Court at Aurangabad and territorial jurisdiction of the following revenue districts was attached to the Bench at Aurangabad with effect from 4th May, 1982 though prior to that these districts were attached to the main seat of the High Court at Bombay, The districts attached to the Bench at Auranga�bad are :
Aurangabad.
Bhir.
Jalana.
Nandar.
Usmanabad.
Palani.
The aforesaid notification was challenged and ultimately decided by the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Narain Shamrao Puranik 1982(3) SCC 519.
In para 21 of the judgment, the Apex Court ruled that constitu�tional structure of a High Court depends upon the statute creating it. It was further ruled that the matters arising out of Marathwada region i. e. the districts referred to above for which the Aurangabad Bench was estab�lished, Aurangabad Bench will have the jurisdiction in respect of those districts of Marathwada region from where the cases arise. Here it will not be out of place to state that after State Reorganisation Act, 1956, the Bombay High Court is having three Benches. The bilingual State of Bom�bay was bifurcated into two separate States i. e. State of Maharashtra and State of Gujarat Bombay High Court is having three Benches which are located at Nagpur, Aurangabad and Panji at Goa, and these respective Benches are functioning and entertaining cases only arising out of the districts attached to the respective Benches irrespective of the fact that in exercise of sovereign powers any order is passed at Bombay by the Govern�ment of Maharashtra State by virtue of its capital being located at Bombay. The petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are being filed and entertained by tbe respective Benches or the main seat according to the districts attached to the respective Benches and the main seat irrespective of the fact that the order or notification is issued from Bombay where the capital is located.
As stated above, the reorganisation of the States which has taken place in the year 1956 has also affected the existing High Courts resulting into establishment of various Benches of various High Courts i. e. in the State of Bihar Ranchi Bench was formed, in the State of Madhya Pradesh Gwaliar & Indore Benches were formed, in the State of Rajasthan main seat was at Jodhpur and Jaipur Bench was formed and in the State of Maha�rashtra, Aurangabad Bench was formed wherein existing territorial juris�diction of Marathwara was included and Nagpur Bench was formed wherein existing territorial jurisdiction of Vidarbha was included. In all the notifications issued under subclause 2 of Section 51 of the States Re�organisation Act 1956 issued by Hon''ble President of India in consultation with the Governor and the Chief Justice of the State concerned, similar expression ''cases arising in the districts of has been used and the Benches and main seats of those High Courts are entertaining the cases according to the districts attached to the Benches and Main seat irrespective of the facts that the orders are passed and notifications issued from the places where the capitals of the respective States are located.
In this regard, it is significant to give true meaning of the terms ''arise'' and ''accrue'' so as to make the position crystal clear. The terms ''arise'' and ''accrue'' are not synonymous, ''arise'' being used in the sense ''to begin'', ''mount'', ''appear'', ''happen'', ''proceed'', ''from exist'' and accrue signifies result, acquire, receive benefit. The word ''arise'' has been held synonymous to the word ''originate''s therefore, if any enactment, notifi�cation or order is made pertaining to the district outside territorial limits of Oudh area, it would mean that the cafe ''originates''from that parti�cular district where the affected party resides or immovable property is situate, and thus the dispute ''originates'' where the person concerned reside or the property is located and not where the capital of the State is located or from where the notifications, orders or enactments etc. etc, are passed or issued in discharge of sovereign functions of the State by virtue of location of the capital there.
(See Words & Phrases, Permanent Edition4 page9 and Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 6 page525)
Dealing with the submission of Sri Umesh Chandra, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners introducing the theory of ''cause of action'' that even if the cause of action arises in any part of the State of Uttar Pradesh but if it gives partial cause of action within the Oudh area, it becomes the choice of the litigant to file his petition under Article 226 of the Constitution either at the main seat of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad or at the LUCKNOW of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad as the litigant acquires the position of dominus litis and accordingly if he files his petition at the LUCKNOW of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad the same can neither be transmitted to Allahabad nor can be returned for presentation before the main seat at Allahabad rather the same is to be decided at Lucknow on merits, although the lis may be pertaining to the districts outside the Oudh area.
