Inder Singh vs The State

Teja Singh, C.J.—Inder Singh who describes himself as Mohant Dera Jeondsar was arrested under the Orders of the Deputy Commissioner of Patiala on 5-4-1950 and was produced before him on the 7th when the Deputy Commissioner ordered him to be detained for a period of one month u/s 3 of the Preventive Detention Act. On the 4th May the Deputy Commissioner extended Inder Singh''s period of detention for an indefinite period. The present petition u/s 491, Criminal P.O., was made by Inder Singh on the 10th May.

The order of detention of the petitioner is challenged on various grounds. It is alleged by him that no grounds of detention were communicated to him till more than a month after he had been originally ordered to be detained, that the Deputy Commissioner who was the detaining authority was not satisfied of the necessity of detention in the words of Section 3. that the police on whose reports merely the Deputy Commissioner made the order of detention were actuated by malice and extraneous consideration and that the persons working behind the scene, who were responsible for persuading the police to take action against the petitioner were the prominent members of the Akall Party, whom the petitioner had serious differences and to counteraction whose activities in the Ilaqa the petitioner had always been busy. In support of his allegations the petitioner examined the Deputy Commissioner and also put himself in the witness box. The evidence of the Deputy Commissioner revealed that only day after the petitioner had been ordered to be detained in the Central Jail, Patiala a Police Officer approached the Deputy Commissioner with request that he be handed over to him because he was required for interrogation in connection with his subversive activities, the Deputy Commissioner accepted the request of the Police Officer and made over the petitioner to him. It was also proved that the petitioner remained in the Custody of the Police till 3rd May, when the Deputy Commissioner considered it necessary to Issue orders for his being brought back to the Jail. On these allegations, it was strenuously argued before me by Shri Jagan Nath, Counsel for the petitioner, that the object of the police in this case was not to prevent the petitioner from taking any part in subversive activities or activities that were prejudicial to public safety or order but they merely wanted him for interrogation in connection with the offence which they thought the petitioner had committed or in which he had taken part. It may, however, be pointed out that the detaining authority in this case being the Deputy Commissioner, the motives which actuated the police to make reports against the petitioner are not strictly speaking relevant unless it can be shown that the Deputy Commissioner was acting in collaboration with the police and he shared their object and motive. But this is not established. It is true that at the time the Deputy Commissioner made the order of detention the only material on the strength of which he claims to have been satisfied regarding the necessity of the petitioner''s detention consisted of the two reports by the Police but there is nothing before me to show that he had any indication that the police were not acting bona fide or that their object in reporting against the petitioner was other than to have a preventive action against him.

2a. The real point, however, which calls for determination in order to find out whether the detention order made by the Deputy Commissioner was legal is whether the requirements of Section 7 of the Act were complied with. The section lays down that:

when a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made, and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making representation against the order, in a case where such order has been made by the Central Government to that Government, and in a case where it has been made by a State Government or an officer subordinate thereto, to the State Government,

It has been held in a large number of cases and this fact is not denied by the learned Assistant to the Advocate-General who appeared for the State that the meaning of the words "as soon as may be", is that the grounds of detention should be communicated to the detenu within a reasonable time and if this is not done the detention must be regarded as illegal. The reason in my opinion is clear and it is that the law gives a detenu a valuable right to make a representation to the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, against his detention and unless the grounds of detention are communicated to him within a reasonable time his right to make the representation is really affected thereby. In Jamil Ahmad Vs. Emperor, which was a case under U.P. Maintenance of Public Order (Temporary) Act it was held that u/s 5 of the Act that was analogous to Section 7 of the Preventive Detention Act it was the duty of the officer concerned to inform the person detained of his right to make representation against the order and to afford him the earliest practicable opportunity of doing so, and that failure to do this amounted to violation of the mandatory provision of the law and the person detained was prejudiced thereby. In that case there was a delay of 32 days and the order of detention was set aside for this reason. This aspect of the matter was also discussed by me in the case ''INDER SINGH v. THE STATE'', Cri Misc. No. 209 of 2006) and I held that the provisions of law are mandatory and if they are not complied with the detention must necessarily be declared as illegal, in that case the grounds of detention were not communicated to the detenu for one month and 22 days and I held that the delay was inordinate and set aside the detention on this ground.

