In Re: Wahid

Subba Rao, J.—The Honorary Presidency Magistrates, convicted the first accused u/s 75 of the City Police Act and sentenced him to. pay

a fine of Rs. 25 or in default to one week''s rigorous imprisonment. In addition, the Court directed him to be bound over u/s 106 of the Criminal

Procedure Code.

The learned Counsel for the accused argued that the order u/s 106 of the Criminal Procedure Code was bad inasmuch as the provisions of

Section 511 Criminal Procedure Code, had not been complied with. u/s 511, Criminal Procedure Code, particular procedure has been prescribed

for proving the previous convictions, and that procedure admittedly has not been followed in this case. Dealing with Section 511, Criminal

Procedure Code, the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court in Emperor v. Sheikh Abdul ILR (1916) Cal. 1128 observed as follows:

With regard to the statement of the learned Magistrate as to the procedure adopted in the Police Court for the proof of previous convictions, we

may say at once that we cannot accept the learned Magistrate''s suggestion that Presidency Magistrates are absolved from the ordinary rules of

evidence in taking proof of such previous convictions. Whenever it is required to prove a previous, conviction against a man, whether it be for the

purpose of enhancement of punishment u/s 75, Indian Penal Code or in proceedings under Chapter VIII, Criminal Procedure Code, such previous

convictions must be proved strictly and in accordance with law. Unless they are so proved, no Court--whether it be that of a Presidency

Magistrate or not--can properly take such previous convictions into consideration against an accused person.

These are weighty observations and must be followed strictly whenever the question arose in regard to the proof of previous convictions. But in

this case a perusal of the judgment shows that the accused admitted that they had previous convictions. It is very likely that the accused did not

think of denying such convictions, as, if denied, they could have been easily proved.

The learned Counsel also relied upon a judgment of Horwill, J., in In Re: Arumuga Thevar, in support of his argument that in a case where the

accused is sentenced u/s 75 of the City Police Act he should not be also bound over u/s 106, Criminal Procedure Code. That judgment does not

support this argument. In that case except the solitary instance of disorderliness of which he was convicted there was no other material before the

Magistrate for binding over the accused u/s 106, Criminal Procedure Code. Further the order in this case was passed on 10th February, 1948,

and practically the period of one year is running out. In the circumstances, I think it is not a fit case for interference.

The revision is dismissed.