With reference to the case in hand, it is contended that since the notification was issued at Lucknow for inviting tenders in respect of all the six sugar factories, out of which five sugar factories are admittedly located outside the Oudh area, hence partly cause of action arose at Lucknow which is admittedly located within the Oudh area, therefore, the petition can be entertained and decided by the LUCKNOW.
51, Indeed, the argument advanced by Sri Umesh Chandra is ingenious one, but we are afraid that the theory of cause of action propounded in the Code of Civil Procedure under the provisions of Sections 15 to 20 which deal with whole or partial cause of action, has any application to the writ proceedings.
The rule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory enactment i. e. the Code of Civil Procedure. Before 121977 there was a divergence of judicial opinion on the question whether the provisions of CPC apply MUTATIS MUTANDIS to writ proceedings by virtue of Section 141 CPC. According to one view Section 141 CPC was directly attracted to an application under Article 226 of the Constitution but according to other view the provisions of CPC do not govern in terms the writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, This divergency was finally set at rest by CPC Amendment Act, 1976 whereby following explanation has been added to Section 141 which has come into force with effect from 121977.
"Explanation :In this section, the expression ''proceedings'' include proceedings under Order IX, but does not include any procee�ding under Article 226 of the Constitution."
Thus after the amendment, the settled position is that the provi�sions of CPC do not apply MUTATIS MUTANDIS to writ proceedings. Thus the theory of cause of action introduced by Sri Umesh Chandra, learned senior counsel to the writ proceedings has now no legs to stand after the amendment in the CPC referred to above. In this regard, the dictum laid down in the Nasiruddin''s case (supra) is also of no avail to the petitioners as aforesaid amendment came into force with effect from 121977 whereas the judgment in Nasiruddin''s case was pronounced on 29875.
No doubt, by the 15th Amendment Act, 1963 jurisdiction has been conferred on the High Courts to entertain a petition under Article 226 against the Union of India or any other body or authority located in Delhi if the cause of action has arisen, wholly or in part, within its jurisdiction, by inserting Clause A which was later renumbered as clause (2) of Article 226.
(See para 10 of Oil & Natural Commission V. Utpal Kumar Basu & Ohers J.T. 1994(5) SC 1).
On a plain reading of clause 2 of Article 226 of the Constitution it becomes clear that the High Court can exercise the power if the cause of action wholly or in part, arisen within the territory in relation to which it exercise jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority is not within the said territories. Meaning thereby if there is dispute regarding territorial jurisdiction of two High Courts, certainly it can be resolved on the basis of cause of action in view of the provisions of subclause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Illustratively, if main seat of the authority against whom writ is to be issued, is located at Delhi and the cause of action arises partly at Delhi and partly at Lucknow, certainly in that situation the litigant will be in the position of dominus litis to choose the forum either at Delhi or at Lucknow and the cause of action in view of the provisions of subclanse (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India would be determining foctor. But that is not the position here. Here, admittedly cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction but the only dispute is whether with regard to the districts situated outside the Oudh area the jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is exercisable while sitting at Lucknow. For resolving this difficulty, the theory of cause of action does not come into play rather the same is to be resolved on the basis of demarcation and determination of Oudh area which has been done by Hon''ble the Chief Justice in exercise of the powers conferred by first pro�viso to Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order whereby only 12 districts have been attached to the Oudh area in relation to which the jurisdiction of High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is exercbable by the LUCKNOW of this Court.
In a recent pronouncement in Navo Vidhvalav v. Bhupendra Kaur and others (Judgments Today 1988(2) SC 236) the apex court ruled that by virtue of explanation added to Section 141 of the Civil Prccedure Code, the provisions of Civil Procedure Code are inapplicable to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Thus in the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, which are of special & extra ordinary jurisdiction, by virtue of explanation added to Section 141 CPC the applicability of the Civil Procedure Code has been excluded and as a necessary corollary application of Sections 15 to 20 CPC and thereby theory of cause of action have been excluded.
(See also Umesh Chandra Vinod Kumar & others Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Bharthana, Etawah & others (1993 UPLB & EC 765 FB), (AIR 1977 Andhra Pradesh 250).
The theory of cause of action can be viewed from another angle, also. The law is a special law if it applies to a limited contingency, locality or person and not to all. If it affects all, it ceases to have the character of special law and becomes the general law.