The detenu made a statement on oath that when he was produced before the Deputy Commissioner and was ordered to be detained no grounds of detention were communicated to him. According to him the grounds of detention were first communicated to him through the Jail authorities on 6th of May after his second order of detention had been made. These grounds as is clear from the statement of the Deputy Commissioner related only to the order of 4th May whereby the detenu''s period of detention was extended and had nothing to do whatsoever with his original order of detention. The Deputy Commissioner stated that he told the detenu verbally at the very time he ordered him to be detained why action was being taken against him. A few days later, i.e., on 23rd April 1950 he thought that it was necessary to afford the detenu another opportunity of making representation to the Government and accordingly he recorded a written order giving the grounds of detention and sent it to the jail for purposes of communication to the detenu. Since the detenu at that time was not in jail and had been taken away by the police that order could not be served upon him till the 18th of May. The opening words of this order are as follows:

On 7-4-1950 when you were arrested and produced before me I verbally intimated to you the reasons for your arrest and detention u/s 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. Once again to afford you an opportunity to give you a right to make a representation to the Government if you feel aggrieved against my order of arrest and detention for one month in the Central Jail, Patiala. Then follow reasons.

There can be no doubt that on the day the Deputy Commissioner recorded this order he was of the impression that the reasons of detention had been verbally communicated to the detenu on 7-4-1850 but In order to be sure whether this impression of the Deputy Commissioner was correct we must turn to the order of that date, i.e., 7-4-1950 which is fairly detailed. In the first paragraph of the order it is mentioned that the Deputy Commissioner examined the material placed before him by the police regarding Inder Singh''s activities. The second paragraph is to the effect that the detenu was interrogated by the Deputy Commissioner and his past history was gone into. The third paragraph records the conviction of the Deputy Commissioner that Inder Singh cannot be allowed to remain at large and his activities must be checked at once otherwise the public peace and maintenance of law and order shall be seriously Jeopardised. The penultimate paragraph relates to the order of detention. The following are the words of the last paragraph:

I have further intimated to him the result of his activities which obviously lead towards the disturbances of public peace and security of the Government and further that he has a right under law to make a representation to the Government, if he feels aggrieved against my order of arrest and detention.

Shri Chetan Dass argues that if the last paragraph be read with the other paragraphs of the order it will be clear that the Deputy Commissioner intimated to the detenu the reasons for life detention and this is what he meant by the words "the result of his activities: Shri Jagan Nath on the other hand urges, that the "result of his activities" was that the petitioner was detained and this is all that the Deputy Commissioner said to the petitioner at that time. On giving careful consideration to the matter I am of the opinion that Shri Jagan Nath''s contention must prevail because if the Deputy Commissioner had in fact communicated the reasons of arrest to the petitioner there was nothing to prevent him from mentioning this fact in so many words. After all the Deputy Commissioner is an experienced officer and if he had communicated these reasons to the petitioner he should have made a prominent mention of this fact in his order. He did not do this and 1 can not understand why he should have felt shy of using the exact words of Section 7. But my impression is that probably the Deputy Commissioner did not have the Detention Act before him and he did not realise that it was his duty to communicate the reasons of detention to the detenu and for this reason he merely told him that since; his activities were dangerous he was being detained The order dated 23rd April 1950 recorded by the Deputy Commissioner, no doubt, mentions the reasons of detention, but this, as I have already pointed out, was not communicated to the detenu till one month and 11 days later. I hold that this did not comply with the mandatory requirements of law and for his reason the detention must be held illegal.

I may also mention another fact in this connection. Even if I were to hold that the Deputy Commissioner did communicate the reasons of arrest to the detenu verbally on the very day he was arrested, the question is what those reasons were. Unfortunately the Deputy Commissioner''s evidence on this point is not helpful, because he does not tell us what exactly he told the detenu and there is no other material on the record from which it can be held that the verbal communication made by the Deputy Commissioner to the detenu or at that occasion gave the reasons that would be sufficient for purposes of law. It has been held in several cases that if the reason are vague and indefinite they do not serve the purpose and position Is the same as if no reasons are communicated at all. The burden to prove that the reason were of such a nature that it was possible for the detenu to base thereon his representation to the Government lies upon the State. In the present case as we do not know anything about the reasons at all. I am of the opinion that this is an additional reason why detention order cannot be upheld. The result is that the application is accepts and if is ordered that the petitioner be released forthwith.