The theory of ''cause of action'' originates from the Code of Civil Procedure which is of general character and is therefore, a general law. In the present case, the theory of ''exercise of jurisdiction revolving on the place of sitting'' originates from the amalgamation Order 1948 which is of special character and is therefore in the shape of special law. It applies to a limited contingency i. e. where the case falls within the territorial jurisdiction of one High Court and the Judges sit at two places in order to exercise jurisdiction of the High Court.
Thus where the controversy pertains to the territorial jurisdiction of two different High Courts, certainly the theory of ''cause ot action in the shape of subclause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India comes into play with full force but where the controversy pertains to the exercise of jurisdiction of one High Court as in the present case, theory of ''exercise of jurisdiction revolving on the place of sitting'' comes into play.
Both the theories have got different fields to operate but at the appropriate occasions, the theory having characteristic of special law will have overriding effect in preference to the theory having characte�ristic of general law, is the well settled position of law.
To be more specific it may be made clear that in the instant case there is no dispute pertaining to territorial jurisdiction of two High Courts rather the dispute is pertaining to exercise of jurisdiction while sitting at Lucknow, therefore, the provisions of subclause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India or the theory of cause of action is not attracted. To resolve the controversy involved in the instant case as to whether the Judges sitting at Lucknow can take cognizance in the cases pertaining to the districts outside the Oudh area the theory of''exercise of jurisdiction revolving on the place of sitting'' originated from the Amalgamation Order is attracted with full force and applying this theory the irresistible conclu�sion in the considered opinion of this Courtis that the Judges sitting at Lucknow cannot exercise jurisdiction of the High Court and cannot take cognizance in the cases arising out of the districts which are situated out�side the Oudh area.
Here it goes within saying that the Amalgamation Order is a self contained Code for the purpose it has been promulgated ard is in the nature of special law and where ccnmon law, rights as well as special lew rights, both are existing and in force in such a situation notwithstanding any express provision in the common law excluding special law rights, by neces�sary implication, the common law rights are excluded and the special law rights are to prevail oven the common law rights.
In Ratan Lal Adukia & another v. Union of India (AIR 1990 SC 101) where Their Lordships while construing the provisions of Sec�tion 80 of the Railway Act, held that Section 80 of the Railway Act, 1961 provides forum where the suit for compensation for the loss of life or per�sonal injury to the passagers or for the loss, destruction, damage or non�delivery of goods against Railway administration may be brought. It was further held that, the said section was a special provision and selfcontained code and it impliedly repelled in respect of suits covered by it, the general provisions of Section 20 of Civil Procedure Code. 1908. Thus, where the matter is covered by the special law, it byepasses the provisions of general law. (See also Municipal Board, Sareilly v. Bharat Oil Co. AIR 199O SC 548.
In this regard the maxim ''GENERALIA SPECIALIBUS NON DEROGANT which means general things do not derogate from special, cannot be lost sight of.
Sri Umesh Chandra, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, giving much emphasis contended that even in the cases arisen in the districts which are situated outside the Oudh area if revisional or appellate orders passed by the revisional or appellate forums located at Lucknow or representations made to such authorities located at Lucknow are challenged, it shall be the discretion of litigant to file such case either at Allahabad or at Lucknow as partly cause of action arose at Lucknow.
In this regard suffice it to say that mere location of revisional orappellate forum at Lucknow is not a sufficient basis for the exercise of jurisdiction. Further the appeal or revision is nothing but a process in continuation to original proceeding therefore, such will be the cases arising out of an area where the lis originally commences. As stated above, with the commencement of Explanation added to Section 141 CPC with effect from 121977, since the application of the provisions of CPC including Sections 15 to 20 CPC have been excluded in the writ pro�ceedings hence assuming partly cause of action arose at Lucknow by virtue of revisional or appellate forums being located at Lucknow, such cases will not be deemed to have arisen in Oudh area rather will be deemed to have arisen in the districts where the lis originated. Thus the submissions made by Sri Umesh Chandra in this regard have no legs to stand after 121977 and the aid taken by Sri Chandra from Nasiruddin''s case (supra) is otiose and is of no avail to the petitioners.
The Privy Council also had an occasion to deal with a similar situation in Ryots & Garabandhoi and other villages v. Zamindar of Pariakimdi and other (AIR 1943 PC 164) wherein their lordships of Privy Council considered, in the peculiar situation they were dealing with, that the mere location of the appellate authority alone in the Town of Madras was not a sufficient basis for the exercise of jurisdiction whereas both the subject matter, viz, the settlement of rent for lands in Ganjam, and the Revenue Officer authorised to make the settlement at first instance were outside the local limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court.
This view of Privy Council has been relied upon by Hon''ble Patanjali Shastri C J. in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Rao (AIR 1953 SC 210) wherein it has been held by the apex Court that the rule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory enactment and cannot apply to writs issuable under Article 226.
Both the above cases have been taken into consideration by the apex Court in the recent pronouncement in Oil & Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu & others(iT 1994 (5)SC 1) wherein by necessary implication their lordships of apex Court have approved exclusion of the provisions of CPC in the writ proceedings.
This aspect of the matter also cannot be lost sight of that in the changing society the Government is emerging as the biggest litigant and most of the revisional and appellate forums are being located at the place where the capital is located therefore, in this background if the submission made by Sri Umesh Chandra emphasising on the theory of partial cause of action, are accepted the whole purpose of creating Benches will be geopardised and it will become impossible to extend benefit of Benches to those for whom the Benches have been created.
Here we may point out that it is not that after coming into force of the Amalgamation Order, Lucknow became the capital of Uttar Pradesh. As is evident from the historical background given above, Lucknow is capital of Uttar Pradesh since much prior to the Amalgamation Order. Before the Amalgamation Order too, the Chief Court in Oudh was not having any jurisdiction with regard to the districts outside the Oudh area although the notifications, orders, enactments, appellate orders and revisional orders were being issued from Lucknow even with regard to the districts outside the Oudh area. Therefore, it is not within our pleasure to hold that the Judges sitting at Lucknow can take cognizance even in the cases pertaining to those districts which are situated outside the Oudh area, ignoring the historical background stated above.
In the words of Cardozo ''the judge is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knighterrant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness.''
(See ''The Nature of the Judicial Process'' page 141, Idul Hasan v. Rajendra Kumar Jain AIR 1990 SC 678 page 681)
A great Jurist and distinguished Judge who retired as Chief Justice of Madhya Pradesh High Court, Justice G. P. Singh in his widely recognised book ''Principles of Statutory Interpretation'' has expressed his opinion that in interpreting and applying Statute, Judges have to keep in mind that the Statute is master and not servant of the judgment and that is how much emphasis was given in construing and giving effect to the intention of the legislature which is the basic principle of interpreta�tion and construction of Statute. The Statute is to be construed to make it effective and workable.
The legal term ''cause of action'' and the phrase ''cases arising out of should not be intermingled as both represent different meanings and operate in different areas. The (cause of action) which is commonly known as bundle of facts, gives a rise to the party concerned to take remedial steps whereas the (cases arising out of) attaches emphasis on the place from where the case originates.
However, as far as criminal case is concerned the maxim in this regard is, ''CRIME TRAHIT PERSONAM'' which means the crime carries the person and the commission of crime gives jurisdiction to the court of that place where the offence is committed.
(See (1990) 1 SCC 568 Kubic Daru Saz v. Union of India.)
Thus from the foregoing discussions, this Courtis of the con�sidered opinion that in view of the elementary rules of interpretation, historical background referred to above, the interpretations given by various High Courts and the apex Court of the pari materia expression referred to above, the expression ''shall sit at Lucknow in order to exercise in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh'' used in the first proviso to Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order means ''shall sit at Lucknow in order to exercise in respect of cases pertaining to Oudh area or the cases arising from the Oudh area''. Meaning thereby the Judges of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad shall sit at Lucknow to exercise jurisdiction of this Court in respect of the cases pertaining te 12 districts alone namely Lucknow, Faizabad, Sultanpur, Rae Bareli, Pratapgarh, Barabanki, Gonda, Bahraich, Sitapur, Kheri, Hardoi, and Unnao, as demarcated by Hon''ble the Chief Justice in exercise of powers conferred by the first proviso to Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order.
Accordingly in the instant case, petition pertaining to the sugaf factory located at Sultanpur which is admittedly within the Oudh area, can be entertained and decided by the LUCKNOW but the petition pertaining to the sugar factories located at other fize districts which are admittedly outside the Oudh area, no cognizance can be taken by the LUCKNOW, therefore, papers be transmitted to the main seat at Allahabad tor disposa.'' in accordance with law.
So far as the emphasis given by Sri Umesh Chandra on the conclusions arrived at by the apex Court in Nasiruddin''s case (supra) vide paras 36 to 38 is concerned, there is no dispute with the total conclusions arrived at therein. However, it may be made clear that as far as the theory of cause of action attracting jurisdiction of LUCKNOW even in the cases pertaining to those districts which are situated outside the Oudh area is concerned, Nasiruddin''s case (supra) is of no avail to the petitioners in view of the change in law with effect from 121977 (adding Explanation to Section 141 CPC) and in view of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in the recent pronouncements in Oil & Natural Gas Commission''s case (supra) and Navodaya Vidyalaya Samiti''s case (supra).
Similarly, other decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners i. e. in Om Prakash v. Divisional Superintendent Northern Railway (AIR 1970 All 440), M/s. Khunnoo Lal and Sons V, Union of India (AIR 1974 All 170), Salik Ram v. Ram Lakhan (AIR 1973 All 107), Santosh Kumar v. State of U.P.( 1994 LCD 12 (sic) at page 254)and Smt. Prabhavati Devi v. Board of Revenue (1994 ACJ 176) to the extent they are based on the theory of partial cause of action meaning thereby they uphold applicability of the provisions of CPC in the Writ proceedings for attracting jurisdiction of LUCKNOW in entertaining petitions pertain�ing to the districts which are situated outside Oudh area, have become otiose in view of the change in law with effect from 121977 (adding Explanation to Section 141 CPC) and in view of the dictum laid down by the apex Court in recent pronouncements in Oil & Natural Gas Commission''s case (supra) & Navodaya Vidyalaya Samiti''s case (supra).
We have also sent for the information about the total pendency at LUCKNOW and the Additional Registrar of LUCKNOW sent data of pendency stating that till 30th June 1994, to 2,46,292 (two lacs forty six thousand two hundred and ninety two) cases are pending at LUCKNOW. The exercise of jurisdiction by LUCKNOW is confined to 12 districts alone whereas that of the main seat at Allahabad pertains to 55 districts. Thus the pendency figure of LUCKNOW is many times more than that of the main seat at Allahabad.
In view of the premises aforesaid, the irresistible conclusion to Which this ) ourt arrived at is, that mere issuance of any order, direction, notification or enactment from Lucknow With regard to the distritct situated outside Oudh area, in exercise of sovereign powers of U. P. State, is not sufficient basis for attracting the exercise of jurisdiction by LUCKNOW, so far as writ petitions under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India pertaining to the districts situated outside Oudh area are concerned. Similarly, mere passing of any order or judgment, with regard to any lis originated in the districts situated outside Oudh area., by the revisional and appellate forums located at Lucknow and mere pendency or disposal of any representation by any authority located at Lucknow with regard to the lis originated in the districts situated outside Oudh area, are not sufficient basis for attracting the exercise of jurisdiction by LUCKNOW so far as writ petitions under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India pertaining to the districts situated outside Oudh area are concerned. The exercise of jurisdiction by LUCKNOW is confined to the lis pertaining to the 12 districts mentioned above.
Under the circumstances narrated above, this Court directs the Registrar of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and the Additional Registrar of the Court at LUCKNOW, to sort out writ petitions pend�ing at LUCKNOW pertaining to the districts outside the Oudh area (comprising 12 districts mentioned above), and transmit the same within a month from today to the main seat at Allahabad intimating the parties concerned about the same, so that they may take necessary steps to pursue their petitions at Allahabad.
The Additional Registrar of the Court at LUCKNOW is further directed to ensure that on the pattern of main seat at Allahabad in the LUCKNOW too, the writ petitions/cases and applications are presented first in the registry and only after due scrutiny and registration etc. the same be placed before the respective Benches by the registry.
This Court humbly requests Hon''ble the Chief Justice cf High Court of Judicature at Allahabad to take suitable steps for implementation of recently introduced rules at LUCKNOW also in the same manner as have been implemented at the main seat at Allahabad so as to maintain uniformity at both the places i. e. at the main seat at Allahabad and the Bench at Lucknow.
In the result, it is held that the writ petition on behalf of The Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. Sultanpur, is to be entertained and decided by the LUCKNOW while the writ petition in so far as it relates to The Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. Sathiaon, District Azamgarh, The Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. Rasra, District Ballia, The Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. satha, District Aligarh, The Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. Aurai, District Bhadohi and the Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. Jewar, District Bulandshahr, is to be transmitted to the main seat at Allahabad for disposal in accordance with law. The petitioners are given 10 days'' time to indicate their option as to whether they want to press the petition on behalf of the Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. Sultanpur or on behalf of the remaining Chini Mills. In case, they give their option for the writ petition being confined to The Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. Sultanpur, it shall be entertained and decided by the LUCKNOW. In case, they opt for the petition to be treated on behalf of the rest of the Chini Mills Ltd. in question, the writ petition shall be transmitted to the Allahabad for disposal in accordance with law,
With the above directions, preliminary point involved in this petition stands decided in the light of what has been stated above and the office is directed to proceed further in accordance with the directions (supra).
Per Hon''ble S. R. Singh
I have had the privilege and advantage of going through the erudite and scholarly judgment prepared by brother Lal, interspersed with exhaustive and indepth analysis of the question under consideration in the historical backdrop of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and of the Chief Court of Oudh at Lucknow. I am in respectful agreement with the conclusions deduced by brother Lal that the expression ''in respect of cases arising in such area in Oudh'' occurring in the first proviso to clause 14 of the U. P. High Court Amalgamation Order, 1948 (in short ''the order'') in the context it occursmeans "in respect of cases pertaining to such area in Oudh" and that the Judges of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad sitting at Lucknow may exercise jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in the High Court only in respect of cases, pertaining to any of the 12 districts, comprising the erstwhile area of Oudh as also with reasonings given by him in support of the conclusions aforestated. However, in view of paramount significance of the question under consideration, I would like to dovetail few words to lend further vitality to the above conclusions arrived at by brother Lal. 90 On a conjoint reading of clauses (1) (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, it becomes crystal clear that a High Court can exercise the power to issue direction, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercise jurisdiction notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. (See ''O. N. G. C. v. Utpal Kumar Basu and others JT 1994(5) SC 1). But by virtue of clause 14 of the order such power and jurisdiction vested in the court in respect of cases arising in the erstwhile territories of Oudh namely, the territories comprising the districts of Lucknow, Faizabad, Sultanpur, Rae Bareli. Pratapgarh, Barabanki, Gonda, Bahraich, Sitapur, Kheri, Hardoi and Unnao, can be exercised only by the Judges for the time being, sitting at Lucknow and not by those sitting at Allahabad. This appears to be the purport and import of the first proviso to clause 14 of the Order and there is no quarrel with this provision. The difficulty that arises, however, pertains to the purport, scope and ambit of the expression, ''in respect of cases arising in such area in Oudh'' occurring in the First proviso to clause 14 of the order. The word ''cases'' has been used in the First proviso in the sense of a legal proceeding submitted to the Court by a party in the forms required by law in which the judicial power of the court becomes capable of being exercised. In its true purport and import it has a meaning quite distinct from the expression ''cause of action'' which has a different connotation. The expression ''cause of action'' means that a bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove when traversed to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by a court. The expression ''cases arising'' has no such connotation. But in Nasir Uddin''s case (AIR 1976 SC 331), the Supreme Court has applied the theory of ''cause of action'' for the pur�poses of determining the jurisdiction of the LUCKNOW of the Court. The dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in Nasir Uddin''s case, how�ever, stands watered down in relation to the proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution in view of the legislative changes with effect from 121977 in Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure whereby the concept of''cause'' of action'' being the determining factor for the purposes of terri�torial jurisdiction of a court of law is no longer applicable to writ proceed�ing under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. It cannot be gainsaid that the law declared by the Supreme Court, is binding but if the very basis of the law so declared by the Supreme Court stands altered by means of any legislative enactment, the decision of the Supreme Court, in my opinion, ceases to be operative as a binding precedent.
In view of the above discussion, I concur with the order proposed to be passed by brother Lal.
(Ordered accordingly.")